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 Women’s	   Conventions,	   endorsing	   and	   approach	   based	   on	   the	   recognition	   of	  structural	   discriminatory	   social	   patterns	   and	   cultural	   practices,	   have	   been	  adopted	   in	   the	   Universal	   System,	   with	   limited	   national	   impact,	   and	   in	   the	  Regional	   ones.	   Such	   systems	   present	   different	   structures,	   conditions	   and	  resources,	  which	   contribute	   to	   determine	   the	   conditions	   for	  plausibility	  of	   the	  rights	  enshrined.	  	  	  The	   Inter-­‐American	   System	   adopted	   the	   Belém	   do	   Pará	   Convention	   (BdPC)	  back	   in	   1994,	   nevertheless,	   it	   largely	   failed	   to	   attract	   attention	   in	   legal	  scholarship,	   particularly	   in	   Western	   countries.	   We	   argue	   that,	   given	   its	   high	  degree	   of	   comparability	   with	   the	   European	   System,	   the	   analysis	   of	   such	  experience	   provides	   valuable	   informative	   material	   to	   shape	   a	   European	  response.	  	  	  Our	   first	   objective	   is,	   hence,	   to	   analyse	   the	   process	   of	   internalisation	   of	   the	  BdPC	   in	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   System.	   Analysing	   Inter-­‐American	   Institution’s	  case	  law	  on	  VAW	  since	  1994	  and	  the	  evolution	  of	  relevant	  national	  legislation	  in	   the	   region,	   we	   find	   evidence	   of	   the	   role	   of	   a	   coalition	   of	   civil	   society	  organisations	   and	   scholars’	   in	   compensating	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions’	   lack	  of	   previous	   experience	   with	   gendered	   analyses,	   enabling	   an	   incremental	  learning	  process	  and	  triggering	  BdPC	  full	   justiciability,	   initially	  unclear	  due	  to	  BdPC	   ambiguous	   wording.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   availability	   of	   authoritative	  precedents	   to	   hold	   before	   national	   governments	   in	   a	   relatively	   culturally	  homogeneous	   context	   enhanced	   national	   implementation	   of	   regionally	  constructed	  principles	  and	  standards,	  harmonised	  with	  those	  of	   the	  Universal	  System.	   The	   IACrtHR	   plays	   a	   crucial	   interpretive	   function,	   clarifying	   the	  implications	  of	  an	   inherently	   incomplete	   instrument	   in	  concrete	  cases.	  On	  the	  basis	   of	   the	   identification	   of	   early	   setbacks,	   we	   suggest	   a	   reform	   of	   the	  IACommHR	   filtering	   function,	   which	   should	   be	   limited	   to	   the	   evaluation	   of	  petitions’	   admissibility	  and	   to	   coordinate	   the	  availability	  of	   crucial	   contextual	  information.	   This	   function	   should	   be	   performed	   with	   the	   support	   of	   Inter-­‐American	   Commission	   of	  Women’s	   expertise.	   Such	   procedural	   reform	  would	  improve	   analyses	   of	   complex	   cases	   emerging	   from	   intersectionality	   and	  cultural	  diversity,	  still	  unsatisfactorily	  developed.	  	  Our	   second,	   and	   consequent,	   objective	   is	   to	   use	   our	   findings	   to	   identify	   a	  generalizable	  method	  to	  ensure	  women’s	  rights	  plausibility.	  We	  argue	  that	  both	  
	   XVIII 
ECrtHR’s	  case	   law	  and	  CoE	  Member	  States’	   legislations	  on	  VAW	  are	  still	  at	  an	  early	   stage.	   However,	   the	   Istanbul	   Convention	   does	   not	   grant	   the	   ECrtHR	  competence	   on	   the	   protection	   mechanism	   established.	   On	   the	   basis	   of	   our	  findings,	   we	   argue	   the	   need	   to	   reconsider	   ECrtHR	   role	   with	   respect	   to	   the	  Istanbul	   Convention	   and	   present	   a	   concrete	   proposal	   to	   guarantee	   the	  feasibility	   of	   its	   contentious	   jurisdiction,	   avoiding	   further	   clogging-­‐up,	  valorising	   the	   recently	   introduced	   Pilot	   Judgment	   Procedure	   and	   the	   specific	  expertise	  provided	  by	  GREVIO.	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General	  Introduction	  	  	  
Background	  and	  motivation	  	  
	  During	  my	  previous	  academic	  studies,	  I	  had	  to	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  while,	   for	   historical	   reasons,	   Latin	   American	   regional	   initiatives	   frequently	  drew	   on	   similar	   European	   consolidated	   experiences	   for	   inspiration	   and	  guidance,	   at	   times	   arguably	   resorting	   to	   actual	   “transplants,”1	  they	   generally	  failed	   to	   attract	  European	  attention	   as	   comparable	   external	   sources	  of	   useful	  information.	   Indeed,	   the	   generalised	   tendency	   is	   that	   of	   a	   unidirectional	  dialogue,	   or	  monologue	   (De	  Vergottini,	   2011),	   through	  which	   long	   successful	  European	  regional	  experiences	  are	  used	  as	  sources	  of	  authoritative	  solutions	  to	  similar	  problems	  in	  Latin	  America,	  whereas	  the	  European	  counterpart	   largely	  perceives	   itself	   as	  a	  path-­‐breaker.	  The	  context	  has	   recently	   changed	   for	  what	  concerns	  the	  interaction	  between	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  System	  of	  Human	  Rights,	  which	  counts	  on	  a	  long	  successful	  history	  in	  the	  Latin	  American	  region,	  and	  the	  European	   System	   of	   Human	   Rights,2	  increasingly	   interested	   in	   the	   doctrinal	  evolutions	   emerging	   from	   the	   activities	   of	   an	   homologous	   system	   with	  comparable	  legitimacy	  and	  auctoritas3	  (Garlicki,	  2012).	  	  	  Building	   on	   the	   evidence	   gathered	   in	   my	   previous	   research	   experiences	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Examples	   of	   political	   and	   economic	   integration	   are	   UNASUR	   and	   MERCOSUR,	   emerging	   from	  previous	   integration	   experiments	   in	   Latin	   America	   and	   inspired	   by	   the	   process	   that	   from	   the	  European	  Economic	  Community	   led	  to	  the	  European	  Union.	  The	  focus	  of	   this	  research,	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  System	  of	  Human	  Rights,	  established	  by	  the	  Organisation	  of	  American	  States	  in	  1969,	  is	  an	  example	  of	  regional	  integration	  in	  the	  field	  of	  human	  rights	  protection	  that,	  in	  its	  early	  phases,	  drew	  on	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  European	  Convention	  of	  Human	  Rights	  within	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe.	  	  2	  For	   an	   extensive	   study	   on	   the	   historical	   interaction	   between	   the	   two	   regional	   Human	   Rights	  Courts	  refer	  to:	  García	  Roca	  et	  al.	  2012.	  	  3	  Evidence	   of	   an	   emerging	   bi-­‐directional	   dialogue	   is,	   for	   instance,	   the	   adoption	   by	   the	   European	  Court	   of	   Human	   Rights	   of	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   doctrinal	   elaborations	   on	   the	   issue	   of	   the	  
desaparecidos,	  with	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Court	  recognising	  State’s	  responsibility	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  continuous	  nature	  of	  the	  violation	  to	  guarantee	  effective	  legal	  proceedings;	  see	  Massolo,	  2012.	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Latin	   America,4	  I	   embarked	   on	   my	   doctoral	   studies	   with	   the	   objective	   of	  contributing	  to	  provide	  bases	  for	  a	  stronger	  bi-­‐directional	  dialogue.	  Given	  the	  evolutionary	   jurisprudence	   produced	   by	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   Court	   of	   Homan	  Rights	  (IACrtHR)	  on	  cultural	  rights,	  in	  particular	  for	  what	  concerns	  indigenous	  communities,	  harmonising	  regional	  solutions	  with	  the	  international	  normative	  framework	  provided	  by,	  inter	  alia,	  Convention	  169	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  Indigenous	  and	   Tribal	   Peoples	   of	   the	   International	   Labour	   Organisation	   (ILO),	   I	   initially	  focused	   on	   the	   issue	   of	   legal	   and	   cultural	   pluralism	   in	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  System,	   as	   a	   potentially	   useful	   comparable	   experience	   to	   address	   new	  questions	   arising	   in	   the	   increasingly	  multi-­‐cultural	   European	   context.	   During	  this	   early	  phase,	   I	   recognised	   that	  my	   interdisciplinary	  academic	  background	  enabled	  me	  to	  count	  on	  suitable	  tools	  of	  analysis	  to	  appropriately	  understand	  the	   complexities	   arising	   from	   the	   socio-­‐legal	   approach	   endorsed	   by	   recent	  international	  human	  rights	  instruments,	  which	  overcomes	  the	  shortcomings	  of	  the	   positivist	   approach	   and	   the	   limits	   of	   the	   traditional	   understanding	   of	  universality	  and	  objectivity.	  	  While	  I	  began	  my	  studies,	  the	  European	  region	  was	  confronting	  the	  challenges	  emerging	   from	  the	  need	   to	  guarantee	  effectiveness	   to	   the	   rights	  enshrined	   in	  the	   1979	   United	   Nation	   Convention	   on	   the	   Eradication	   of	   Violence	   Against	  Women	  (CEDAW)	  and	  in	  CEDAW	  Committee’s	  1992	  General	  Recommendation	  19,	   recognising	   gender-­‐based	   violence5	  as	   a	   form	   of	   discrimination	   and	   a	  violation	   of	  women’s	   fundamental	   rights.	  While	   the	   issue	   of	   violence	   against	  women	   (VAW)	   gained	   momentum	   with	   the	   adoption	   of	   CEDAW	   Optional	  Protocol	   in	  2000,	  granting	  CEDAW	  Committee	   the	  competence	  to	  receive	  and	  consider	   petitions	   from	   individuals	   or	   groups	   from	  within	   the	   jurisdiction	   of	  ratifying	   States,	   and	   a	   plethora	   of	   recommendations,	   declarations,	   guidelines	  and	   awareness	   raising	   campaigns	   in	   the	   Universal	   System,	   European	   Union	  (EU)	  and	   in	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  (CoE),	   the	   latter	  was	  coming	  to	  terms	  with	  the	  need	  do	  adopt	  a	  specific	  convention	  on	  women’s	  rights	  to	  promote	  national	  implementation.	   The	   ECrtHR	   was	   developing	   its	   doctrine	   to	   harmonise	   its	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  The	   research	   for	   my	   Master’s	   final	   dissertation	   on	   the	   problems	   and	   perspectives	   of	   Latin	  American	   regional	   integration	   initiatives	   was	   developed	   during	   my	   stay	   at	   the	   National	  Autonomous	  University	  of	  Mexico	  (2007-­‐2008).	  5	  Although	   the	  wording	   gender-­‐based	   violence	   is	   currently,	   and	   correctly,	   starting	   to	   be	   used	   to	  refer	  to	  a	  violence	  emerging	  from	  a	  wider	  variety	  of	  sexual	   identities,	  we	  are	  going	  to	  use	   it	  as	  a	  synonym	   for	   violence	   against	   women,	   considering	   their	   interchangeable	   use	   in	   current	  international	  instruments	  on	  women’s	  rights,	  the	  objet	  of	  this	  research.	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decisions	  with	  the	  paradigm	  shift	  on	  the	   interpretation	  of	  VAW,	  however,	   the	  specific	   features	  of	   the	  Women	  Conventions	   required	   the	   actualisation	  of	   the	  traditional	   tools	  of	   analysis.	  The	  national	   inquiries	  of	  United	  National	   Special	  Rapporteurs	   on	   Violence	   Against	   Women	   signalled	   that	   social	   and	   cultural	  patterns,	   reproducing	  discrimination	   against	  women	   and	   creating	   conductive	  contexts	   for	   VAW,	  were	   not,	   in	   Sepper’s	  words,	   a	   problem	   exclusive	   to	   “less	  democratic	  of	  less-­‐developed	  countries”.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  while	  Western	  States	  had	   generally	   achieved	   legal	   equality,	   culture	   remained	   an	   obstacle	   to	  substantive	  equality6	  (Sepper,	  2008).	   In	  this	  sense,	  Article	  5(a)	  CEDAW	  posed	  the	   greater	   challenges,	   requiring	   States	   to	   modify	   the	   social	   and	   cultural	  patterns	   of	   conduct	   of	  men	   and	  women,	  which	   are	   based	   on,	   and	   reproduce,	  unequal	  relations	  of	  power	  between	  the	  sexes.	  	  	  My	   research	   interests,	   nationality	   and,	   certainly,	   my	   gender,	   created	   the	  conditions	  for	  an	  active	  participation	  in	  the	  debate	  in	  Italy	  on	  a	  legal	  response	  to	  VAW,7	  triggered	  by	  CEDAW	  Committee’s	  considerations	  on	  national	  periodic	  reports,	   that	   confronted	   Italy	   with	   the	   gravity	   of	   the	   phenomenon.	   The	  objective	  was	  preparing	  a	  draft	  legislative	  text	  that	  would	  reflect	  the	  normative	  framework	  provided	  by	  CEDAW	  and	  General	  Recommendation	  19,	  adopting	  a	  holistic	  approach	  to	  the	  problem.8	  The	  evolution	  of	  my	  research	  focus	  emerged	  naturally	  when,	   searching	   for	   comparative	  material	   to	   inform	  our	  activities,	   I	  realized	   that,	   to	   the	   overall	   absence	   in	   the	   CoE	   of	   examples	   of	   national	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  On	   the	   transition	   from	   the	   traditional,	   formal,	   understanding	   of	   equality	   to	   the	   concept	   of	  
substantive	  equality	  refer,	  amongst	  the	  many,	  to	  Roth,	  2002.	  7	  CEDAW	   Special	   Rapporteurs	   underlined	   the	  magnitude	   of	   the	   problem	   in	   Italy,	   signalling	   that	  fragmentation	   of	   the	   legal	   framework,	   inadequate	   punishments	   and	   lack	   of	   effective	   redress	   for	  women	  victims	  of	  VAW,	  contribute	  to	  the	  invisibility	  of	  the	  phenomenon	  and	  its	  consequences,	  and	  inadequately	   address	   its	   causes.	   For	   specific	   reference	   see	   the	   2011	   CEDAW	   Committee’s	  observations	   on	   Italy	   and	   the	   2012	  Report	   of	   the	   Special	   Rapporteur	   on	   VAW,	  who	   stated	   that:	  “Violence	   against	   women	   remains	   a	   significant	   problem	   in	   Italy.	   As	   the	   most	   pervasive	   form	   of	  
violence,	  domestic	  violence	  continues	  to	  affect	  women	  across	  the	  country.	  The	   increasing	  number	  of	  
victims	   of	   femicide	   by	   partners,	   spouses	   or	   former	   partners	   reflects	   the	   continuum	   in	   domestic	  
violence.	  Most	  manifestations	   of	   violence	   are	   underreported	   in	   the	   context	   of	   a	   patriarchal	   society	  
where	  domestic	  violence	   is	  not	  always	  perceived	  as	  a	  crime;	  where	  victims	  are	   largely	  economically	  
dependent	  on	  the	  perpetrators	  of	  violence;	  and	  perceptions	  persist	  that	  the	  state	  responses	  will	  not	  be	  
appropriate	  or	  helpful”	  (Manjoo,	  2012,	  p.	  17).	  8	  This	   participatory	   process	   resulted	   in	   the	   presentation	   of	   the	   Draft	   Law	   3390	   Norme	   per	   la	  
promozione	   della	   soggettività	   femminile	   e	   per	   il	   contrasto	   al	   femminicidio	   (Norms	   to	   promote	  women’s	  subjectivity	  and	  contrast	  feminicide),	  presented	  by	  Sen.	  Serafini	  to	  the	  Senate	  at	  the	  end	  of	   2012,	   under	  Monti	   presidency,	   currently	   waiting	   to	   be	   re-­‐submitted	   for	   consideration	   to	   the	  parliament	  elected	  in	  2013.	  A	  more	  limited	  Decree	  Law,	  mainly	  focused	  on	  punitive	  measures,	  has	  been	  presented	   to	   the	  Chamber	  of	  Deputies	   in	  August	  2013.	   Its	   conversion	   into	   law	   is	   currently	  pending,	  and	  should	  be	  finalized	  by	  the	  end	  of	  October	  2013.	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legislations	  reflecting	  the	  paradigm	  shift	  on	  VAW,9	  corresponded	  a	  completely	  different	   context	   in	   the	   Latin	   American	   region,	  where	   recently	   adopted	   laws	  generally	  presented	  the	  features	  required	  by	  the	  new	  understanding	  on	  VAW10.	  Struck	   by	   the	   sharp	   difference,	   I	   immediately	   realized	   that	   I	   had	   run	   over	   a	  perfect	  case	  to	  conclusively	  pursue	  the	  objective	  of	  my	  doctoral	  studies.	  	  	  As	   opposed	   to	   the	   CoE,	   as	   early	   as	   in	   1994,	   its	   American	   counterpart,	   the	  Organisation	   of	   American	   States	   (OAS),	   had	   adopted	   a	   specific	   regional	  convention	   on	   VAW,	   just	   a	   couple	   of	   years	   after	   the	   path-­‐breaking	   General	  Recommendation	   19:	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   Convention	   on	   the	   Prevention,	  Punishment	  and	  Eradication	  of	  Violence	  against	  Women	  (Convention	  of	  Belém	  do	  Pará,	  from	  now	  on	  BdPC).	  Not	  only	  this	  instrument	  reflected	  and	  actualised	  the	   normative	   framework	   provided	   by	   CEDAW,	   including	   its	   transformative	  Article	   5(a)	   (Article	   8,	   BdPC),	   but	   it	   also	   provided	   for	   a	   stronger	   protection	  mechanism,	   granting	   the	   competence	   to	   receive	   and	   consider	   individual	  petitions	   to	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   Commission	   and	   the	   Court	   (respectively,	  IACommHR	   and	   IACrtHR),	   several	   years	   before	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	   Optional	  Protocol	  to	  CEDAW.	  	  	  Considering	   that	   both	   Inter-­‐American	   and	   CoE	   Member	   States	   had	   ratified	  CEDAW,	   most	   of	   them	   in	   the	   years	   after	   its	   adoption	   in	   1979,	   my	   direct	  intuition	  was	  that	  the	  BdPC	  was	  probably	  the	  cause	  of	  such	  different	  outcomes	  in	  the	  two	  regional	  systems.	  Indeed,	  there	  is	  a	  wide	  consensus	  in	  the	  literature	  on	   the	   limited	   influence	   exercised	   by	   CEDAW	   on	   guaranteeing	   States’	  compliance	   (Evatt,	   2002;	   Merry,	   2003,	   2006).	   Refocusing	   my	   research	   I	  realized	  that,	  for	  what	  concerned	  legal	  literature,	  there	  was	  an	  impressive	  lack	  of	   systematic	   studies	   on	   the	   evolution	   and	   features	   of	   the	   process	   through	  which	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  System	  had	  adapted.	  	  Through	  an	  extensive	   review	  of	   the	  English,	  Spanish,	  Portuguese,	  French	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  There	  are	  only	  two	  exceptions	  amongst	  the	  47	  Council	  of	  Europe	  Member	  States,	  Spain,	  with	  Law	  1/2004	  Against	  gender-­‐based	  violence,	  and	  Sweden,	  with	  the	  1998	  Government	  Bill	  for	  the	  Violence	  Against	  Women	  Act.	  For	  extensive	  analysis	  of	   the	   content	  of	  national	   legislations	  on	  VAW	   in	   the	  Council	   of	   Europe,	   refer	   to	   the	   studies	   of	   the	   Gender	   Equality	   and	   Anti-­‐Trafficking	   Division	  (currently	  Gender	  Equality	  Division):	  Hagemann-­‐White	  and	  Bohn,	  2007;	  Hagemann-­‐White,	  2008;	  Hagemann-­‐White,	  2010.	  	  10	  Some	  preliminary	  considerations	  on	  Latin	  American	  legislations	  on	  VAW	  have	  been	  published	  in	  Galanti,	  Borzacchiello,	  2013.	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Italian	   human	   rights	   literature,	   I	   could	   find:	   brief	   articles	   on	   the	   IACrtHR’s	  doctrinal	   elaborations	   in	   cases	   of	   VAW	   (Arango	   and	   Henao,	   2011);	   studies	  focused	  broadly	  on	  the	  principles	  of	  equality	  and	  non-­‐discrimination	  of	  women	  in	   Inter-­‐American	   jurisprudence	   (Dulitzky,	   2007;	   Osuna,	   2008;	   Friedman,	  2009;	   Valencias	   2011)	   and	   its	   influence	   on	   regional	   domestic	   systems	  (Heranandez-­‐Truyol,	   2001;	   Oré-­‐Aguilar,	   1998;	   Badilla	   and	   Torres	   García,	  2004);	   accounts	  of	   the	  antecedents	  and	  drafting	  process	  of	   the	  BdPC	   (Meyer,	  1999);	  case	  studies	  on	  national	  implementation	  and	  impact	  of	  Inter-­‐American	  standards	   on	   VAW,	   e.g.	   prevention	   and	   eradication	   of	   femicide	   in	   Guatemala	  (Trujillo,	   2009),	   Brazil	   (Macaulay,	   2000),	   Mexico	   (Acosta	   López,	   2012;	  Calzolaio,	   2012);	   critiques	   focused	   on	   specific	   features	   of	   the	   new	   regional	  normative	   framework	   on	   women’s	   rights,	   e.	   e.	   persistent	   male-­‐bias	   (Arroyo	  Vargas,	   2011),	   or	   more	   general	   studies	   on	   the	   jurisprudential	   evolutions	   of	  Inter-­‐American	   standards	   of	   protection	   (Burgorgue-­‐Larsen,	   2008;	  Schönsteiner,	   2011;	   Stubbs,	   1999;	   	   Rescia	   and	   Seitles,	   2000).	   Several	   studies	  focused	  on	  how,	  in	  general.	  Treaty	  ratification	  influences	  structural	  changes	  to	  adapt	   to	   new	   emerging	   understandings	   (Meyer	   et	   al.	   1997;	   Bradley	   and	  Ramirez,	   1996;	   Frank	   et	   al.	   2000;	   Hualde	   and	   Ramirez,	   2001;	   Meyer	   et	   al.	  2010),	  on	   the	  role	  of	  national	  and	   	   international	   institutions,	  and	  other	  social	  institutions,	   in	   guaranteeing	  national	   compliance	   (Suarez	   and	  Ramirez,	   2007,	  Koo	  and	  Ramirez,	  2009),	  or	  on	  the	  synergic	  interaction	  between	  international	  instruments	   and	   institutions	   in	   adapting	   existing	   principles	   to	   the	   specific	  needs	   of	   the	   protection	   of	   women’s	   rights	   and	   eradication	   of	   VAW,	   creating	  gender-­‐specific	   standards	   and	   procedures	   (Stadelman,	   2006,	   Bernard,	   1996,	  Jacobs	  et	  al.	  2000).	  The	  overall	  tendency	  of	  the	  literature	  was	  to	  underline	  the	  contemporary	  contributions	  of	  the	  frameworks	  set	  by	  CEDAW	  and	  the	  BdPC	  in	  shaping	  the	  international	  response	  for	  women’s	  rights	  protection,	  while	  some	  studies	  focused	  on	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  universal	  system	  in	  guaranteeing	  the	  effectiveness	   of	   the	   elaborated	   specific	   standards	   (Holtmaat,	   2006,	   Merry,	  2003,	  Shin,	  2004;	  Goodale	  and	  Merry,	  2007).	  There	  seemed	  to	  be	  virtually	  no	  systematic	   study	   focusing	   on	   the	   process	   of	   internalisation	   of	   the	   new	  paradigm	  set	  by	  the	  BdPC	  in	  Inter-­‐American	  Institutions	  activities,	  besides	  the	  emphasis	  on	   their	   reception	  and	   further	  elaboration	  of	   the	  new	  international	  standards	  and	  principles	  on	  the	  subject.	  Notable	  exceptions	  were	   two	  studies	  authored	  by	  Zuloaga,	  where	  from	  a	  feminist	  perspective,	  the	  author	  addressed	  some	  controversial	  issue	  in	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  experience	  with	  the	  BdPC,	  with	  a	  particular	   focus	  on	   the	   “early	  neglect”	   of	   the	   instrument	  by	   Inter-­‐American	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Institutions	  (Zuloaga,	  2004,	  2008).	  	  	  At	  the	  time	  of	  my	  background	  research,	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  System	  counted	  on	  a	  rather	  developed	  regional	  case	  law	  on	  VAW,	  which	  was	  producing	  pioneering	  doctrinal	   developments	   on	   women’s	   rights,	   while	   there	   also	   seemed	   to	   be	   a	  generalised	  tendency	  of	  national	  legislations	  on	  VAW	  to	  converge	  on	  common	  principle	   and	   standards	   on	   VAW.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   limited	   impact	   of	  CEDAW	  in	  guaranteeing	  effectiveness	  to	  women’s	  rights	  and	  promote	  national	  implementation	   had	   been	   long	   criticized	   (e.g.	   Charlesworth	   et	   al.	   in	   1991;	  Chinkin,	   1995;	   Byrnes	   and	   Connors,	   1996;	   Holtmaat,	   2004,	   Byrnes	   and	  Freeman,	   2012),	   CEDAW	   Committee’s	   case	   law	   under	   the	   Optional	   Protocol	  was	  still	  at	  an	  early	  stage,11	  and	  the	  initial	  enthusiasm	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	   new	   protection	   mechanism	   had	   been	   disappointed	   by	   its	   overall	  underutilization	  (Connors,	  2010).	  	  At	   this	   point	   it	   was	   clear	   to	  me	   that,	   to	   provide	   a	   valuable	   contribution	   and	  fulfil	  my	  objectives,	  my	   research	   focus	  had	   to	  be	   a	   systematic	   analysis	   of	   the	  Inter-­‐American	  experience	  with	  the	  BdPC,	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  the	  conditions	  
for	   plausibility12 	  of	   the	   paradigm	   shift	   on	   VAW	   enshrined	   in	   the	   Women	  Conventions	  and	  single	  out	  the	  structural,	  institutional	  and	  procedural	  features	  that	  a	  human	  rights	  system	  needed	  to	  guarantee	  their	  effectiveness	  at	  regional	  and	  national	  level.	  In	  other	  words,	  there	  was	  a	  need	  to	  evaluate	  the	  processes	  through	  which	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   System	   regionalised	   the	   shifted	   paradigm,	  its	   features,	   successes	   and	   setbacks.	   Therefore,	   I	   would	   not	   focus	   on	   the	  general	   state	   of	   women’s	   rights	   in	   the	   region,	   but	   rather	   assess	   the	  appropriateness	   of	   this	   regional	   system	   for	   pursuing	   the	   structural	   change	  required	  by	  the	  BdPC	  to	  reach	  its	  overall	  objectives.	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  this	  research	  provides	  a	  double	  contribution	  to	  the	  international	  debate	  on	  women’s	  rights:	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  providing	  a	  systematic	  evaluation	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  By	   2010,	   CEDAW	   Committee	   had	   only	   decided	   on	   six	   cases	   of	   VAW,	   involving	   four	   countries	  (Austria,	   Hungary,	   United	   Kingdom	   and	   Philippines).	   The	   number	   doubled	   in	   the	   following	   two	  years,	   with	   five	   additional	   cases	   decided	   in	   the	   period	   2011-­‐2012,	   involving	   three	   countries	  (Belarus,	  Bulgaria	  and	  Canada).	  12	  In	   focusing	   on	   the	   conditions	   for	  plausibility	   of	  women’s	   rights,	  we	   followed	   the	   suggestion	   of	  Prof.	  Madsen,	   in	   the	   introduction	   to	  Madsen,	  Verschraegen	  (ed),	  2013.	   In	   the	  spring	  of	  2012,	   the	  author	   of	   this	   research,	  was	   allowed	   the	   opportunity	   to	   conduct	   part	   of	   her	   research	   at	   iCourts,	  Centre	  of	  Excellence	  for	  International	  Courts	  of	  the	  University	  of	  Copenhagen,	  co-­‐directed	  by	  Prof.	  Madsen.	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of	  the	  dynamic	  process	  through	  which	  the	  BdPC	  has	  influenced	  a	  reshaping	  of	  the	   Inter-­‐American	   System,	   it	   allows	   to	   identify	   its	   crucial	   elements	   and	  suggest	  directions	  for	  improvement;	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  processes	  that	  will	  emerge	  with	  the	  entry	  into	  force	  of	  the	  2011	  Council	  of	  Europe	  Convention	  on	  preventing	   and	   combating	   violence	   against	   women	   and	   domestic	   violence	  (Istanbul	   Convention),	   could	   count	   on	   that	   systematic	   evaluation	   of	   a	  consolidated	   experience	   in	   a	   comparable	   system,	   to	   avoid	   repetition	   of	  experienced	  errors	  and	  setbacks.	  	  	  
Overview	  of	  contents	  	  	  The	  First	  Section	  of	  this	  research	  is	  composed	  of	  two	  parts.	  In	  the	  first	  part	  we	  briefly	   recall	   the	   historical	   evolution	   of	   the	   international	   instruments	   on	  women’s	   rights	   in	   the	   second	   half	   of	   the	   past	   century,	   describing	   the	  development	   through	   stages	   that	   led	   to	   the	   paradigm	   shift	   endorsed	   by	  Women’s	   Conventions.	   Considering	   its	   legacy	  with	   the	   international	   feminist	  movement,	   to	   explain	   its	   origins	   and	   implications	   and	   set	   our	   research	  framework,	  we	  present	  a	  comparative	  analysis	  of	  CEDAW,	  BdPC	  and	   Istanbul	  Convention	   (i.e.	   the	   Women’s	   Conventions)	   using	   the	   conceptual	   tools	  elaborated	   by	   feminist	   legal	   scholars,	   in	   particular	   for	   what	   concerns	   the	  critique	   of	   human	   rights	   norms	   neutrality,	   the	   challenge	   to	   the	   traditional	  public/private	  divide	  of	  international	  law	  and	  the	  concept	  of	  intersectionality.	  A	   special	   attention	   is	   dedicated	   to	   the	   evolution	   of	   the	   understanding	   of	  gender-­‐based	   violence	   as	   originating	   in	   discrimination	   and	   reproducing	  unequal	   power	   relations	   between	   the	   sexes.	   The	   second	   part	   thoroughly	  describes	  our	  approach	  and	  research	  methodology.	  First	  of	  all,	  we	  identify	  the	  minimum	  preconditions	   that,	   building	   on	   our	   previous	   conclusions,	   a	   human	  rights	   system	   should	   present	   in	   order	   to	   coherently	   pursue	   the	   scope	   of	   the	  Women’s	   Conventions,	   i.e.	   those	   features	   that	   suit	   the	   basic	   requirements	  emerged	   from	   the	   debate	   on	   women’s	   rights,	   and	   make	   their	   effectiveness	  plausible.	  In	  analysing	  their	  dimensions,	  we	  argue	  that	  the	  availability	  of	  such	  preconditions	  allows	  to	  draw	  some	  preliminary	  conclusions	  for	  what	  concerns	  the	   expectations	   to	   place	   on	   such	   instruments,	   regardless	   of	   the	   system	   in	  which	   they	   are	   adopted	   being	   universal	   or	   regional.	   We	   next	   focus	   on	   the	  additional	  favourable	  conditions	  that	  regional	  systems	  provide,	  with	  particular	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reference	  to	  their	  multi-­‐level	  structure	  and	  to	  the	  specificities	  of	  the	  socio-­‐legal	  approach	  reflected	  in	  the	  Women’s	  Conventions.	  	  	  Building	   on	   our	   considerations,	   in	   the	   second	   part	   of	   this	   Section	   we	   draw	  some	   conclusions	   on	   the	   structural	   causes	   of	   CEDAW	   limited	   impact	   in	  guaranteeing	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  rights	  enshrined,	  and	  address	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  relative	  underutilization	  of	  the	  new	  protection	  mechanism	  provided	  by	  its	  Optional	   Protocol.	  We	   then	   continue	   presenting	   the	   primary	   objective	   of	   our	  analysis	   and	   our	   consequent	   secondary	   objective.	   The	   primary	   objective	   has	  two	   dimensions:	   a)	   analyse	   the	   dynamic	   process	   through	   which	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  System	  consolidated	  its	  experience	  with	  the	  BdPC,	  in	  order	  to	  assess	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  minimum	  preconditions	  previously	  determined	  influenced	  it	  and	   identify	   other	   specific	   elements	   that	   might	   had	   a	   positive	   or	   negative	  impact	   on	   the	   process,	   and	   b)	   use	   our	   findings	   to	   propose	   future	  improvements.	  The	  ultimate	  scope	  is	  to	  determine	  whether	  our	  analysis	  allows	  us	  to	  identify	  the	  features	  of	  a	  successful	  method	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  challenges	  of	   the	   paradigm	   shift	   endorsed	   by	   the	  Women’s	   Conventions.	   Our	   secondary	  objective,	   which	   will	   be	   more	   extensively	   addressed	   in	   our	   future	  developments	   of	   this	   research,	   is	   to	   assess	   whether	   such	   method	   can	   be	  generalised	  to	  another	  regional	  system,	  providing	  useful	   informative	  material	  to	  shape	  appropriate	  preconditions	  of	  plausibility	  for	  the	  Istanbul	  Convention	  in	   the	  Council	   of	   Europe.	   In	   the	   last	   sub-­‐section	  we	  describe	   the	   structure	  of	  this	   research,	   based	   on	   Inter-­‐American	   case	   law	   on	   VAW	   and	   on	   Latin	  American	   countries’	   national	   legislations	   on	   VAW,	   and	   present	   the	  methodology	  used	  for	  the	  analysis.	  	  The	  Second	  Section	  starts	  with	  a	  brief	  overview	  of	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  System	  structure.	  We	   then	  present	  a	   thorough	  descriptive	  analysis	  of	   Inter-­‐American	  case	  law	  on	  VAW	  and	  of	  the	  content	  of	  national	  legislations	  on	  VAW	  since	  the	  adoption	   of	   the	   BdPC	   in	   1994.	   We	   decided	   to	   put	   this	   Section	   before	   our	  analytical	   study,	   however,	   it	   is	   up	   to	   the	   reader	   to	   decide	   whether	   to	   go	  through	   it	   “chronologically,”	   or	   rather	   use	   it	   as	   reference	   while	   reading	   the	  following	  Section.	  	  	  In	  the	  Third	  Section	  we	  develop	  our	  analysis	  of	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  experience	  with	  the	  BdPC,	  using	  the	  conceptual	  tools	  presented	  in	  the	  First	  Section	  and	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  approach	  and	  methodology	  described	  in	  the	  Second	  Section	  of	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this	   research.	   We	   begin	   focusing	   on	   the	   type	   of	   enforcement	   mechanism	  provided	   by	   the	   BdPC,	   and	   analyse	   the	   issues	   concerning	   the	   contentious	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  IACrtHR,	  which	  had	  to	  be	  officially	  clarified	  by	  the	  Court	   in	  2006	  due	  to	  an	  arguably	  technical	  obstacle.	  We	  then	  continue	  with	  an	  analysis	  of	   the	   reviewed	   case	   law	   focusing	   on	   the	   process	   through	   which	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions	   gradually	   internalised	   a	   gender	   perspective	   in	   their	  interpretation	   of	   VAW,	   the	   complexities	   emerging	   from	   intersectionality	   and	  the	   overcoming	   of	   the	   traditional	   public/private	   divide	   in	   international	   law,	  which	  had	  long	  prevented	  States	  from	  acknowledging	  their	  positive	  obligations	  in	   eradicating	   VAW.	   In	   the	   third	   sub-­‐section	   we	   analyse	   the	   evolution	   of	  national	   legislations	   on	   VAW,	   considering	   both	   the	   hierarchical	   status	   of	  international	   instruments	   of	   human	   rights	   in	   domestic	   legal	   systems	   and	   the	  contemporary	   evolution	   of	   regional	   jurisprudence	   on	   VAW	   previously	  analysed.	   We	   identify	   a	   first	   and	   second	   generation	   of	   legislations,	   with	  distinctive	  features,	  and	  we	  recognise	  a	  clear	  turning	  point	  in	  IACrtHR’s	  2006	  first	   ruling	   on	   a	   petition	   invoking	   the	   BdPC	   (Castro-­‐Castro	   case).	   Although	   a	  direct	   causal	   link	   can	  be	  difficult	   to	   establish	   conclusively,	   for	  what	   concerns	  VAW	  we	   are	   able	   to	   provide	   significant	   evidence	   of	   a	   direct	   influence	   of	   the	  Inter-­‐American	   System	   structure	   and	   suitable	   preconditions	   on	   national	  implementation	   of	   the	   relevant	   BdPC	   provisions.	   Favourable	   rules	   of	  procedure	  of	   Inter-­‐American	  Institutions,	  allowed	  the	  contribution	  of	  a	  multi-­‐level	   coalition	   of	   civil	   society	   actors	   and	   organisations,	   that	   facilitated	   the	  adoption	  of	  a	  gender	  perspective	  that	  such	  institutions	  had	  not	  yet	  internalised	  in	   their	   long	   experience	   in	   the	   region,	   directly	   influencing	   the	   process	   of	  internalisation	  of	   the	  new	  paradigm	   in	   their	  understanding	  of	   gender-­‐related	  violations	  and	  even	  providing	  the	  IACrtHR	  with	  a	  favourable	  occasion	  to	  clarify	  its	   contentious	   jurisdiction	   on	   the	   BdPC.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   this	   interaction	  triggered	   a	  mutual	   alimentation	   process	   that,	   providing	   regional	   actors	   with	  authoritative	   precedents,	   created	   favourable	   conditions	   to	   enhance	   the	  likelihood	   of	   a	   regional	   convergence	   of	   national	   legislations	   on	   VAW.	   In	   this	  perspective,	   the	   IACrtHR	   represents	   a	   crucial	   engine	   to	   fill	   the	   inherent	  incompleteness	  of	  a	  convention	  with	  the	  specificities	  of	  the	  BdPC,	  given	  that	  its	  full	   meaning	   can	   only	   determined	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   contextual	   and	   subjective	  concrete	  conditions.	  	  The	   final	   Fourth	   Section	   is	   dedicated	   to	   an	   extensive	   discussion	   on	   the	  conclusions	  we	  can	  draw	   from	  our	   findings.	  On	   the	  basis	  of	  our	   research,	  we	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describe	   the	   crucial	   features	   of	   the	  method	  developed	  by	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  System	   to	   respond	   to	   the	   challenges	   of	   the	   paradigm	   shift	   endorsed	   by	   the	  BdPC,	  and	  propose	  some	  guidelines	   to	  use	   the	   favourable	  elements	   identified	  to	  further	  improve	  the	  process	  and	  overcome	  some	  persisting	  shortcomings.	  In	  particular,	   we	   suggest	   a	   reform	   of	   the	   IACommHR’s	   role	   in	   the	   protection	  mechanism,	   removing	   its	   filtering	   function	   of	   the	   cases	   to	   be	   referred	   to	   the	  IACrtHR,	   and	   extending	   and	   better	   organizing	   its	   Rapporteurships.	   This	   role	  better	  suits	  the	  currently	  mature	  regional	  context	  and	  provides	  the	  means	  for	  responding	   to	   the	   increased	   need	   for	   contextual	   and	   thematic	   analyses,	  required	   to	   guarantee	   consistency	   in	   decisions	   and	   coherence	   with	   an	  increasingly	  complex	  socio-­‐legal	  approach	  to	  human	  rights.	  In	  this	  perspective,	  we	   dedicated	   the	   last	   part	   of	   this	   section	   to	   present	   our	   proposal	   for	   an	  analytical	   method	   that	   consistently,	   and	   conclusively,	   holds	   together	   the	  challenges	   emerging	   from	   clashes	   of	   fundamental	   rights.	   Such	   clashes	   arise	  from	   intersectionality	   and	   cultural	   diversity,	   characterizing	   current	  multicultural	   societies,	   and	   represent	   a	   difficult	   problem	   to	   solve	   coherently	  when	   abiding	   to	   the	   paradigm	   shift	   endorsed	   by	   Women’s	   Conventions,	   in	  particular	   for	  what	   concerns	   the	   effectiveness	   of	  what	   established	   by	   Article	  5(a)	  CEDAW	  and	  8	  BdPC.	  To	  develop	  and	  justify	  our	  proposal	  we	  use	  the	  facts	  of	  a	  case	  decided	  by	   the	   IACommHR	   in	  2001,	  Ana,	  Beatriz,	  and	  Celia	  González	  
Pérez	  v	  Mexico,	  providing	  an	  explanatory	  example	  of	  how	  our	  proposed	  method	  can	  be	  concretely	  used	  to	  achieve	  a	  coherent	  solution.	  	  	  In	  the	  second	  part	  of	  this	  last	  Section	  we	  follow	  up	  to	  our	  secondary	  objective,	  developing	   a	   brief	   a	   priori	   assessment	   of	   the	   perspectives	   of	   the	   Istanbul	  Convention	  (not	  yet	  come	  into	   force)	   in	   the	  European	  System,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  high	  degree	  of	  similarity	  between	  the	  two	  regional	  systems.	  We	  describe	  a	  workable	   outline	   for	   our	   future	   research	   focus,	   in	  which	  we	  will	   evaluate	   to	  what	   extent	   the	   conclusions	   drawn	   from	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   experience	   are	  “exportable,”	  whether	  and	  how	  they	  can	  be	  adapted	  to	  a	  different	  context,	  and	  we	  single	  out	  specific	  preconditions	  of	  the	  European	  System	  that	  might	  provide	  further	   tools	   to	   enhance	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   the	   recent	   Istanbul	   Convention.	  For	   the	   limited	   scope	   of	   this	   final	   task,	   based	   on	   CoE	   analytical	   studies	   on	  Member	   States’	   national	   legislations	   on	   VAW,	   we	   provide	   evidence	   of	   the	  overall	   shortcomings	   of	   the	   European	   context	   compared	   to	   Inter-­‐American	  context.	   We	   then	   turn	   to	   a	   brief	   analysis	   of	   how,	   in	   absence	   of	   a	   specific	  convention	   in	   the	   CoE,	   the	   ECrtHR	   addressed	   cases	   of	   domestic	   violence,	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highlighting	  the	  tools	  of	  interpretations	  used	  and	  the	  frequent	  reference	  to	  the	  Women’s	   Conventions.	   Through	   our	   analysis	   we	   recognise	   that	   the	   ECrtHR	  rarely	   refers	   to	   discrimination	   when	   analysing	   the	   facts,	   while	   it	   usually	  recognised	   breaches	   to	   the	   Right	   to	   a	   private	   life	   (Article	   8	   ECHR),	   and	   an	  extensive	   use	   of	   the	   doctrine	   of	   the	   margin	   of	   appreciation.	   Drawing	   some	  preliminary	   conclusions,	   we	   argue	   that	   both	   ECrtHR’s	   case	   law	   and	   CoE	  Member	  States	   legislations	  on	  VAW	  appear	   to	  be	  still	   at	  an	  early	   stage	   in	   the	  process	   of	   internalisation	   of	   the	   international	   paradigm	   shift	   on	   VAW,	  compared	  to	  the	  Latin	  American	  region.	  Based	  on	  the	  findings	  of	  our	  research	  on	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   experience	  with	   the	   BdPC,	  which	   provide	   evidence	   of	  the	   crucial	   element	   constituted	   by	   IACrtHR’s	   contentious	   jurisdiction	   on	   the	  instrument,	   we	   focus	   on	   one	   significant	   element	   of	   difference	   between	   the	  BdPC	   and	   the	   Istanbul	   Convention,	   that,	   in	   our	   view	  might	   imply	   the	   latter’s	  limited	  prospective	  influence	  in	  the	  region,	  i.e.	  its	  lack	  of	  a	  strong	  enforcement	  mechanism	  and,	  in	  particular,	  the	  missed	  opportunity	  to	  grant	  the	  ECrtHR	  the	  competence	   on	   the	   new	   instrument.	   Given	   the	   high	   degree	   of	   comparability	  between	  the	  two	  systems,	  and	  in	  the	  light	  of	  our	  previous	  considerations	  with	  respect	   to	   ECrtHR’s	   case	   law	   and	   overall	   unsatisfactory	   development	   of	  national	   legislations	   on	   VAW,	   we	   develop	   our	   arguments	   on	   the	   need	   to	  reconsider	   ECrtHR’s	   role	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   Istanbul	   Convention.	  We	   argue	  that	   the	   likely	   negative	   impact	   on	   national	   implementation	   of	   its	   exclusion	  from	   the	   protection	   mechanism	   and	   the	   unacceptable	   consequences	   with	  respect	   to	   the	   implicit	   marginalization	   of	   the	   long	   marginalized	   women’s	  rights,	  do	  not	  allow	  to	  justify	  such	  choice	  on	  the	  need	  to	  encourage	  ratifications	  (which	   are,	   anyway,	   coming	   at	   a	   very	   slow	   pace).	   After	   presenting	   the	  substantial	   reasons,	   implied	   in	   the	   jus	   cogens	   nature	   of	   the	   principles	   of	  equality	   and	   non-­‐discrimination,	   based	   on	  which	   the	   choice	   not	   to	   grant	   the	  ECrtHR	  with	  the	  contentious	  jurisdiction	  on	  the	  instrument	  is	  to	  be	  considered	  as	  contravening	  to	  the	  emerged	  international	  consensus	  on	  women’s	  rights,	  we	  adopt	  a	  problem-­‐solving	  approach	  to	  suggest	  a	  solution	  that	  holds	  together	  the	  need	   to	   avoid	   Court’s	   overload	   and	   to	   guarantee	   Istanbul	   Convention’s	   full	  justiciability.	  One	  of	  the	  features	  of	  our	  proposal	  is	  to	  turn	  the	  Group	  of	  Experts	  on	  VAW	   (GREVIO),	   currently	   the	   only	  body	   established	  by	   the	  Convention	   to	  monitor	  States’	   compliance,	   into	  an	   intermediate	  body	  with	  specific	   (needed)	  expertise,	  considering	  and	  informing	  the	  cases	  before	  they	  are	  submitted	  to	  the	  Court.	  In	  this	  way,	  GREVIO	  would	  be	  able	  to	  reject	  ill-­‐founded	  cases	  before	  they	  reach	   the	   Court	   and	   facilitate	   its	   work	   once	   a	   case	   is	   submitted	   to	   its	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consideration.	  We	   then	   provide	   additional	   reasons	   to	   argue	   the	   feasibility	   of	  ECrtHR’s	  competence	  on	  the	  Istanbul	  Convention	  explaining,	  for	  instance,	  how	  the	   recently	   introduced	   pilot-­‐judgement	   procedure,	   specifically	   designed	   to	  address	   systemic	   dysfunction	   generating	   related	   cases,	   could	   be	   successfully	  pre-­‐organized	  by	  GREVIO	  in	  cases	  of	  VAW.	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Section	   I	   -­‐	   The	   path	   to	   the	  
paradigm	   shift	   on	   women’s	  
rights	  	  	  
Introduction:	   A	   brief	   review	   of	   the	   historical	  
evolution	  of	  women’s	  rights	  international	  protection	  	  	  
	  
“A	  revolution	  has	  taken	  place	  in	  the	  last	  decade.	  Women’s	  rights	  have	  been	  
catapulted	  onto	  the	  agenda	  with	  a	  speed	  and	  determination	  that	  has	  rarely	  been	  
matched	  in	  international	  law...	  women’s	  rights	  discourse	  [had]	  a	  special	  
trajectory,	  facilitating	  its	  emergence	  as	  a	  major	  innovation	  of	  human	  rights	  
policy	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  international	  law;	  a	  process	  of	  ‘international	  
norm	  creation’	  “	  (Coomaswamy,	  1997)13	  	  	  The	  historical	  evolution	  of	  the	  international	  protection	  of	  women’s	  rights	  (or,	  if	  preferred,	   human	   rights	   of	   women),	   particularly	   for	   what	   concerns	   the	  understanding	   of	   the	   issue	   of	   violence	   against	   women,	   constitutes	   an	  informative	  example	  of	   the	  dynamic	  potential	  of	   international	   instruments	  of	  human	  rights	  protection.	  	  	  In	   this	   Section	   we	   present	   a	   chronological	   review	   of	   the	   evolution	   of	  international	  instruments	  of	  protection	  of	  women’s	  rights	  and	  the	  incremental	  process	  leading	  to	  recognise	  VAW	  as	  a	  human	  rights	  violation,	  which	  manifests	  discriminatory	  social	  structures	  nullifying	  women’s	  substantive	  equality.	  	  
	  Cook	  presents	  the	  process	  of	  protection	  and	  promotion	  of	  women’s	  legal	  rights	  in	   international	   law	   as	   a	   progress	   through	   stages	   (Cook,	   1995).	   The	   first,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  United	  Nations	  Special	  Rapporteur	  on	  Violence	  Against	  Women	  in	  the	  period	  1994-­‐2003.	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focused	  on	  specific	  rights	  and	  specialized	  conventions,	  such	  as	  the	  Employment	  of	  Women	  During	  the	  Night	  Convention	  (1919);	   in	   the	  second,	  discrimination	  on	   grounds	   of	   sex	   was	   prohibited,	   e.g.	   the	   1948	   Universal	   Declaration	   of	  Human	   Rights,	   in	   regional	   instruments	   and	   constitutions;	   the	   third	   phase	  addresses	   the	   structural	   nature	   of	   violation	   of	   women’s	   rights,	   starting	   with	  CEDAW	   in	   1979.	   The	   related	   evolving	   jurisprudence	   extended	   the	   original	  vision	  addressing	  chronologically	  four	  generations	  of	  rights:	  political	  and	  civil;	  economic,	   social	  and	  cultural;	  group	  rights	   (indigenous);	  women’s	   rights,	   and	  challenging	  the	  public/private	  boundary	  (Coomaswamy,	  1997).	  
	  Article	   2	   of	   the	   1979	   Convention	   on	   the	   Elimination	   of	   All	   Forms	   of	  Discrimination	   Against	   Women	   (CEDAW)	   explicitly	   referred	   to	   the	   need	   to	  address	   the	   public	   as	   well	   the	   private	   sphere:	   “State	   Parties	   condemn	  
discrimination	  against	  women	  in	  all	  its	  forms,	  agree	  to	  pursue	  by	  all	  appropriate	  
means	  and	  without	  delay	  a	  policy	  of	  eliminating	  discrimination	  against	  women	  
and	  to	  this	  end,	  undertake	  –	  among	  others	  –	  to	  take	  all	  appropriate	  measures	  to	  
eliminate	   discrimination	   against	   women	   by	   any	   person,	   organisation	   or	  
enterprise”.	   Although	   CEDAW	   obtained	   a	   success	   in	   terms	   of	   ratifications,	   a	  high	  number	  of	  signatories	  expressed	  reservations,	  which	  included	  substantial	  provisions	   and	   outnumbered	   the	   reservations	   expressed	   for	   any	   other	  international	   human	   rights	   treaty14	  (Cook,	   1990).	   The	   nature	   of	   the	   problem	  led	  CEDAW	  Committee	  to	  issue	  General	  Recommendation	  4	  in	  1987,	  to	  prompt	  signatories	  to	  withdraw	  their	  reservations.	  	  The	  discussion	  about	   enforcement	  mechanisms	   included	   the	   consideration	  of	  the	   possibility	   of	   individual	   complaints.	  However,	   the	   final	   text	   adopted	   only	  provided	   for	  a	  monitoring	  procedure,	   led	  by	   the	  CEDAW	  Committee	   (Ilic	   and	  Corti,	  1997).	  	  The	  issue	  of	  VAW,	  not	  included	  in	  CEDAW,	  was	  explicitly	  addressed	  a	  few	  years	  later.	   The	   1984	  Resolution	   1984/14	   of	   the	  U.N.	   Economic	   and	   Social	   Council	  and	  the	  1985	  Resolution	  40/36	  of	   the	  U.N.	  General	  Assembly,	   invite	  States	   to	  prevent	   and	   respond	   to	   cases	   of	   domestic	   violence.	   The	   issue	   was	   then	  addressed	  by	  the	  CEDAW	  Committee	  with	  1989	  General	  Recommendation	  12,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  As	  we	  will	   see	   further	  on	   in	   this	   research,	   some	  of	   these	  reservations	  have	  been	  expressed	  on	  substantial	   provisions,	   such	   as	  Article	  5.a,	   and	   their	   abidance	   to	  what	   established	  by	   the	  Vienna	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  Treaties	  (VCLT)	  is	  controversial.	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that	  required	  States	  to	  submit	  period	  reports	  specifically	  on	  VAW.	  In	  1990,	  the	  UN	  General	  Assembly	  passed	  Resolution	  45/114,	  addressing	  the	  public	  and,	  if	  necessary,	   criminal	   response	   to	   domestic	   violence	   and	   the	   1992	   CEDAW	  Committee	  General	  Recommendation	  19	  marked	  a	   shift	   in	   the	  understanding	  of	  the	  nature	  and	  the	  impact	  of	  VAW	  (Vojdik,	  2007),	  defining	  it	  as	  violence	  that	  is	   directed	   against	   a	   woman	   because	   she	   is	   a	   woman	   or	   that	   affects	   women	  disproportionately,	   explicitly	   referring	   to	   gender-­‐based	   violence,	   in	   all	   forms	  (Art.	   1),	   as	   a	   violation	   of	   the	   principle	   of	   gender	   equality	   and	   CEDAW,	   and	  requiring	  CEDAW	  signatories	  to	  take	  positive	  measures	  to	  eliminate	  all	   forms	  of	  violence	  against	  women.	  	  The	   direct	   follow	   up	   to	   this	   new	   understanding	   was	   the	   preparation	   of	   a	  Manual	   for	   Practitioners	   by	   the	   Canadian	  Department	   of	   Justice,	   the	  Helsinki	  Institute	   for	   Crime	   Prevention	   and	   Control	   and	   the	   Crime	   Prevention	   and	  criminal	  Justice	  Branch	  of	  the	  UN	  Secretariat	  in	  1993.	  	  The	  Manual	   stressed	   the	   importance	   of	   cooperation	   and	   the	   integration	   of	   a	  criminal	  justice	  approach	  with	  other	  measures	  and	  public	  policies.	  The	  Manual	  highlighted	   two	   crucial	   features	   of	   VAW,	   referring	   to	   its	   nature	   of	   hidden	  phenomenon	  since	  “communities	  deny	  the	  problem,	  fearing	  that	  admission	  of	  its	  
existence	   is	   an	   assault	   on	   the	   integrity	   of	   the	   family.	   Few	   official	   statistics	   are	  
kept.	  (…)	  Victims	  are	  often	  reluctant	  to	  report	  abuse	  because	  they	  feel	  ashamed	  
of	  being	  assaulted	  by	  their	  husbands;	  they	  may	  be	  afraid;	  they	  may	  have	  a	  sense	  
of	  family	  loyalty”,	  and	  tackling	  its	  structural	  nature15	  and	  implicit	  acceptability	  (Yilo	  and	  Bogard,	  1988),	  “Violence	  in	  the	  home	  has	  its	  origins	  in	  an	  entire	  social	  
context.	   Wife	   battery	   is	   a	   reflection	   of	   the	   broad	   structures	   of	   sexual	   and	  
economic	   inequality	   in	   society.	   Studies	   show	   that	   rather	   than	   representing	   an	  
aberration,	   violence	   in	   the	   home	   is	   widely	   accepted	   and	   tolerated.	   It	   is	   an	  
extension	  of	  the	  role	  society	  expects	  men	  to	  play	  in	  their	  domestic	  sphere.	  In	  this	  
analysis,	  the	  abuse	  of	  women	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  display	  of	  men	  power,	  the	  outcome	  
of	   social	   relations	   in	  which	  women	  are	  kept	   in	  a	  position	  of	   inferiority	   to	  men”	  (Manual	  for	  Practitioners,	  Introduction).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Previous	   tendencies	   focused	   on	   theories	   of	   causation	  more	   centred	   on	   the	   individual,	   linking	  violence	   against	  women	   and	   domestic	   violence	   to	   personal	   characteristics	   of	   the	   perpetrator	   or	  victims’	  actions	  (Smith,	  1989).	  For	  general	  reference	  on	  these	  theories	  of	  causation	  refer,	  inter	  alia,	  to:	  Holtzworth-­‐Munroe	  et	  al.	  1997;	  Rosenbaum,	  Hoge,	  1989;	  Magdol	  et	  al.	  1997;	  Cicchetti	  ,Tucker,	  1994.	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  1993	   is	   also	   the	   year	   of	   the	   establishment	   by	   the	  UN	   Security	   Council	   of	   the	  International	  Tribunal	  for	  prosecution	  of	  offences	  committed	  in	  the	  territory	  of	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia.	  The	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  Tribunal	  included	  rape	  and	  acts	  of	   sexual	   violence	   against	  women,	   and	   spelled	   out	   that	   systematic	   rape	  may	  constitute	  a	  crime	  against	  humanity.	  	  	  The	   1994	   UNGA	   Declaration	   on	   the	   Elimination	   of	   Violence	   Against	   Women	  interpreted	   VAW	   as	   “a	   manifestation	   of	   historically	   unequal	   power	   relations	  
between	   men	   and	   women"	   (Preamble,	   para.	   6),	   contributing	   to	   reproducing	  women’s	  subjugation.	  Explicitly	  referring	  to	  VAW	  as	  a	  human	  rights	  violation,	  the	  Declaration	  indicated	  the	  due	  diligence	  principle	  as	  the	  applicable	  standard	  for	   the	  prevention	  and	  protection	   (Article	  4.c),	   requiring	  States	   to	  abide	   to	   it	  whether	  those	  acts	  were	  perpetrated	  by	  the	  State	  or	  by	  private	  persons.	  	  
	  In	  1994,	  the	  United	  Nations	  Commission	  on	  Human	  Rights	  appointed	  a	  Special	  Rapporteur	   on	   violence	   against	   women,	   who,	   in	   her	   Preliminary	   Report,	  referred	   to	   the	   issue	   as	   one	   of	   most	   pervasive	   of	   human	   rights	   violations,	  denying	  women	  equality,	  security,	  dignity,	  and	  the	  right	  to	  enjoy	  fundamental	  freedoms,	   requiring	   States’	   participation	   in	   eradicating	   the	   problem.	   She	  stressed	  the	  historically	  unequal	  power	  relations	  among	  men	  and	  women,	  the	  social	   acceptance	   of	   using	   sexuality	   to	   control	   women,	   cultural	   ideology	   and	  government	  inaction.	  	  
	  In	  the	  same	  year,	  the	  General	  Assembly	  of	  the	  Organisation	  of	  American	  States	  adopted	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   Convention	   on	   the	   Prevention,	   Punishment	   and	  Eradication	   of	   Violence	   Against	   Women	   (Belém	   do	   Pará	   Convention,	   BdPC),	  which	   set	   out	   States’	   duties	   relating	   to	   the	   eradication	   of	   gender-­‐based	  violence.	  The	  BdPC	  was	  drafted	  by	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Commission	  on	  Women,	  an	   intergovernmental	   institution	  established	   in	  1928	   to	  ensure	  women’s	  civil	  and	  political	   rights	   that,	   since	   its	   inception,	  had	  been	   the	   leading	  body	   in	   the	  regional	   evolution	   of	   women’s	   rights	   instruments.16	  The	   BdPC	   adopted	   the	  concept	  of	  violence	  against	  women	  as	  an	  issue	  of	  gender	  equality.	  Its	  Preamble	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  The	   Inter-­‐American	  Commission	  of	  Women	  was	   the	  promoter	  of	   the	   first	  regional	   instruments	  on	   women’s	   rights:	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   Conventions	   on	   the	   Nationality	   of	  Women	   (Montevideo,	  Uruguay	   1933),	   the	   Granting	   of	   Political	   Rights	   to	   Women	   (Bogotá,	   Colombia	   1948),	   and	   the	  Granting	  of	  Civil	  Rights	  to	  Women	  (Bogotá,	  Colombia	  1948).	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states	   that	   violence	   against	   women	   is	   "a	   manifestation	   of	   the	   historically	  
unequal	  power	  relations	  between	  women	  and	  men”	  (Preamble,	  para.	  3).	  VAW	  is	  defined	   broadly,	   including	   physical,	   sexual	   and	   psychological	   violence.	   At	  Article	   3	   the	   Convention	   establishes	   the	   need	   to	   guarantee	   to	  women	   "to	   be	  
free	   from	   violence	   in	   both	   the	   public	   and	   private	   spheres",	   requiring	   States	   to	  take	  affirmative	  steps	  to	  prevent	  and	  eradicate	  VAW.	  States	  must	  "pursue,	  by	  all	  
appropriate	  means	  and	  without	  delay,	  policies	   to	  prevent,	  punish	  and	  eradicate	  
such	  violence”	  (Article	  7).	  Specifically,	   it	  requires	  States	  "to	  apply	  due	  diligence	  
to	  prevent,	  investigate	  and	  impose	  penalties	  for	  violence	  against	  women"	  (Article	  7.b).	  	  In	   1995,	   the	   Beijing	   Fourth	   World	   Conference	   on	   Women	   included	   VAW	  	  amongst	   the	   priority	   areas	   for	   action	   to	   achieve	   gender	   equality	   “Violence	  
against	   women	   is	   an	   obstacle	   to	   the	   achievement	   of	   the	   objectives	   of	   equality,	  
development	   and	   peace.	   Violence	   against	   women	   both	   violates	   and	   impairs	   or	  
nullifies	   the	   enjoyment	   by	   women	   of	   their	   human	   rights	   and	   fundamental	  
freedoms.	   The	   long-­‐standing	   failure	   to	   protect	   and	   promote	   those	   rights	   and	  
freedoms	  in	  the	  case	  of	  violence	  women	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  concern	  to	  all	  States	  and	  
should	  be	  addressed”	  (Final	  Declaration,	  Section	  D,	  para.	  112).	  	  	  In	   2000	   the	   Human	   Rights	   Committee	   General	   Comment	   28	   on	   Equality	   of	  Rights	   Between	   Men	   and	   Women	   interpreted	   Article	   3	   of	   the	   International	  Covenant	   on	   Civil	   and	   Political	   Rights17	  as	   requiring	   proactive	   conduct	   by	  States,	   to	   ensure	   to	   men	   and	   women	   equally	   the	   enjoyment	   of	   all	   rights	  provided	  for	  in	  the	  Covenant	  in	  both	  the	  public	  and	  the	  private	  sectors	  and,	  in	  order	   to	  assess	  compliance	  with	  Articles	  7	   (Right	   to	  Humane	  Treatment)	  and	  24	   (Rights	   of	   the	   Child)	   of	   the	   Covenant,	   requested	   States	   parties	   to	   provide	  information	  on	  national	  laws	  and	  practices	  with	  regard	  to	  domestic	  and	  other	  types	  of	  violence	  against	  women.18	  	  In	   the	   same	   year,	   with	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	   Optional	   Protocol,	   came	   to	  conclusion	   the	   long	   debate	   on	   the	   need	   to	   provide	   CEDAW	   with	   a	   more	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Article	  3	  ICCPR:	  The	  States	  Parties	  to	  the	  present	  Covenant	  undertake	  to	  ensure	  the	  equal	  right	  of	  
men	  and	  women	  to	  the	  enjoyment	  of	  all	  civil	  and	  political	  rights	  set	  forth	  in	  the	  present	  Covenant.	  18	  This	  Comment	  explicitly	  refers	  to	  domestic	  violence	  as	  a	  breach	  to	  the	  right	  to	  humane	  treatment	  (Article	   7	   ICCPR).	   Several	   Concluding	  Observations	   of	   the	   Committee	   stress	   this	   view,	   see,	   inter	  
alia:	  those	  directed	  to:	  Russian	  Federation,	  2010	  (para.	  10)	  and	  Denmark,	  2008	  (para.	  8).	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effective	  enforcement	  mechanism,	  started	  in	  1991.	  Notably,	  this	  further	  treaty	  prohibited	  reservations.	  	  In	  2003,	  a	  Protocol	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  Women	  was	  added	  to	  the	  African	  Charter	  on	   Human	   and	   People’s	   Rights	   (Banjul	   Charter),	   including	   new	   structural	   or	  economic	  forms	  of	  violence	  against	  women,	  such	  as	  unequal	  rights	  in	  marriage,	  polygamy,	   negative	  media	   campaigns,	   and	   traditional	   and	   religious	   practices	  which	  treat	  women	  as	  second-­‐class	  citizens.	  19	  	  In	  2005	  the	  Committee	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights	  issued	  General	  Comment	  no.	  16	  on	  the	  Equal	  Right	  of	  Men	  and	  Women	  to	  the	  Enjoyment	  of	  All	  Economic,	   Social	   and	   Cultural	   Rights,	   stating	   that	   gender-­‐based	   violence	   is	   a	  form	   of	   discrimination	   that	   inhibits	   the	   ability	   to	   enjoy	   rights	   and	   freedoms,	  including	  economic,	   social	  and	  cultural	   rights,	  on	  a	  basis	  of	  equality,	  and	   that	  States	  Party	  must	  take	  appropriate	  measures	  to	  eliminate	  violence	  against	  men	  and	  women	  and	  act	  with	  due	  diligence	  to	  prevent,	  investigate,	  mediate,	  punish	  and	  redress	  acts	  of	  violence	  against	  them	  by	  private	  actors,	  as	  well	  as	  provide	  victims	   of	   domestic	   violence,	   primarily	   women,	   with	   access	   to	   safe	   housing,	  remedies	  and	  redress	  for	  physical,	  mental	  and	  emotional	  damage.	  	  	  In	  her	  2006	  Third	  Report,	   the	  Special	  Rapporteur	  on	  violence	  against	  women	  Yakin	   Ertürk	   argued	   that	   there	   is	   a	   rule	   of	   customary	   international	   law	   that	  “obliges	   States	   to	   prevent	   and	   respond	   to	   acts	   of	   violence	   against	  women	  with	  
due	   diligence”	   (para.	   29).	  Addressing	   the	   problem	   of	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   the	  principle	   in	   eradicating	   the	   causes	   of	   gender-­‐based	   violence,	   she	   emphasised	  the	  lack	  of	  effort	  in	  prevention.	  	  	  In	   2008	   the	   Council	   of	   the	   European	   Union	   adopted	   the	   EU	   guidelines	   on	  violence	   against	   women	   and	   girls	   and	   combating	   all	   forms	   of	   discrimination	  against	   them,	   and	   in	   2010,	   the	   Special	   Rapporteur	   on	   VAW	   Rashida	   Manjoo	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  The	  African	  Charter	  on	  Human	  and	  Peoples'	  Rights	  was	  established	  in	  1981	  by	  the	  Organisation	  of	  African	  Unity	  (now	  African	  Union)	  and	  came	  into	  force	  in	  1986.	  To	  date,	  53	  States	  of	  the	  African	  Union	  have	  ratified	  the	  Charter.	  This	  regional	  human	  rights	  protection	  mechanism,	  mirrors	  those	  of	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   and	   European	   system.	   The	   African	   Commission	   on	   Human	   and	   Peoples’	  Rights	  monitors	   States’	   compliance	  with	   the	   Charter.	   The	   1998	   Protocol	   establishing	   an	   African	  Court	   on	   Human	   and	   Peoples’	   Rights	   came	   into	   force	   in	   2005,	   and	   the	   Court	   admitted	   the	   first	  application	  in	  2008.	  Although	  this	  regional	  system	  will	  not	  be	  further	  analysed	  in	  this	  research,	  it	  is	  in	  our	  research	  development	  plans	  to	  thoroughly	  address	  this	  case.	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considered	   that	   the	  obligation	   to	  provide	  adequate	  reparations	   to	   the	  victims	  involves	   ensuring	   the	   rights	   of	   women	   to	   access	   to	   both	   criminal	   and	   civil	  remedies	   and	   the	   establishment	   of	   effective	   protection,	   support	   and	  rehabilitation	  services	  for	  survivors	  of	  violence.20	  	  	  Finally,	   in	  2011	  the	  Committee	  of	  Ministers	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe,	  adopted	  the	   Convention	   on	   Preventing	   and	   Combating	   Violence	   against	   Women	   and	  Domestic	  Violence	  (Istanbul	  Convention),	  currently	  open	  for	  ratifications.	  	  The	  current	  approach	  to	  women’s	  rights	  emerged	  in	  a	  process	  through	  which	  several	  features	  of	  the	  traditional	  approach	  in	  international	  human	  rights	  law	  were	   challenged,	   on	   the	  basis	  of	   their	   shortcomings	   in	  promoting	   substantial	  equality	  and	  non-­‐discrimination	  between	  men	  and	  women.	  The	  new	  paradigm	  internalised	   the	   view	   that	  women’s	  human	   rights	   cannot	  be	   ensured	  without	  generating	  a	  process	  of	  social	  transformation,	  embedding	  them	  in	  societies	  and	  creating	  the	  conditions	  for	  their	  effectiveness.	  CEDAW,	  BdPC	  and	  the	  Istanbul	  convention	  reflect	  an	  understanding	  that	  emerged	  primarily	  from	  the	  need	  to	  respond	   to	   the	   critiques	   coming	   from	   feminist	   legal	   scholarship	   and	   feminist	  movements.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  This	  position	  reflects	  the	  evolved	  international	  consensus,	   in	  the	  framework	  of	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  international	   instruments,	   such	   as:	   CEDAW	   General	   Recommendation	   28	   and	   19;	   UNGA	  Declaration	  on	  the	  Elimination	  of	  Violence	  Against	  Women	  (Article	  4.g);	  Beijing	  Platform	  for	  Action	  (para.	  125);	  2006	  Report	  of	  CEDAW	  Special	  Rapporteur	  on	  VAW	  (see	  Ertürk,	  2006,	  para.	  83);	  the	  Inter-­‐American	   Convention	   on	   the	   Prevention,	   Punishment	   and	   Eradication	   of	   Violence	   Against	  Women	  (Article	  7.f	  and	  7.g);	  the	  Additional	  Protocol	  to	  the	  African	  Charter	  on	  Human	  and	  People’s	  Rights	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  Women	  (Article	  4.2.f);	  EU	  guidelines	  on	  violence	  against	  women	  and	  girls	  (para.	   3.2.7.1);	   Council	   of	   Europe	   Convention	   on	   Preventing	   and	   Combating	   Violence	   against	  Women	  and	  Domestic	  Violence,	  (Articles	  20	  and	  23).	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Literature	  review	  	  	  The	   main	   feature	   of	   the	   Women’s	   Conventions	   is	   their	   emphasis	   on	   social	  transformation,	   considered	   crucial	   to	   guarantee	   the	   achievement	   of	   that	  substantive	  equality	  and	  non-­‐discrimination	  that	  the	  traditional	  approach	  has	  not	   satisfactorily	   ensured.	  We	   argue	   that	   their	   legacy	  with	   critical	   (feminist)	  legal	   scholarship	   and	   the	   feminist	   movements21	  suggests	   to	   adopt	   the	   same	  perspective	   to	   identify	   the	   minimum	   conditions	   that	   the	   systems	   in	   which	  they’ve	  been	  adopted	  should	  present	  to	  make	  their	  effectiveness	  plausible.	  	  In	  order	  to	  define	  the	  framework	  of	  our	  research	  and	  elaborate	  on	  the	  adopted	  approach,	   it	   is	   crucial	   to	   trace	   the	   origins	   and	   implications	   of	   the	   current	  paradigm,	   focusing	   on	   the	   contributions	   provided	   by	   critical	   (feminist)	   legal	  scholarship.	   Admittedly,	   this	   is	   a	   selective	   choice,	   but	   we	   can	   argue	   our	  reasons.	   In	   the	   early	   phase	   of	   this	   research,	   when	   reviewing	   the	   available	  literature	  on	  women’s	   rights	   in	   international	  human	  rights	   law,	  we	  could	  not	  but	   notice	   that	   that	   the	   main	   efforts	   were	   directed	   to	   arguing,	   proving	   and	  justifying	  the	  criticisms	  raised	  towards	  the	  traditional	  approach	  to	  equality	  and	  non-­‐discrimination.	   Indeed,	   the	   current	   international	   consensus	   on	   the	   new	  paradigm	  is	  a	  fairly	  recent	  novelty	  and,	  as	  we	  will	  see,	  there	  is	  still	  reluctance	  in	   completely	   internalising	   it,	   beyond	   the	   plethora	   of	   declarations,	  recommendations	  and	  awareness	  raising	  campaigns.	  22	  	  With	  our	  study	  we	  wish	  to	  overcome	  the	  “legitimacy	  building”	  phase,	  we	  do	  not	  aim	   to	  ground	  or	   justify	   the	  paradigm	  shift	  of	   the	  conventions,	  which	  we	  can	  now	  consider	  uncontroversial,	  but	  to	  contribute	  guaranteeing	  its	  conditions	  for	  
plausibility.	   In	   other	   words,	   we	   wish	   to	   move	   from	   arguing	   its	   legitimacy	   to	  using	  it	  to	  determine	  which	  features	  human	  rights	  systems	  need	  to	  present	  in	  order	   for	   their	   efforts	   to	   be	   conclusive.	   To	   do	   so,	   we	   will	   elaborate	   on	   the	  conceptual	   tools	   provided	   by	   critical	   (feminist)	   legal	   scholarship,	   to	   identify	  favourable	  conditions	  to	  make	  the	  new	  understanding	  feasible	  in	  the	  practice.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  For	  studies	  focused	  on	  the	  influence	  of	  feminist	  legal	  scholarship	  and	  feminist	  movements	  on	  the	  process	  that	  led	  to	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  Women’s	  Conventions	  refer	  to:	  True,	  Mintrom,	  2001;	  Bunch,	  1990;	  Kelly,	  2005;	  Merry,	  2006.	  22	  As	   we	   will	   see	   in	   the	   Fourth	   Section	   of	   this	   research,	   the	   ECrtHR	   has	   not	   been	   granted	  contentious	   jurisdiction,	  or	  other	  competences,	  on	   the	   Istanbul	  Convention.	  States’	   compliance	   is	  monitored	  by	  a	  specific	  body,	  GREVIO.	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Paraphrasing	  Garlicki,	   the	  systems	   in	  which	  Women’s	  Conventions	  have	  been	  adopted	   have	   different	   structures	   and	   operate	   in	   different	   conditions,	   with	  different	  resources,	  which	  contribute	  to	  determine	  the	  possibility	  to	  reach	  the	  objectives	  set	   in	  the	  conventions	  (Garlicki,	  2012).	  For	  this	  reason,	  we	  decided	  to	   develop	   our	   literature	   review	   of	   critical	   (feminist)	   legal	   scholarship	  combining	   it	  with	  a	  comparative	  presentation	  of	   the	  most	  significant	   features	  of	   the	  Women’s	   Conventions,	   underlining	   how	   they	   responded	   to	   the	   raised	  “categories	   of	   challenge”	   (Chinkin,	   Charlesworth,	   2000)	   and	   signalling	   their	  implications	   for	   what	   concerns	   preconditions	   for	   the	   current	   paradigm	  effectiveness.	  	  	  	  
Questioning	  objectivity	  and	  neutrality	  	  Arguably,	  the	  major	  contribution	  of	  feminist	  legal	  critique	  to	  the	  advancement	  of	  women’s	  rights,	  in	  international	  human	  rights	  law,	  has	  been	  the	  challenge	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  objectivity	  (Charlesworth,	  1999)	  and	  the	  introduction	  of	  gender	  as	  a	  category	   of	   analysis.	   While	   the	   emphasis	   on	   objectivity	   grounded	   the	  legitimacy	   of	   human	   rights	   law	   in	   the	   early	   phases,	   and	   several	   authors	  stressed	   its	   centrality	   (Simma,	   Paulus,	   1999;	   Dunoff,	   Trachtman,	   1999),	  feminist	  scholars	  were	  sceptical	  about	  the	  assumed	  neutrality	  and	  impartiality	  of	   a	   system	   that	   did	   not	   include	   women’s	   voices	   (Charlesworth	   et	   al.	   1991;	  Koskemmeini,	   1995).	   Their	   critique	   of	   liberal	   rights	   stressed	   their	   inherent	  
androcentric	  nature	  (MacKinnon,	  1987;	  Smart,	  1989).	  	  Feminist	  legal	  scholarship	  focuses	  on	  the	  fact	  that,	  since	  its	  foundation	  in	  1948,	  women	   held	   few	   positions	   of	   power	   and	   influence	   in	   the	   UN	   System	  (Charlesworth	  et	  al.	  1991;	  Zuloaga,	  2008).	  In	  this	  view,	  the	  de	  facto	  exclusion	  of	  women	   influenced	   the	   agenda	  of	   the	  United	  Nations,	   resulting	   in	   a	   pervasive	  gender	  bias	  within	  the	  content	  and	  definition	  of	  human	  rights	  law	  (Johnstone,	  2006).	  They	  pointed	  at	  the	  invisibility	  of	  the	  gendered	  dimensions	  of	  women’s	  rights,	   focusing	   on	   the	   fact	   that	   women	   face	   problems	   and	   forms	   of	  discrimination	   that	   men	   do	   not	   experience,	   such	   as	   domestic	   violence,	   and	  sexual	  degradation	  (Zuloaga,	  2008;	  MacKinnon,	  1987).	  	  The	   original	   gender	   bias	   of	   human	   rights	   law	   is	   individuated	   in	   the	  predominance	  of	  civil	  and	  political	  rights	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  economic	  and	  social	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rights,	   considering	   the	   latters	   crucial	   to	   promote	   women’s	   rights.	   Johnstone	  maintains	  that	  the	  focus	  on	  civil	  and	  political	  rights	  suggests	  both	  a	  male	  and	  Western	  liberal	  bias,	  which	  diminished	  the	  relevance	  of	  the	  immediate	  needs	  of	  anyone	  who	  was	  not	  Western,	  white,	  adult,	  and	  male	  (Johnstone,	  2006).	  In	  this	  sense,	  gender-­‐bias	  not	  only	  disregards	  women,	  but	   implies	   the	  definition	  of	  a	  content	  of	  human	  rights	  structured	  and	  worded	  in	  a	  way	  that	  might	  allow	  for	  their	  use	  to	  deny	  women	  self-­‐determination,	  e.g.	   the	  right	   to	  culture,	  religion,	  and	  private	   family	   life,	   possibly	   invoked	   at	   the	   expense	   of	  women's	   rights	   to	  education,	   healthcare,	   employment,	   and	   freedom	   to	  marry	   (Hemndez-­‐Truyol,	  1997;	   Coomaraswamy,	   2001).	   Feminist	   scholars	   consider	   civil	   and	   political	  rights,	  referred	  to	  spheres	  in	  which	  women,	  given	  the	  structural	  discrimination	  they	  experience,	  fail	  to	  enter	  or	  are	  significantly	  underrepresented,	  as	  vested	  in	  an	   objectivity	   not	   allowed	   to	   economic,	   social	   and	   cultural	   rights.	   In	   this	  perspective,	  they	  stress	  international	  human	  rights	  law	  bias	  for	  what	  concerns	  the	   lack	   of	   enforcement	  mechanisms	   for	   those	   economic,	   social	   and	   cultural	  rights,	   crucial	   to	   achieve	   women’s	   substantial	   equality	   (Fellmeth,	   2000).	  Zuloaga	  notes	  how,	   in	   this	   sense,	   the	   traditional	  assumption	   that	   justifies	   the	  division	  of	  human	  rights	  into	  two	  groups	  as	  necessary	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	   cannot	   be	   considered	   legitimate	   (Steiner	   and	   Alston,	   2000;	   Zuloaga,	  2008).	  	  	  Some	  scholars	  recognise	  gender-­‐bias	  in	  all	  dimensions	  of	  international	  human	  rights	   protection,	   considering	   human	   rights	   law	   structurally	   male-­‐gendered	  both	   conceptually,	   substantially	   but	   also	   procedurally.	   As	   mentioned,	  conceptually	   because	   of	   the	   absence	   of	   women	   from	   decision-­‐making	  processes,	  and	  substantively,	  since	  conceived	   in	  a	  way	  that	  cannot	  but	   ignore	  women’s	   experiences	   (Charlesworth	   et	   al.,	   1991;	   Coomaraswamy,	   1997,	  Fineman,	   2011)	   given	   women’s	   underrepresentation	   in	   international	  institutions	  and	  at	  national	  level	  (Zuloaga,	  2004,	  2008).	  Procedurally,	  because	  inherently	  patriarchal	  States	  choose	  their	  own	  representatives	  in	  international	  organisations,	   preventing	   the	   empowerment	   of	   women.	   In	   other	   words,	   had	  women	   obtained	   equal	   representation	   in	   diplomatic	   posts,	   human	   rights	   law	  (and	  other	  branches	  of	  international	  law)	  would	  include	  women's	  view	  points.	  However,	   the	   underrepresentation-­‐critique	   has	   been,	   itself,	   challenged	   as	  mainly	  descriptive,	  not	  necessarily	   implying	  that	   the	   international	   legal	  order	  contributes	  to	  male	  dominance	  per	  se,	  and	  lacking	  the	  possibility	  to	  be	  backed	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by	  a	  counterfactual,	  providing	  evidence	  that	  equal	  representation	  would	  have	  resulted	  in	  the	  inclusion	  of	  a	  gender	  perspective	  (Fellmeth,	  2000).23	  	  Asking	   the	   “woman	   question,”	   feminist	   movements	   and	   scholars	   raised	   the	  problem	   of	   how	   norms	   and	   practices	   affect	   women’s	   lives	   (Fellmeth,	   2000),	  arguing	   for	   a	   contextual	  methodology	   (Bartlett,	   1990).	   As	  we	  will	   see	   in	   the	  following	  Sections	  of	  this	  research,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  evidence	  provided	  that	  the	   traditional	   “neutral”	   approach	   implied	   that	   gender-­‐specific	   variants	   of	  violations	   had	   been	   missed	   or	   not	   adequately	   responded	   to	   (Byrnes,	   1992),	  Women’s	   Conventions	   were	   drafted	   to	   respond	   to	   these	   criticisms.	   The	   new	  instruments	   internalise	   the	   problem,	   both	   for	   what	   concerns	   addressing	   the	  issue	   of	   women’s	   underrepresentation	   in	   national	   and	   international	  institutions,	   with	   the	   underlying	   gender	   mainstreaming	   strategy	   promoting	  women’s	  participation	  to	  political	  life,	  and	  integrating	  sex	  and	  gender	  as	  crucial	  elements	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  social	  structures	  and	  human	  rights	  violations.	  	  	  	  
Sameness,	  difference	  or	  dominance	  	  The	   principles	   of	   equality	   and	   non-­‐discrimination	   have	   traditionally	  constituted	   reference	   points,	   constructive	   elements	   and	   interpretive	   tools	   to	  determine	  the	  content	  of	  human	  rights	  norms.24	  They	  are	  of	   jus	  cogens	  nature	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Fellmeth	   argues:	   “(…)	  The	  Westphalian	   system	  was	  not	   gender	  driven	  per	   se;	   there	   is	   no	   strong	  
evidence	  that	  women	  would	  have	  done	  things	  differently.	  Not	  every	  head	  of	  state	  during	  the	  formative	  
years	  of	   international	   law	  was	  male.	  Most	  powerful	  states	  were,	  during	  the	  most	   formative	  years	  of	  
international	  law,	  ruled	  at	  least	  partly	  by	  women	  at	  one	  time	  or	  another:	  from	  Queens	  Victoria	  and	  
Elizabeth	   in	   England	   to	   Mary	   Stuart,	   Queen	   of	   Scots;	   from	   Queen	   Maria	   Theresa	   of	   Hungary	   and	  
Bohemia	  to	  Catherine	  the	  Great	  of	  Russia;	  from	  Queen	  Isabella	  of	  Spain	  to	  the	  Empress	  Dowager	  Cixi	  
of	  China.'77	  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  Peace	  of	  Westphalia	  was	  to	  protect	  elite	  power,	  not	  male	  power	  per	  se,	  
although	   the	   protection	   of	   male	   power	   was	   necessarily	   the	   result	   of	   protecting	   elite	   power.	   Thus,	  
there	  followed	  a	  considerable	  neglect	  of	  women's	  concerns	  prior	  to	  the	  Second	  World	  War”	  (Fellmeth,	  2000,	  p.	  703).	  24	  Besides	   the	  Women’s	  Conventions,	   all	   human	   rights	   instruments	   include	   explicit	   references	   to	  these	   principles.	   See,	   inter	  alia:	   Universal	   Declaration	   of	   Human	  Rights	   (Article	   2);	   Covenant	   on	  Civil	  and	  Political	  Rights,	  (Articles	  2.1	  and	  26);	  Covenant	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights	  (Article	  2);	  European	  Convention	  of	  Human	  Rights	   (Article	  14);	  American	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	   (Article	   1.1);	   African	   Charter	   on	   Human	   and	   Peoples	   Rights,	   (Article	   2);	   International	  Convention	  on	  the	  Protection	  of	  the	  Rights	  of	  All	  Migrant	  Workers	  and	  Members	  of	  Their	  Families	  (Articles	   1.1	   and	   7);	   Convention	   on	   the	   Elimination	   of	   All	   Forms	   of	   Racial	   Discrimination;	   ILO	  Convention	   on	   Discrimination	   in	   Matter	   of	   Employment	   and	   Occupation;	   UNESCO	   Convention	  against	  Discrimination	   in	   Education;	  Declaration	   of	   the	  United	  Nations	   on	   the	   Elimination	   of	   All	  Forms	  of	  Intolerance	  and	  Discrimination	  Based	  on	  Religion	  or	  Beliefs	  (1981).	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and	   imply	   obligations	   erga	   omnes;	   hence,	   the	   prohibition	   of	   discrimination	  encompasses	   all	   rights	   at	   substantive	   level,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   conditions	   of	   their	  exercise,	  at	  procedural	  level.	  	  There	  is	  a	  wide	  consensus	  in	  feminist	  literature	  on	  considering	  the	  traditional	  approach	  to	  non-­‐discrimination	  (at	  least)	  ineffective.	  Johnstone	  argues	  that	  the	  emphasis	  on	  equality	  and	  non-­‐discrimination,	  since	   the	  Universal	  Declaration	  in	  1948,	  failed	  to	  achieve	  the	  objective	  (Johnstone,	  2006).	  In	  Crenshaw’s	  view,	  the	   crucial	   problem	   of	   the	   non-­‐discrimination	   doctrine	   is	   its	   focus	   on	  intentionality,	   which	   distinguishes	   unlawful	   from	   lawful	   discrimination	  (Crenshaw,	   1989).	  MacKinnon	   blames	   the	   “sameness”	   discourse	   of	   requiring	  women	  to	  adopt	  masculine	  qualities	  to	  achieve	  equality,	  and	  of	  being	  unable	  to	  provide	  solutions	  to	  problems	  affecting	  predominantly	  women,	  given	  the	  male-­‐bias	  of	  the	  standard	  norm.	  She	  argues	  that	  sex	  equality	  law	  has	  been	  ineffective	  in	  providing	  women	  with	  what	   they	   are	   socially	  prevented	   to	   achieve	  on	   the	  basis	  of	  a	  condition	  at	  birth	  (MacKinnon,	  1998).	  	  	  While	  some	  scholars	  adopted	  an	  approach	  focused	  on	  differences	  between	  the	  sexes,25	  sometimes	   arguing	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   difference	   in	   ethics,26	  others	  rejected	   it.	   The	   latters	   maintain	   that,	   whilst	   it	   reacted	   to	   the	   traditional	  equality,	   the	   difference	   approach	   still	   failed	   to	   consider	   differences	   in	   social	  status,	   assuming	   neutrality	   of	   social	   institutions,	   e.g.	   the	   family,	   and	  overlooking	   the	   context	   in	   which	   women	   live	   (Littleton,	   1987).	   In	   this	  perspective	   the	   difference	   paradigm	  presents	   two	   contradictions:	   on	   the	   one	  hand	   it	  dismisses	  differences	  between	  women	  (Villamoare,	  1991),	  assuming	  a	  universal	   women-­‐hood	   and	   replacing	   a	   stereotype	   for	   another	   one,	   on	   the	  other	   hand,	   it	   inherently	   legitimated	   unequal	   treatment	   between	   men	   and	  women,	   reproducing	   the	   status	   quo,	   although	   with	   a	   positive	   aura	   (Scott,	  1989).	   Some	   maintained	   that	   difference	   should	   be	   taken	   into	   account	   for	  contextual	  (Hawkesworth,	  1989),	  or	  situated	  (Brigham,	  1987)	  interpretations,	  not	   as	   an	   assumption	   for	   shaping	   policies	   and	   rules.	   Building	   on	   this	  perspective,	   post-­‐modernists	   scholars	   in	   particular,	   emphasized	   the	  specificities	   of	  women’s	   experiences	   (Probyn,	   1990)	   and	   refused	   to	   privilege	  any	   particular	   difference	   (Di	   Stefano,	   1990).	   According	   to	   them,	   feminist	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  See,	  inter	  alia:	  Freedman,	  1983;	  Olsen,	  1983;	  Williams,	  1982;	  Scales,	  1986;	  Boyd,	  Sheehy,	  1986;	  Littleton,	  1987;	  Menkel-­‐Meadow,	  1989.	  26	  For	  an	  overview	  refer	  to:	  Tong,	  1993	  and	  Grimshaw,	  1991.	  
	   29 
scholarship	   had	   to	   “become	   more	   localized,	   issue-­‐oriented,	   and	   explicitly	  
fallibilistic"	   (Fraser	   and	  Nicholson,	   1990).	   However,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   post-­‐modernists	   were	   criticized	   for	   inherently	   disabling	   the	   construction	   of	   an	  approach	   useful	   to	   provide	   generalizable	   solutions	   to	   the	   problem	   (Handler,	  1992),	  hence	  reproducing	  the	  status	  quo.	  	  To	   overcome	   the	   shortcomings	   of	   the	   traditional	   equality	   doctrine,	   the	  contradictions	   of	   the	  difference	  paradigm	  and	   the	   limited	  usefulness	   of	   post-­‐modernists’	   approach	   for	   promoting	   women’s	   rights	   on	   a	   large	   scale,	   some	  scholars	  argued	  for	  an	  alternative	  form	  of	  analysis,	  based	  on	  the	  observation	  of	  diversified	  realities,	  but	  directed	  towards	  challenging	  them	  (MacKinnon,	  1987,	  1989).	  Some	  focused	  on	  disadvantages	  in	  social	  relations	  (Rhode,	  1990),	  others	  articulated	  an	  approach	  built	  on	  the	  notions	  of	  dominance	  and	  powerlessness	  (McKinnon,	  1987,	  1989),	   focusing	  on	  social	   structures	   relegating	  women	   in	  a	  position	   of	   subjugation.	   According	   to	   MacKinnon	   "[f]or	   women	   to	   affirm	  
difference,	  when	  difference	  means	  dominance,	   as	   it	   does	  with	  gender,	  means	   to	  
affirm	  the	  qualities	  and	  characteristics	  of	  powerlessness"	  (MacKinnon,	  1987).	  	  CEDAW	  was	  the	  first	  instrument	  on	  women’s	  rights	  to	  integrate	  the	  critiques	  of	  the	   traditional	   notion	   of	   equality	   and	   non-­‐discrimination,	   adopting	   that	   of	  
substantive	  equality.	  	  Indeed,	  Article	  4	  CEDAW	  explicitly	  refers	  to	  differentiated	  measures	  to	  achieve	  equal	   opportunities:	   “1.	   Adoption	   by	   States	   Parties	   of	   temporary	   special	  
measures	  aimed	  at	  accelerating	  de	  facto	  equality	  between	  men	  and	  women	  shall	  
not	  be	  considered	  discrimination	  as	  defined	  in	  the	  present	  Convention,	  but	  shall	  
in	   no	   way	   entail	   as	   a	   consequence	   the	   maintenance	   of	   unequal	   or	   separate	  
standards;	   these	  measures	  shall	  be	  discontinued	  when	  the	  objectives	  of	  equality	  
of	  opportunity	  and	  treatment	  have	  been	  achieved.	  2.	  Adoption	  by	  States	  Parties	  of	  
special	  measures,	  including	  those	  measures	  contained	  in	  the	  present	  Convention,	  
aimed	  at	  protecting	  maternity	  shall	  not	  be	  considered	  discriminatory”.	  
	  Article	   5(a),	   acknowledging	   the	   existence	   of	   social	   structures	   in	  which	   social	  and	  cultural	  patterns	  of	  conduct	  of	  men	  and	  women	  reproduce	  and	  idea	  of	  the	  inferiority	  of	  women	  based	  on	  stereotyped	  roles,	  provides	  evidence	  of	  CEDAW	  endorsement	   of	   an	   approach	   based	   on	   social	   relations.	   The	   content	   of	   this	  article	   is	   further	   clarified	   by	   Point	   11	   of	   General	   Recommendation	   19:	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“Traditional	  attitudes	  by	  which	  women	  are	  regarded	  as	  subordinate	  to	  men	  or	  as	  
having	   stereotyped	   roles	   perpetuate	  widespread	   practices	   involving	   violence	   or	  
coercion	  […]	  the	  underlying	  consequences	  of	  these	  forms	  of	  gender-­‐based	  violence	  
help	   to	  maintain	  women	   in	   subordinate	  roles	  and	  contribute	   to	   the	   low	   level	  of	  
political	   participation	   and	   to	   their	   lower	   level	   of	   education,	   skills	   and	   work	  
opportunities”.	  
	  The	   case-­‐law	   of	   the	   organs	   of	   international	   supervision	   of	   human	   rights	  evolved	  into	  considering	  discriminatory	  any	  distinction	  which	  does	  not	  have	  a	  legitimate	   purpose,	   or	   an	   objective	   and	   reasonable	   justification,	   and	   which	  does	  not	  keep	  a	  relation	  of	  proportionality	  between	  its	  purpose	  and	  the	  means	  employed.	   In	   1989	   General	   Comment	   18,	   the	   UN	   Human	   Rights	   Committee	  interpreted	  Article	  26	  of	  the	  Covenant	  on	  Civil	  and	  Political	  Rights	  of	  the	  United	  Nations,	   which	   sets	   forth	   the	   basic	   principle	   of	   equality	   and	   non-­‐discrimination,	   as	   constituting	   an	   actual	   right	   to	   equality27	  (Morawa,	   2002),	  besides	   being	   an	   interpretive	   tool	   for	   all	   human	   rights	   norms	   (General	  Comment	   18,	   para.	   12).	   The	   1995	   Fourth	   World	   Conference	   on	   Women	   in	  Beijing,	  recognised	  de	  facto	  as	  well	  as	  de	  jure	  barriers	  to	  women’s	  enjoyment	  of	  human	   rights,	   moving	   beyond	   the	   traditional	   notion	   of	   sex-­‐equality,	   and	  conceptualising	   human	   rights	   as	   rights	   to	   outcomes,	   not	   just	   equal	  opportunities,	  as	  already	  elaborated	  for	  what	  concerned	  racial	  discrimination.	  	  
	  
	  
Violence	  against	  women	  and	  discriminatory	  social	  structures	  	  The	   1993	   UN	   Declaration	   on	   the	   Elimination	   of	   Violence	   Against	   Women	  explicitly	  endorsed	   the	  dominance	  approach.	   In	   its	  Preamble,	   the	  Declaration	  recognises	   “that	   violence	   against	   women	   is	   a	   manifestation	   of	   historically	  
unequal	  power	  relations	  between	  men	  and	  women,	  which	  have	  led	  to	  domination	  
over	  and	  discrimination	  against	  women	  by	  men	  and	  to	  the	  prevention	  of	  the	  full	  
advancement	   of	  women,	   and	   that	   violence	   against	  women	   is	   one	   of	   the	   crucial	  
social	   mechanisms	   by	   which	   women	   are	   forced	   into	   a	   subordinate	   position	  
compared	  with	  men”.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Early	  evidence	  of	   jurisprudence	  adopting	   this	  perspective	  can	  be	   found	   in	  ECrtHR,	  Gaygusuz	  v.	  
Austria	  (1996).	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The	  BdPC,	  drafted	   in	   the	  same	  years	  and	  adopted	   in	  1994,	  adopted	   the	  same	  approach:	   “violence	   against	  women	   is	   an	   offense	   against	   human	   dignity	   and	   a	  
manifestation	   of	   the	   historically	   unequal	   power	   relations	   between	   women	   and	  
men”	  (Preamble).	  	  This	  is	  also	  the	  case	  for	  the	  Preamble	  of	  the	  Istanbul	  Convention:	  “recognising	  
that	   violence	   against	   women	   is	   a	   manifestation	   of	   historically	   unequal	   power	  
relations	   between	   women	   and	   men,	   which	   have	   led	   to	   domination	   over,	   and	  
discrimination	   against,	   women	   by	   men	   and	   to	   the	   prevention	   of	   the	   full	  
advancement	  of	  women”.	  	  Considering	  VAW	  both	  an	  evidence	  of	  discrimination	  and	  a	  concurrent	  cause	  of	  its	   reproduction,	   all	   Women’s	   Conventions	   define	   it	   as	   a	   human	   rights	  violation,	   adopting	   the	  understanding	  promoted	  by	   feminist	   legal	   scholarship	  (Coomaraswamy,	  2001).	  	  CEDAW	   General	   Recommendation	   19	   states:	   “Gender-­‐based	   violence,	   which	  
impairs	  or	  nullifies	   the	  enjoyment	  by	  women	  of	  human	  rights	  and	   fundamental	  
freedoms	  under	  general	  international	  law	  or	  under	  human	  rights	  conventions,	  is	  
discrimination	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  article	  128	  of	  the	  Convention	  […]”	  (Point	  7,	  General	  Comments).	  
	  Similarly,	   the	   BdPC	   states:	   “Violence	   against	  women	   constitutes	   a	   violation	   of	  
their	   human	   rights	   and	   fundamental	   freedoms,	   and	   impairs	   or	   nullifies	   the	  
observance,	  enjoyment	  and	  exercise	  of	  such	  rights	  and	  freedoms	  […]”	  (Preamble).	  	  Finally,	  in	  the	  Istanbul	  Convention:	  “	  ‘violence	  against	  women’	  is	  understood	  as	  a	  
violation	  of	  human	  rights	  and	  a	  form	  of	  discrimination	  against	  women	  and	  shall	  
mean	  all	  acts	  of	  gender-­‐based	  violence29	  that	  result	   in,	  or	  are	   likely	   to	  result	   in,	  
physical,	  sexual,	  psychological	  or	  economic	  harm	  or	  suffering	  to	  women	  […]”	  (Art.	  3.1).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Article	   1	   CEDAW:	   For	   the	   purposes	   of	   the	   present	   Convention,	   the	   term	   "discrimination	   against	  
women"	   shall	  mean	  any	  distinction,	  exclusion	  or	   restriction	  made	  on	   the	  basis	  of	   sex	  which	  has	   the	  
effect	   or	   purpose	   of	   impairing	   or	   nullifying	   the	   recognition,	   enjoyment	   or	   exercise	   by	   women,	  
irrespective	  of	   their	  marital	   status,	   on	  a	  basis	   of	   equality	  of	  men	  and	  women,	   of	  human	   rights	  and	  
fundamental	  freedoms	  in	  the	  political,	  economic,	  social,	  cultural,	  civil	  or	  any	  other	  field.	  29	  At	  Article	  3.d,	  the	  Istanbul	  Convention	  defines	  gender-­‐based	  violence	  as	  violence	  that	  is	  directed	  against	  a	  woman	  because	  she	  is	  a	  woman	  or	  that	  affects	  women	  disproportionately.	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  VAW	   is,	   hence,	   a	   structural	   problem,	   both	   a	   manifestation	   of	   the	   power	  imbalance	   between	   sexes	   and	   a	   social	   mechanism	   that	   forces	   women	   into	  subordination.	  The	  Preamble	  of	   the	   Istanbul	  Convention	   explicitly	   recognises	  this	   feature,	   referring	   to	   “the	   structural	   nature	   of	   violence	   against	   women	   as	  
gender-­‐based	  violence”.	  	  The	  reference	   to	  gender,	  or	  women,	   in	  Women’s	  Conventions	  emphasises	   the	  specificity	   of	   the	   problem.	   The	   right	   to	   be	   free	   from	   violence	   is	   not	   an	  adaptation	   of	   a	   right	   built	   upon	   male	   experience,	   and,	   therefore,	   it	   is	   not	  grounded	   on	   the	   notion	   of	   equality	   between	   the	   sexes.	   This	   is	   a	   significant	  advancement	   from	   the	   traditional	   understanding	   of	   discrimination,	   which	  responds	   to	   the	   criticism	   to	   the	   traditional	   conceptualisation	   of	   equality	   and	  non-­‐discrimination	  doctrine.	  	  However,	  the	  term	  "gender,"	  rather	  than	  sex,	  better	  internalises	  the	  reference	  to	  the	  social	  construction	  of	  the	  ideas	  of	  	  "femininity"	  and	  "masculinity"	  and	  the	  role	   of	  men	   and	  women	   in	   society.	   In	   Charlesworth	  words,	   the	   term	   gender	  allows	   to	   refer	   to	   “the	   excess	   cultural	   baggage	   associated	  with	   biological	   sex”	  (Charlesworth,	  1999,	  p.	  379).	  The	  introduction	  of	  the	  term	  in	  international	  law	  is,	   itself,	  historically	  and	  culturally	  determined,	  signalling	  the	  consolidation	  of	  the	  paradigm	  shift	  on	  women’s	  rights.	  	  	  Whereas	  1979	  CEDAW	  never	  uses	   it,	  both	  1992	  General	  Recommendation	  19	  (throughout	  the	  whole	  text)	  and	  1994	  BdPC	  (once)	  use	  the	  term	  gender	  when	  referring	  to	  VAW:	  	  General	  Recommendation	  19	  (e.g.	  Point	  6,	  General	  Comments)	  “The	  Convention	  in	  article	  1	  defines	  discrimination	  against	  women.	  The	  definition	  
of	  discrimination	  includes	  gender-­‐based	  violence,	  that	  is,	  violence	  that	  is	  directed	  
against	   a	   woman	   because	   she	   is	   a	   woman	   or	   that	   affects	   women	  
disproportionately”.	  	  BdPC	  (Article	  1)	  
“For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  Convention,	  violence	  against	  women	  shall	  be	  understood	  
as	  any	  act	  or	  conduct,	  based	  on	  gender,	  which	  causes	  death	  or	  physical,	  sexual	  or	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psychological	  harm	  or	  suffering	   to	  women,	  whether	   in	   the	  public	  or	   the	  private	  
sphere”.	  
	  Whilst	  none	  of	  them	  explicitly	  defines	  it,	  its	  interpretation	  as	  a	  social	  construct	  can	  be	  derived	  by	  other	  provisions,	  referring	   to	  women’s	  (subordinated)	  role	  in	  society	  as	  based	  on	  “stereotyped	  patterns	  of	  behaviour	  and	  social	  and	  cultural	  
practices”	   (BdPC,	  Art.	  6.b)	  or	  on	   “traditional	  attitudes”,	  “stereotyped	  roles”	  and	  “prejudices	  and	  practices”	  (General	  Recommendation	  19,	  Point	  11,	  commenting	  on	  Articles	  2.f,	  5	  and	  10.c	  CEDAW).	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  more	  recent	  Istanbul	  Convention	  dedicates	  Article	  3	  to	  define	   the	   concept,	   stating	   that:	   “’gender’	   shall	   mean	   the	   socially	   constructed	  
roles,	   behaviours,	   activities	   and	   attributes	   that	   a	   given	   society	   considers	  
appropriate	  for	  women	  and	  men”	  (Art.	  3.c).	  	  	  
Norms	  and	  social	  transformation	  
	  	  
“The	  critical	  feature	  of	  the	  CEDAW	  process	  is	  its	  cultural	  and	  educational	  role:	  its	  
capacity	  to	  coalesce	  and	  express	  a	  particular	  cultural	  understanding	  of	  gender.	  
Like	  more	  conventional	  legal	  processes,	  its	  significance	  lies	  in	  its	  capacity	  to	  
shape	  cultural	  understandings	  and	  to	  articulate	  and	  expand	  a	  vision	  of	  rights”	  	  
	  (Merry,	  2003,	  p.	  973)	  	  
	  The	  Women’s	  Conventions	  set	  social	  transformation	  as	  a	  necessary	  process	  for	  achieving	   substantive	   equality	   and,	   specifically,	   to	   eradicate	   VAW.	   Social	  change	   is	   understood	   as	   promoted	   by	   the	   cooperation	   of	   international	   law,	  transnational	   advocacy	   networks,	   national	   legislation	   and	   public	   policies,	   all	  considered	  crucial.	  In	  this	  sense,	  international	  law	  responded	  to	  the	  traditional	  critique	   in	   critical	   (and	   feminist)	   legal	   scholarship	   towards	   the	   excessive	  emphasis	  on	  “text	  drafting”	  as	  opposed	  to	  an	  overarching	  commitment	  to	  social	  and	  cultural	  processes	  of	  regulation	  (Merry,	  1995).	  	  CEDAW	  states:	  “States	  Parties	  shall	  take	  all	  appropriate	  measures:	  (a)	  To	  modify	  
the	   social	   and	   cultural	   patterns	   of	   conduct	   of	  men	   and	  women,	  with	   a	   view	   to	  
achieving	   the	   elimination	   of	   prejudices	   and	   customary	   and	   all	   other	   practices	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which	  are	  based	  on	   the	   idea	  of	   the	   inferiority	  or	   the	  superiority	  of	  either	  of	   the	  
sexes	  or	  on	  stereotyped	  roles	  for	  men	  and	  women”	  (Art.	  5.a).	  Further	  clarified,	  in	  relation	  to	  VAW	  by	  General	  Recommendation	  19.30	  	  	  Similarly,	   with	   the	   BdPC:	   “The	   States	  Parties	  agree	   to	  undertake	  progressively	  
specific	  measures,	   including	  programs:	  b.	   to	  modify	  social	  and	  cultural	  patterns	  
of	  conduct	  of	  men	  and	  women,	  including	  the	  development	  of	  formal	  and	  informal	  
educational	   programs	   appropriate	   to	   every	   level	   of	   the	   educational	   process,	   to	  
counteract	   prejudices,	   customs	   and	   all	   other	   practices	   which	   are	   based	   on	   the	  
idea	  of	   the	   inferiority	  or	   superiority	  of	  either	  of	   the	   sexes	  or	  on	   the	   stereotyped	  
roles	   for	   men	   and	   women	   which	   legitimize	   or	   exacerbate	   violence	   against	  
women”	  (Article	  8.b).	  
	  On	  the	  same	  line,	  according	  to	  the	  Istanbul	  Convention:	  “Parties	  shall	  take	  the	  
necessary	   measures	   to	   promote	   changes	   in	   the	   social	   and	   cultural	   patterns	   of	  
behaviour	   of	   women	   and	   men	   with	   a	   view	   to	   eradicating	   prejudices,	   customs,	  
traditions	  and	  all	  other	  practices	  which	  are	  based	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  inferiority	  of	  
women	  or	  on	  stereotyped	  roles	  for	  women	  and	  men”	  (Art.	  12.1).	  	  Focusing	  on	  CEDAW,	  Holtmaat	  and	  Supper	  note	  that	  Article	  5.a	  did	  not	  attract	  much	  attention	   in	   the	   literature	   (Holtmaat,	  2004;	  Sepper,	  2008).	  The	  same	   is	  true	  with	   regards	  with	   the	   other	   two	   conventions,	  which	   is	   surprising,	   given	  the	  innovative	  nature	  of	  the	  transformative	  approach.	  Its	  origins	  can	  be	  found	  in	   the	   long	   debate	   about	   the	   role	   of	   law	   in	   society,	   and	   the	   international	  endorsement	   of	   an	   understanding	   of	   institutional	   preconditions	   and	   cultural	  embeddedness	   as	   crucial	   elements	   to	   address	   structural	   problems,	   diverting	  from	  a	  strictly	  legalistic	  perspective	  (Banakar,	  2004;	  Fredman,	  2001)	  	  This	   socio-­‐legal	   approach,	   endorsed	   by	   Women’s	   Conventions,	   implies	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30 	  “Traditional	   attitudes	   by	   which	   women	   are	   regarded	   as	   subordinate	   to	   men	   or	   as	   having	  
stereotyped	   roles	   perpetuate	   widespread	   practices	   involving	   violence	   or	   coercion,	   such	   as	   family	  
violence	   and	   abuse,	   forced	   marriage,	   dowry	   deaths,	   acid	   attacks	   and	   female	   circumcision.	   Such	  
prejudices	   and	   practices	   may	   justify	   gender-­‐based	   violence	   as	   a	   form	   of	   protection	   or	   control	   of	  
women.	  The	  effect	  of	  such	  violence	  on	  the	  physical	  and	  mental	  integrity	  of	  women	  is	  to	  deprive	  them	  
the	  equal	  enjoyment,	  exercise	  and	  knowledge	  of	  human	  rights	  and	  fundamental	  freedoms.	  While	  this	  
comment	  addresses	  mainly	  actual	  or	  threatened	  violence	  the	  underlying	  consequences	  of	  these	  forms	  
of	  gender-­‐based	  violence	  help	  to	  maintain	  women	  in	  subordinate	  roles	  and	  contribute	  to	  the	  low	  level	  
of	  political	  participation	  and	  to	  their	   lower	  level	  of	  education,	  skills	  and	  work	  opportunities”	   (Point	  11,	  General	  Comments).	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interpretation	   of	   law	   as	   a	   social	   construct,	   historically	   and	   culturally	  determined	   and,	   hence,	   dynamic.	   Madsen	   refers	   to	   individual	   rights	   as	  
“constructed	  in	  and	  by	  society”	  (Madsen,	  2013),	  Rhul	  considers	  law	  a	  context	  for	  society	  and	  society	  a	  context	  for	  law	  (Rhul,	  1996).	  Norms,	  and	  the	  policies	  they	  imply,	  contribute	  to	  the	  production	  and	  shaping	  of	  social	  relations,	  and	  should	  not	  be	  restrictively	  considered	  as	  a	  reaction	  to	  problems,	  while	  they	  give	  shape	  and	  name	  to	  problems,	  making	  them	  visible	  (Bacchi,	  Eveline,	  2010).	  Culture	  is	  considered	   adaptive,	   in	   a	   state	   of	   constant	   change,	   evolving	   through	   internal	  conflicts	   and	   inconsistencies.	   Raday	   argues	   that,	   when	   an	   adaptive	   culture	  opens	   to	   a	   human	   right	   instance,	   there	   will	   be	   a	   process	   of	   interactive	  development	  rather	  than	  of	  confrontation	  (Raday,	  2003).	  	  	  Like	   many	   colleagues	   in	   critical	   legal	   studies	   and,	   previously,	   Marxist	   legal	  literature,	  feminist	  scholars	  are	  cautious	  towards	  the	  role	  of	  law	  (both	  national	  and	   international)	   to	   trigger	   social	   change	   (Johnstone,	   2006;	   Chinkin	   et	   al.	  1991).	  Whilst	  some	  preferred	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  role	  of	  advocacy	  and	  campaigning	  (Smart,	   1989),	   others	   were	   concerned	   about	   the	   excessive	   emphasis	   on	  uniformity	   required	   by	   a	   legal	   approach	   (Bartlett,	   1990).	  However	   there	   is	   a	  wide	   consensus	   on	   considering	   norms	   as	   complementary	   instruments	   of	  transformation,	   valorising	   their	   social	   impact	   (Fellmeth,	   2000),	   "special	  resonance"	   (Rhode,	  1990)	  and	  symbolic	  power	   in	  articulating	  new	  meanings,	  social	  alternatives	  (Villmoare,	  1985)	  and	  political	  mobilization	  (Milner,	  1989).	  Merry	   argues	   that	   norms	   contribute	   to	   processes	   of	   cultural	   redefinition,	  through	   which	   subjugation	   can	   be	   resisted	   and	   challenged	   by	   means	   of	   law	  (Merry,	  2003).	  Others	  expressed	  similar	  views,	  claiming	  that	  rights	  can	  operate	  as	  a	  defence,	  although	  they	  not	  necessarily	  lead	  to	  liberation	  (Williams,	  1988;	  Matsuda,	  1989;	  Crenshaw,	  1988)	  or	  welcomed	  international	  human	  rights	  law	  as	   providing	   partial	   protection	   from	   subjectivity	   (Koskenniemi,	   1995).	   Hunt	  emphasises	  that	  such	  strategy	  of	  social	  transformation	  can	  only	  work	  if	  rights	  articulate	   into	   social	   practices,	   producing	   and	   produced	   by	   an	   emergent	  common	   sense	   (Hunt,	   1990).	   On	   the	   same	   line,	   other	   scholars	  maintain	   that	  people	  generally	  conform	  to	  laws	  because	  they	  are	  part	  of	  a	  taken-­‐for-­‐granted	  context	   (Ewick,	   Silbey,	   1998).	   Post-­‐modernists	   partially	   share	   this	   view	   of	  norms	   as	   situated	   in	   particular	   socio-­‐economic	   and	   cultural	   experiences	   of	  women	  (Bartlett	  1990;	  Sarat,	  1993,	  Ewick,	  Silbey	  1998),	  although	  preferring	  to	  refer	  to	  rights.	  In	  this	  perspective,	  rights	  are	  practices	  articulating	  expectations	  between	  and	  amongst	  women	  and	  men	  (Minow,	  1988).	  This	  issues	  address	  the	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critical	  importance	  of	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  norms	  and	  of	  the	  institutions	  emanating	  them	  (Madsen,	  2011).	  	  	  Negating	  the	  contemporarily	  conservative	  and	  dynamic	  nature	  of	  norms	  would	  prove	  controversial,	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  their	  historical	  evolution.	  Notably,	  it	  would	  imply	  creating	   the	   conditions	   of	   a	   self-­‐fulfilling	   prophecy,	   protecting	   the	   legal	  discourse	   from	   the	   challenges	   emerging	   from	   evolving	   understandings,	   thus	  contributing	   to	   the	   crystallization	   of	   its	   content.	   Moreover,	   it	   would	   deprive	  such	   new	   understandings	   of	   a	   powerful,	   if	   not	   merely	   symbolic,	   tool	   for	  concretization.	   In	   this	   sense,	   a	   critical	   stand	   should	   not	   tend	   to	   take	   social	  transformation	   out	   of	   the	   legal	   agenda,	   but	   participate	   in	   the	   construction	   of	  norms	   to	   promote	   the	   incorporation	   of	   alternative	   understandings	   (Kinoy,	  2004).	  Processes	  of	  social	  change	  are	  complex	  and	   the	  construction	  of	  norms	  valorising	   “an	   idea,	   ideal	   or	   practice,	   only	   comes	   about	   when	   a	   specific	  
sociological	   context	   and	   a	   specific	   configuration	   of	   historical	   contingencies	  
coexist”	  (Madsen,	  2013).	  	  As	   for	   law	   in	  general,	   the	  sociological	  approach	  to	  human	  rights	   law	  typically	  focuses	   on	   its	   limitation	   in	   influencing	   social	   change	   (Freeman,	   2002).	   Some	  critical	   scholars	   express	   disappointment	   in	   the	   capacity	   of	   a	   legal	   system	   to	  achieve	   the	  desired	   goals	   of	   a	   social	  movement,	   and	   go	   as	   far	   as	  negating	   its	  transformative	  power	  and	  affirming	  its	  inherent	  legitimation	  of	  the	  status	  quo,	  functioning	   as	   a	   system	   of	   believes	   that	   makes	   it	   appear	   natural	   and	  unchangeable	   (Gordon,	   1982),	   thus	   protecting	   the	   existing	   social	   order	  (Luhmann,	   1993).	   According	   to	   some	   scholars,	   human	   rights	   law	   reinforces	  existing	   institutions	   and	   ideologies	   and	   neutralizes	   the	   instances	   of	   social	  reform	  groups,	  narrowing	   their	   causes	  and	  de-­‐radicalizing	  or	  absorbing	   their	  agenda	   (Lobel,	   2007).	   Foucault	   directed	   attention	   to	   the	   institutional	  mechanisms	   that	  allow	  some	  knowledges	   to	  become	  dominant	   in	   the	  struggle	  for	   control	   of	   discourses.	   In	   this	   view,	   some	   issues	   fail	   to	   gain	   credibility	  because	  they	  confront	  the	  rules	  of	  relevance	  (Foucault,	  1991).	  	  Human	  rights	  norms	  have	  been	  addressed	  with	  a	  special	  focus	  in	  the	  debate	  on	  the	   role	   of	   norms	   in	   promoting	   the	   advancement	   of	   women’s	   rights.	  Notwithstanding	   an	   overall	   scepticism	   on	   the	   role	   of	   norms	   in	   general	   in	  promoting	  social	  transformation,	  there	  is	  currently	  a	  widespread	  consensus	  in	  feminist	   legal	   scholarship	   in	   considering	  human	  rights	  norms	  as	   contributing	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to	  the	  legitimation	  of	   feminists’	  claims,	  providing	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  discourse	  in	  a	  powerful	  language	  (Sen,	  2003)	  and	  a	  useful	  tool	  for	  communicating	  with	  States	  (Johnstone,	   2006).	   Merry	   argues	   that	   human	   rights	   provided	   a	   unifying	  framework	   for	   transnational	   feminism,	   enabling	   it	   to	   challenge	   the	  “naturalness”	  of	  gender	  discrimination	  (Merry,	  2006).	  Transnational	  advocacy	  networks	   and	   international	   conferences	   are	   considered	  powerful	   channels	   to	  share	   and	   disseminate	   ideas	   (Keck,	   Sikkink	   1998;	   Sanjeev,	   Riker;	   Sikkink	  2002),	  as	  well	  as	   to	  construct	  new	  understandings	   (Merry	  2006;	  Riles	  2001).	  Merry	   emphasise	   the	   impact	   of	   human	   rights	   discourse	   on	   women’s	  perceptions	   themselves,	  and	   its	   suitability	   to	  construct	  claims	  simultaneously	  universally	  and	  locally	  rooted	  (Merry,	  2006).	  	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   while	   recognising	   the	   usefulness	   of	   articulating	  women’s	  claims	   in	   the	   language	   of	   human	   rights,	   Kelly	   raises	   a	   concern	   about	   the	  possible	  risk	  of	  “neutralization”	  of	  the	  feminist	  agenda:	  “One	  is	  left	  to	  ponder	  on	  
whether	   the	   language	   of	   human	   rights	   both	   provided	   something	   and	   took	  
something	   away.	   Through	   its	   vocabulary	   and	   machinery	   feminists	   created	   a,	  
perhaps	  unprecedented,	  way	  to	  transcend	  differences	  and	  achieve	  agreed	  goals:	  
they	  not	  only	  spoke	  a	  ’common	  language’	  with	  each	  other,	  but	  one	  that	  could	  be	  
heard	   within	   the	   UN	   and	   international	   law.	   It	   is	   unlikely	   that	   the	   more	  
challenging	  language	  of	  domination	  and	  oppression	  could	  have	  performed	  these	  
functions.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   it	   remains	   an	   open	   question	  whether	   rights-­‐based	  
claims	   can	   be	   extended	   to	   encompass	   the	   feminist	   (and	   UN)	   aspiration	   to	   end	  
violence	   against	   women	   through	   the	   deeper	   social	   transformation	   of	   gender	  
orders	  and	  gender	  relations”	  (Kelly,	  2004,	  p.	  5).	  	  Women’s	   Conventions	   consider	   norms	   as	   one	   of	   the	   elements	   of	   social	  transformation.	  The	  question	  is,	  hence,	  to	  promote	  their	  effectiveness	  while,	  at	  the	   same	   time,	   strengthening	   an	  understanding	  of	   their	   culturally	   productive	  role,	   i.e.	   determining	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   legal	   processes	   contribute	   to	   the	  construction	   (and	   reproduction)	   of	   social	   and	   cultural	   life	   and	   how	   law	   and	  society	  interact	  (Rhul,	  1996).	  	  At	   a	  meeting	   in	   the	  United	  Nations	   in	   2003,	   the	   Special	   Rapporteur	   on	   VAW	  Coomaraswamy	   argued	   that	   implementation	   is	   the	   biggest	   challenge	   to	   the	  human	  rights	  approach	  to	  VAW.	  The	  same	  author	  had	  previously	  noted	  that,	  “if	  
norms	  do	  not	  permeate	  down	  into	  the	  realm	  of	  everyday	  life,	  then	  the	  foundation	  
	   38 
of	   feminist	   analysis	   and	   understanding	   will	   have	   been	   lost”	   (Coomaraswamy,	  1997).	  	  	  
Universality,	  cultural	  relativism	  and	  intersectionality	  
	  In	   feminist	   scholarship,	   the	   critique	   to	   universality	   shares	   the	   same	   basis	   as	  that	  against	  objectivity	  and	  neutrality,	  recognising	  additional	  elements	  of	  bias	  of	   human	   rights	   norms	   and,	   somehow,	   creating	   a	   division	   in	   feminist	   claims	  themselves.	  	  In	  the	  legal	  discourse,	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  universality	  of	  human	  rights	  has	  been	  long	  debated	  (Zucca,	  2007;	  Brems,	  2008),	  ranging	  from	  perspectives	  based	  on	  natural	  law,	  which	  understand	  it	  as	  a	  set	  of	  standards	  that	  apply	  by	  definition	  to	  all	  human	  beings,	  to	  positivistic	  views,	  which	  focus	  on	  the	  formal	  acceptance	  of	   certain	   rights	  by	   the	  majority	  of	   States.	  The	   socio-­‐legal	   approach	  has	  been	  traditionally	  critical	  towards	  the	  concept	  of	  universal	  rights,	  which	  are	  seen	  as	  historically,	   geographically	   and	   culturally	   determined	   (Morris,	   2006;	   Turner,	  1993).	  In	  this	  perspective,	  hence,	  the	  content	  and	  meaning	  of	  rights	  cannot	  be	  considered	  universal	  	  (Stenner,	  2013).	  The	  dynamic	  evolution	  of	  human	  rights,	  both	   for	   what	   concerns	   the	   understanding	   of	   their	   content	   and	   their	  implementation	   (Garlicki,	   2012),	   suggests	   that	   a	   sociologically	   informed	  approach	   to	   human	   rights	  might,	   indeed,	   prove	   to	   be	   a	   better	   suited	   tool	   for	  their	  conceptualisation.	  	  Since	  its	  adoption	  in	  1948,	  the	  UDHR	  has	  become	  the	  norm	  of	  reference	  for	  all	  human	  rights	  instruments	  (Möller,	  De	  Zayas,	  2010).	  However,	  interculturalism,	  cultural	  relativism	  and	   legal	  pluralism	  made	  more	  complex	  the	  debate	  on	  the	  legitimacy	   of	   transformative	   objectives	   of	   human	   rights	   instruments	   and	   of	  their	  universalistic	  claims,	  at	  times	  creating	  the	  conditions	  for	  clashes	  between	  fundamental	  rights	  (Fellmeth,	  2000;	  Merry,	  2006;	  Bribosia	  and	  Rorive,	  2010).	  The	   doctrine	   strives	   to	   compose	   tensions	   arising	   when	   the	   universalistic	  aspirations	   of	   inherently	   abstract	   concepts,	   or	   their	   constitutional	   substance	  (Cassese,	  2006),	  need	  to	  be	  applied	  to	  concrete	  societal	  contexts	  (Zumbansen,	  2005),	   acquiring	   specific	  meanings.	   Cultural	   relativists,	   for	   instance,	   see	  with	  suspicion	   the	   forceful	   transplant	   of	   exogenous	   systems	   of	   values	   in	   different	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cultural	  contexts.31	  There	  is	  a	  need	  to	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  the	  abstractness	  and	  ambiguities	   inherent	   in	   the	   concept	   of	   human	   rights	   (Madsen,	   2010),	  recognising	   the	   tensions	   they	   arise	   both	   because	   of	   the	   historical	   dynamic	  evolution	  of	  the	  understanding	  of	  their	  content	  and	  because	  of	  the	  complexity	  of	   contemporary	  multicultural	   societies.	   As	   Madsen	   argues	   “There	   is	   nothing	  
natural,	   let	   alone	   inevitable,	   about	   ordering	   societies	   around	   the	   idea	   of	  
universally	  equal	  and	  inalienable	  human	  rights”	  (Madsen,	  Verschraegen,	  2013).	  	  Some	   of	   the	   critiques	   from	   feminist	   scholars	   do	   not	   address	   the	   concept	   of	  universality	   per	   se,	   rather	   they	   challenge	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   universal	   claims	  based	   on	   norms	   constructed	   around	   a	   white-­‐male	   subjectivity,	   culturally,	  economically	   and	   socially	   determined	   (Crenshaw,	   1988).	   Indeed,	   this	   view	  does	   not	   prevent	   some	   feminist	   scholars	   to	   assume	   the	   universality	   of	  patriarchal	  structures,	  which	  put	  women	  in	  a	  position	  of	   inferiority	  across	  all	  societies	  regardless	  of	   their	  perception	  of	   them	  (Merry,	  1995).	  Those	  sharing	  this	  standpoint	  do	  not	  overlook	  cultural	  diversity,	  but	  accommodate	  it	  through	  a	  balancing	  process	   that	  does	  not	   reject	   the	  universality	  of	  a	   set	  of	  minimum	  standards.	   In	   this	  view,	   self-­‐perception	  of	   subjugation	  has	   to	  be	  enabled	  by	  a	  framework	   that	  provides	   the	   instruments	   to	  challenge	   it.	  Merry	  stresses	   that,	  in	   Western	   societies	   themselves,	   battered	   women	   did	   not	   talk	   about	   it	   as	   a	  crime	  until	  recently.	  It	  took	  the	  political	  activities	  of	  feminists,	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  shelter	  and	  the	  support	  of	  the	  judiciary	  and	  the	  police	  to	  generate	  the	  massive	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  women	  asking	  the	  courts	  for	  help.	  In	  this	  sense	  law,	  national	   and	   international,	   culturally	   redefined	   and	   re-­‐constructed	   gender	  identities,	   bringing	   to	   the	   understanding	   of	   VAW	   as	   illegitimate	   and	  undeserved.	  	  	  This	  is	  a	  critical	  issue	  for	  cultural	  relativist	  scholars,	  particularly	  in	  the	  case	  of	  feminist	   post-­‐modernist	   and	   post-­‐colonial	   views	   (Nicholson,	   1990;	   Ashe,	  1988).	  Some	  interpret	  international	  human	  rights	  law	  as	  a	  product	  of	  Western	  thinking	   (Chow,	  1991),	   inherently	   incapable	   to	   account	   for	   cultural	   diversity,	  and	  stress	  that	  rights	  have	  different	  meaning	  in	  different	  contexts	  (Villamoare,	  1991;	  Morse,	  Sayeh,	  1995),	  which	  affect	  people’s	  expectations	  (Minow,	  1987).	  	  In	   this	   perspective,	   the	   international	   discourse	   on	   women’s	   rights	   does	   not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  The	  problems	  arising	  from	  cultural	  diversity	  will	  be	  addressed	  in	  the	  Third	  and	  Fourth	  Sections	  of	   this	   research.	   For	   perspectives	   focused	   on	   the	  Western-­‐bias	   of	   universal	   rights	   refer	   to,	   inter	  
alia:	  Pannikar,	  1982;	  Ibhawoh,	  2001;	  Sjørslev,	  2001.	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integrate,	   for	   instance,	   the	   claims	   of	   deeply	   religious	   women	   or	   women	  belonging	  to	  minority	  cultures	  (Reitman,	  1997).	  	  	  Some	   scholars,	  whether	   feminist	   or	  not,	   point	   at	   the	   inherent	   essentialism	  of	  cultural	   relativism,	  which	  depicts	   culture	   (and	   social	  practices)	   as	  monolithic	  and	   unchangeable	   (Mayer,	   1996;	   Sepper,	   2008),	   incapable	   of	   dynamic	  adaptations	   to	   changing	   circumstances	   and	   understandings,	   interpreted	   as	  illegitimate	   alterations.	   They	   maintain	   that	   this	   reluctance	   to	   consider	  progressive	  reforms	  maintains	  the	  status	  quo,	  preventing	  any	  change	  in	  social	  relations	  (Reitman,	  1997).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  others	  consider	  cultural	  defence	  unproblematic	   and	   enriching,	   up	   until	   the	   point	   in	   which	   it	   demands	   the	  preservation	   of	   structures	   infringing	   human	   rights	   (Nussbaum,	   1999).	   A	  criticism	   to	   these	   last	   positions	   might	   be	   that	   they	   assume,	   eventually,	   a	  convergence	  towards	  “reasonable	  understandings”	  (Gunning,	  1992).	  	  	  As	  mentioned,	  the	  new	  international	  human	  rights	  approach	  to	  women’s	  rights	  largely	   endorses	   an	   understanding	   of	   women’s	   conditions	   worldwide	   as	   a	  product	  of	  social	  structures	  reproducing	  male-­‐dominance.	  They	  explicitly	  refer	  to	   the	   necessity	   of	   a	   social	   transformation,	   encompassing	   culture,	   custom,	  religion	  and	  traditions.	  Legitimate	  intervention	  largely	  overcomes	  national	  and	  individual	   self-­‐determination,	   challenging	   the	   limitations	   of	   “assuming	   an	  
autonomous	   individual	   whose	   self-­‐	   realization	   consists	   of	   protecting	   his	   or	   her	  
freedom	  of	  choice	  and	  action”(Garlicki,	   2012),	   and	   identifying	   the	  existence	  of	  contextual	   constraints	   on	   agency	   (Chinkin,	   Charlesworth,	   2000;	  Coomaraswamy,	   1997).	   This	   perspective	   assumes	   that	   no	   real	   self-­‐determination	   can	   be	   exercised	   in	   social	   institutions	   (e.g.	   State,	   family)	  were	  power	  relations	  amongst	  individuals	  are	  unequal.	  	  	  Social	   and	   cultural	   transformation	   is,	   therefore,	   an	   instrument	   to	   achieve	   the	  recently	   shaped	  standards	   for	  women’s	   rights	  protection	  and	  promotion,	   and	  cultural	   differences	   cannot	   be	   invoked	   to	   justify	   their	   rejection.	   In	   this	  framework,	   social,	   religious	   and	   traditional	   practices	   are	   not	   entitled	   to	  deference	  merely	  because	  they	  are	  culturally	  specific	  traditions	  (Binion,	  1995).	  The	   effort	   should,	   hence,	   be	   put	   in	   identifying	   and	   modifying	   particularly	  conductive	   contexts	   for	   VAW,	   considered	   illegitimate	   and	   unjustifiable	  (Coomaraswany,	  1997).	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The	  critical	  point	  to	  reduce	  this	  tension	  is	  to	  provide	  for	  a	  method	  that	  enables	  different	  cultures	  to	  articulate	  their	  own	  interpretation	  (Gunning,	  1992),	  while	  providing	   those	  who	  perceive	  a	  violation	  with	  an	   instrument	  of	  defence.	  This	  issue	  calls	  for	  a	  focus	  on	  an	  inclusive	  dialogue	  to	  construct	  a	  global	  consensus	  on	  human	  rights	  understandings,	  a	  challenge	  that	  the	   international	   field	  faces	  not	  only	  for	  what	  concerns	  women’s	  rights.	  As	  we	  will	  see	  in	  the	  Third	  Section	  of	  this	  research,	  the	  approach	  based	  on	  unequal	  power	  relations	  provides	  tools	  to	  accommodate	  these	  tensions.	  	  Following	  up	  on	   the	  precious	  considerations,	   if	  acceptable	  solutions	  might	  be	  found	   for	   what	   concerns	   accommodating	   cultural	   diversity	   on	   single	   issues,	  reaching	  a	  “temporary	  political	  consensus	  on	  a	  specific	  issue”	   (Braidotti,	  1992),	  the	  problem	  of	  intersectionality	  complicates	  the	  framework.	  As	  we	  will	  see,	  the	  difficulties	   in	   promoting	   women’s	   rights,	   particularly	   in	   the	   legal	   sphere,	  required	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  simplification,	  which	  discouraged	  the	   integration	  of	  additional	  elements	  of	  complexity.	  	  Some	   feminist	   scholars	   challenge	   the	   adoption	   of	   an	   approach	   based	   on	  unequal	  positions	  of	  power	  focused	  solely	  on	  gender	  (e.g.	  Crenshaw,	  1988).	  In	  this	   perspective,	   a	   single-­‐factor	   analysis	   makes	   invisible	   other	   forms	   of	  subjugation.	  In	  their	  view	  suffering	  and	  oppression	  derive,	  in	  some	  cases,	  from	  an	   intersection	  of	  several	   factors	  (Haraway,	  1991),	  demanding	  more	  complex	  analyses.	  	  	  Those	   focusing	   on	   intersectionality	   understand	   women’s	   identities	   as	  constructed	   by	   a	   diverse	   set	   of	   social	   relations,	   which	   might	   even	   be	  contradictory	  (Flax,	  1990).	  Mohanty	  argues,	  "Women	  are	  constituted	  as	  women	  
through	   the	   complex	   interaction	   between	   class,	   culture,	   religion	   and	   other	  
ideological	  institutions	  and	  frameworks.	  They	  are	  not	  'women'	  -­‐	  a	  coherent	  group	  
-­‐	  solely	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  particular	  economic	  system	  or	  policy”	  (Mohanty,	  1988).	  In	   this	   view,	   although	   a	   strategic	   political	   alliance	   is	   needed	   to	   promote	  women’s	  rights,	  it	  should	  not	  be	  confused	  with	  homogeneity.	  These	  claims	  can	  be	   internalised	   extending	   the	   analysis	   based	   on	   unequal	   power	   relations	  between	   sexes	   to	   all	   forms	   of	   social	   dominance,	   without	   restricting	   them	   to	  those	  exercised	  by	  men	  over	  women	  in	  patriarchal	  societies.	  	  	  This	   views	   originated	   in	   the	   Black	  Women	  movement,	   which	   pointed	   at	   the	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shortcomings	   of	   a	   feminist	   theory	   consolidated	   creating	   a	   consciousness	   of	  (white)	   women	   in	   opposition	   to	   (white)	   man	   (Crenshaw,	   1988;	   Thornhill,	  1985).	   Western	   feminism,	   hence,	   overlooks	   other	   social	   structures,	   such	   as	  race,	   which	   constitute	   women’s	   identities.	   Crenshaw	   argues	   that	   for	   black	  women,	  belonging	   to	  a	  community	  defined	  by	  race,	  a	  challenge	  of	  patriarchal	  structures	   created	   in	   opposition	   to	   black	   man	   and	   through	   an	   alliance	   with	  white	  (privileged)	  women,	  was	  not	  a	  viable	  solution	  (Crenshaw,	  1988).	  Similar	  claims	  have	  been	  raised	  by	  post-­‐colonialist	  feminists	  and,	  recently,	  by	  Muslim	  women	   scholars.	   Johnstone	   argues	   for	   the	   consideration	   of	   intersectional	  issues,	   such	   as	   race	   and	   gender,	   disability	   and	   gender,	   and	   age	   and	   gender,	  which	  have	  historically	  fallen	  through	  the	  gaps	  (Johnstone,	  2006).	  	  Intersectionality	   and	   cultural	   diversity,	   constant	   elements	   of	   the	   reality	   of	  women’s	  experiences	   (Hooks,	  1984),	  demand	   for	  more	  complex	  analyses	  and	  theories.	  	  	  The	  Women’s	  Conventions	  provide	  some	  elements	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  address	  complex	  cases	  of	  intersection,	  moreover,	  with	  their	  emphasis	  on	  the	  role	  of	  the	  State,	   they	   provide	   for	   mechanisms	   of	   localized	   interventions,	   more	  appropriate	  for	  context-­‐based	  analyses.	  	  CEDAW	   Preamble,	   setting	   the	   framework	   of	   the	   Convention,	   recognises	   a	  multiplicity	  of	  factors	  affecting	  people’s	  possibility	  to	  enjoy	  their	  fundamental	  rights,	   referring	   to	   “the	   eradication	   of	   apartheid,	   all	   forms	   of	   racism,	   racial	  
discrimination,	  colonialism,	  neo-­‐colonialism,	  aggression,	   foreign	  occupation	  and	  
domination	  and	  interference	  in	  the	  internal	  affairs	  of	  States	  [as]	  essential	  to	  the	  
full	   enjoyment	   of	   the	   rights	   of	   men	   and	   women”.	   Article	   14	   refers	   to	   the	  particular	   problems	   faced	   by	   rural	   women.	   It	   should	   be	   pointed	   out	   that,	  however,	  only	  Article	  14	  explicitly	  requires	  an	  analysis	  that	  takes	  into	  account	  the	   intersection	   between	   multiple	   factors,	   namely	   gender	   and	   other	   factors	  determining	  the	  particular	  conditions	  faced	  by	  a	  specific	  group	  of	  women.	  	  The	   BdPC,	   although	   only	   with	   reference	   to	   VAW,	   provides	   a	   better	   suited	  wording	   far	  what	   concerns	   intersectionality.	  Article	  9	   states:	   “With	  respect	  to	  
the	  adoption	  of	  the	  measures	  in	  this	  Chapter,	  the	  States	  Parties	  shall	  take	  special	  
account	   of	   the	   vulnerability	   of	   women	   to	   violence	   by	   reason	   of	   among	   others,	  
their	  race	  or	  ethnic	  background	  or	  their	  status	  as	  migrants,	  refugees	  or	  displaced	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persons.	   Similar	   consideration	   shall	   be	   given	   to	   women	   subjected	   to	   violence	  
while	   pregnant	   or	   who	   are	   disabled,	   of	   minor	   age,	   elderly,	   socio-­‐economically	  
disadvantaged,	   affected	   by	   armed	   conflict	   or	   deprived	   of	   their	   freedom.”	   The	  language	  of	  Article	  9	   could	  easily	  be	  used	  as	   the	   starting	  point	  of	   an	  analysis	  encompassing	   the	   interplay	   of	   several	   factors	   creating	   the	   conditions	   for	  unequal	  power	  relations.	  	  The	  more	   recent	   Istanbul	  Convention	  provides	   the	  most	   articulated	  wording.	  Article	  12.3	  establishes:	  “Any	  measures	  taken	  pursuant	  to	  this	  chapter	  shall	  take	  
into	   account	   and	   address	   the	   specific	   needs	   of	   persons	   made	   vulnerable	   by	  
particular	  circumstances	  and	  shall	  place	  the	  human	  rights	  of	  all	  victims	  at	  their	  
centre”.	   The	   crucial	   significance	   of	   this	   provision	   is	   its	   reference	   to	  vulnerability,	   an	   important	   element	   for	   a	   complex	   analysis	   of	   the	   causes	   of	  subjugations.	   Article	   44	   (Jurisdiction)	   contains	   other	   elements	   worth	   to	   be	  signalled.	   Point	   2	   states:	   “Parties	   shall	   endeavour	   to	   take	   the	   necessary	  
legislative	  or	  other	  measures	  to	  establish	  jurisdiction	  over	  any	  offence	  established	  
in	  accordance	  with	  this	  Convention	  where	  the	  offence	  is	  committed	  against	  one	  of	  
their	   nationals	   or	   a	   person	   who	   has	   her	   or	   his	   habitual	   residence	   in	   their	  
territory”,	  and	  at	  Point	  5	  we	  read:	  “Parties	  shall	  take	  the	  necessary	  legislative	  or	  
other	   measures	   to	   establish	   jurisdiction	   over	   the	   offences	   established	   in	  
accordance	  with	  this	  Convention,	  in	  cases	  where	  an	  alleged	  perpetrator	  is	  present	  
on	  their	  territory	  and	  they	  do	  not	  extradite	  her	  or	  him	  to	  another	  Party,	  solely	  on	  
the	  basis	  of	  her	  or	  his	  nationality”.	  The	   use	   of	   the	  male	   and	   female	   pronouns,	  both	   referring	   to	   the	  victim	   (Point	  2)	   and	   the	  perpetrator	   (Point	  3),	   suggests	  the	   possibility	   to	   use	   the	   Istanbul	   Convention	   in	   complex	   cases,	   where	   the	  victim	  is	  not	  necessarily	  a	  women	  and	  the	  perpetrator	  is	  not	  necessarily	  a	  man.	  Such	  a	  broad	  application	  is	  conceivable	  if	  addressing	  cases	  applying	  an	  analysis	  encompassing	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  factors	  creating	  vulnerability,	  e.g.	  homophobic	  societies,	   and	   resulting	   in	   discriminatory	   violence	   as	   a	   manifestation	   of	  unequal	  power	  relations.	  	  Women’s	   Conventions	   provide	   the	   basis	   to	   respond	   to	   the	   issues	   posed	   by	  intersectionality	   and	  provide	   elements	   to	   address	  multi-­‐dimensional	   analysis	  of	  contexts	  creating	  unequal	  power	  relations.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  is	  inherent	  in	   the	   emphasis	   on	   specific	   situations	   and	   personal	   identities	   that	   a	   legal	  instrument,	   particularly	   an	   international	   one,	   cannot	   exhaustively	   cover	   all	  possibilities.	  The	  critical	  point	  is	  not	  to	  dismiss	  their	  usefulness	  on	  the	  basis	  of	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their	   incompleteness,	  but	   to	  provide	  means	   to	   “complete”	   them	  in	  a	  way	   that	  responds	   to	   the	  concerns	  raised.	   In	   this	   sense,	   international	  and	  national	   law	  and	   institutions	   are	   required	   to	   adopt	   a	   self-­‐critical	   posture,	   avoiding	  considering	   gendered	   analysis	   as	   sufficiently	   explanatory	   of	   increasingly	  complex	  situations,	  reproducing	  the	  errors	  made	  in	  the	  past,	  when	  gender	  was	  not	  considered	  a	  category	  of	  analysis.	  Let	  us	  recall	  that	  it	  took	  three	  decades	  to	  use	   the	   framework	   of	   analysis	   adopted	   in	   the	   1963	   Declaration	   Against	   all	  Forms	  of	  Racial	  Discrimination	  to	  understand	  the	  nature	  and	  consequences	  of	  VAW,	   with	   the	   1993	   Declaration	   on	   the	   Elimination	   of	   Violence	   Against	  Women.	  Most	  of	  the	  advancements	  made	  in	  the	  international	  response	  to	  VAW	  are	  not	  actual	  innovations,	  but	  adapted	  notions,	  concepts	  and	  principles,	  which	  existed	  but	  were	  not	  applied	  to	  issues	  that,	  for	  historical	  and	  cultural	  reasons,	  were	  not	  understood	  as	  human	  rights	  violations.	  	  	  
Domestic	  effectiveness	  and	  the	  public/private	  dilemma	  	  The	   centrality	   of	   domestic	   implementation	   brings	   about	   the	   question	   of	   the	  traditional	  public/private	  divide	  in	  international	  law.	  	  Traditionally,	   feminist	   legal	  scholars	  have	  been	  sceptical	  about	  the	  usefulness	  of	   international	   law	   to	   respond	   to	   acts	   of	   VAW.	   They	   pointed	   at	   their	   easy	  dismissal	  when	  committed	  by	  public	  agents,	  given	  that	  such	  acts	  are	  not	  part	  of	  their	  duties	  and,	  hence,	  not	  attributable	  to	  the	  State.	  For	  instance,	  the	  definition	  of	  torture,	  by	  focusing	  only	  on	  purposeful	  torture	  by	  public	  officials,	  excluded	  other	   “non-­‐purposeful”	   violence	   perpetrated	   by	   State	   agents	   (MacKinnon,	  1993).	   Moreover,	   failing	   to	   create	   a	   nexus	   between	   VAW	   and	   human	   rights,	  international	   law	   left	   unaddressed	   all	   the	   “private”	   social	   domains,	   in	   which	  women	   are	   most	   likely	   to	   suffer	   from	   oppression32	  (Charlesworth,	   1995;	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  As	  we	  will	  see	  in	  the	  following	  paragraphs,	  this	  understanding	  of	  the	  private	  and	  public	  domains	  has	  been	  criticized	  as	  emerging	  from	  a	  culturally	  defined	  context,	  incapable	  to	  describe	  societies	  in	  which	   such	  dichotomy	  does	  not	   exist,	   or	  presents	  different	   features.	   Crenshaw	   stressed	   that	   the	  separate-­‐spheres	  literature	  assumes	  this	  feature	  as	  a	  universal	  element	  of	  the	  social	  construction	  of	  women’s	  gender,	  while	   this	  might	  not	  be	   the	  case	   (Crenshaw,	  1988).	  However,	   some	  objected	  that	  no	   judgement	   is	  made	  on	   the	   “private”,	  while	   its	   identification	   comes	   from	  observation	  and	  refusing	   it	   would	   deprive	   communication	   of	   a	   powerful	   tool	   (Fellmeth,	   2000).	   Other	   scholars	  underline	   that,	   in	   some	   societies,	   the	   restriction	   on	   State’s	   intervention	   in	   the	   private	   sphere	  actually	  protects	  women	  from	  unwanted	  public	  interference	  on	  their	  lives	  (Cook,	  1995;	  Buss,	  1997;	  Engle,	  1994).	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Johnstone,	   2006;	   Rao,	   1996;	   Buss,	   1997).	   Hence,	   the	   public/private	   divide	  affected	   disproportionately	   women,	   actually	   constituting	   a	   significant	  limitation	  to	  States’	  possibility	  to	  intervene	  in	  spheres	  protected	  by	  the	  right	  to	  a	   private	   life.	   Under	   these	   conditions,	   the	   international	   field	  was	   considered	  unfit	   to	   protect	   and	   promote	   women’s	   rights	   (Johnstone,	   2006;	   MacKinnon,	  1993).	  	  	  With	  the	  recognition	  of	   the	   jus	  cogens	  nature	  of	   the	  principles	  of	  equality	  and	  non-­‐discrimination,	   they	   came	   to	   imply	   obligations	   erga	   omnes,	   thereby	  encompassing	   all	   the	   addressees	   of	   the	   legal	   norms	   (omnes)	   in	   all	   domains.	  While	   jus	  cogens	  is	  a	  concept	  of	  material	   law,	  the	  obligations	  erga	  omnes	  refer	  to	  the	  structure	  of	  their	  performance,	  on	  the	  part	  of	  all	  the	  entities	  and	  all	  the	  individuals	   bound	   by	   them	   (Ragazzi,	   1997;	   Byers,	   1997;	   Annacker,	   1994).	  Judge	   Cançado	   Trindade,	   describes	   an	   horizontal	   dimension,	   in	   which	   these	  principles	   bind	   all	   States	   Party	   to	   human	   rights	   treaties	   (obligations	   erga	  
omnes	  partes),	   and	   all	   the	   States	  which	   compose	   the	   organized	   international	  community	   (obligations	   erga	   omnes	   lato	   sensu),	   and	   a	   vertical	   dimension,	   in	  which	   the	   obligations	   erga	   omnes	   of	   protection	   bind	   both	   the	   organs	   and	  agents	   of	   public	   power,	   and	   the	   individuals	   themselves	   (Cançado	   Trindade,	  1999).	  	  In	   this	   framework	  Women’s	   Conventions	   cut	   through	   the	   problem,	   explicitly	  clarifying	   the	   need	   to	   address	   violations	   to	  women’s	   rights	   regardless	   of	   the	  “type”	   of	   perpetrator	   and	   the	   ambit	   in	  which	   they	   occur.	   Chinkin	   recognised	  that	   CEDAW	   responded	   to	   the	   inadequacy	   of	   international	   law	   to	   address	  private	   abuses	   (Chinkin,	   1995,	   2000).	   Indeed,	   Article	   2.e	   CEDAW	   requires	  States	   “To	   take	   all	   appropriate	   measures	   to	   eliminate	   discrimination	   against	  
women	   by	   any	   person,	   organisation	   or	   enterprise.”	   However,	   the	   more	   recent	  instruments	  are	  more	  explicit.	  	  General	  Recommendation	  19	  refers	  to	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  States	  in	  cases	  of	   acts	   perpetrated	   by	   private	   individuals	   at	   Point	   9:	   “[…]	   Under	   general	  
international	   law	   and	   specific	   human	   rights	   covenants,	   States	   may	   also	   be	  
responsible	   for	   private	   acts	   if	   they	   fail	   to	   act	   with	   due	   diligence	   to	   prevent	  
violations	  of	  rights	  or	  to	  investigate	  and	  punish	  acts	  of	  violence,	  and	  for	  providing	  
compensation”.	   Then	   reiterates	   it	   in	   the	   Specific	   Recommendations	   at	   Point	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24.a:	  “States	  parties	  should	  take	  appropriate	  and	  effective	  measures	  to	  overcome	  
all	  forms	  of	  gender-­‐based	  violence,	  whether	  by	  public	  or	  private	  act.”	  
	  The	   BdPC	   establishes	   it	   in	   Article	   1:	   “For	   the	   purposes	   of	   this	   Convention,	  
violence	   against	   women	   shall	   be	   understood	   as	   any	   act	   or	   conduct,	   based	   on	  
gender,	  which	  causes	  death	  or	  physical,	  sexual	  or	  psychological	  harm	  or	  suffering	  
to	  women,	  whether	  in	  the	  public	  or	  the	  private	  sphere”.	  	  The	   Istanbul	   Convention	   clarifies	   its	   stand	   at	   Article	   3,	   dedicated	   to	   defining	  concepts:	  “’violence	  against	  women’	  is	  understood	  as	  a	  violation	  of	  human	  rights	  
and	  a	   form	  of	  discrimination	  against	  women	  and	  shall	  mean	  all	  acts	  of	  gender-­‐
based	   violence	   that	   result	   in,	   or	   are	   likely	   to	   result	   in,	   physical,	   sexual,	  
psychological	  or	  economic	  harm	  or	  suffering	  to	  women,	  including	  threats	  of	  such	  
acts,	  coercion	  or	  arbitrary	  deprivation	  of	  liberty,	  whether	  occurring	  in	  public	  or	  
in	   private	   life”.	   It	   then	   reiterates	   it	   at	   Article	   4.1:	   “Parties	   shall	   take	   the	  
necessary	   legislative	   and	   other	  measures	   to	   promote	   and	   protect	   the	   right	   for	  
everyone,	  particularly	  women,	  to	  live	  free	  from	  violence	  in	  both	  the	  public	  and	  the	  
private	  sphere”.	  	  Hence,	  currently,	  mandatory	  non-­‐intervention	  in	  private	  matters	  (or	  national-­‐sovereignty)	   cannot	   be	   invoked	   to	   justify	   the	   failure	   of	   a	   State	   to	   protect	  women	   from	   violence,	   understood	   as	   a	   human	   rights	   violation	   and	   a	  manifestation	   of	   discrimination.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   active	   role	   of	   States	  encountered	   scepticism	   in	   feminist	   legal	   scholarship,	   which	   traditionally	  considered	   them	   patriarchal	   institutions33	  (e.g.	   MacKinnon,	   1987;	   Littleton,	  1989,	   Walby,	   1990).	   Charlesworth	   emphasises	   that	   the	   concept	   of	   national-­‐sovereignty	   limits	   the	   possibility	   of	   triggering	   a	   process	   directed	   to	   achieve	  equality	   (Charlesworth,	   1995)	   and	   eradicate	   VAW.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   Cook	  recognised	   that,	   although	   national-­‐sovereignty	   can	   still	   be	   an	   obstacle	   to	  effective	   enforcement,	   its	   invocation	   has	   significantly	   lost	   legitimacy	   (Cook,	  1994).	   The	   form	   in	  which	   States	   should	   intervene	   has	   also	   been	   questioned.	  Gunning,	   for	  instance,	  argues	  for	  a	  particular	  emphasis	  on	  education,	  to	  avoid	  the	   confrontation	   with	   local	   resistance	   that	   a	   punitive	   approach	  might	   arise	  (Gunning,	  1992).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  In	  this	  perspective,	  international	  law	  itself	  reproduces	  patriarchal	  structures,	  since	  it	  binds	  and	  is	  created	  by	  States	  (Charlesworth	  at	  al.,	  1991).	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  Being	  the	  State	  itself	  a	  social	  institution,	  historically	  and	  culturally	  determined,	  some	   scholars	   argue	   that	   its	   patriarchal	   structure	   should	   not	   be	   considered	  unchangeable,	  and	  that	  a	  radical	  position	  in	  this	  sense	  would	  contribute	  to	  the	  reproduction	  of	  the	  status	  quo,	  interpreting	  as	  suspicious	  any	  attempt	  to	  social	  change	   (Fellmeth,	   2000;	   Buss,	   1997).	   In	   this	   view,	   although	   States	   (and	  international	  law)	  cannot	  be	  considered	  as	  the	  only	  tools	  to	  improve	  women’s	  conditions,	  their	  complementary	  role	  should	  not	  be	  overlooked.	  	  	  Women’s	  Conventions	  endorse	  a	  socio-­‐legal	  approach	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  role	  of	  institutions,	  which	  implies	  the	  recognition	  of	  States’	  positive	  responsibilities	  in	   promoting	   and	   protecting	   human	   rights	   (Holmes	   and	   Sunstein	   1999;	  Galligan	  and	  Sandler	  2004).	  In	  this	  view,	  human	  rights	  have	  inherently	  positive	  and	  negative	  dimensions	  (Landman,	  2006),	  needing	  institutional	  preconditions	  for	   their	  enjoyment	   (Madsen,	  2013).	  Positive	  obligations	  entail	   the	  obligation	  of	   protecting	   the	   life	   of	   individuals	   within	   States’	   jurisdiction	   in	   cases	   of	  imminent	   risk.34	  This	   interpretation	   has	   been	   elaborated	   to	   cover	   cases	   in	  which	   the	   State	   knows,	   or	   ought	   to	   know,	   that	   an	   individual	   (or	   a	   group)	   is	  subject	  to	  a	  risk	  involving	  the	  violation	  of	  her/his	  right	  to	  life.	  Hence,	  failure	  to	  adopt	  measures	  to	  prevent	  such	  breach	  would	  give	  rise	  to	  State’s	  responsibility	  for	  omission.	  	  CEDAW	  (and	  General	  Recommendation	  19),	  BdPC	  and	  the	  Istanbul	  Convention	  elevate	   the	  promotion	  of	  human	  rights	  (of	  women)	  above	  cultural	  values	  and	  social	  patterns,	  explicitly	  imposing	  positive	  obligations	  to	  States,	  crucial	  actors	  in	   the	  process	  of	   social	   change.	  Not	  only	  signatories	  commit	   to	  eliminate	  and	  penalize	  all	  practices	   that	  result	   in	  discrimination	  against	  women	   in	  all	  social	  relations	  and	  institutions,	  but	  they	  also	  commit	  to	  promote	  cultural	  and	  social	  change	   to	   eliminate	   prejudices	   and	   stereotypes,	   in	   order	   to	   guarantee	  
substantive	  equality	  between	  en	  and	  women.	  	  	  For	   what	   concerns	   CEDAW,	   Article	   2	   establishes	   positive	   and	   negative	  obligations	  for	  the	  States,	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  adaptation	  of	  their	  legal	  systems	  to	  its	   provisions,	   stating	   that:	   “States	   Parties	   condemn	   discrimination	   against	  
women	   in	   all	   its	   forms,	   agree	   to	   pursue	   by	   all	   appropriate	  means	   and	  without	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Refer,	  for	  instance,	  to	  ECrtHR	  elaboration	  in	  Osman	  v.	  United	  Kingdom	  (1998).	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delay	   a	   policy	   of	   eliminating	   discrimination	   against	   women	   and,	   to	   this	   end,	  
undertake:	  (a)	  To	  embody	  the	  principle	  of	  the	  equality	  of	  men	  and	  women	  in	  their	  
national	   constitutions	   or	   other	   appropriate	   legislation	   if	   not	   yet	   incorporated	  
therein	  and	   to	   ensure,	   through	   law	  and	  other	  appropriate	  means,	   the	  practical	  
realization	   of	   this	   principle;	   (b)	   To	   adopt	   appropriate	   legislative	   and	   other	  
measures,	   including	  sanctions	  where	  appropriate,	  prohibiting	  all	  discrimination	  
against	  women;	   (c)	   To	   establish	   legal	   protection	   of	   the	   rights	   of	  women	   on	   an	  
equal	   basis	  with	  men	   and	   to	   ensure	   through	   competent	   national	   tribunals	   and	  
other	   public	   institutions	   the	   effective	   protection	   of	   women	   against	   any	   act	   of	  
discrimination;	   (d)	   To	   refrain	   from	   engaging	   in	   any	   act	   or	   practice	   of	  
discrimination	   against	   women	   and	   to	   ensure	   that	   public	   authorities	   and	  
institutions	   shall	   act	   in	   conformity	   with	   this	   obligation;	   (e)	   To	   take	   all	  
appropriate	  measures	  to	  eliminate	  discrimination	  against	  women	  by	  any	  person,	  
organisation	   or	   enterprise;	   (f)	   To	   take	   all	   appropriate	   measures,	   including	  
legislation,	  to	  modify	  or	  abolish	  existing	  laws,	  regulations,	  customs	  and	  practices	  
which	  constitute	  discrimination	  against	  women;	  (g)	  To	  repeal	  all	  national	  penal	  
provisions	  which	  constitute	  discrimination	  against	  women”.	  	  Article	   3	   CEDAW	   refers	   to	   their	   duties	   for	   what	   concerns	   the	   elaboration	   of	  public	  policies:	  “States	  Parties	  shall	  take	  in	  all	  fields,	  in	  particular	  in	  the	  political,	  
social,	   economic	   and	   cultural	   fields,	   all	   appropriate	   measures,	   including	  
legislation,	   to	   ensure	   the	   full	   development	   and	   advancement	   of	  women,	   for	   the	  
purpose	  of	  guaranteeing	   them	  the	  exercise	  and	  enjoyment	  of	  human	  rights	  and	  
fundamental	   freedoms	   on	   a	   basis	   of	   equality	   with	   men”.	   Article	   4	   explicitly	  considers	  the	  possibility	  of	  adopting	  special	  measures	  to	  facilitate	  the	  process:	  
“1.	   Adoption	   by	   States	   Parties	   of	   temporary	   special	   measures	   aimed	   at	  
accelerating	  de	   facto	  equality	  between	  men	  and	  women	  shall	  not	  be	  considered	  
discrimination	  as	  defined	  in	  the	  present	  Convention,	  but	  shall	  in	  no	  way	  entail	  as	  
a	   consequence	   the	   maintenance	   of	   unequal	   or	   separate	   standards;	   these	  
measures	   shall	   be	   discontinued	   when	   the	   objectives	   of	   equality	   of	   opportunity	  
and	   treatment	   have	   been	   achieved.	   2.	   Adoption	   by	   States	   Parties	   of	   special	  
measures,	   including	  those	  measures	  contained	  in	  the	  present	  Convention,	  aimed	  
at	  protecting	  maternity	  shall	  not	  be	  considered	  discriminatory”.	  
	  In	  General	  Recommendation	  19,	  CEDAW	  Committee	  raised	  a	  concern	  about	  the	  fact	   that	   “not	   all	   the	   reports	   of	   States	   parties	   adequately	   reflected	   the	   close	  
connection	   between	   discrimination	   against	  women,	   gender-­‐based	   violence,	   and	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violations	  of	  human	  rights	  and	  fundamental	  freedoms.	  The	  full	  implementation	  of	  
the	  Convention	  required	  States	  to	  take	  positive	  measures	  to	  eliminate	  all	  forms	  of	  
violence	  against	  women”	   (Point	   4).	   Point	   24	   includes	   a	   comprehensive	   list	   of	  measures	   that	   States	   are	   required	   to	   enact,	   individuating	   reforms	   and	  integrations	   to	   be	   inserted	   in	   national	   legislations	   (including	   adaptation	   of	  Criminal	  law),	  trainings	  for	  public	  officials,	  data	  collection,	  involvement	  of	  the	  media,	   public	   education	   programmes,	   criteria	   for	   effective	   investigations,	  protective	  measures	  and	  support	  services	  for	  victims.	  	  Similarly,	  Article	  7	  BdPC	  addresses	  the	  requirements	  to	  States	  with	  respect	  to	  their	  domestic	   legal	  systems:	  “The	  States	  Parties	  condemn	  all	  forms	  of	  violence	  
against	  women	  and	  agree	  to	  pursue,	  by	  all	  appropriate	  means	  and	  without	  delay,	  
policies	   to	   prevent,	   punish	   and	   eradicate	   such	   violence	   and	   undertake	   to:	   a.	  
refrain	   from	  engaging	   in	  any	  act	  or	  practice	  of	   violence	  against	  women	  and	   to	  
ensure	   that	   their	   authorities,	   officials,	   personnel,	   agents,	   and	   institutions	  act	   in	  
conformity	  with	  this	  obligation;	  b.	  apply	  due	  diligence	  to	  prevent,	  investigate	  and	  
impose	   penalties	   for	   violence	   against	   women;	   c.	   include	   in	   their	   domestic	  
legislation	  penal,	  civil,	  administrative	  and	  any	  other	  type	  of	  provisions	  that	  may	  
be	  needed	  to	  prevent,	  punish	  and	  eradicate	  violence	  against	  women	  and	  to	  adopt	  
appropriate	  administrative	  measures	  where	  necessary;	   d.	   adopt	   legal	  measures	  
to	  require	  the	  perpetrator	  to	  refrain	  from	  harassing,	  intimidating	  or	  threatening	  
the	  woman	  or	  using	  any	  method	  that	  harms	  or	  endangers	  her	  life	  or	  integrity,	  or	  
damages	   her	   property;	   	   e.	   take	   all	   appropriate	   measures,	   including	   legislative	  
measures,	  to	  amend	  or	  repeal	  existing	  laws	  and	  regulations	  or	  to	  modify	  legal	  or	  
customary	   practices	   which	   sustain	   the	   persistence	   and	   tolerance	   of	   violence	  
against	  women;	   f.	   establish	   fair	   and	   effective	   legal	   procedures	   for	  women	  who	  
have	   been	   subjected	   to	   violence	   which	   include,	   among	   others,	   protective	  
measures,	  a	   timely	  hearing	  and	  effective	  access	   to	   such	  procedures;	  g.	   establish	  
the	   necessary	   legal	   and	   administrative	   mechanisms	   to	   ensure	   that	   women	  
subjected	  to	  violence	  have	  effective	  access	  to	  restitution,	  reparations	  or	  other	  just	  
and	  effective	  remedies;	  and	  h.	  adopt	  such	  legislative	  or	  other	  measures	  as	  may	  be	  
necessary	  to	  give	  effect	  to	  this	  Convention”.	  	  	  Article	  8	  refers	  to	  obligations	  what	  concerns	  public	  policies:	  “The	  States	  Parties	  
agree	   to	   undertake	   progressively	   specific	   measures,	   including	   programs:	   a.	   to	  
promote	   awareness	   and	   observance	   of	   the	   right	   of	   women	   to	   be	   free	   from	  
violence,	   and	   the	   right	   of	   women	   to	   have	   their	   human	   rights	   respected	   and	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protected;	   b.	   to	   modify	   social	   and	   cultural	   patterns	   of	   conduct	   of	   men	   and	  
women,	  including	  the	  development	  of	  formal	  and	  informal	  educational	  programs	  
appropriate	   to	   every	   level	   of	   the	   educational	   process,	   to	   counteract	   prejudices,	  
customs	  and	  all	  other	  practices	  which	  are	  based	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  inferiority	  or	  
superiority	  of	  either	  of	  the	  sexes	  or	  on	  the	  stereotyped	  roles	  for	  men	  and	  women	  
which	   legitimize	   or	   exacerbate	   violence	   against	   women;	   c.	   to	   promote	   the	  
education	   and	   training	   of	   all	   those	   involved	   in	   the	   administration	   of	   justice,	  
police	  and	  other	  law	  enforcement	  officers	  as	  well	  as	  other	  personnel	  responsible	  
for	   implementing	   policies	   for	   the	   prevention,	   punishment	   and	   eradication	   of	  
violence	  against	  women;	  d.	  to	  provide	  appropriate	  specialized	  services	  for	  women	  
who	  have	  been	  subjected	  to	  violence,	  through	  public	  and	  private	  sector	  agencies,	  
including	  shelters,	  counselling	  services	  for	  ail	  family	  members	  where	  appropriate,	  
and	   care	   and	   custody	   of	   the	   affected	   children;	   e.	   to	   promote	   and	   support	  
governmental	   and	   private	   sector	   education	   designed	   to	   raise	   the	   awareness	   of	  
the	   public	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   problems	   of	   and	   remedies	   for	   violence	   against	  
women”.	  	  Finally,	   Article	   9	  mirrors	   the	   intent	   of	   Article	   4	   CEDAW:	   “With	   respect	   to	   the	  
adoption	   of	   the	   measures	   in	   this	   Chapter,	   the	   States	   Parties	   shall	   take	   special	  
account	   of	   the	   vulnerability	   of	   women	   to	   violence	   by	   reason	   of	   among	   others,	  
their	  race	  or	  ethnic	  background	  or	  their	  status	  as	  migrants,	  refugees	  or	  displaced	  
persons.	   Similar	   consideration	   shall	   be	   given	   to	   women	   subjected	   to	   violence	  
while	   pregnant	   or	   who	   are	   disabled,	   of	   minor	   age,	   elderly,	   socio	   economically	  
disadvantaged,	  affected	  by	  armed	  conflict	  or	  deprived	  of	  their	  freedom”.	  	  	  
	  The	   Istanbul	   Convention	   is	   even	   more	   precise,	   Article	   5	   summarizes	   States	  obligations	   stating	   that:	   “1.	   Parties	   shall	   refrain	   from	   engaging	   in	   any	   act	   of	  
violence	   against	   women	   and	   ensure	   that	   State	   authorities,	   officials,	   agents,	  
institutions	  and	  other	  actors	  acting	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  State	  act	  in	  conformity	  with	  
this	  obligation.	  2.	  Parties	  shall	  take	  the	  necessary	  legislative	  and	  other	  measures	  
to	   exercise	  due	  diligence	   to	  prevent,	   investigate,	   punish	  and	  provide	   reparation	  
for	  acts	  of	  violence	  covered	  by	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  Convention	  that	  are	  perpetrated	  
by	  non-­‐State	  actors”.	  Article	  6	  calls	   for	  gender-­‐sensitive	  policies:	   “Parties	  shall	  
undertake	  to	  include	  a	  gender	  perspective	  in	  the	  implementation	  and	  evaluation	  
of	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  provisions	  of	  this	  Convention	  and	  to	  promote	  and	  effectively	  
implement	  policies	  of	  equality	  between	  women	  and	  men	  and	  the	  empowerment	  of	  
women”.	   Article	   4.4	   reflects	   Article	   9	   BdPC	   and	   Article	   4	   CEDAW,	   clarifying	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that:	   “Special	  measures	   that	  are	  necessary	   to	  prevent	  and	  protect	  women	   from	  
gender-­‐based	  violence	  shall	  not	  be	  considered	  discrimination	  under	  the	  terms	  of	  
this	  Convention”.	  	  In	   the	   following	   Chapters,	   the	   Istanbul	   Convention	   thoroughly	   addresses	   the	  crucial	   elements	   of	   the	   holistic	   approach	   required.	   Chapter	   II	   refers	   to	  integrated	   policies	   and	   data	   collection,	   requiring	   State	   wide	   comprehensive	  and	  coordinated	  policies	  (Article	  7)	  and	  the	  allocation	  of	  appropriate	  financial	  resources	  for	  the	  implementation	  of	  integrated	  policies,	  included	  those	  carried	  out	  by	  NGOs	  and	  civil	  society	  (Article	  8).	  Chapter	  III	  is	  dedicated	  to	  prevention	  (Arts.	  12	  and	  16),	  awareness	  rising	  (Article	  13),	  education	  and	  training	  (Arts.	  14	  and	  15)	  and	  participation	  of	  the	  private	  sector	  and	  the	  media	  (Article	  17).	  Chapter	   IV	   refers	   to	  protection	  and	   support	   for	   victims	  of	   violence	   (Arts.	   18-­‐28).	  Chapter	  V	  refers	  to	  the	  adaptation	  of	  national	  legal	  systems	  (Arts.	  29-­‐48),	  while	  Chapter	  VI	  presents	  a	  thorough	  interpretation	  of	  States’	  obligations	  with	  respect	  to	  investigation,	  prosecution,	  procedural	  law	  and	  protective	  measures	  (Arts.	   49-­‐58).	   Finally,	   Chapter	   VIII	   establishes	   the	   criteria	   to	   enhance	  international	  co-­‐operation	  on	  the	  issue.	  	  States’	  abidance	  to	  their	  positive	  obligations	  is	  evaluated	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  due	  diligence.	  If	  State’s	  responsibility	  overarches	  negative	  (respect	  for	  human	  rights)	  and	  positive	  obligations	  (protecting	  and	  promoting)	  to	  reach	  substantive	   minimum	   standards	   (Byrnes	   and	   Connors,	   1996;	   Macklem	   and	  Scott,	  1992),	  In	  her	  2006	  Report,	  UN	  Special	  Rapporteur	  on	  VAW	  Yakin	  Ertürk	  referred	  to	  a	  rule	  of	  customary	  international	  law	  that	  “obliges	  States	  to	  prevent	  
and	   respond	   to	   acts	   of	   violence	   against	  women	  with	   due	   diligence”	   (para.	   29),	  explicitly	   including	   due	   diligence	   in	   relation	   to	   VAW	   into	   the	   realm	   of	   jus	  
cogens.	  Therefore,	   the	   failure	   of	   the	   State	   to	   promote	   and	   protect	   rights	   does	   not	  depend	  on	   the	  necessity	   to	   identify	  a	  particular	  perpetrator	   (Fredman,	  2010)	  and	  its	  responsibility	  emerges	  from	  inadequate	  national	  structures	  to	  respond	  to	  VAW,	  including	  the	  failure	  to	  adequately	  investigate	  such	  acts.	  The	  challenge	  is	   then	   to	   effectively	   reform	   inadequate	   national	   structures,	   while	  contemporarily	   focusing	   on	   transforming	   the	   social	   and	   cultural	   patterns	  which	  generate	  VAW	  and	  conduct	  to	  impunity	  (even	  in	  cases	  in	  which	  national	  legislation	   provides	   appropriate	   frameworks	   for	   action	   and	   formal	   legal	  equality).	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  Both	   General	   Recommendation	   19	   and	   the	  Declaration	   on	   the	   Elimination	   of	  Violence	  Against	  Women	  explicitly	  refer	  to	  the	  principle	  of	  due	  diligence:	  	  In	   General	   Recommendation	   19	   “Under	  general	   international	   law	  and	   specific	  
human	   rights	   covenants,	   States	  may	  also	   be	   responsible	   for	   private	   acts	   if	   they	  
fail	  to	  act	  with	  due	  diligence	  to	  prevent	  violations	  of	  rights	  or	  to	  investigate	  and	  
punish	   acts	   of	   violence,	   and	   for	   providing	   compensation”	   (Point	   9,	   General	  Comments).	  	  The	   UN	   1993	   Declaration	   includes	   it	   in	   Article	   4.c:	   “States	   should	   condemn	  
violence	  against	  women	  and	  should	  not	  invoke	  any	  custom,	  tradition	  or	  religious	  
consideration	   to	   avoid	   their	   obligations	   with	   respect	   to	   its	   elimination.	   States	  
should	  pursue	  by	  all	  appropriate	  means	  and	  without	  delay	  a	  policy	  of	  eliminating	  
violence	  against	  women	  and,	  to	  this	  end,	  should:	  […]	  (c)	  Exercise	  due	  diligence	  to	  
prevent,	   investigate	  and,	   in	  accordance	  with	  national	   legislation,	  punish	  acts	  of	  
violence	  against	  women,	  whether	   those	  acts	  are	  perpetrated	  by	   the	  State	  or	  by	  
private	  persons”.	  	  Similarly,	  at	  Article	  7.b,	  the	  BdPC	  establishes	  that:	  “The	  States	  Parties	  condemn	  
all	   forms	   of	   violence	   against	   women	   and	   agree	   to	   pursue,	   by	   all	   appropriate	  
means	  and	  without	  delay,	  policies	  to	  prevent,	  punish	  and	  eradicate	  such	  violence	  
and	  undertake	   to:	   […]	  b.	  apply	  due	  diligence	   to	  prevent,	   investigate	  and	   impose	  
penalties	  for	  violence	  against	  women”.	  	  
	  Article	   5.2	   of	   the	   Istanbul	   Convention	   states	   that:	   “Parties	   shall	   take	   the	  
necessary	   legislative	   and	   other	   measures	   to	   exercise	   due	   diligence	   to	   prevent,	  
investigate,	   punish	   and	   provide	   reparation	   for	   acts	   of	   violence	   covered	   by	   the	  
scope	  of	  this	  Convention	  […].”	  	  On	  these	  bases,	  attention	  should	  be	  paid	  to	  distinctions	  between	  States’	  ability	  to	   adequately	   address	  VAW	  and	   their	  willingness	   to	   abide,	   in	   the	   light	   of	   the	  
principle	   of	   proportionality,	   according	   to	   which	   States’	   obligations	   cannot	   be	  interpreted	   in	  a	  way	  that	   imposes	  on	  them	  an	   impossible	  of	  disproportionate	  burden. 35 	  However,	   a	   written	   international	   instrument	   is	   not	   suitable	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  This	  perspective	  is	  clarified,	  for	  instance,	  in	  ECrtHR	  Osman	  v.	  United	  Kingdom	  (1998),	  para.	  116.	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conclusively	  solve	  an	  that	  need	  to	  be	  evaluated	  referring	  to	  concrete	  cases,	   in	  order	   to	   determine	   whether,	   in	   a	   particular	   context,	   the	   State	   acted	   to	   the	  extent	  of	  its	  ability	  (Cook,	  1995).	  	  Through	   the	   notion	   of	   positive	   obligations,	   the	   (extended)	   principle	   of	   due	  diligence	   and	   the	   explicit	   reference	   to	   VAW	   as	   a	   human	   rights	   violation,	  Women	   Conventions	   have	   satisfactorily	   responded	   (“to	   the	   extent	   of	   their	  abilities”)	  to	  the	  early	  criticism	  of	  feminist	  legal	  scholars.	  	  The	  critical	  issue	  is,	  therefore,	  guaranteeing	  effectiveness	  to	  their	  provisions	  at	  domestic	   level,	   having	   singled	   out	   the	   State	   as	   a	   crucial	   engine	   to	   eradicate	  VAW.	   This	   brings	   us	   to	   address	   the	   question	   of	   the	   establishment	   of	  enforcement	  and	  monitoring	  mechanism	  to	  promote	  States’	  implementation	  of	  Women’s	  Conventions	  provisions,	  to	  guarantee	  compliance	  and	  promote	  their	  political	  will	  to	  abide	  (or	  overcome	  the	  lack	  of	  it).	  	  	  
The	  controversial	  choice	  of	  a	  specialized	  instrument	  	  
“One	  of	  the	  most	  telling	  ironies	  is	  that	  CEDAW	  was	  enacted,	  according	  to	  its	  
preamble,	  because	  the	  state	  parties	  to	  the	  convention	  were	  concerned	  that,	  in	  
spite	  of	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  UN	  treaties	  and	  conventions	  promoting	  equal	  
opportunity	  and	  equal	  rights	  for	  women,	  ‘extensive	  discrimination	  against	  
women	  continues	  to	  exist’.	  The	  parties	  apparently	  decided	  that	  the	  solution	  to	  the	  
problem	  of	  real	  world	  violations	  of	  treaty-­‐based	  rights	  was	  to	  create	  more	  treaty-­‐	  
based	  rights”	  (Fellmeth,	  2000,	  p.	  721)	  	  	  	  Feminist	  legal	  scholars	  are	  generally	  sceptical	  in	  their	  judgement	  of	  specialized	  international	  instruments	  on	  women’s	  rights.	  Some	  authors	  consider	  CEDAW	  a	  prove	  of	  the	  marginalization	  of	  women's	  rights	  emphasising,	  inter	  alia,	  the	  fact	  that	   it	  was	  adopted	  by	  the	  Commission	  on	  the	  Status	  of	  Women	  instead	  of	  by	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the	  Human	  Rights	  Commission36,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  other	  treaties	  (Chinkin,	  2005;	  Johnstone,	  2006).	  37	  	  Elaborating	   on	   what	   previously	   considered	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   recognised	  conceptual	   and	   structural	   gender-­‐bias	   of	   the	   traditional	   approach,	  we	  do	  not	  find	   this	   negative	   attitude	   entirely	   coherent.	   	   Indeed,	   if	   arguing	   women’s	  underrepresentation	   in	   international	   institutions	   as	   a	   crucial	   negative	  condition	   for	   the	   inclusion	   of	   a	   gender	   perspective	   in	   human	   rights	   law,	   we	  believe	   that	   a	  more	   coherent	   conclusion	  would	   be	   to	   consider	   positively	   the	  decision	   to	   entrust	   the	   elaboration	   of	   a	   specific	   instrument,	   “fixing”	   the	  shortcoming	   of	   existing	   ones,	   to	   a	   Commission	   with	   appropriate	   expertise.	  Given	  the	  persisting	  gender	  bias	  in	  UN	  institutions	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  adoption	  of	   CEDAW,38	  the	   preference	   on	   the	   Commission	   on	   the	   Status	   of	   Women	  appears	   to	   us	   more	   reasonable	   than	   waiting	   for	   gender-­‐balanced	   Human	  Rights	   Commission,	   or	   expecting	   a	   male-­‐biased	   composition	   to	   satisfactorily	  integrate	   gender	   as	   a	   tool	   of	   analysis	   and	   norm	   production.	   We	   agree	   with	  Fellmeth	   in	   the	  view	  that	   	  “segmentation	  derives	  from	  historical	  formation,	  not	  
formal	   taxonomy”	   (Fellmeth,	   2000,	   p.	   702),	   with	   the	   resulting	   specialized	  instruments	  representing	  a	  "catching	  up"	  by	  international	  law	  of	  a	  new	  shared	  consensus.	  	  	  On	   the	   technical	   side,	   it	   should	   not	   be	   overlooked	   that	   a	   reform	   of	   the	   old	  conventions,	   to	   avoid	   the	   drafting	   of	   a	   specific	   instrument,	   would	   require	  reopening	   the	   process	   of	   ratification	   by	   all	   signatories.39	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	  solely	   relying	   on	   advocating	   the	   integration	   of	   a	   gender	   perspective	   in	   the	  interpretation	  of	  existing	  (arguably	  male-­‐biased)	  conventions	  would	  maintain	  undesirable	   arbitrariness	   and	   discretion.	   Indeed,	   if	   recognising	   gender-­‐discrimination	   as	   a	   structural	   problem,	   judges	   and	   officers	   cannot	   be	  considered	  to	  be	  immune	  from	  the	  contextual	  influence	  of	  the	  social	  structures	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Replaced	  in	  2006	  by	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Council.	  37	  Johnstone	  stresses	   that:	   “CEDAW	  Committee	  was	  also	  geographically	  and	  structurally	  isolated;	  it	  
was	   located	   in	  Vienna	  under	   the	  auspices	  of	   the	  Division	   for	   the	  Advancement	  of	  Women,	  while	   the	  
other	   committees	   were	   in	   Geneva	   under	   the	   Office	   for	   the	   High	   Commissioner	   for	   Human	   Rights”	  (Johnstone,	  2006,	  p.	  151).	  38	  The	  need	  to	  achieve	  gender	  balance	  is	  still	  considered	  a	  priority,	  as	  stressed	  in	  the	  2005	  Report	  of	  the	  UN	  High	  Commissioner	  for	  Human	  Rights:	  “it	  is	  essential	  that	  a	  gender	  balance	  be	  achieved	  in	  
relation	  to	  the	  overall	  list	  of	  mandate	  holders”	  (p.	  67).	  39	  We	  note	  that,	  if	  States’	  lack	  of	  political	  will	  is	  the	  problem,	  a	  CEDAW	  reform	  requiring	  a	  second	  round	  of	  ratifications	  cannot	  be	  a	  viable	  option.	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they	   live	   in,	   not	   even	   those	  with	   the	   “high	  moral	   character”40	  sufficient	   to	   be	  nominated	  for	  human	  rights	  institutions.	  In	  other	  words,	  a	  specific	  instrument	  constitutes	  a	  useful	  tool	  for	  social	  transformation	  at	  all	  levels.	  	  Being	   the	   understanding	   of	   the	   content	   of	   human	   rights	   norms	   historically,	  culturally	  and	  socially	  determined,	  we	  might	  argue	  that,	  until	  very	  recently,	  the	  rights	  currently	  enshrined	  in	  CEDAW	  and	  Women’s	  Conventions	  were	  not	  even	  conceivable,	  and	  that	   the	  previous	  generations	  of	  rights,	  namely,	  political	  and	  civil,	   have	   been	   propaedeutic	   to	   women’s	   emancipation	   and	   to	   the	   further	  articulation	  of	   their	   instances.	   If	   the	  new	  specific	   instruments	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  imply	  per	  se	  the	  reproduction	  of	  women’s	  rights	  marginalization,	  this	  criticism	  raises	   a	   useful	   concern	   and	   should	   not	   be	   superficially	   dismissed,	   as	   it	  promotes	  an	  increased	  attention	  towards	  the	  possible	  risks	  of	  their	  limited	  use.	  	  As	   we	   will	   see,	   marginalization	   can	   more	   probably	   derive	   from	   weak	  enforcement	  mechanisms.	  	  Other	   arguments	   focus	   on	   the	   language	   of	   specific	   instruments	   and	  declarations.	  Charlesworth	  points	  out	  at	  the	  circumscribed	  idea	  of	  womanhood	  adopted	  in	  the	  Platform	  for	  Action	  of	  the	  Fourth	  World	  Conference	  on	  Women	  held	   in	   Beijing	   in	   1995	   (Charlesworth,	   2000).	   She	  maintains	   that	   the	   debate	  about	   what	   might	   constitute	   "balanced	   and	   non-­‐stereotyped"	   images	   of	  women,	   paradoxically	   resulted	   in	   a	   paragraph	   referring	   to	   women's	  experiences	  as	  including	  the	  "balancing	  [of]	  work	  and	  family	  responsibilities,	  as	  
mothers,	   as	   professionals,	   as	   managers	   and	   as	   entrepreneurs"	   (Beijing	  Declaration,	   para.	   46)	   p.	   73),	   thus,	   in	   fact,	   proving	   the	   difficulty	   in	   removing	  elements	   of	   stereotype.	   Otto	   noted	   that	   the	   traditional	   role	   of	   motherhood	  remains	  central,	  only	  enriched	  with	  the	  recognition	  of	  women’s	  role	  in	  the	  free	  market	   economy,	   leaving	   several	   aspects	   of	   women's	   lives	   still	   unaddressed	  (Otto,	  1996).	  However,	  one	  might	  argue	  this	  focus	  can	  be	  justified	  on	  the	  basis	  of	   its	   descriptive	   nature,	   which	   points	   at	   an	   observable	   situation,	   without	  judging	  (or	  defining)	  women’s	  role.	  	  A	  similar	  critique	  can	  be	  moved	  to	  CEDAW	  Preamble,	  which	  states	  “Bearing	  in	  
mind	   the	   great	   contribution	   of	   women	   to	   the	   welfare	   of	   the	   family	   and	   to	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  This	   is	   the	   usual	   wording	   used	   by	   international	   human	   rights	   instruments,	   see,	   for	   instance,	  Article	   21	   ECHR	   and	  Article	   52	  BdPC,	   both	   referring	   to	   the	   appointment	   of	   judges	   in	   respective	  regional	  Courts.	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development	   of	   society,	   so	   far	   not	   fully	   recognised,	   the	   social	   significance	   of	  
maternity	   and	   the	   role	   of	   both	   parents	   in	   the	   family	   and	   in	   the	   upbringing	   of	  
children,	  and	  aware	  that	  the	  role	  of	  women	  in	  procreation	  should	  not	  be	  a	  basis	  
for	   discrimination	   but	   that	   the	   upbringing	   of	   children	   requires	   a	   sharing	   of	  
responsibility	  between	  men	  and	  women	  and	  society	  as	  a	  whole”.	  From	  a	  feminist	  perspective,	   the	   emphasis	   on	   the	   social	   significance	   of	   maternity,	   although	  tamed	   by	   the	   reference	   to	   the	   shared	   responsibility	   of	   parenthood,	   falls	   in	   a	  contradiction	   similar	   to	   that	   of	   the	   Beijing	   Platform	   for	   Action.	   The	  contradiction	  is	  reinforced	  in	  the	  following	  paragraph,	  which	  states:	  “a	  change	  
in	  the	  traditional	  role	  of	  men	  as	  well	  as	  the	  role	  of	  women	  in	  society	  and	  in	  the	  
family	   is	   needed	   to	   achieve	   full	   equality	   between	   men	   and	   women”.	   This	  aspiration	  is	  put	  in	  a	  place	  that	  makes	  it	  somehow	  ironical,	  having	  previously	  referred	   to	   the	   role	   of	  women	   exclusively	   in	   relation	   to	   reproduction,	  where	  the	  “particular	  function”	  of	  women	  is	  enforced	  by	  nature,	   i.e.	   their	  sex,	  not	  by	  the	  social	  construction	  of	  their	  gender.	  	  On	   the	   same	   line,	   Charlesworth	   notes	   that	   Article	   27	   of	   the	   Fourth	   Geneva	  Convention	   provides	   protection	   from	   sexual	   crimes	   as	   attacks	   on	   women’s	  honour	   or	   community	   identity 41 	  rather	   than	   human	   rights	   violations	  (Charlesworth,	   1999),	   perpetuating	   the	   view	   of	   women	   as	   cultural	   objects	  (Chappell,	  2003).	  Notably,	  the	  First	  Additional	  Protocol	  replaced	  the	  reference	  to	   a	   woman's	   honour	   with	   the	   notion	   that	   women	   should	   "be	   the	   object	   of	  
special	  respect",	  although	  the	  general	  wording	  maintains	  the	  emphasis	  on	  their	  childbearing	  function.	  	  In	   the	   following	   paragraphs,	   we	   will	   address	   some	   innovative	   features	   of	  Women’s	   Conventions	   and	   the	   new	   approach	   of	   VAW	   as	   a	   human	   rights	  violation,	  which	  possibly	  overcome	  the	  scepticism	  on	  specialized	  instruments.	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  See	  also	  Prosecutor	  v.	  Karadzii	  and	  Mladic,	  which	  states	  that:	  "The	  systematic	  rape	  of	  women	  (…)	  
is	  in	  some	  cases	  intended	  to	  transmit	  a	  new	  ethnic	  identity	  to	  the	  child.	  In	  other	  cases	  humiliation	  and	  
terror	  serve	  to	  dismember	  the	  group".	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Guaranteeing	   national	   implementation	   of	   international	  
principles	  and	  standards	  	  While	   pointing	   at	   the	   limitations	   of	   a	   strictly	   legal	   approach	   based	   on	   the	  individualization	  of	  human	  rights	  (Fredman,	  2008;	  Galligan	  and	  Sandler,	  2004:	  Greer,	  2013),	  human	  rights	  scholars	  lawyers	  and	  activists	  have	  long	  criticised	  weak	   enforcement	   mechanisms	   to	   ensure	   national	   implementation	   of	  conventional	  provisions	  (Merry,	  2003).	  Teson	  argues	  that	  any	  liberal	  theory	  of	  international	   law,	   feminist	  or	  not,	  "must	  .	  .	  .	  postulate	  an	  affirmative	  obligation	  
in	  international	  law	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  state	  to	  have	  a	  reasonably	  effective	  legal	  
system	   in	   which	   assaults	   against	   life,	   physical	   integrity,	   and	   property	   are	   not	  
tolerated"	  (Teson,	  2001).	  Enforceable	  conventional	  norms,	  besides	  their	  formal	  legally	   binding	   nature	   for	   ratifying	   States,	   are	   more	   suitable	   to	   function	   as	  complementary	   instruments	   to	   promote	   domestic	   implementation	   and	   the	  transformation	  of	  the	  State	  as	  a	  social	  institution,	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  national	  legislation	   can	   influence	   societies.	   To	  move	   beyond	   reliance	   on	   the	   symbolic	  meaning	   of	   an	   international	   human	   rights	   instrument,	   providing	   feasible	  conditions	  for	  its	  effectiveness	  is	  crucial.	  Heyns	  and	  Vilijoen	  maintain	  that	  the	  success	   of	   any	   international	   human	   rights	   system	   should	   be	   assessed	   on	   its	  impact	   on	   the	   domestic	   level,	   whether	   occurred	   in	   response	   to	   enforcement	  mechanisms	  or	  because	  treaty	  norms	  have	  been	  internalised	  in	  domestic	  legal	  systems	  or	  cultures	  (Heyns,	  Vilijoen,	  2001).	  	  Analysing	  CEDAW,	  Charlesworth	  et	  al.	  point	  out	  that	  the	  1979	  convention	  does	  not	   provide	   any	   specific	   mandatory	   measures	   or	   predictable	   penalties	   for	  States	   that	   fail	   to	   take	   positive	   action	   to	   implement	   its	   provisions	  (Charlesworth	  et	  al.	  2001).	  This	  omission	  has	  been	  interpreted	  as	  an	  evidence	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  political	  will	  to	  actually	  ensure	  observance	  (Keck,	  Sikkink,	  1998).	  Although	   legally	   binding	   on	   ratifying	   states,	   not	   all	   States	   have	   acted	  consequentially	  (Merry,	  2003).	  	  	  Johnston	   points	   out	   at	   the	   high	   number	   of	   (substantive)	   reservations	   to	  CEDAW,	   compared	   to	   its	   “prototype”,	   the	   Convention	   for	   the	   Elimination	   of	  Racial	  Discrimination	  (Johnstone,	  2006),	  which	  she	  interprets	  as	  evidence	  of	  a	  wider	   tolerance	   for	   gender	  discrimination	   than	   racial	  discrimination.	  Chinkin	  observes	   that	   several	   States	   have	  made	   sure	   to	   clarify	   that	   CEDAW	   is	   a	   non-­‐binding	   instrument	   insofar	   as	   its	   provisions	   conflict	   with	   the	   domestic	   legal	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system	   	   (Chinkin,	   1995).	   Based	   on	   extensive	   research,	   Merry	   provides	   a	  summary	  of	  the	  variety	  of	  States’	  (poor)	  responses	  to	  CEDAW	  implementation:	  “Some	  opt	  out	  of	  key	  provisions	  when	  they	  sign	  the	  convention;	  some	  ratify	  it	  but	  
regard	   it	   as	   non-­‐self-­‐executing,	   requiring	   further	   domestic	   legislation	   for	  
implementation;	  and	   some	   ignore	   it	  altogether	  despite	   ratification.	  Some	  states	  
fail	  to	  translate	  it	  into	  national	  languages,	  refuse	  to	  prepare	  and	  present	  period	  
reports	   on	   their	   compliance,	   or	   simply	   fail	   to	   keep	   the	   sex-­‐disaggregated	  
statistics	  that	  make	  it	  possible	  to	  see	  if	  women	  are	  being	  treated	  equally	  to	  men	  
in	  job	  opportunity,	  education,	  and	  political	  participation”	  (Merry,	  2003,	  see	  also	  Bayefsky	   2001;	   Mayer	   1996).	   Heyns	   and	   Vilijoen	   found	   limited	   impact	   of	  CEDAW	   on	   domestic	   systems	   and	   argued	   for	   strengthening	   its	   monitoring	  mechanisms,	  while	   supplementing	   them	  with	   “creative	   efforts”	   to	   internalise	  its	  norms	  in	  the	  domestic	  legal	  and	  cultural	  system	  (Heyns,	  Vilijoen,	  2001).	  	  The	   monitoring	   mechanism	   established	   by	   CEDAW	   includes	   a	   Reporting	  Procedure,	   according	   to	  which	  CEDAW	  Committee	   evaluates	  national	   reports	  on	   progresses	   and	   discusses	   further	   actions	   with	   government	  representatives,42	  and	  an	  Inter-­‐State	  Procedure,	  through	  which	  States	  can	  refer	  disputes	   about	   the	   interpretation	   and	   implementation	   of	   CEDAW	   to	  arbitration,	   if	   the	  dispute	  is	  not	  settled,	   it	  can	  be	  referred	  to	  the	  International	  Court	   of	   Justice.	   This	   procedure	   is	   subject	   to	   a	   large	   number	   of	   reservations	  and	  has	  never	  been	  used.	  The	  weakness	  of	  this	  mechanism	  has	  been	  identified	  as	  a	  reason	  for	  CEDAW	  being	  relegated	  to	  a	  “second-­‐class	  instrument”	  (Meron,	  1990).	  As	  mentioned,	  the	  problem	  was	  acknowledged	  and	  addressed	  through	  a	  10	  years	  long	  process,43	  which	  resulted	  in	  the	  adoption	  of	  an	  Optional	  Protocol,	  entered	  into	  force	  in	  2000.	  	  Ratifying	   the	   Optional	   Protocol	   States	   recognise	   the	   competence	   of	   the	  Committee	   to	   receive	   and	   consider	   communications	   (Article	   1).	   Article	   2	  provides	   a	   Communication	   Procedure	   to	   submit	   individual	   (or	   collective)	  complaints	   invoking	   CEDAW	   provisions,	   which	   will	   be	   admitted	   by	   the	  Committee	   if	   all	   available	  domestic	   remedies	  have	  been	   exhausted	   and	   if	   the	  complaint	  is	  not,	  nor	  has	  been,	  under	  the	  examination	  of	  another	  international	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Ilic	  and	  Corti	  present	  a	  overview	  of	  the	  protection	  mechanisms	  for	  women’s	  rights	  in	  comparison	  with	  those	  established	  by	  other	  human	  rights	  treaties,	  see	  Ilic	  and	  Corti,	  1997.	  	  43 	  A	   detailed	   chronology	   of	   the	   stages	   of	   the	   process	   can	   be	   found	   on	   the	   UN	   website	   at:	  http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/protocol/history.htm	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institution	   (Article	   4).	   Before	   its	   final	   decision,	   when	   appropriate,	   the	  Committee	   can	   require	   the	   State	   to	   adopt	  precautionary	  measures	   to	  protect	  alleged	   victims	   from	   irreparable	   harm	   (Article	   5).	   Articles	   8	   and	   9	   establish,	  respectively,	   an	   Inquiry	   and	   Follow-­‐up	   Procedure,	   according	   to	   which	   the	  Committee	   can	   initiate	   a	   confidential	   investigation	   based	   on	   “reliable	  
information	   of	   grave	   and	   systematic	   violations”	   and	   require	   States	   to	   provide	  reports	  on	  remedial	  efforts.	  While	  Article	  10	  provides	  an	  opting	  out	  clause,44	  by	  which	   signatories	   can	   avoid	   to	   submit	   to	   the	   procedures	   at	   Articles	   8	   and	   9,	  Article	  17	  prohibits	  reservations	  to	  the	  Optional	  Protocol,	  which	  has	  currently	  been	   ratified	   by	   more	   than	   half	   of	   CEDAW	   States	   Party.	   The	   Committee	  addressed	  the	  first	  complaint	  in	  2005	  and,	  to	  date,	  has	  delivered	  11	  decisions.45	  	  	  The	   other	   two	   regional	   Women’s	   Conventions	   established	   their	   own	  mechanisms	   of	   protection.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   the	  BdPC,	   the	   question	   gave	   rise	   to	  several	  controversial	  issues.	  We	  give	  here	  a	  brief	  description	  of	  the	  procedure	  established,	   which	   will	   be	   thoroughly	   examined	   in	   the	   Third	   Section	   of	   this	  research.	  	  Article	   12	   BdPC	   allows	   any	   person	   or	   group	   of	   persons,	   or	   any	   non-­‐governmental	  entity,	  legally	  recognised	  in	  one	  or	  more	  OAS	  members,	  to	  lodge	  petitions	   with	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   Commission	   on	   Human	   Rights,	   containing	  denunciations	   or	   complaints	   of	   violations	   of	   Article	   7	   BdPC	   by	   a	   State	   Party.	  The	  Commission	  shall	  consider	  such	  claims	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  norms	  and	  procedures	  established	  by	  the	  American	  Convention	  of	  Human	  Rights	  (ACHR)	  and	  the	  Statutes	  and	  Regulations	  of	  the	  IACommHR.	  The	  BdPC	  was	  adopted	  in	  1994,	   and	   by	   1996	   it	   had	   been	   ratified	   by	   most	   ACHR	   members,	   with	   no	  reservations.46	  In	   1998	   the	   Commission	   received	   its	   first	   petition	   invoking,	  
inter	   alia,	   BdPC	   provisions	   (Maria	   da	   Penha	   v.	   Brazil).	   In	   2004,	   for	   the	   first	  time,	   the	   Commission	   referred	   a	   case	   were	   the	   petitioners	   had	   invoked	   the	  BdPC,	  although	  excluding	  such	  provisions	  from	  its	  application	  to	  the	  Court.	  In	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  Four	  countries	  have	  followed	  this	  option:	  Bangladesh,	  Belize,	  Colombia	  and	  Cuba.	  45 	  CEDAW	   Committee’s	   jurisprudence	   under	   the	   Optional	   Protocol	   is	   available	   at:	  http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CEDAW/Pages/Jurisprudence.aspx.	  46	  Bahamas	  is	  not	  a	  significant	  exception,	  since	  the	  country	  did	  not	  ratify	  the	  ACHR,	  while	  it	  ratified	  the	   BdPC	   in	   1995	   clarifying	   that:	   “Article	   7(g)	   of	   the	   Convention	   imports	   no	   obligation	   upon	   the	  
Government	  of	  the	  Commonwealth	  of	  The	  Bahamas	  to	  provide	  any	  form	  of	  compensation	  from	  public	  
funds	  to	  any	  woman	  who	  has	  been	  subjected	  to	  violence	  in	  circumstances	  in	  which	  liability	  would	  not	  
normally	  have	  been	  incurred	  under	  existing	  Bahamian	  law”	  (May	  3,	  1995.).	  Currently,	  only	  Canada	  and	  United	  States,	  amongst	  all	  OAS	  members,	  have	  not	  ratified	  the	  BdPC.	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this	   occasion,	   as	   we	   will	   see,	   the	   IACrtHR	   had	   to	   clarify	   its	   contentious	  jurisdiction	   on	   the	   instrument	   through	   a	   lengthy	   systematic	   and	   teleological	  interpretation	  (Castro-­‐Castro	  case).	  Therefore,	  currently,	  the	  BdPC	  presents	  the	  same	  strong	  mechanism	  of	  enforcement	  as	  the	  ACHR.	  	  Let	  us	  underline	  that	  these	  evolutions	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  System	  happened	  at	  the	   same	   time	   as	   the	   UN,	   which	   includes	   Latin	   American	   countries,	   were	  addressing	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  weak	  mechanism	  of	  enforcement	  established	  by	  CEDAW.	   Notably,	   the	   first	   petition	   invoking	   the	   BdPC	   received	   by	   the	  IACommHR	   was	   submitted	   while	   the	   debate	   on	   the	   Optional	   Protocol	   to	  CEDAW	  was	   finally	   coming	   to	   an	   end,	   with	   the	   first	   line	   involvement	   of	   the	  Inter-­‐American	   Institute	   of	   Human	   Rights,	   an	   autonomous	   academic	  international	   institution	   created	   in	   1980	   through	   an	   agreement	   signed	  between	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  and	  the	  Republic	  of	  Costa	  Rica. 47 	  Analysing	   similar	   processes,	   Merry	   underlines	   the	   function	   of	   the	  circulation	  of	  ideas	  through	  institutions	  and	  networks	  in	  creating	  new	  (global)	  cultural	   understandings	   and	   articulating	   new	   normative	   standards	   produced	  through	  international	  consensus	  (Merry,	  2003).	  	  Interestingly,	   the	   more	   recent	   2011	   Istanbul	   Convention	   (IC),	   although	  counting	   on	   these	   two	   previous	   experiences	   and	   adopted	   in	   a	   context	   very	  similar	   to	   that	   of	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   System,	   resorted	   to	   a	   monitoring	  mechanism	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  CEDAW	  before	  the	  Optional	  Protocol.	  Chapter	  IX	  of	  the	  Istanbul	  Convention	  is	  entirely	  dedicated	  to	  the	  monitoring	  mechanism.	  	  The	  IC	  is	  not	  in	  force	  yet,	  and	  the	  ratification	  process	  seems	  to	  be	  taking	  long.48	  This	   instrument	   provides	   for	   a	   Group	   of	   Experts	   on	   Action	   Against	   Violence	  Against	   Women	   and	   Domestic	   Violence	   (GREVIO),	   which	   will	   assess	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  In	   1997,	   experts	   of	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   Institute	   for	   Human	   Rights	   (IIHR)	   provided	   technical	  assistance	   to	   governments’	   delegations	   participating	   to	   the	   drafting	   process	   of	   the	   Optional	  Protocol.	  The	  IIHR	  produced	  a	  document	  containing	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  debate,	  recommendations,	  and	  precedents	  under	  other	  international	  instruments	  for	  each	  one	  of	  the	  24	  articles	  discussed.	  In	  order	   to	   disseminate	   information	   on	   the	   Optional	   Protocol	   and	   strengthen	   Latin-­‐American	  countries	   commitment	   to	   the	   new	   mechanism,	   the	   IIHR	   triggered	   a	   regional	   debate	   involving	  representatives	   of	   ministries	   of	   foreign	   affairs,	   governmental	   agencies	   responsible	   for	   women’s	  issues	   and	   the	  women’s	  movement.	   For	   further	   information	   of	   IIHR’s	   contributions	   refer	   to	   the	  Institution’s	  website	  at:	  http://www.iidh.ed.cr/multic/DefaultIIDHEn.aspx.	  	  48	  As	  we	  will	  see	  in	  detail	  in	  the	  Fourth	  Section	  of	  this	  research,	  to	  date	  only	  five	  out	  of	  the	  47	  CoE	  Member	  States	  ratified	  the	  Istanbul	  Convention.	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measures	  enacted	  by	  States	  Party	  to	  ensure	  its	  effectiveness,	  based	  on	  national	  responses	   to	  a	  questionnaire	   (Article	  68).	  Additionally,	  GREVIO	  may	  draw	  on	  information	   from	   NGOs,	   national	   institutions	   for	   the	   protection	   of	   human	  rights,	   the	   Council	   of	   Europe	   Commissioner	   for	   Human	   Rights,	   the	  Parliamentary	  Assembly	  and	  other	  specialized	  bodies	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe.	  National	  Parliaments	  are	  also	   invited	  to	  participate	   in	  the	  monitoring	  process	  (Art.	  70).	  Should	  the	  information	  received	  be	  insufficient	  or	  should	  a	  particular	  issue	   require	   immediate	   attention,	   GREVIO	   may	   travel	   to	   the	   country	   in	  question	  for	  an	  inquiry.	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  information	  at	  its	  disposal,	  GREVIO	  may	  adopt	  reports	  and	  conclusions	  aimed	  at	  helping	  the	  State	  Party	  to	  better	  implement	   the	   convention.	   It	   may	   also	   adopt	   general	   recommendations	  addressed	  to	  all	  States	  Party	  (Art.	  69).	   In	  addition	  to	  GREVIO,	  a	  second	  entity	  composed	  of	  the	  representatives	  of	  States	  Parties	  will	  be	  set	  up:	  the	  Committee	  of	   the	  Parties	   (Art.	   67).	   Its	   tasks	  will	   include,	   among	  others,	   electing	  GREVIO	  members	   and	   issuing	   recommendations	   to	   States	   Party	   concerning	   the	  measures	  to	  be	  taken	  in	  order	  to	  implement	  GREVIO	  conclusions.	  The	  choice	  of	  this	   mechanism	   is	   controversial,	   given	   that	   both	   the	   other	   two	   instruments	  found	  appropriate	   to	  establish	  (somehow	  “on	   the	  run”)	  stronger	  mechanisms	  of	   enforcement.	   The	   issue	   will	   be	   addressed	   in	   the	   Fourth	   Section	   of	   this	  research.	  	  Having	   described	   how	   the	   three	   instruments	   provide	   for	   domestic	  implementation,	   we	   now	   introduce	   some	   additional	   elements	   to	   the	   debate	  about	   the	   role	   of	   international	   instruments	   and	   institutions	   in	   guaranteeing	  effectiveness	  to	  international	  conventions.	  	  Cook	  argues	  that	  international	  institutions	  should	  not	  be	  allowed	  to	  adjudicate	  private	  allegations	  of	  human	  rights	  violations	   committed	  by	  non-­‐state	  actors,	  since	   a	   flood	   of	   complaints	   would	   flood	   international	   adjudication	   systems,	  making	   them	   incapable	   of	   effective	   functioning	   and	   affecting	   their	   credibility	  (Cook,	   1994).	   In	   this	   view,	   States	   should	   enforce	   international	   human	   rights	  obligations	   by	   requiring	   their	   own	   internal	   institutions	   to	   study	   and	   react	   to	  human	   rights	   violations	   She	  maintains	   that	   a	   suitable,	   but	   ideal,	   compromise	  would	   be	   for	   States	   to	   hold	   each	   others	   accountable.	   However,	   it	   must	   be	  underlined,	   States	   rarely	   do	   so	   in	   absence	   of	   a	   compelling	   requirement.	   As	  Fellmeth	   pointed	   out	   “these	   are	   very	   attractive	   recommendations,	   [however]	  
how	  this	  accountability	  would	  play	  out	  would	  presumably	  be	  an	  entirely	  political	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choice	  by	  states,	  as	  it	  is	  now”	  (Fellmeth,	  2000,	  p.	  723).	  Notably,	  States’	  abidance	  also	   depends	   on	   the	   domestic	   status	   of	   conventional	   human	   rights	   norms,	  regardless	  of	  their	  content	  or	  specificity,	  although	  this	  could	  arguably	  be	  traced	  back	   to	   their	   a	   priori	   political	   will.	   Fellmeth	   maintains	   that	   Cook’s	   position	  
“does	  not	  preclude	  at	   least	   the	   supplementary	   establishment	  of	  an	   independent	  
international	   institution	   charged	   with	   investigating	   states	   that	   exhibit	   a	  
consistent	  failure	  to	  enforce	  such	  rights,	  and	  with	  the	  further	  power	  to	  declare	  a	  
state	  in	  violation	  of	  its	  treaty	  obligations	  if	  the	  evidence	  so	  warrants”	  (Fellmeth,	  2000,	  p.	  723)	  and	  that	  this	  solution	  would	  better	  serve	  women’s	  interests.	  	  	  These	  issues	  will	  be	  thoroughly	  addressed	  in	  the	  Third	  and	  Fourth	  Sections	  of	  this	  research.	  	  	  
Drawing	  preliminary	   conclusions:	   expectations	  and	  
conditions	  for	  plausibility	  	  The	  current	  approach	  to	  women’s	  rights	  emerged	  in	  a	  process	  through	  which,	  the	  traditional	  approach	  in	  international	  human	  rights	  law,	  was	  challenged	  on	  the	   basis	   of	   its	   shortcomings	   in	   promoting	   substantial	   equality	   and	   non-­‐discrimination	   between	   men	   and	   women.	   As	   seen	   through	   our	   literature	  review,	   CEDAW,	   BdPC	   and	   the	   Istanbul	   convention	   reflect	   a	   paradigm	   shift	  shaped	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  critiques	  coming	  from	  feminist	  legal	  scholarship	  and	  feminist	   movements.	   The	   new	   paradigm	   internalises	   the	   view	   that	   women’s	  human	   rights	   cannot	   be	   ensured	   without	   generating	   a	   process	   of	   social	  transformation,	   embedding	   them	   in	   societies	   and	   creating	   the	   conditions	   for	  their	  effectiveness.	  We	  presented	  the	  crucial	  conventional	  provisions	  reflecting	  the	  evolving	  understanding,	  in	  particular	  for	  what	  concerns	  the	  eradication	  of	  VAW	   as	   a	   product	   of	   discrimination	   that	   reproduces	   unequal	   relations	   of	  power	  between	  the	  sexes.	  	  	  The	   increased	   international	   awareness	   and	   involvement	   of	   transnational	  advocacy	   networks,	   have	   substantially	   contributed	   to	   the	   dissemination	   and	  construction	  of	  a	  shared	  understanding.	  The	  new	  conventional	  texts	  addressed	  and	   responded	   to	   a	   wide	   variety	   of	   criticisms,	   triggering	   evolutions	   in	   the	  international	   understanding	   of	   the	   issue.	   The	   emphasis	   on	   neutrality	   and	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objectivity	  has	  been	  replaced	  by	  the	  recognition	  of	  the	  need	  to	  include	  a	  gender	  perspective,	   both	   in	   the	   drafting	   of	   norms	   and	   in	   their	   interpretation	   in	  concrete	   cases.	  The	  new	   international	  understanding	   is	  based	  on	  considering	  the	  female	  actor	  as	  the	  starting	  point	  for	  an	  assessment,	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  the	  male	   actor	   is.	   Women’s	   underrepresentation	   in	   national	   and	   international	  institutions	  has	  been,	  for	  the	  past	  three	  decades	  and	  especially	  since	  the	  ‘90s,	  a	  crucial	   issue	   on	   the	   international	   agenda	   and	   at	   national	   level.	   The	   early	  equality	   and	   anti-­‐discrimination	   doctrines,	   proved	   ineffective	   to	   promote	  women’s	  rights,	  have	  been	  replaced	  by	  the	  endorsement	  of	  an	  approach	  based	  on	  social	   structures	  and	  unequal	   relations	  of	  power,	   reproducing	  subjugation	  of	   women	   through	   a	   stereotypical	   representation	   of	   genders.	   International	  instruments	   on	   women’s	   rights	   currently	   identify	   a	   variety	   of	   measures	   to	  eradicate	   VAW,	   overarching	   law	   and	   public	   policies,	   and	   the	   traditional	  limitations	  to	  States	  intervention	  in	  the	  private	  sphere	  is	  now	  counterbalanced	  by	  their	  positive	  obligations	  to	  protect	  and	  promote	  women’s	  rights	  with	  due	  diligence.	   The	   issue	   of	   the	   limited	   impact	   of	   conventional	   norms,	   due	   to	   the	  lack	   of	   enforcement	  mechanisms,	   and	   their	   strong	   legally-­‐binding	   nature	   has	  been	  addressed	  both	  by	  CEDAW	  Committee,	  with	  the	  Optional	  Protocol,	  and	  by	  Inter-­‐American	   Institutions,	   where	   the	   IACrtHR	   is	   granted	   contentious	  jurisdiction	  on	  the	  BdPC.	  	  	  Interestingly,	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  did	  not	  draw	  on	  such	  previous	  experiences,	  and	  the	  ECrtHR	  is	  not	  the	  competent	  body	  to	  hear	  cases	  involving	  the	  Istanbul	  Convention.	   Social	   transformation,	   i.e.	   the	   eradication	   of	   social	   and	   cultural	  patterns	   reproducing	   the	   idea	   of	   women’s	   inferiority,	   including	   religious	  traditions	   and	   customary	   practices,	   is	   the	   core	   of	   the	   current	   strategy	  envisaged	  by	  international	  human	  rights	  law	  to	  promote	  and	  protect	  women’s	  rights.	  This	   feature	  carries	   the	   inherent	   implication	  of	  a	   tension,	   identifying	  a	  challenge	   which	   a	   written	   text	   cannot	   solve,	   if	   not	   partially.	   Indeed,	   three	  issues	   emerge	  as	   still	   needing	   to	  be	   conclusively	   accommodated,	  namely:	   the	  universalistic	   aspiration	   of	   human	   rights	   norms,	   cultural	   relativism	   and	  intersectionality.	   As	   showed,	   these	   problems	   have	   not	   been	   discarded	   in	   the	  international	   debate,	   but	   the	   complexity	   of	   shaping	   acceptable	   solutions	   in	  concrete	  cases,	  as	  we	  will	  see,	  raises	  concerns.	  	  	  Given	   the	   incremental	   process	   that	   shaped	   the	   understanding	   reflected	   in	  Women’s	   Conventions,	   we	   assume	   a	   general	   international	   consensus	   on	   the	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paradigm	  shift	  and	  a	  significant	   level	  of	  public	   legitimacy.	  Therefore,	  we	  shall	  take	   into	  account	  that	  possible	  shortcomings	   in	  their	  effectiveness	  might	  be	  a	  consequence	   of	   the	   complexity	   of	   the	   new	   paradigm	   and	   of	   contingent	  obstacles	   or	   structural	   deficiencies,	   as	   opposed	   to	   lack	   of	   international	  institutions’	   political	   will	   to	   reach	   the	   set	   objectives.	   Although	   such	   position	  might	   be	   challenged,	   we	   believe	   it	   provides	   us	   with	   the	   most	   appropriate	  framework	   to	   adopt	   a	   problem-­‐solving	   attitude,	   since	   it	   rests	   on	   the	  recognition	   of	   the	   illegitimacy	   of	   any	   lack	   of	   political	   will	   for	  what	   concerns	  ensuring	   substantial	   equality	   and	   non-­‐discrimination	   between	   men	   and	  women.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   political	   will	   (and	   lack	   of	   it)	   remains	   a	   problem	  when	   it	   comes	   to	   national	   implementation,	   given	   that	   States	   are	   not	  institutions	   established	   purposely	   to	   protect	   human	   rights,	   although	   they	  certainly	  constitute	  the	  first	  level	  in	  which	  such	  rights	  should	  b	  guaranteed.	  	  While	   the	   Vienna	   Convention	   on	   the	   Law	   of	   the	   Treaties	   (VCLT)	   sets	   the	  normative	   standards	   to	   guarantee	   State’s	   compliance	   to	   international	   law,	  regardless	  of	   the	  structure	  and	   type	  of	   the	  national	   system	   in	  which	   they	  are	  adopted,	   the	   normative	   framework	   it	   provides	   is	   not	   sufficient,	   per	   se,	   to	  ensure	   States’	   abidance.	   Women’s	   Conventions	   set	   a	   normative	   framework	  requiring	   the	   development	   of	   a	   process	   in	   which	   all	   social	   actors	   (in	   the	  national,	   international,	   legal,	   political	   and	   private	   spheres)	   are	   necessary	   to	  achieve	   their	   effectiveness	   and	   to	   maintain	   internal	   and	   external	   coherence.	  While	  the	  process	  that	  shaped	  their	  content	  contributes	  to	  their	  legitimacy,	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  it	  Women’s	  Conventions	  need	  to	  prove	  effective	  in	  realizing	  their	   scope	   in	   a	   way	   that	   is	   consistent	   with	   their	   ambitious	   framework	   of	  analysis.	  As	  mentioned,	  they	  remain	  inherently	  incomplete	  instruments,	  which	  rely	  on	  the	  vertical	  and	  horizontal	  interaction	  of	  legal	  and	  social	  institutions,	  at	  national	   and	   international	   level,	   advocacy	   networks	   and	   civil	   society	  movements,	  requiring	  inclusive	  processes.	  
	  This	   analysis	   does	   not	   aim	   to	   ground	   or	   justify	   the	   goal	   that	   Women’s	  Conventions	   pursue,	   which	   we	   derived	   from	   their	   content	   and	   assume	   as	  already	   constructed	   and	   legitimate,	   but	   rather	   focuses	   on	   the	   conditions	   for	  
plausibility	   of	   this	   understanding,	   analysing	   the	   institutional	   and	   procedural	  preconditions	  for	  their	  effectiveness.	  As	  underlined	  by	  Garlicki,	  the	  systems	  in	  which	   such	   conventions	   have	   been	   adopted	   have	   different	   structures	   and	  operate	  with	  different	  resources	  in	  different	  conditions	  (Garlicki,	  2012),	  which	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contribute	   to	   determine	   the	   possibility	   to	   reach	   the	   objectives	   set	   in	   the	  conventions.	  	  Reviewing	  feminist	  legal	  scholarship,	  we	  described	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  paradigm	  shift	   characterizing	   the	   new	   international	   approach	   to	   women’s	   rights,	   and	  singled	   out	   crucial	   conventional	   provisions	   reflecting	   this	   change.	   Given	   the	  legacy	  of	  the	  emerged	  understanding	  with	  feminist	  claims,	  we	  adopt	  the	  same	  standpoint	   to	  determine	  the	  minimum	  conditions	  that	  a	  human	  rights	  system	  should	   present	   to	   coherently	   pursue	   the	   scope	   set	   by	  Women’s	   Conventions,	  i.e.	  those	  features	  that	  suit	  the	  basic	  requirements	  emerged	  from	  the	  debate	  on	  women’s	  rights,	  and	  make	  their	  effectiveness	  plausible	  	  Some	   favourable	   preconditions	   for	   their	   effectiveness	   are	   common	   to	   all	  human	   rights	   instruments.	   They	   concern	   their	   legitimacy,	   accessibility,	  accountability,	  ability	  to	  interact	  with	  national	  institutions	  and	  legally	  binding	  nature.	   However,	   considering	   Women’s	   Conventions	   and	   the	   contributions	  from	  feminist	  scholarship	  analysed,	  we	  can	  determine	  their	  specificities	  when	  it	   comes	   to	   ensure	   women’s	   rights,	   and	   single	   out	   additional	   favourable	  preconditions	   required	   by	   the	   socio-­‐legal	   approach	   endorsed.	   Favourable	  preconditions	  do	  not	  necessarily	  imply	  the	  positive	  impact	  of	  the	  conventions,	  however,	  they	  make	  it	  more	  likely.	  	  	  Women’s	   Conventions	   internalise	   the	   critique	   to	   objectivity	   and	  neutrality	   of	  human	  rights	  norms,	  constituting	  specific	  instruments	  that	  introduce	  gender	  as	  a	   category	   of	   analysis.	   However,	   this	   choice	   carries	   the	   risk	   of	  marginalizing	  women’s	   rights	   in	   the	  human	   rights	   discourse.	   This	   possibility	   implies	   that	   a	  broad	   mandate	   of	   international	   institutions	   established	   to	   ensure	   the	   rights	  they	  enshrine,	  would	  be	  an	  additional	  element	  to	  consider	  in	  determining	  their	  expectations	   of	   effectiveness	   and	   coherence.	   This	   element	   encompasses	   the	  possibility	   to	   provide	   reparations	   for	   victims,	   as	  well	   as	   to	   address	   systemic	  failures	  in	  national	  contexts	  beyond	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  concrete	  cases,	  minimizing	  the	  risk	  of	  tackling	  women’s	  rights	  as	  an	  isolated	  subject.	  Moreover,	  given	  that	  inequality	  in	  social	  relations	  of	  power	  hinders	  women’s	  rights	  in	  the	  public	  and	  private	   domain,	   international	   Institutions’	   should	   be	   able	   to	   recognise	  international	  responsibility	  of	  States	  in	  the	  case	  of	  violations	  perpetrated	  both	  by	   public	   officials	   and	   by	   private	   individuals,	   counting	   on	   appropriate	  mechanisms	   of	   monitoring	   or	   enforcement	   of	   conventional	   provisions.	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Additionally,	  the	  emphasis	  on	  prevention	  requires	  International	  Institutions	  to	  set	  principles	  and	  standards	  concerning	  both	  negative	  and	  positive	  obligations	  of	  a	  State.	  	  Women’s	  balanced	  representation	  in	  international	  institution’s	  membership	  is	  an	   additional	   specific	   precondition.	   Besides	   ensuring	   the	   competence	   and	  integrity	   of	   their	   members,	   human	   rights	   institutions	   and	   bodies	   should	  guarantee	   balanced	   sex	   representation	   in	   their	   membership.	   This	   feature	  enhances	   the	   likelihood	  of	   counting	   on	   specific	   expertise	   to	   address	   complex	  questions,	   overarching	   multiple	   dimensions.	   In	   general,	   more	   diversified	  memberships,	  representing	  the	  actual	  composition	  of	  society,	  facilitate	  the	  task	  of	  integrating	  different	  perspectives	  in	  analyses.	  While	  this	  requirement	  cannot	  be	   fulfilled	   structuring	   them	   as	   sorts	   of	   parliaments,	   there	   is	   a	   generalised	  consensus	   in	   considering	   (at	   least)	   a	   balanced	   sex-­‐representation	   in	  institutions	  as	  a	  necessary	  precondition	  for	  the	  plausibility	  of	  women’s	  rights.	  	  Given	  the	  objective	  of	  social	  transformation	  to	  give	  meaning	  to	  women’s	  rights,	  we	  can	  identify	  other	  favourable	  conditions	  that	  a	  human	  rights	  system	  should	  guarantee	   to	   enhance	   its	   possibility	   to	   influence	   such	   process	   adopting	   a	  specific	  convention.	  	  The	  nature	  of	  international	  institutions’	  function	  largely	  determines	  the	  extent	  of	   expectations	   that	   can	   be	   placed	   on	   their	   suitability	   to	   influence	   States’	  abidance	  and	  adaptation,	  promoting	  the	  development	  of	  national	  mechanisms	  suitable	   to	   address	   specific	   violations	   and	   the	   implement	   measures	   of	  prevention.	  International	  human	  rights	  systems	  intervene	  if	  a	  violation	  cannot	  be	  adequately	  addressed	  at	  national	  level,	  requiring	  the	  exhaustion	  of	  domestic	  remedies	  for	  their	  activation	  to	  activate	  international	  adjudication	  procedures,	  when	   provided.	   However,	   the	   possibility	   to	   extend	   the	   influence	   of	   their	  decisions	   beyond	   the	   single	   case,	   depends	   on	   other	   characteristics	   of	   their	  subsidiary	  role.	  	  	  Generally	  speaking,	  the	  formal	  status	  of	  human	  rights	  instruments	  in	  national	  constitutional	   structures,	   influences	   their	   effectiveness	   in	   national	   legal	  systems	  and	  give	  a	  broader	  meaning	  to	  institution’s	  subsidiarity.	  International	  human	  rights	  law	  have	  different	  hierarchical	  status	  in	  domestic	  orders,	  which	  varies	  from	  supra-­‐constitutional,	  constitutional,	  supra-­‐legislative	  or	  legislative.	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At	  the	  same	  time,	  regardless	  of	  the	  domestic	  hierarchical	  status	  of	  international	  law,	   the	  higher	   the	  national	  deference	   to	   international	   institutions’	  decisions,	  the	   more	   effective	   the	   human	   rights	   system	   will	   be	   in	   ensuring	   States’	  compliance	   with	   international	   institutions’	   decisions.	   Besides	   monitoring	  national	  abidance,	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  body	  with	  contentious	  jurisdiction	  on	  an	  international	  instrument,	  providing	  a	  mechanism	  of	  sanctions,	  improves	  the	  likelihood	   of	   States’	   compliance.	   Institutions’	   ability	   to	   appropriately	   address	  the	   causes	   of	  women’s	   rights	   violations,	   providing	   systemic	   analyses	   beyond	  the	   limits	   of	   concrete	   cases	   depends	   on	   their	   familiarity	  with	   national	   social	  and	   legal	   contexts,	   on	   their	   interaction	   with	   civil	   society	   organisations	   and	  governmental	   institutions	   and	   on	   the	   possibility	   to	   launch	   investigations	  providing	  necessary	  additional	  information	  on	  specific	  contexts.	  Through	  their	  monitoring	   or	   adjudicating	   functions,	   international	   institutions	   can	   shape	  standards	  providing	  generalisable	  guidelines	  for	  all	  States	  Party.	  	  These	  considerations	  allow	  us	  to	  draw	  some	  preliminary	  conclusions	  for	  what	  concerns	   the	   expectations	   to	   place	   on	   a	   human	   rights	   system’s	   ability	   to	  effectively	   promoting	   Women’s	   Conventions.	   Some	   of	   these	   conclusions	   are	  generalizable	  to	  any	  adopted	  instrument	  of	  human	  right	  protection,	  others,	  as	  we	  will	   see,	   address	   the	   specificities	   of	   the	   socio-­‐legal	   approach	   identified	   in	  the	  reviewed	  literature.	  	  	  The	  emergence	  of	  regional	  systems	  of	  human	  rights	  protection	  responds	  to	  the	  need	   to	   augment	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   human	   rights	   norms,	   compared	   to	   the	  structure	   of	   the	   universal	   system,	   counting	   on	   enhanced	   proximity	   between	  the	   supranational	   and	   national	   domains,	   greater	   bi-­‐directional	   familiarity,	  cultural	  homogeneity	  and	  interdependence	  of	  State’s	  Party	  to	  an	  international	  instrument.	  	  	  Proximity	  and	  familiarity	  influence	  the	  accessibility	  of	  a	  regional	  human	  rights	  system,	   generally	   higher	   than	   that	   of	   the	   universal	   system.	   Although	   both	  systems	  share	  a	   subsidiary	  nature	  with	   respect	   to	  national	   legal	   systems,	   the	  fact	  that	  international	  institutions	  cannot	  intervene	  in	  cases	  submitted	  to	  other	  international	   procedures	  makes	   the	   options	   they	   provide	  mutually	   exclusive.	  In	  this	  sense,	  regional	  systems	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  become	  the	  “first	  choice”	  for	  victims	   of	   human	   rights	   violations	   (Garlicki,	   2012).	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	  parallel	   development	   of	   case	   law	   in	   the	   universal	   system,	   provides	   crucial	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references	  and	  a	  source	  of	  legitimation	  for	  a	  regional	  institution	  that	  needs	  to	  address	  complex	  cases.	  	  Regional	  systems	  provide	  multi-­‐level	  mechanism	  of	  protections,	  based	  on	   the	  subsidiarity	   of	   regional	   institutions	   and	   legally-­‐binding	   conventions,	   which	  improves	   their	   possibility	   to	   influence	   States’	   abidance	   and	   promote	  convergence	   to	   shared	   principles	   and	   standards	   beyond,	   and	   before,	   the	  activation	   of	   international	   adjudication	   mechanisms.	   States	   are	   assumed	  capable	   of	   adopting	   appropriate	   measures	   since,	   in	   principle,	   their	   direct	  connection	  to	  national	  societies	  enables	  them	  to	  better	  determine	  the	  content	  of	   conventional	   requirements	   in	   their	   national	   contexts.49	  Nevertheless,	   their	  discretionality	  is	  submitted	  to	  the	  control	  of	  supranational	  institutions.	  	  While	  there	  is	  no	  need	  to	  exclude	  that	  a	  similar	  process	  might	  be	  triggered	  by	  decisions	   of	   a	   universal	   body,	   and	   it	   has	   often	   been	   the	   case,	   it	   seems	  more	  likely	  that	  non	  directly	  involved	  countries	  would	  refer	  to	  decisions	  delivered	  to	  a	  State	  that	  share	  with	  them	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  homogeneity.	  In	  other	  words,	  Guatemala	   might	   find	   easier,	   and	   more	   appropriate,	   to	   adopt	   an	   approach	  suggested	   by	   the	   IACrtHR	   in	   a	   case	   involving	   Argentina,	   rather	   than	   that	  adopted	   by	   CEDAW	  Committee	   in	   a	   case	   involving,	   let	   us	   say,	   Philippines	   or	  Austria.	  	  	  Triggering	  States’	  implementation	  is	  crucial,	  since	  the	  national	  level	  is	  the	  more	  suitable	  context	  to	  provide	  responses	  to	  the	  complexities	  of	  an	  understanding	  based	   on	   social	   transformation.	  While	   States’	   are	   required	   to	   provide	   locally	  shaped	   solutions	   to	   specific	   social	   and	   cultural	   contexts,	   the	   existence	   of	   a	  regional	   institution,	   particularly	   in	   the	   case	  of	   human	   rights	  Courts,	   provides	  the	   opportunity	   to	   externally	   evaluate	   the	   appropriateness	   of	   the	   measures	  implemented	  with	  the	  set	  scope,	  further	  guaranteeing	  a	  mechanism	  to	  address	  violations	  which	   national	   recourses	  might	   have	   left	   unattended.	   At	   the	   same	  time,	   reflecting	   the	   universal	   framework,	   regional	   systems	   perform	   a	   crucial	  role	   in	  guaranteeing	  the	  adoption	  of	  national	  solutions	  harmonised	  with	  both	  regional	   instruments	   and	   the	   universal	   understanding.	   Regional	   Courts,	   in	  particular,	   maintain	   a	   certain	   degree	   of	   control	   on	   States’	   discretionality,	  evaluating	   their	   due	   diligence	   for	   what	   concerns	   negative	   and	   positive	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  This	  perspective	  is	  adopted,	  inter	  alia,	  ECrtHR	  Handyside	  v.	  the	  UK	  (1976,	  par.	  48)	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obligations,	   making	   sure	   that	   the	   scope	   of	   a	   convention	   is	   fulfilled.	   Garlicki	  stresses	   the	   significance	   of	   such	   function	   of	   regional	   human	   rights	   systems,	  with	  particular	  reference	  to	  the	  influence	  of	  a	  regional	  Court	  in	  maintaining	  	  ”a	  
bi-­‐focused	   perspective	   trying	   to	   harmonise	   national	   solutions	   on	   the	   one	   hand	  
and,	   on	   the	   other,	   harmonising	   their	   case-­‐law	   with	   concepts	   and	   solutions	  
elaborated	   at	   universal	   level”	   (Garlicki,	   2012,	   p.	   4).	  50	  Regional	   human	   rights	  Courts	   constitute	   crucial	   engines	   to	   enhance	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   a	  multilevel	  system51	  of	   human	   rights	   protection	   and	   promote	   regional	   convergence	   on	  international	  standards,	  guaranteeing	  the	  conditions	  for	  what	  has	  been	  called	  an	   horizontal	   (or	   cross)	   jurisdictional	   dialogue	   between	   national	   and	  international	   judicial	  bodies	   (De	  Vergottini,	  2011).	  To	  extend	   the	   influence	  of	  such	   favourable	   conditions	   to	   a	   newly	   adopted	   human	   rights	   instrument,	  hence,	  a	  regional	  Court	  should	  be	  granted	  contentious	  jurisdiction	  on	  it.	  	  	  It	   might	   be	   somehow	   redundant	   to	   underline	   that,	   regional	   systems	   with	  authoritative	   Courts,	   provide	   more	   suitable	   conditions	   than	   the	   universal	  system	   for	   guaranteeing	   accessible	  mechanisms	   to	   protect	   human	   rights	   and	  promote	   national	   implementation.	   However,	   we	   argue	   that	   in	   the	   case	   of	  Women’s	   Conventions	   preference	   to	   regionalised	   solutions	   should	   be	  grounded	  on	  other	  specific	  elements,	   inherent	   to	   the	  complexity	  of	   the	  socio-­‐legal	  approach	  they	  endorse,	  elaborated	  in	  the	  reviewed	  feminist	  literature.	  	  Conventions	   endorsing	   a	   transformational	   approach,	   no	  matter	   how	   evolved,	  cannot	  provide	  a	  perfect	  and	  complete	  norm	  of	  reference	  to	  address	  all	  arising	  issues.	   As	   Judge	   Cançado	   Trindade	   argued	   “The	   facts	   are	   richer	   than	   the	  
formulations	   of	   precepts,	   they	   predate	   the	   latter,	   and	   they	   must	   constantly	   be	  
reformulated	   in	   light	   of	   the	   core	   principles	   of	   the	   law	   of	   nations,	   to	   attain	   the	  
realization	   of	   justice”	   (Mapiripán	   Massacre,	   Cançado	   Trindade	   Concurring	  Opinion,	  par.	  15).	  This	  argument	  applies	   to	   international	  human	  rights	   law	  in	  general,	   and	   grounds	   decisions	   to	   establish	   institution	   competent	   on	  developing	   the	   interpretation	   of	   conventional	   provisions,	   applying	   them	   to	  concrete	   cases.	   The	   dynamic	   nature	   of	   human	   rights	   norms	   and	   the	   crucial	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  The	   influence	   of	   the	  margin	  of	  appreciation	   doctrine	   affects	   the	   extent	   and	   degree	   of	   regional	  convergence	  on	  shared	  solutions.	  	  51The	   structures	   of	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   and	   European	   Systems	   can	   be	   defined	   as	   multilevel,	  polycentric	  or	  integrated,	  depending	  on	  the	  emphasis	  put	  on	  their	  different	  elements.	  For	  a	  general	  idea	  on	  the	  different	  perspectives	  refer	  to:	  Gambino,	  2010;	  Pizzolo,	  2013	  and	  Morrone,	  2011.	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function	  of	   formative	   interpretation,	  require	  contextualised	   interpretations	  to	  guarantee	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  conventional	  provisions.	  	  	  No	  written	  text	  can	  be	  complete	  if	  its	  content	  is	  required	  to	  reflect	  the	  changing	  shape	   and	   context	   –	   social,	   political,	  moral	   and	   cultural	   –	   of	   societies.	   In	   this	  sense,	  international	  institutions	  add	  and	  shape	  conventional	  meanings	  through	  decisions	  and	  jurisprudence,	  when	  critical	  information	  is	  revealed	  in	  concrete	  circumstances,	  allowing	  for	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  flexibility	  and	  adaptation	  to	  an	  evolving	  social	  consensus	  and	  accounting	   for	   its	   fallibility	  (Fellmeth,	  2000)	   in	  specific	  contingencies	  that	  were	  not	  (or	  could	  not	  be)	  foreseen.	  As	  we	  argued,	  regional	   systems	   provide	   more	   suitable	   structures	   to	   allow	   context-­‐based	  interpretation	   and	   implementation,	   while	   guaranteeing	   that	   national	  discretionality	  and	  social	  specificities	  do	  not	  turn	  into	  mechanisms	  to	  maintain	  the	  status	  quo.	  
	  This	  brings	  forth	  an	  argument	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  controversial	  debate	  about	  the	  appropriateness	   of	   a	   specific	   instrument	   to	   promote	   women’s	   rights.	   We	  believe	  that	  the	  risk	  of	  a	  marginalization	  of	  women’s	  rights	  is	  diminished	  in	  the	  case	   of	   specific	   conventions	   belonging	   to	   a	   system	   created	   around	   a	   general	  convention,	   adjudicated	  by	  a	   common	   judicial	   institution.	   Indeed,	   the	   specific	  convention	   would	   be	   likely	   invoked	   in	   conjunction	   with	   the	   general	  convention,	  given	  that	  the	  specific	  rights	  are,	  by	  definition,	  included	  in	  general	  provisions.	   In	   this	   sense,	   a	   specific	   instrument	   will	   perform	   its	   function	   of	  providing	  additional	  elements	  for	  Courts’	  analyses,	  remaining	  integrated	  in	  the	  general	  framework.	  In	  this	  research,	  we	  discharge	  a	  priori	  rejections	  of	  specific	  instruments	  to	  internalise	  a	  gender-­‐perspective	  in	  human	  rights	  norms,	  given	  that	  they	  result	  in	  the	  reproduction	  of	  the	  status	  quo,	  completely	  relying	  on	  the	  discretionality	  or	  experience-­‐based	  sensitivity	  of	  judges	  the	  choice	  of	  adopting	  it	  in	  their	  reasoning.	  
	  It	   has	   been	   argued	   that	   a	   feminist	   approach	   requires	   situated	   judgements	  rather	  than	  Grand	  Theories	  (Rhode,	  1990).	  We	  argue	  that	   it	   is	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	   challenges	   posed	   by	   pluralism,	   cultural	   diversity	   and	   intersectionality,	   as	  elaborated	   in	   feminist	   literature,	   that	   we	   can	   provide	   arguments	   to	   prefer	  regional	   to	   universal	   approaches	   international	   mechanism	   to	   promote	  women’s	  rights	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As	   seen,	   while	   objectivity	   and	   neutrality	   of	   human	   rights	   norms	   was	   being	  questioned	  against	  the	  need	  to	  integrate	  a	  gender	  perspective	  in	  human	  rights	  law,	   their	   universality	   was	   challenged	   as	   geographically	   and	   culturally	  determined	   (Morris,	   2006;	   Turner,	   1993).	   The	   universality	   of	   human	   rights	  norms	   has	   been	   put	   under	   question	   by	   scholars	   pointing	   at	   its	   inherent	  assumption	  of	  cultural	  and	  social	  homogeneity,	  which	  uncovered	  the	  Western-­‐bias	  of	  the	  human	  rights	  discourse.	  Considering	  the	  paradigm	  shift	  on	  women’s	  rights,	  which	  requires	  social	  and	  cultural	  transformation	  to	  meet	  standards	  of	  substantial	   equality,	   perceived	   legal-­‐ethnocentrism	   (Bartlett,	   1990,	   Merry,	  2006)	  could	  negatively	  affect	  its	  legitimacy	  and	  hinder	  the	  possibility	  to	  reach	  set	  objectives	  in	  culturally	  diverse	  contexts.	  In	  this	  perspective,	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	   regional	   convention,	   reflecting	   the	   universal	   understanding	   while	  guaranteeing	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  contextual	  adaptation	  of	  its	  content,	  provides	  a	   remarkable	   opportunity	   to	   challenge	   arguments	   pointing	   at	   the	  unacceptability	  of	  the	  enforcement	  of	  exogenous	  understandings	  in	  a	  culturally	  diverse	  international	  community.	  	  	  Regional	  and	  national	  constructions	  of	  legal	  understandings	  on	  women’s	  rights	  are	  consistent	  with	  the	  need	  to	  guarantee	  the	  right	  to	  cultural	  diversity,	  while	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  regional	  jurisdiction	  responding	  to	  the	  universal	  framework,	  allows	   to	   respect	   and	  adapt	   cultural	   differences	  without	   considering	   them	  as	  given	  and	  unchangeable,	  articulating	  regional	   standards	   in	  a	  way	   that	   is	  both	  nationally	   (and	   socially)	   acceptable	   and	   inserted	   in	   a	   broader	   regional	   and	  universal	   framework.	   The	   basic	   norms	   of	   reference	   remain	   universal,	   while	  their	  enforcement	  and	  interpretation	  are	  allocated	  to	  regional	  Courts.	  Regional	  adaptation,	   more	   sensitive	   to	   a	   culturally	   homogenous	   context,	   allows	   for	  incremental	  effectiveness	  of	  transformational	  norms	  that	  might	  be	  prima	  facie	  opposed	   if	   attributed	   to	   a	   universal	   institution,	   individuating	   acceptable	  solutions.	  	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   very	   emphasis	   on	   the	   need	   to	   integrate	   a	   gender	  perspective	  in	  international	  human	  rights	  law,	  has	  been	  questioned	  as	  largely	  overshadowing	   the	   influence	   of	   other	   social	   structures,	   which	   diversify	   the	  causes	   of	   discrimination.	   Focusing	   on	   intersectionality,	   feminist	   scholars	  pointed	   at	   the	   multiple	   factors	   influencing	   women’s	   identities,	   intersecting	  with	   their	   gender	   in	   conditioning	   their	   social	   position.	   Intersectionality	   and	  cultural	  diversity	  demand	  for	  more	  complex	  analyses	  and	  theories,	  since	  they	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are	   a	   constant	   element	   of	   the	   reality	   of	   women’s	   experiences	   (Hook,	   1984).	  Written	   conventions	   cannot	   provide	   solutions	   to	   this	   problem,	   besides	  signalling	   its	  existence,	  while	  a	  consistent	  response	   to	   this	  challenge	  requires	  informed	  context-­‐based	  analyses.	   In	  this	  perspective,	  a	  regional	  system,	  given	  its	  proximity	  and	   familiarity	  with	  national	  contexts	  and	  closer	   links	  with	  civil	  society	   organisations	   and	   governmental	   institutions,	   appears	   to	   be	   better	  suited	   to	   count	   with	   the	   additional	   information	   required	   to	   shape	   coherent	  decisions,	   accounting	   for	   intersectionality	   and	   diversity,	   while	   maintaining	   a	  close	   control	   over	   the	   measures	   adopted	   by	   member	   States	   and	   their	   due	  diligence.	  	  Proximity,	   familiarity	   and	   closer	   links	   with	   national	   societies,	   make	   regional	  systems	   the	   preferable	   option	   to	   trigger	   a	   multi-­‐level	   process,	   capable	   of	  constructing	   solutions	   that	   account	   for	   these	   challenges	   coherently	   and	  consistently.	  
	  The	   system	   provided	   by	   CEDAW	   had	   a	   limited	   impact	   on	   influencing	   States’	  compliance	  with	   conventional	   provisions	   (Evatt,	   2002;	  Merry,	   2003).	   On	   the	  one	   hand,	   the	   reason	   for	   such	   unsatisfactory	   impact	   can	   be	   found	   in	   that	  CEDAW	  only	  provided	  for	  a	  monitoring	  mechanism	  to	  ensure	  States’	  abidance,	  guaranteed	  by	  a	  specific	  Committee.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  major	  challenge	  to	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  rights	  enshrined,	  was	  the	  high	  number	  of	  reservations	  put	  on	  those	  provisions	  which	  characterized	  the	  paradigm	  shift	  adopted,	  such	  as	  Article	  5(a)	  CEDAW,	  addressing	   the	  systemic	  nature	  of	  gender	   inequalities	  and	  requiring	  systemic	  solution	  and	  structural	  changes	  in	  national	  societies	  or	  communities.	   This	   feature	   arguably	   proves	   a	   generalised	   limited	   national	  commitment	   to	   endorse	   the	   emerged	   transformative	   approach,	   addressing	  those	   social	   and	   cultural	   patterns	   reproducing	   gender	   discrimination	  (Holtmaat,	  2004;	  Merry,	  2006,	  Evatt,	  2001).	  	  To	   address	   the	   problem	   of	   its	   limited	   impact	   on	   national	   systems,	   in	   2000	  CEDAW	   Committee	   adopted	   an	   Optional	   Protocol,	   which	   admits	   no	  reservations,	  allowing	  it	  to	  receive	  and	  consider	  individual	  and	  group	  petitions.	  However,	   this	   mechanism	   is	   available	   only	   for	   petitioners	   within	   the	  jurisdiction	   of	   countries	   that	   have	   ratified	   both	   treaties,	   and	   reservations	   to	  CEDAW	  persist	  constituting	  a	  significant	  limitation	  to	  the	  Committee’s	  activity.	  The	  adoption	  of	  the	  Optional	  Protocol	  came	  after	  more	  then	  10	  years	  of	  debate	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in	  the	  universal	  system,	  its	  entry	  into	  force	  was	  enthusiastically	  celebrated	  as	  a	  long	  due	  response	  to	  CEDAW	  shortcomings	  and	  100	  out	  of	  its	  187	  States	  Party	  to	   CEDAW	   ratified	   it	   by	   2010.52	  However,	   in	   the	   first	   ten	   years,	   only	   25	  petitions	  were	  submitted	  to	  the	  Committee.	  The	  pattern	  has	  recently	  changed,	  with	   the	   submission	   of	   20	   additional	   petitions	   in	   the	   two	   following	   years	  (Connors,	   2012).	   Connors	   argues	   that	   the	   issue	   of	   the	   early	   under-­‐utilization	  was	  not	   striking	  per	  se,	  given	   that	   the	   admission	  of	   petitions	  depends	   on	   the	  previous	   exhaustion	   of	   domestic	   remedies,	   a	   time	   consuming	   process	  (Connors,	   2010).	   However,	   we	   shall	   underline	   that,	   although	   this	   argument	  seems	  prima	  facie	  convincing,	  it	  does	  not	  actually	  justify	  the	  impressive	  under-­‐utilization	   of	   the	   new	   mechanism	   considering,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	   high	  number	  of	  ratifications	  and	  the	  poor	  women’s	  rights	  standards	  guaranteed	   in	  several	   States	   Party	   and,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   rule	   of	   prior	  exhaustion	   can	   be	   overcome	  when	   the	   national	   legal	   system	   is	   organized	   in	  such	  a	  way	  to	  constitute	  an	  obstacle	  to	  women’s	  access	  to	  effective	  remedies.	  	  	  In	  our	  view,	  a	  more	   telling	  element	   to	  understand	  such	  a	  disappointing	  early	  performance	  is	  the	  generalised	  lack	  of	  familiarity	  of	  national	  societies	  with	  the	  instrument	  provided	  and,	   in	  general,	  with	  the	  human	  rights	  discourse	  framed	  in	   the	   universal	   system.	   Connors	   emphasises	   the	   role	   of	   capacity	   building	  initiatives	   at	   national	   level	   and	   greater	   visibility	   gained	   by	   CEDAW	  Committee’s	   first	  decisions	  and	  outreach	  activities	  (Connors,	  2012).	  For	  what	  concerns	   VAW,	   originally	   not	   covered	   by	   CEDAW	   but	   included	   in	   1992	  with	  General	  Recommendation	  19,	   to	  date	  CEDAW	  Committee	  ruled	  on	  11	  cases.53	  Only	   two	   of	   these	   cases	   concern	   countries	   not	   belonging	   to	   the	   Council	   of	  Europe,	  namely	  Philippines	   and	  Canada.	  The	  protection	  mechanism	  provided	  by	   the	   universal	   system	   seems	   to	   be	   more	   accessible	   for	   countries	   already	  belonging	   to	   a	   regional	   human	   rights	   system.	   This	   is	   unsurprising,	   given	   the	  crucial	   influence	   that,	   the	  habit	   to	   human	   rights	   discourse	   and	   supranational	  mechanisms	   of	   protection,	   exercises	   on	   the	   likelihood	   of	   individuals	   to	  conceive	   the	  possibility	   to	   refer	   to	   international	   systems,	  or	  even	   to	  conceive	  violations	   themselves.	   	   In	   other	   words,	   those	   societies	   were	   socio-­‐cultural	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  After	  2010	  four	  additional	  countries	  have	  ratified	  the	  Optional	  Protocol.	  53	  A.	   T.	   v.	   Hungary	   (2005),	   A.	   S.	   v.	   Hungary	   (2006),	   Goekce	   v.	   Austria	   (2007),	   Yildirim	   v.	   Austria	  (2007),	  N.	   S.	   F.	   v.	   United	  Kingdom	   (2007),	   Vertido	   v.	   Philippines	   (2010),	   V.	   K.	   v.	   Bulgaria	   (2011),	  
Abramova	   v.	   Belarus	   (2011),	   S.V.P.	   v.	   Bulgaria	   (2012),	   Jallow	   v.	   Bulgaria	   (2012),	   Kell	   v.	   Canada	  (2012).	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patterns	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  violate	  CEDAW	  provisions,	  are	  also	  those	  in	  which	  the	  likelihood	  of	  the	  actual	  use	  of	  CEDAW	  Optional	  Protocol	  is	  lower.	  	  	  The	   Inter-­‐American	   and	   European	   systems	   are	   the	  most	   articulated	   regional	  systems	   of	   human	   rights	   protection	   currently	   existing.	   Both	   of	   them	   are	  organized	   around	   general	   human	   rights	   conventions,	   respectively	   the	   ACHR	  and	   the	   ECHR,	   which	   present	   a	   similar	   catalogue	   of	   fundamental	   rights	  enforced	  and	  interpreted	  by	  the	  respective	  regional	  human	  rights	  courts.	  Both	  systems	   have	   introduced	   specific	   instruments	   for	   the	   protection	   of	   women’s	  rights	  and	  the	  eradication	  of	  VAW,	  reflecting	  the	  framework	  set	  by	  CEDAW	  and	  General	   Recommendation	   19.	   However,	   whereas	   the	   BdPC	   was	   adopted	   in	  1994,	   and	   its	   development	   in	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   System	   is	   contemporary	   to	  that	   of	   the	   universal	   system	   after	   General	   Recommendation	   19	   and	   the	  Optional	  Protocol,	  the	  Istanbul	  Convention	  is	  a	  recent	  innovation,	  not	  yet	  into	  force.	  	  None	  of	  the	  cases	  decided	  by	  CEDAW	  Committee	  involves	  a	  State	  Party	  to	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  System,	  whereas	  nine	  out	  of	  eleven	  of	  them	  concern	  a	  member	  of	   the	   Council	   of	   Europe.	   The	   first	   evident	   element	   of	   difference	   is	   that,	   as	  opposed	  to	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  System,	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  cannot	  yet	  count	  on	  a	  specific	  convention	  on	  women’s	  rights	  and	  VAW.	  With	  the	  availability	  of	  a	  new	   mechanism	   of	   protection	   under	   the	   Optional	   Protocol,	   in	   absence	   of	   a	  European	   women’s	   convention,	   the	   high	   degree	   of	   familiarity	   of	   Council	   of	  Europe	  States’	  societies	  with	  international	  systems	  of	  human	  rights	  protection,	  and	  the	  increased	  international	  awareness	  on	  VAW,	  prompted	  victims	  of	  VAW	  to	  “distribute”	  their	  petitions	  between	  the	  more	  familiar,	  but	  under-­‐equipped,	  ECrtHR	  and	  the	  less	  familiar,	  but	  better-­‐endowed,	  CEDAW	  Committee.	  	  	  On	  the	  contrary,	  not	  only	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  System	  had	  adopted	  the	  BdPC	  in	  1994,	  but	  also,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  entry	  into	  force	  of	  the	  Optional	  Protocol,	  the	  IACommHR	   had	   already	   received	   several	   petitions	   invoking	   the	   BdPC,	  including	  the	  crucial	  Maria	  da	  Penha	  case	  on	  domestic	  violence	  (2001),	  which	  had	   gained	   great	   resonance	   in	   the	   region.	  Moreover,	   by	   the	   time	   of	   the	   first	  CEDAW	  Committee’s	   decisions,	   the	  Castro-­‐Castro	  case	  had	  been	   submitted	   to	  the	   IACrtHR,	   providing	   the	   occasion	   to	   clarify	   its	   contentious	   jurisdiction	   on	  the	  BdPC.	  These	  elements	  made	  the	  more	  familiar	  Inter-­‐American	  Institutions	  a	   preferable	   option	   for	   victims	   of	   VAW,	   given	   their	   historical	   long-­‐proven	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effectiveness	   in	   providing	   remedies	   and	   compensation	   for	   victims	   (Abregú,	  Espinoza,	   2006)	   and	   because	   of	   the	   multilevel	   level	   structure	   of	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   System,	   better	   fit	   than	   the	   universal	   one	   to	   promote	   structural	  reforms	  at	  national	  level.	  	  Although	   with	   the	   2001	   Optional	   Protocol	   CEDAW	   provided	   for	   an	  adjudicatory	  body	  to	  address	   the	  problem	  of	  national	  compliance,	  only	  States	  that	   ratified	   it	   are	   subject	   to	   the	   jurisdiction	   of	   the	   Committee,	   and	   the	  effectiveness	   of	   this	   mechanism	   is	   still	   challenged	   by	   the	   high	   number	   of	  substantive	   reservation	   to	   CEDAW	   that	   still	   persist,	   hindering	   its	   legally	  binding	  nature.	  	  	  Despite	  the	  lively	  debate	  triggered	  by	  the	  drafting	  of	  the	  Istanbul	  Convention,	  the	  twenty	  years	  long	  experience	  of	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  System	  with	  the	  BdPC	  has	   attracted	   surprisingly	   little	   attention,	   as	   an	   appropriate	   source	   of	  information	  on	  the	  use	  and	  development	  of	  Women’s	  Conventions	  in	  regional	  systems.	   International	   literature	   on	   the	   BdPC	   is	   mainly	   concerned	   with	  assessing	   its	   impact	   on	   promoting	   equality	   and	   non-­‐discrimination	   in	   the	  region.	  To	  our	  knowledge,	  as	  mentioned,	  there	  is	  virtually	  no	  literature	  focused	  on	   evaluating	   the	   process	   through	   which	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   System	  regionalised	   the	   shifted	   paradigm,	   its	   features	   and	   setbacks,	   and	   attempts	   of	  comparative	   analysis	   of	   the	   two	   regional	   systems’	   performance	   on	   women’s	  rights	  are	  not	  available.	  	  	  Through	  this	  research	  we	  do	  not	  want	  to	  draw	  conclusions	  on	  the	  general	  state	  of	   women’s	   rights	   in	   the	   Latin	   American	   region.	   Although	   this	   kind	   of	  assessments	   are	   crucial	   to	   evaluate	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   new	   conventions	   on	  achieving	   the	   set	   objectives,	   we	   recognise	   that	   the	   transformative	   approach	  endorsed	  might	  require	  a	  long	  period	  of	  adaptation	  to	  effectively	  realize	  social	  change.	  Some	  measures	  might	   improve	  women’s	  conditions	  almost	  overnight.	  This	  is	  the	  case	  of,	  for	  instance,	  repealing	  norms	  reflecting	  unjustified	  unequal	  treatment	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  sex.	  In	  our	  research,	  we	  wish	  to	  identify	  which	  are	  the	  structural	   and	   procedural	   preconditions	   determining	   the	   plausibility	   of	   the	  procedural	  objectives	  set	  by	  Women’s	  Conventions.	  Our	  conclusions	  will	  assess	  the	   appropriateness	   of	   a	   system	   such	   as	   that	   established	   by	   the	   ACHR	   for	  triggering	   the	  multi-­‐level	  structural	  change	  required	  by	   the	  BdPC	  to	  reach	   its	  scope,	  signalling	  its	  strengths	  and	  shortcomings.	  Such	  conclusions	  will	  prove	  a	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valuable	   contribution	   to	   the	   debate	   on	   the	   recent	   Istanbul	   Convention	   in	   the	  European	   System,	   singling	   out	   the	   features	   of	   a	   generalizable	   method	   to	  promote	  and	  protect	  women’s	  rights	  in	  regional	  systems,	  exploiting	  the	  specific	  opportunities	  provided	  by	  regional	  systems’	  structures	  and	  function.	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  this	  research	  aims	  to	  provide	  a	  systematic	  evaluation	  of	  the	  dynamic	  process	   through	  which	   the	  BdPC	  has	   been	   internalised	   in	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   System,	   with	   the	   objective	   of	   identifying	   concrete	   proposals	   for	  further	   evolutions	   and	   improvements.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   possibility	   to	  count	   on	   a	   selection	   of	   best	   practices	   from	   a	   comparable	   system,	   allows	   to	  avoid	   repetition	   of	   experienced	   errors	   and	   setbacks	   and	   inform	   the	   function	  and	  role	  of	  the	  Istanbul	  Convention	  as	  an	  instrument	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe,	  that	  will	  need	  to	  be	  guaranteed	  the	  best	  conditions	  for	  plausibility.	  	  We	   want	   to	   evaluate	   whether,	   besides	   adopting	   a	   specific	   convention,	   the	  Inter-­‐American	   system	   internalised	   the	   shift	   in	   understanding	   enshrined	   in	  both	  BdPC	  and	  CEDAW	  and	  through	  which	  process.	  We	  consider	  the	  changed	  paradigm	  as	  primarily	  characterized	  by	  the	  approach	  on	  social	  transformation	  to	   guarantee	   the	   achievement	   of	   that	   substantive	   equality	   and	   non-­‐discrimination	   that	   the	   traditional	   approach	   to	   women’s	   rights	   has	   not	  satisfactorily	   ensured.	  We	  will	   focus	   on	   the	   influence	   of	   those	   elements	   that	  differentiate	   the	   regional	   mechanism	   provided	   by	   the	   BdPC	   in	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  System	  from	  that	  guaranteed	  by	  CEDAW	  and	  its	  Optional	  Protocol	  in	  the	   universal	   system.	   In	   doing	   so,	   we	   want	   to	   single	   out	   how	   the	   specific	  preconditions	  characterizing	  regional	  systems	  influence	  the	  plausibility	  of	  the	  new	  paradigm	  on	  women’s	  rights.	  	  On	   the	  basis	  of	  our	   findings,	  we	  will	   evaluate	   if	   specific	   characteristics	  of	   the	  Inter-­‐American	   System	   allow	   for	   improvement	   in	   its	   responsiveness	   to	   the	  requirements	   set	   by	   the	   BdPC,	   understood	   through	   the	   conceptual	   tools	  provided	  within	   the	   social-­‐legal	   approach	  and,	   in	  particular,	  by	   feminist	   legal	  scholarship.	   This	   study	   will	   allow	   us	   to	   determine	   if,	   in	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  System,	   we	   can	   single	   out	   a	   successful	   method	   developed	   to	   respond	   to	   the	  peculiar	   challenges	   of	   Women’s	   Conventions’	   approach,	   and	   whether	   this	  method	   is	   strictly	   dependent	   on	   Inter-­‐American	   System’s	   structural	   and	  procedural	  specificities	  or	  could	  be	  generalised	  to	  other	  regional	  systems.	  Such	  conclusions	  would	  provide	  crucial	  informative	  material	  to	  construct	  a	  concrete	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proposal	   identifying	   appropriate	   conditions	   of	   plausibility	   for	   the	   Istanbul	  Convention	  in	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe.	  	  
	  
Research	  structure	  and	  methodology	  	  Our	   analysis	   has	   been	   developed	   through	   tree	   phases.	  We	   first	   evaluated	   to	  what	  extent	  the	  structure	  and	  composition	  of	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  System	  fulfils	  those	   minimum	   conditions	   previously	   identified	   as	   crucial	   to	   guarantee	   the	  plausibility	  of	  women’s	  rights	  protection	  and	  promotion,	   i.e.	  public	   legitimacy	  of	  both	  the	  regional	  system	  itself	  and	  of	  the	  BdPC,	  established	  enforcement	  and	  monitoring	   mechanisms	   to	   guarantee	   BdPC	   effectiveness,	   mandate	   of	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions	   on	   the	   BdPC,	   accessibility	   of	   the	   mechanism	   of	  protection,	  suitability	  of	  the	  system’s	  multilevel	  structure	  to	  promote	  national	  implementation.	  	  In	   the	   second	   phase	  we	   assessed	   Inter-­‐American	   System’s	   performance	  with	  the	   BdPC,	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   tools	   of	   analysis	   provided	   by	   feminist	   legal	  scholarship.	  In	  order	  to	  do	  so,	  we	  identify	  indicators	  suitable	  to	  account	  for	  the	  dynamicity	   of	   the	   process,	   signal	   changes,	   trends	   and	   obstacles.	   Considering	  the	   scope	   of	   our	   research,	   our	   choice	   was	   naturally	   directed	   to	   qualitative	  indicators,	   better	   fit	   to	   assess	   the	   characteristic	   of	   a	   process	   with	   such	   a	  dynamic	  nature.	  Quantitative	  indicators	  will	  be	  better	  suitable	  in	  follow	  ups	  to	  this	   research,	   directed	   to	   assess	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   the	   final	   objectives	   of	  substantial	   equality	   and	   non-­‐discrimination	   have	   been	   achieved	   in	   Latin	  American	   societies,	   through	   the	   analysis	   of	   a	   wide	   variety	   of	   data	   and	  information	  gathered	  at	  national	  level.	  	  	  We	  do	  not	  analyse	  the	  whole	  of	  Inter-­‐American	  case	  law	  and	  documentation	  on	  issues	  related	  to	  the	  principles	  of	  equality	  and	  non-­‐discrimination,	  since	  such	  a	  broad	   focus	  would	   be	   largely	   inconclusive	  with	   respect	   to	   our	   objective.	  We	  argue	   that,	   for	   what	   concerns	   the	   crucial	   elements	   of	   the	   paradigm	   shift	  reflected	  in	  the	  BdPC,	  the	  most	  appropriate	  focus	  is	  to	  concentrate	  the	  analysis	  on	   Inter-­‐American	  case	   law	  on	  VAW.	  VAW	  case	   law	  provides	  a	  workable	  and	  informative	  sample	   for	  an	   in	  depth	  analysis	  of	   the	  process	  through	  which	  the	  BdPC	   paradigm	   has	   been	   “internalised”	   in	   institutions’	   decisions.	   The	   mere	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reference	   to	   the	   convention	   is,	   hence,	   sufficient	   to	   draw	   conclusions	   on	   the	  reception	   of	   its	   paradigm.	   We	   needed	   to	   focus	   on	   how	   Inter-­‐American	  Institutions	  evaluate	  concrete	  cases	  under	  BdPC	  provisions,	  and	  evaluate	  their	  decisions	   against	   the	   concepts	   elaborated	   in	   feminist	   legal	   literature	   and	  endorsed	  by	  the	  convention.	  Indicators	  of	  BdPC	  internalisation	  were:	  	  
- The	   use	   of	   the	   BdPC	   as	   a	   complementary	   tool	   of	   interpretation	   of	  general	   provisions	   enshrined	   in	   the	   ACHR,	   minimizing	   the	   risk	   of	  marginalization	  of	  women’s	  rights.	  
- Elements	  suggesting	  the	  actual	  adoption	  of	  a	  gender	  perspective	  in	  the	  analysis,	   i.e.	   their	   consideration	   of	   how	   gender	   discrimination	  determines	   the	   causes	   of	   VAW	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	   narrower	  consideration	   of	   sex	   as	   determining	   the	   form	   of	   the	   violation	   (e.g.	  rape).	  Would	  such	  perspective	  be	  difficult	   to	  determine,	   the	   type	  and	  extent	   of	   the	   measures	   required	   in	   Inter-­‐American	   Institution’s	  decision	   for	   States	   compliance	   allows	   for	   a	   certain	   degree	   of	  objectivity	   in	   our	   interpretation.	   In	   general,	   the	   broader	   the	   type	   of	  measures	   considered	   appropriate,	   the	   more	   likely	   it	   would	   be	   that	  such	   institutions	   are	   addressing	   the	   structural	   gender-­‐related	  determinants	  of	  the	  violation.	  
- The	  suitability	  of	  decisions	   to	  determine	   standards	  of	  protection	  and	  promotion	  of	  women’s	  rights	  extending	  beyond	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  cases,	  besides	  their	  remedial	  appropriateness.	  
- The	  conditions	  under	  which	  international	  responsibility	  is	  recognised.	  Whether	   such	   responsibility	   emerges	   only	   for	   what	   concerns	  omissions	   in	   guaranteeing	   effective	   legal	   procedures	   to	   address	  occurred	  violations,	  or	  it	  is	  recognised	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  States’	  failure	  to	  fulfil	   positive	   obligations	   to	   prevent	   VAW	   and	   eradicate	   its	  discriminatory	  causes.	  
- Institutions’	   ability	   to	   hold	   States	   accountable	   for	   violations	  perpetrated	  in	  the	  case	  of	  both	  public	  agents	  and	  private	  individuals.	  
- The	   consideration	   of	   other	   factors	   that	   intersect	   with	   gender	   in	  causing	  VAW	  in	  concrete	  cases.	  In	  order	  to	  recognise	  the	  development	  of	  a	  multi-­‐factorial	  analysis	  we	  will	  need	  to	  look	  for	  explicit	  mentions	  of	   other	   determinants	   of	  women’s	   social	   positions	   in	   concrete	   cases.	  When	  finding	  evidence	  of	  attempts	  to	  develop	  intersectional	  analysis,	  we	   assessed	   the	   coherence	   of	   institutions’	   decisions	   with	   the	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transformative	  approach	  enshrined	  in	  the	  BdPC,	  identifying	  measures	  to	  address	  additional	  causes	  of	  discrimination	  and	  subjugation	  in	  their	  conclusions	  and	  recommendations.	  	  Such	  focus,	  through	  a	  chronological	  analysis	  of	  case	  law,	  allows	  us	  to	  single	  out	  the	   crucial	   elements	   of	   the	   incremental	   process	   through	  which	   the	  BdPC	  has	  been	   internalised	  and	  developed	   in	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  System,	  as	  well	  as	   the	  strengths	   and	   weaknesses	   of	   the	   structural	   and	   procedural	   conditions	  provided	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  BdPC	  objectives.	  	  Considering	   the	   central	   role	   that	   national	   implementation	   of	   conventional	  provisions	  perform	  in	  guaranteeing	  the	  conditions	  for	  social	  transformation,	  in	  the	   third	   phase	  we	   analysed	   the	   evolution	   of	   national	   legislation	   on	   VAW	   in	  States	   Party	   to	   the	   BdPC,	   that	   recognise	   the	   adjudicatory	   function	   of	   the	  IACrtHR.	   Given	   the	   subsidiary	   nature	   of	   inter-­‐American	   institutions,	   national	  adaptation	  to	  the	  BdPC	  is	  a	  crucial	  engine	  of	  the	  multilevel	  structure	  of	  human	  rights	  protection	  established	  in	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  System,	  providing	  the	  first	  instance	  for	  protection	  and	  constituting	  the	  primary	  domain	  for	  prevention.	  A	  comparative	   chronological	   analysis	   of	   the	   character	   and	   content	   of	   national	  legal	   reforms	   since	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	   BdPC,	   in	   1994,	   provides	   a	   crucial	  indicator	   of	   the	   suitability	   of	   the	   regional	   System	   to	   promote	   national	  implementation	   of	   the	   understanding	   reflected	   in	   the	   BdPC	   and	   regional	  convergence	   to	   internationally	   constructed	   standards	   on	   women’s	   rights.	  Future	   research	   should	  extend	   the	   focus	   to	   comprehend	   the	  use	  of	   such	  new	  legislations	   at	   national	   level	   and	   the	   interaction	   between	   Inter-­‐American	  institutions	   and	   national	   courts.	   	   We	   analysed	   to	   what	   extent	   national	  legislations	   internalised	   the	   requirements	   set	   by	   the	   BdPC	   as	   elaborated	   by	  feminist	  scholarship	  considering:	  	  
- The	   object	   of	   the	   laws,	   i.e.	   whether	   they	   cover	   specific	   forms	   of	  violence	  or	  they	  extend	  to	  all	  cases	  of	  gender-­‐based	  violence.	  
- The	   mechanism	   of	   protection	   provided	   to	   punish	   acts	   of	   VAW	   and	  prevent	  reiteration.	  
- Elements	  suggesting	   the	   internalisation	  of	   the	  understanding	  of	  VAW	  as	  caused	  by	  and	  reproducing	  unequal	  social	  relations.	  
- Explicit	  references	  to	  the	  BdPC	  or	  other	  human	  rights	  instruments.	  
- The	   inclusion	   of	   integrated	   measures	   of	   prevention	   directed	   to	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eradicate	   discrimination,	   beyond	   providing	   specific	   measures	   to	  address	  VAW.	  	  The	  content	  of	   Inter-­‐American	  case	   law	  and	  national	   legislations	  of	  VAW	  was	  analysed	  and	  interpreted	  in	  the	  framework	  set	  by	  the	  BdPC,	  reflecting	  CEDAW	  and	   General	   Recommendation	   19,	   assessing	   its	   responsiveness	   to	  requirements	  set	  by	  the	  paradigm	  shift	  in	  the	  understanding	  of	  VAW.	  Using	  the	  conceptual	   tools	   originated	   in	   feminist	   literature	   we	   analysed	   whether	   the	  paradigm	  shift	  they	  contributed	  to	  generate	  has	  been	  effectively	  internalised	  in	  the	  practice,	   beyond	   the	   conventional	   text	   and	   through	  which	  process.	  When	  needed,	   the	   legal	  analysis	  has	  been	  enriched	  with	  supplementary	   information	  providing	  details	  on	  the	  regional	  and	  universal	  context	  in	  which	  such	  processes	  take	  place.	  	  While	  Inter-­‐American	  case	  law	  is	  publicly	  available	  and	  downloadable	  from	  the	  Inter-­‐American	   Institutions	   websites,	   for	   what	   concerns	   national	   legislations	  we	  gathered	  our	  material	  both	   through	  governmental	  websites	  and	  resorting	  to	   a	   network	   of	   Latin	   American	   academic	   contacts,	   established	   during	   our	  period	   of	   research	   at	   the	   Faculty	   of	   Law	   of	   the	   University	   of	   Buenos	   Aires,	  under	   the	   supervision	   of	   Prof.	   Calogero	   Pizzolo,	   our	   visiting	   period	   at	   the	  Centre	   of	   Excellence	   for	   International	   Courts	   (iCourts)	   of	   the	   University	   of	  Copenhagen,	  for	  which	  we	  are	  grateful	  to	  Prof.	  Mikael	  Rask	  Madsen,	  and	  during	  our	  previous	  stance	  at	  the	  National	  Autonomous	  University	  of	  Mexico	  (UNAM)	  in	  Mexico	  City.	  	  	  This	  network	  allowed	  us	  to	  obtain	  first	  hand	  material,	  unavailable	  online,	  from	  public	   officials	   and	   specialized	   research	   centres	   in	   Latin	   American	   countries.	  With	  the	  exception	  of	  Dominican	  Republic,	  the	  Caribbean	  countries	  have	  been	  excluded	   from	   the	   analysis.	   The	   reason	   of	   such	   choice	   is	   that	   only	  Barbados,	  Haiti	  and	  Trinidad	  y	  Tobago	  ratified	  the	  ACHR	  and	  recognised	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	   the	   Court54	  and	   their	   sharp	   specificities	   and	   minor	   homogeneity	   with	   the	  regional	   legal,	   cultural	   and	   political	   context,	   weaken	   the	   accuracy	   of	  generalisations.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  In	  addition,	  Dominica	  ratified	  the	  Convention	  but	  did	  not	  recognise	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  Court.	  Incidentally,	  but	  out	  of	   the	  scope	  of	   this	  analysis,	  we	  mention	  that	   in	  September	  2012	  Venezuela	  initiated	  the	  process	  to	  withdraw	  from	  the	  ACHR	  and	  this	  decision	  will	  have	  effects	  in	  September	  2013.	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  Once	  analysed	  the	  content	  of	  case	  law	  and	  national	  legislations	  chronologically,	  and	  their	  performance	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  paradigm	  shift,	  we	  integrated	  our	  findings	  in	  a	  single	  framework,	  presenting	  a	  conjunct	  interpretation	  of	  their	  evolution,	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  whether	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  convention	  itself	  and	  Inter-­‐American	  case	  law	  had	  an	  impact	  on	  regional	  legal	  reforms,	  in	  which	  way	  and	  to	  what	  extent.	  	  	  The	  indicators	  selected	  present	  appropriate	  levels	  of	  reliability	  and	  validity	  in	  order	  to	  be	  useful	  to	  our	  scope.	  In	  order	  to	  limit	  the	  sources	  of	  our	  analysis,	  an	  unavoidable	  task	  given	  the	  overarching	  nature	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  equality	  and	  non-­‐discrimination	  (between	  sexes	  and	   in	  general),	  we	  selected	  case	   law	  and	  legislations	  related	  to	  one	  of	  the	  subjects	  covered	  in	  Women’s	  Conventions,	  i.e.	  VAW.	   The	   validity	   of	   this	   choice	   is	   justifiable	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   informative	  content	  of	  institutions’	  interpretations	  and	  national	  legislations	  on	  the	  subject	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   BdPC	   objectives.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	   shift	   in	   international	  understanding	  on	  VAW	  reflects	   the	   essence	  of	   the	  new	  paradigm	  on	  equality	  and	   non-­‐discrimination,	   since	   with	   1992	   CEDAW	   Committee’s	   General	  Recommendation	   19	   gender-­‐based	   violence	   was	   recognised	   as	   a	   form	   of	  discrimination,	   originating	   in	   structural	   unequal	   relations	   of	   power	   between	  the	  sexes,	  that	  seriously	  inhibits	  women's	  ability	  to	  enjoy	  rights	  and	  freedoms	  on	  a	  basis	  of	  equality	  with	  men.	  This	  understanding	  has	  been	  broadly	  accepted	  and	   internalised	   by	   international	   instruments	   and	   institutions.	   On	   the	   other	  hand,	  measures	  to	  eradicate	  VAW	  are	  required	  to	  address	  legal	  reforms	  as	  well	  as	  social	  and	  cultural	  patterns	  which	  reproduce	  discrimination	  and	  cause	  this	  kind	  of	  violence.	  Therefore,	  a	  focus	  on	  legislation	  on	  VAW	  allows	  us	  to	  identify	  the	   reception	   of	   the	   understanding	   of	   gender	   discrimination	   as	   a	   structural	  element	  in	  current	  social	  relations.	  	  	  Our	   focus	  on	  VAW	  is	  consistent	  with	   the	  scope	  of	   this	  research	  and	  based	  on	  the	   recognition	   of	   the	   distinctive	   features	   of	   the	   paradigm	   shift	   on	   women’s	  rights.	  We	  argue	  that	  the	  reasons	  for	  this	  necessary	  restriction	  of	  the	  research	  focus	  are	  sufficiently	  grounded	  to	  be	  uncontroversially	  acceptable.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  reliability	  of	  the	  indicators	  is	  ensured	  in	  that	  they	  do	  not	  depend	  on	  the	   researcher	   monitoring	   them,	   once	   explicitly	   identified	   the	   focus	   and	   the	  perspective	   is	   accepted.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   type	   of	   indicators	   selected	  might	  be	  challenged	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  qualitative	  indicators	  carry	  the	  risk	  of	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being	   less	  objectively	   interpretable.	  However,	  we	  believe	   that	   the	   strength	  of	  such	   objection	   should	   not	   be	   overestimated.	   Interpretations	   can	   hardly	   be	  completely	  bias-­‐free,	   both	   for	  quantitative	   and	  qualitative	   indicators,	   and	   the	  same	   can	   easily	   be	   argued	   for	   what	   concerns	   the	   selection	   of	   the	   indicators	  themselves.	  The	  best	  option	  is,	  hence,	  to	  limit	  the	  range	  of	  questions	  we	  want	  them	  to	  answer	  and	  account	   for	   their	   fallibility.	   In	   this	  sense,	  we	  use	  them	  to	  evaluate	  the	  internalisation	  of	  the	  paradigm	  shift,	  as	  presented	  in	  the	  previous	  part	  of	  this	  Section,	  and	  to	  assess	  the	  conditions	  for	  its	  plausibility	  provided	  by	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  System,	  without	  expecting	  them	  to	  provide	  information	  on	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  women’s	  rights	  in	  the	  region.	  	  Through	   our	   analysis	   we	   do	   not	   want	   to	   evaluate	   Inter-­‐American	   System’s	  performance	  in	  developing	  the	  best	  way	  to	  address	  women’s	  rights	  issues	  and	  eradicate	  discrimination.	   In	  our	   approach,	   the	   “best	  way”	   coincides	  with	   that	  indicated	  in	  current	  Women’s	  Conventions,	  i.e.	  the	  most	  recent	  evolution	  of	  the	  international	   understanding	   of	   women’s	   rights	   reflected	   in	   the	   conventional	  texts,	   and	   understood	   in	   the	   framework	   of	   the	   reviewed	   feminist	   legal	  literature.	   We	   look	   for	   evidence	   of	   the	   internalisation	   of	   the	   systematic	  approach	   to	  VAW	  eradication	   required	   by	  Women’s	   Conventions,	   looking	   for	  references	  to	  its	  recognised	  discriminatory	  causes.	  	  	  We	   do	   not	   question	   the	   appropriateness	   of	   the	   understanding	   of	   VAW	   as	   a	  form	   of	   discrimination	   to	   address	   structurally,	   this	   is	   taken	   as	   given,	   and	  considering	  the	  inherently	  dynamic	  nature	  of	  human	  rights	  instruments,	  which	  allow	   their	   further	   evolution	   and	   adaptation	   through	   interpretation.	   This	  perspective	   is	   implied	   in	   our	   problem-­‐solving	   approach	   to	   the	   issue.	   We	  currently	   count	   on	   an	   impressive	   number	   of	   international	   instruments	   on	  human	   rights,	   general	   and	   specific,	   regional	   or	   universal.	   Many	   of	   them	   are	  several	   decades	   old,	   and	   are	   continuously	   actualised	   through	   interpretations	  by	   competent	   bodies,	   to	   respond	   to	   the	   historical	   evolution	   of	   the	  understanding	   of	   their	   content.	   Nevertheless,	   they	   provide	   the	   normative	  framework	  creating	  the	  very	  conditions	  for	  such	  evolution.	  In	  this	  perspective	  we	  consider	  the	  adoption	  of	  specific	  conventions	  addressing	  women’s	  rights	  as	  a	  valuable	  contribution	  per	  se,	  enhancing	  the	  likelihood	  of	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  women’s	  rights	  and	  their	  further	  conceptual	  evolutions.	  	  Through	  this	  research	  we	  wish	  to	  identify	  which	  are	  the	  favourable	  structural	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and	   procedural	   conditions	   determining	   the	   plausibility	   of	   the	   paradigm	  presented	   by	   Women’s	   Conventions.	   Therefore,	   conclusions	   on	   the	   general	  state	  of	  women’s	  rights	  in	  the	  region	  will	  not	  be	  drawn	  in	  this	  research.	  Indeed,	  we	   believe	   that	   such	   a	   research	   objective,	   at	   this	   early	   stage	   in	   Women’s	  Conventions	  life,	  would	  not	  necessarily	  provide	  useful	  information	  about	  how	  to	   design	   a	   human	   rights	   system	   suiting	   the	   characteristics	   of	   such	   new	  instruments	  and	  make	  provision’s	  effectiveness	  plausible.	  Our	  conclusions	  will	  assess	   the	  appropriateness	  of	   a	   system	  such	  as	   that	  established	  by	   the	  ACHR	  for	   pursuing	   the	   structural	   change	   required	   by	   the	   BdPC	   to	   reach	   its	   overall	  objectives,	   signalling	   its	   strengths	   and	   shortcomings.	   Our	   objective	   is	   to	  determine	   whether	   we	   can	   recognise	   a	   method	   emerging	   from	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  System	  practice	  with	  the	  BdPC	  and	  if	  the	  specificities	  of	  the	  regional	  system	  allow	  room	  for	  improvement	  in	  responding	  to	  those	  challenges	  that	  the	  conventional	  approach	   implies,	  but	  cannot	  be	  solved	   through	  standardisation	  in	   a	   written	   instrument.	   Our	   last	   task	   will	   be	   to	   determine	   whether	   such	  method	  might	  be	  generalizable	  to	  other	  regional	  systems	  or	  it	  is	  suitable	  given	  the	  specific	  features	  of	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  System.	  	  The	   final	   Section	   of	   this	   research	  will	   be	   dedicated	   to	   outline	   a	   brief	  a	  priori	  assessment	   of	   the	   perspectives	   of	   the	   Istanbul	   Convention	   in	   the	   European	  System,	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   our	   findings	   for	   what	   concerns	   a	   similar	   previous	  experience	   in	   a	   comparable	   regional	   system,	   considering	   the	   similarities	   and	  differences	  of	   the	   two	  systems	  and	  the	  relations	  between	  the	   two	  Courts.	  We	  believe	  that	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  BdPC	  in	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  System	  provides	  a	  crucial	  informative	  experience	  for	  the	  development	  of	  a	  European	  response	  to	  VAW.	   However,	   although,	   the	   ECrtHR	   has	   occasionally	   mentioned	   IACrtHR’s	  (and	  CEDAW	  Committee’s)	  case	   law	  when	  confronting	  cases	  of	  VAW,	  some	  of	  the	  choices	  made	  when	  drafting	  the	  Istanbul	  Convention,	  particularly	  for	  what	  concerns	  the	  enforcement	  mechanisms,	  seem	  to	  have	  overlooked	  lessons	  that	  the	  history	  of	  the	  previously	  enacted	  Women’s	  Conventions	  provided.	  	  ECrtHR’s	   case	   law	   currently	   provides	   an	   enormous	   corpus	   juris	   that	   proves	  sufficient	   to	   serve	   as	   a	   norm	   of	   reference	   to	   solve	   the	  majority	   of	   problems	  involving	   human	   rights.	   Indeed,	   the	   longer	   experience	   of	   the	   ECrtHR	   often	  provided	  the	  IACrtHR	  with	  crucial	  authoritative	  solutions	  to	  similar	  problems.	  However,	  this	  should	  not	  lead	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  European	  System	  is	  capable,	  by	  itself,	  of	  always	  finding	  appropriate	  solutions	  to	  newly	  emerging	  questions	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(Garlicki,	   2012).	   Even	   if	   it	  were,	   it	  would	  prove	   time	   consuming	   to	  work	  out	  each	   solution	   from	   scratch,	   without	   resorting	   to	   exogenous	   references	   or	  experiences	  of	  comparable	  systems,	  which	  currently	  count	  on	  a	  long	  successful	  history	   and	   comparable	   legitimacy	   and	   auctoritas.	   Indeed,	   there	   is	   one	  important	   field	   in	  which	   the	   ECrtHR	   adopted	   a	   doctrine	   shaped	   in	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  context,	  namely	   to	  address	   the	   issue	  of	   the	  desaparecidos	   (Massolo,	  2012).	   With	   our	   analysis,	   we	   wish	   to	   encourage	   and	   provide	   bases	   for	   a	  stronger	   bi-­‐directional	   dialogue	   between	   the	   two	   regional	   systems	   that,	   for	  what	  concerns	  the	  focus	  of	  our	  research,	  would	  allow	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  to	  better	   use	   the	   European	   System’s	   potential	   to	   promote	   the	   ambitious	  objectives	  of	   the	   Istanbul	  Convention.	  Once	  completed	  our	  primary	  objective,	  we	  follow	  up	  to	  our	  motivation	  and	  present	  an	  a	  priori	  assessment	  of	  Istanbul	  Convention’s	  perspectives	  in	  the	  European	  System,	  considering	  differences	  and	  analogies	  with	  the	  analysed	  Inter-­‐American	  experience	  and	  identify	  a	  concrete	  proposal	  for	  improving	  expectations	  of	  its	  effectiveness.	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Section	   II	   –	   Chronological	  
review:	   Inter-­‐American	   case	  
law	   and	   national	   legislations	  
on	  VAW	  
	  
Introduction	  	  In	  this	  Section	  we	  present	  a	  descriptive	  review	  of	  Inter-­‐American	  case	  law	  and	  national	  legislations	  on	  VAW.	  As	  explained	  in	  the	  First	  Section,	  we	  focused	  on	  VAW	  given	  that	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  attitude	  towards	  the	  subject	  constitutes	  a	  suitable	   indicator	   of	   the	   degree	   of	   internalisation	   of	   the	   paradigm	   shift	  endorsed	   by	   Women’s	   Conventions.	   The	   period	   covered	   begins	   with	   the	  adoption	  of	  the	  BdPC,	  in	  1994,	  and	  includes	  all	  relevant	  material	  up	  to	  the	  first	  semester	   of	   2013.	   The	   BdPC	   entered	   into	   force	   in	   1995	   and	   the	   first	   cases	  reviewed	  were	  submitted	  to	  the	  IACommHR	  before	  its	  adoption	  in	  the	  regional	  system	   and,	   consequently,	   concern	   violations	   occurred	   during	   the	   period	   of	  formation	   of	   the	   current	   understanding	   of	   VAW	   as	   a	   human	   rights	   violation.	  Analysing	  the	  relevant	  case	  law	  chronologically	  allows	  us,	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  to	  determine	   whether	   there	   is	   evidence	   of	   an	   impact	   on	   Inter-­‐American	  Institutions’	   analyses	   of	   the	   increased	   international	   awareness	   reflected	   in	  adoption	   of	   the	   BdPC.	   Considering	   1979	   CEDAW,	   1992	   General	  Recommendation	   19	   and	   1994	   UNGA	   Declaration	   on	   the	   Elimination	   of	  Violence	   Against	   Women,	   by	   the	   time	   of	   BdPC	   adoption	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  System	   could	   count	   on	   an	   articulated	   international	   consensus	   on	   the	   origins	  and	  nature	  of	  VAW,	  which	  could	  be	  used	  as	  a	  framework	  of	  analysis,	  arguably,	  even	   before	   the	   formal	   entrance	   into	   force	   of	   the	   instrument.	   The	   same	  considerations	  apply	  for	  what	  concerns	  legislative	  reforms	  nationally	  adopted	  in	  the	  years	  immediately	  before	  1995.	  	  Given	   the	   bi-­‐frontal	   structure	   of	   the	   protection	   mechanism	   provided	   by	   the	  American	   Convention	   on	   Human	   Rights	   (Pizzolo,	   2012),	   and	   reflected	   in	   the	  BdPC,	  the	  reviewed	  cases	  comprehend	  both	  those	  ended	  with	  a	  decision	  of	  the	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IACommHR	  and	  those	  judged	  by	  the	  Court.	  In	  fact,	  the	  IACommHR	  performs	  a	  “filtering”	   function,	   developing	   its	   own	   proceedings	   to	   evaluate	   a	   case	  admissibility	  and	  merits.	  Unless	  a	  friendly	  settlement	  can	  be	  reached,	  it	  is	  up	  to	  the	  Commission’s	  discretion	  whether	   to	  end	  the	  procedure	  with	   its	  Report	   to	  the	  State,	  and	  monitor	  compliance	  with	  the	  decision,	  or	  refer	  it	  to	  the	  IACrtHR,	  through	   a	   further	   application	   presenting	   the	   Commission’s	   view	   of	   the	   facts.	  When	   referring	   a	   case	   to	   the	   Court,	   the	   Commission	   indicates	   the	   provisions	  suggested	   for	   Court’s	   evaluation,	   drawing	   from	   those	   invoked	   by	   the	  petitioners	  and,	  if	  when	  appropriate,	  including	  others	  to	  be	  considered.	  When	  called	   to	   judge	   a	   case,	   the	   Court	   develops	   its	   own	   proceedings	   and	   might	  recognise	  breaches	  of	  the	  suggested	  norms,	  discard	  them,	  or	  add	  others,	  would	  their	  relevance	  emerge	  from	  the	  Court’s	  evaluations	  of	  the	  facts.	  The	  symbolic	  impact	  and	  regional	  influence	  of	  IACrtHR’s	  decisions	  is	  generally	  stronger	  than	  Commission’s	  Reports.	  	  In	  reviewing	  national	  legislations	  on	  VAW,	  we	  noticed	  a	  sharp	  difference	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  legislative	  reforms	  enacted	  before	  and	  after	  2006,	  bringing	  us	  to	  identify	  a	  first	  and	  second	  generation	  of	  laws.	  As	  we	  will	  see,	  2006	  is	  the	  year	  in	   which	   the	   IACrtHR	   officially	   clarified	   its	   contentious	   jurisdiction	   on	   the	  BdPC,	   adopting	   its	   first	   relevant	   ruling	   in	   Castro-­‐Castro.	   Considering	   this	  element,	   and	   the	   peculiar	   features	   of	   the	   two	   generations	   of	   reforms,	   we	  organised	   our	   descriptive	   review	  of	   the	   legislative	   texts	   on	  VAW	   in	   two	   sub-­‐sections,	  respectively	  covering	  the	  period	  1994-­‐2005	  and	  2006-­‐present.	  	  While	  the	  case	  law	  is	  publicly	  available	  and	  downloadable	  from	  Inter-­‐American	  Institutions’	  websites,	  for	  what	  concerns	  national	  legislations	  we	  gathered	  our	  material	   both	   through	   governmental	  websites	   and	   resorting	   to	   a	   network	   of	  Latin	  American	  academic	  contacts	  established	  during	  our	  period	  of	  research	  at	  the	  Faculty	  of	  Law	  of	  the	  University	  of	  Buenos	  Aires,	  our	  visiting	  period	  at	  the	  Centre	   of	   Excellence	   for	   International	   Courts	   (iCourts)	   of	   the	   University	   of	  Copenhagen,	   and	   during	   our	   previous	   stance	   at	   the	   National	   Autonomous	  University	  of	  Mexico	  (UNAM)	  in	  Mexico	  City.	  This	  network	  allowed	  us	  to	  obtain	  first	   hand	   material,	   unavailable	   online,	   from	   public	   officials	   and	   specialized	  research	  centres	  in	  Latin	  American	  countries.	  	  	  With	  the	  exception	  of	  Dominican	  Republic,	  the	  Caribbean	  countries	  have	  been	  excluded	   from	   the	   analysis.	   The	   reason	   of	   such	   choice	   is	   that	   only	  Barbados,	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Haiti	  and	  Trinidad	  y	  Tobago	  ratified	  the	  ACHR	  and	  recognised	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  Court.55	  Moreover,	  their	  sharp	  specificities	  and	  minor	  homogeneity	  with	  the	   regional	   legal,	   cultural	   and	   political	   context,	   would	   have	   weakened	   the	  accuracy	  of	  generalisations.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  In	   addition,	   Dominica	   ratified	   the	   ACHR	   but	   did	   not	   recognise	   the	   jurisdiction	   of	   the	   Court.	  Incidentally,	   but	   out	   of	   the	   scope	   of	   this	   research,	   we	   mention	   that	   Trinidad	   y	   Tobago	   and	  Venezuela	  recently	  withdrew	  from	  the	  ACHR.	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Inter-­‐American	  case	  law	  on	  VAW	  	  In	   the	   ‘90s,	   several	   petitions	   on	   cases	   of	   VAW	   were	   submitted	   to	   the	  IACommHR	  and,	  as	  we	  will	  see,	  a	  few	  reached	  the	  IACrtHR.	  	  	  We	  now	  proceed	  with	  a	  chronological	  description	  of	  the	  cases	  that,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  CEDAW	  or	  BdPC,	  could	  have	  or	  have	  been	  interpreted	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  new	  understanding	   of	   VAW,	   as	   originating	   and	   reproducing	   discrimination.	   In	  reviewing	   relevant	   case	   law	   we	   will	   focus	   on	   the	   interpretations	   relative	   to	  VAW,	  other	  aspects	  of	  the	  decisions	  will	  be,	  hence,	  excluded	  from	  the	  following	  description.	  	  	  
Contentious	  cases	  
	  
Raquel	  Martín	  de	  Mejía	  v.	  Peru	  (1996)	  -­‐	  IACommHR	  
	  The	  facts	  refer	   to	  several	  violations	  perpetrated	  by	  agents	  of	   the	  Peruvian	  State	  against	   Raquel	  Martín	   de	  Mejía,	   a	   teacher	  who	   suffered	   repeated	   sexual	   abuse,	  and	   her	   husband	   Fernando	   Mejía	   Egocheaga,	   a	   lawyer,	   journalist	   and	   political	  activist.	  The	   facts	  occurred	   in	  1991,	  at	  a	   time	   in	  which	   the	  BdPC	  was	  not	  yet	   in	  force,	   and	   the	   Commission’s	   decision	   was	   adopted	   two	   months	   after	   Peru’s	  ratification	  of	  the	  Convention.	  However,	  the	  State	  was	  already	  part	  of	  the	  CEDAW	  since	  1982.	  	  	  Building	   on	   the	   developments	   in	   international	   law	   for	   what	   concerns	   the	  understanding	   of	   rape	   in	   context	   of	   conflict	   and	   political	   instability,	   the	  Commission	   recognises	   the	   victim’s	   sexual	   abuse,	   committed	   by	   members	   of	  security	  forces,	  as	  a	  human	  rights	  violation,	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  right	  to	  physical	  and	  mental	   integrity.	   In	   establishing	   the	   responsibility	   of	   the	   Peruvian	   State,	   the	  Commission	  follows	  ECrtHR’s	  jurisprudence,	  addressing	  the	  case	  under	  Article	  5	  ACHR	   (Right	   to	  Humane	  Treatment)	   and,	   notably,	   Article	   11	   (Right	   to	   Privacy)	  observing	  that	  the	  “concept	  of	  private	  life	  extends	  to	  a	  person's	  physical	  and	  moral	  
integrity,	  and	  consequently	  includes	  his	  sex	  life”	  (Part	  3.a,	  para.	  unnumbered).	  	  The	  facts	  constitute	  a	  relatively	  “easy”	  case	  to	  analyse:	  rape	  as	  a	  form	  of	  inhumane	  and	  degrading	  treatment	  had	  already	  been	  extensively	  addressed	  by	  international	  
	   89 
institutions;	  the	  perpetrators	  were	  agents	  of	  the	  State,	  hence,	  the	  public/private	  dichotomy	   was	   unproblematic	   and	   the	   petitioner	   provided	   accurate	  documentation	   of	   her	   allegations,	   with	   several	   organisations	   supporting	   her	  statements	   with	   reports	   on	   relevant	   contextual	   elements.	   Given	   the	   form	   of	  violence	   suffered,	   the	   sex	   of	   the	   victim	   is	   mentioned	   several	   times	   in	   the	  Commission’s	  reasoning,	  however,	  there	  is	  virtually	  no	  sign	  of	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  broader	  BdPC	  paradigm	  shift	  in	  the	  evaluation	  of	  its	  origins.	  	  The	   Commission	   quoted	   the	   Special	   Rapporteur	   against	   Torture:	   "Rape	   is	   a	  
particularly	  base	  attack	  against	  human	  dignity.	   	  Women	  are	  affected	   in	   the	  most	  
sensitive	  part	  of	  their	  personality	  and	  the	  long-­‐term	  effects	  are	  perforce	  extremely	  
harmful,	   since	   in	   the	  majority	   of	   cases	   the	  necessary	  psychological	   treatment	  and	  
care	  will	  not	  and	  cannot	  be	  provided”	  (Part	   3.a,	   para.	   unnumbered)	  and	   argued	  that	   “Raquel	   Mejía	   was	   raped	   with	   the	   aim	   of	   punishing	   her	   personally	   and	  
intimidating	   her”	   (Part	   A,	   para.	   unnumbered).	   However,	   analyses	   of	   rape	   are	  mainly	  used	  in	  the	  framework	  of	  a	  broader	  understanding	  of	  torture,	  evaluated	  under	  Article	  5	  ACHR.	  Discrimination	  as	  a	  cause	  of	  VAW	  does	  not	  come	  into	  the	  picture,	  since	  the	  conditions	  to	  use	  this	  framework	  depend	  on	  the	  sexual	  abuse	  being:	   1.	   An	   intentional	   act	   through	   which	   physical	   and	   mental	   pain	   and	  suffering	   is	   inflicted	   on	   a	   person;	   2.	   Committed	   with	   a	   purpose,	   and	   3.	  Committed	  by	  a	  public	  official	  or	  by	  a	  private	  person	  acting	  at	  the	  instigation	  of	  the	  former.	  	  	  Considering	   the	  need	   to	  previously	  exhaust	  domestic	   remedies	   the	  Commission	  argues	  that:	  “the	  reasons	  given	  by	  the	  petitioner	  for	  not	  submitting	  a	  petition	  in	  the	  
domestic	   courts	   are	   supported	   by	   different	   documents	   published	   by	  
intergovernmental	  bodies	  and	  nongovernmental	  organisations	  which	  expressly	  note	  
that	   women	   who	   have	   been	   victims	   of	   sexual	   abuse	   by	   members	   of	   the	   security	  
forces	   or	   police	   have	   no	   means	   open	   to	   them	   for	   obtaining	   a	   remedy	   for	   the	  
violations	  of	  their	  rights”	   (Part	  B,	  para.	  unnumbered)	  However,	  notwithstanding	  the	  documentation	  gathered	  highlighting	  impunity	  in	  cases	  of	  violations	  suffered	  by	   women,	   the	   reasoning	   of	   the	   Commission	   does	   not	   go	   beyond	   reporting	  extracts	   of	   it, 56 used	   solely	   to	   argue	   the	   admissibility	   of	   the	   case	   due	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  The	   Decision	   quotes	   a	   long	   extract	   from	   the	   Report	   of	   the	   UN	   Special	   Rapporteur	   Against	  Torture:	  "it	  is	  reported...	  that	  those	  guilty	  of	  [rape	  and	  other	  sexual	  abuses]	  were	  rarely	  brought	  to	  trial	  
even	  in	  those	  cases	  where	  complaints	  were	  filed	  with	  competent	  authorities.	  The	  military	  courts	  took	  no	  
action	  in	  these	  cases	  and	  failed	  to	  place	  the	  accused	  at	  the	  disposal	  of	  the	  civil	  courts,	  as	  they	  were	  required	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unavailability	   of	   domestic	   remedies.	   While	   considering	   the	   issues	   of	   public	  
humiliation	  and	  society’s	  attitude	  to	  the	  victims	  of	  sexual	  abuse	  addressing	  the	  low	  number	  of	  reports	  filed	  by	  women,	  the	  arguments	  are	  again	  used	  to	  support	  the	  admissibility	  of	  the	  case,	  but	  do	  not	  trigger	  a	  broader	  analysis	  of	  discriminatory	  socio-­‐cultural	   patterns,	   possibly	   reproducing	   VAW	   through	   its	   impunity,	   nor	   it	  implies	  a	  reference	  to	  the	  obligations	  of	  the	  Peruvian	  State	  as	  a	  party	  to	  CEDAW,	  specifically	  for	  what	  concerns	  its	  Article	  5(a).57	  	  	  
X	  and	  Y	  v.	  Argentina	  (1996)	  –	  IACommHR	  
	  The	  facts	  happened	  in	  1989,	  when	  the	  BdPC	  was	  not	  in	  force.	  However,	  Argentina	  had	  been	  a	  CEDAW	  State	  Party	  since	  1985	  and	   the	  Decision	  of	   the	  Commission	  was	   adopted	   after	   its	   ratification	   of	   the	   BdPC.	   The	   petitioners,	   Ms.	   X	   and	   her	  thirteen-­‐year-­‐old	   daughter	   Y,	   reported	   that	   the	   Federal	   Government	   Prison	  authorities	   arbitrarily	   performed	   vaginal	   inspections	   when	   they	   visited	   their	  husband	  and	  father.	  They	  claimed	  that	  the	  practice	  constituted	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  American	   Convention,	   offending	   their	   dignity	   and	   right	   to	   privacy	   (Article	   11),	  constituting	  a	  degrading	  punishment	  extending	  beyond	  the	  person	  condemned	  or	  on	  trial	  and	  an	  invasion	  of	  the	  victims’	  physical	  integrity	  (Article	  5.3).	  Notably,	  the	  petitioner	   referred	   to	   the	   practice	   as	   discriminatory	   against	   women,	   invoking	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
to	  do	  by	   law.	  This	   situation	  of	   impunity	   together	  with	  other	   factors	   such	  as	   the	  difficulty	  of	   submitting	  
evidence	  or	  society's	  attitude	  to	  the	  victims	  meant	  that	  a	  large	  percentage	  of	  these	  cases	  were	  never	  even	  
reported".	  Amnesty	  International	  has	  stated	  that	  despite	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  large	  number	  of	  cases	  of	  sexual	  
violations	  in	  emergency	  areas,	  to	  date	  no	  member	  of	  the	  security	  forces	  operating	  in	  those	  areas	  has	  been	  
tried	  for	  rape;	  neither	  have	  effective	  investigations	  been	  made	  following	  complaints	  submitted	  by	  women	  
who	  have	  been	  victims	  of	  sexual	  abuse	  by	  soldiers.	  Human	  Rights	  Watch,	   for	   its	  part,	  has	  observed	  that	  
despite	  the	  widespread	  incidence	  of	  sexual	  abuse	  in	  Peru,	  very	  few	  police	  and	  even	  fewer	  members	  of	  the	  
security	   forces	   have	   been	   tried	   for	   this	   abuse,	   even	   in	   cases	   where	   complaints	   were	   filed	   with	   the	  
appropriate	  authorities.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  the	  evidence	  gathered	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  police	  and	  armed	  
forces	  protect	  those	  guilty	  of	  these	  violations	  and	  grant	  them	  promotions,	  thereby	  implicitly	  tolerating	  the	  
commission	  of	  these	  crimes.	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  also	  maintains	  that	  it	  is	  practically	  impossible	  to	  prove	  a	  
charge	  of	  rape	  against	  a	  member	  of	  the	  security	  forces.	   	  The	  emergency	  legislation	  specifies	  that	  crimes	  
committed	   in	   the	   ‘performance	  of	   duty’	   fall	   under	  military	   jurisdiction,	   in	   accordance	  with	   the	  Code	  of	  
Military	   Justice.	   Although	   sexual	   abuse	   is	   a	   common	   crime	   -­‐	   and	   not	   one	   of	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘duty	  
crimes’	  -­‐	  there	  have	  been	  no	  rape	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  ordinary	  courts	  have	  exercised	  jurisdiction”	  (Raquel	  
Martín	  de	  Mejía	  v.	  Peru,	  part	  B).	  57	  Article	  5(a)	  CEDAW:	  States	  Parties	  shall	  take	  all	  appropriate	  measures:	  a)	  To	  modify	  the	  social	  and	  
cultural	  patterns	  of	  conduct	  of	  men	  and	  women,	  with	  a	  view	  to	  achieving	  the	  elimination	  of	  prejudices	  
and	  customary	  and	  all	  other	  practices	  which	  are	  based	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  inferiority	  or	  the	  superiority	  
of	  either	  of	  the	  sexes	  or	  on	  stereotyped	  roles	  for	  men	  and	  women.	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ACHR	  Article	  24	  (Right	  to	  Equal	  Protection	  Before	  the	  Law),	  in	  relation	  to	  Article	  1.1	  (Obligation	  to	  Respect	  Rights	  with	  no	  Discrimination).	  	  	  Although	  the	  violations	  alleged	  provided	  grounds	  to	  adopt	  the	  understanding	  of	  VAW	   as	   a	   form	   of	   discrimination,	   while	   the	   Commission	   considered	   the	   facts	  under	   Article	   17	   (Rights	   of	   the	   Family)	   and	   Article	   19	   (Rights	   of	   the	   Child),	   it	  discarded	   the	   reference	   to	   Article	   24.	   The	   final	   decision	   recognised	   that,	   by	  imposing	  an	  unregulated	  condition	  for	  the	  fulfilment	  of	  their	  prison	  visits,	  without	  appropriate	  judicial	  and	  medical	  guarantees,	  Argentina	  violated	  the	  rights	  of	  Ms.	  X	  and	  her	  daughter	  Y	  guaranteed	  in	  Articles	  5,	  11	  and	  17,	  in	  relation	  to	  Article	  1.1	  ACHR.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Y,	  the	  Commission	  concluded	  that	  the	  State	  of	  Argentina	  also	  violated	  Article	  19.	  	  	  	  
Diana	  Ortiz	  v.	  Guatemala	  (1996)	  –	  IACommHR	  	  Petitioner	   Sister	   Dianna	   Ortiz,	   a	   United	   States	   citizen	   and	   Catholic	   nun	   of	   the	  Ursuline	   order,	   alleged	   that	   she	   was	   kidnapped,	   brought	   to	   a	   clandestine	  detention	   centre	   and	   raped	   by	   agents	   of	   the	   Guatemalan	   Government	   in	  November	   1989.	   Guatemala	   was	   part	   of	   CEDAW	   since	   1982	   and,	   although	   the	  BdPC	  was	   not	   in	   force	   at	   the	   time	   of	   the	   facts,	   the	   Commission’s	   decision	  was	  adopted	   after	   its	   ratification.	  However,	   the	   Commission	   never	  mentioned	   these	  international	   instruments.	   Based	   on	   the	   information	   submitted	   and	   its	   own	  investigations,	   the	   Commission	   found	   that	   the	   Guatemalan	   Government	   had	  violated	   the	  ACHR	  Articles	  1	   (Obligation	   to	  Respect	  Rights),	   5	   (Right	   to	  Human	  Treatment),	  7	   (Right	   to	  Personal	  Liberty),	  8	   (Right	   to	  a	  Fair	  Trial),	  11	   (Right	   to	  Privacy),	  12	  (Freedom	  of	  Conscience	  and	  Religion),	  16	  (Freedom	  of	  Association)	  and	  25	  (Right	  to	  Judicial	  Protection).	  	  	  The	  Commission	  overlooked	  the	  possibly	  discriminatory	  nature	  of	  the	  violations,	  notwithstanding	   some	   informative	   elements	   that	   might	   have	   suggested	   such	  interpretation.	  During	  the	  hearings	  of	  the	  case,	  General	  Alejandro	  Gramajo,	  then	  Minister	   of	   Defence,	   argued:	   “Sister	  Ortiz	  had	   invented	  her	   story	   to	   cover	  up	  her	  
involvement	  in	  a	  ‘lesbian	  tryst’.	  	  He	  suggested	  that	  her	  facial	  injuries	  resulted	  from	  a	  
love	   affair”	   (para.	   43)	   and	   Government	   officials	   added	   that:	   “Her	   accusations	  
against	  the	  Government	  were	  fabricated,	   that	  she	  had	  staged	  her	  own	  kidnapping	  
and	   that	   she	   was	   working	   with	   groups	   who	   wished	   to	   embarrass	   the	   country	   of	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Guatemala”	  (para.	   117).	  While	  briefly	  defining	   these	   statements	   as	   “particularly	  serious”,	  the	  Commission	  does	  not	  take	  into	  account	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  such	  spiteful	  assertions.	  	  
	  
	  
Ana,	  Beatriz,	  and	  Celia	  González	  Pérez	  v	  Mexico	  (2001)	  –	  IACommHR	  	  The	  Centre	  for	  Justice	  and	  International	  Law	  (CEJIL)	  filed	  a	  petition	  alleging	  the	  international	   responsibility	   of	   Mexico	   for	   the	   illegal	   detention,	   rape,	   and	  torture	  of	  Tzeltal	  sisters	  Ana,	  Beatriz,	  and	  Celia	  González	  Pérez	  by	  members	  of	  the	  security	  forces,	  as	  well	  as	  for	  the	  subsequent	  failure	  of	  the	  national	  judicial	  system	   to	   investigate	   the	   facts	   and	   provide	   redress	   for	   the	   victims.	   The	  petitioners	   invoked	   several	   rights	   enshrined	   by	   the	   ACHR:	   right	   to	   humane	  treatment	   (Article	  5);	   right	   to	  personal	   liberty	   (Article	  7);	   right	   to	   a	   fair	   trial	  (Article	   8);	   right	   to	   privacy	   (Article	   11);	   rights	   of	   the	   child	   (Article	   19);	   and	  right	   to	   judicial	   protection	   (Article	   25).	   The	   facts	   took	   place	   in	   1994,	  Mexico	  was	  a	  CEDAW	  State	  Party	  since	  1981,	  and	  the	  BdPC	  had	  entered	  into	  force	  four	  years	  before	  the	  Commission’s	  decision.	  	  In	   its	  evaluation	  of	   the	   facts,	   the	  Commission	  added	  a	  reference	  to	  Article	  1.1	  ACHR	  (Obligation	  to	  Respect	  Rights	  with	  without	  Discrimination)	  and	  Article	  8	  (Right	   to	   impartial	   examinations	   of	   allegations	   of	   torture)	   of	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   Convention	   to	   Prevent	   and	   Punish	   Torture,	   which	   Mexico	   had	  ratified	  in	  1987.	  As	  in	  the	  Raquel	  Martín	  de	  Mejía	  v.	  Peru	  Decision,	  sexual	  violence	  was	  considered	  under	  Article	  5	  and	  11	  ACHR.	  Although	  the	  Commission	  quoted	  the	   United	   Nations	   Special	   Rapporteur	   on	   VAW,	   clarifying	   that	   "rape	   during	  
warfare	  has	  also	  been	  used	  to	  terrorize	  populations	  and	  induce	  civilians	  to	  flee	  their	  
homes	   and	   villages."	   and	   “the	   consequences	   of	   sexual	   violence	   are	   physically,	  
emotionally	   and	   psychologically	   devastating	   for	   women	   victims"	   (para.	   45)	   and	  briefly	   cited	   the	   BdPC,	   no	   reference	   to	   discrimination	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   gender	  appears	  in	  its	  analysis.	  Recalling	  Raquel	  Martín	  de	  Mejía	  v.	  Peru,	   the	  Commission	  considered	   that	   the	   victims	   were	   “abused	   and	   harassed	   for	   [their]	   alleged	  
participation	   in	   an	   armed	   dissident	   group”	   (para.	   47),	   i.e.	   the	   EZLN	   (Zapatist	  Army	  for	  national	  liberation).	  However,	  the	  reasoning	  led	  to	  the	  recognition	  of	  the	  crime	  of	  torture,	  but	  no	  further	  element	  was	  added	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  sex	  of	  the	   victims	   (nor	   to	   the	   intersectionality	   with	   other	   factors	   such	   as	   their	  indigenous	  origins).	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  The	   Commission	   argued	   that	   the	   abuses	   “led	   [the	   victims]	   to	   flee	   their	  
community	   in	   a	   situation	   of	   fear,	   shame,	   and	   humiliation”	   (para.	   52),	   that	   the	  anguish	  and	  suffering	  “extended	  to	  Delia	  Pérez	  de	  González,	  who	  had	  to	  stand	  by	  
helplessly	   and	   witness	   the	   abuse	   of	   her	   three	   daughters	   by	   members	   of	   the	  
Mexican	  Armed	  Forces	  and	  then	  to	  experience,	  along	  with	  them,	  ostracism	  by	  her	  
community,	  constitutes	  a	  form	  of	  humiliation	  and	  degradation	  that	  is	  a	  violation	  
of	  the	  right	  to	  humane	  treatment	  guaranteed	  by	  the	  American	  Convention”	  (para.	  53)	   	   and	   that	   “that	   the	   pain	   and	   humiliation	   suffered	   by	   the	   women	   was	  
aggravated	   by	   their	   condition	   of	  members	   of	   an	   indigenous	   group”	   (para.	   95),	  	  which	   aggravates	   State’s	   responsibility	   given	   “its	   obligation	   to	   respect	  
indigenous	   cultures” 58 .	   Although	   this	   might	   appear	   as	   the	   embryo	   of	   an	  intersectional	  analysis,	  the	  Commission	  did	  not	  go	  beyond	  describing	  a	  context,	  without	   coming	   to	   any	   conclusion	   for	   what	   concerns	   the	   nature	   of	   the	  violations	  perpetrated.	  	  Additionally,	  as	  we	  will	  see	  in	  the	  Third	  Section	  of	  this	  research,	   the	   position	   adopted	   by	   the	   Commission	   arguably	   implies	   a	  conceptual	   error	   in	   its	   interpretation	   of	   the	   consequences	   of	   the	   abuses	  suffered	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  victims’	  rejection	  from	  their	  communities.	  	  	  
María	  Eugenia	  Morales	  de	  Sierra	  v.	  Guatemala	  (2001)	  -­‐	  IACommHR	  	  This	   case	   does	   not	   refer	   to	   facts	   of	   VAW,	   and	   indeed	   sharply	   differs	   from	  all	  other	  cases	  on	  women’s	  human	  rights	  presented	  to	  Inter-­‐American	  Institution	  to	   date.	   Nevertheless,	   it	   is	   of	   paramount	   interest	   in	   this	   analysis,	   given	   the	  framework	   of	   analysis	   in	   which	   the	   IACommHR	   develops	   its	   reasoning	   and	  conclusions,	  largely	  referring	  to	  CEDAW.	  
	  In	   1995	   the	   Commission	   received	   a	   petition	   from	   CEJIL	   and	   María	   Eugenia	  Morales	  de	  Sierra,	  alleging	  that	  several	  articles	  of	  the	  Guatemalan	  Civil	  Code59	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  This	  argument	  uncovers	  a	  conceptual	  error	  in	  the	  Commission’s	  reasoning,	  which	  disregards	  the	  discriminatory	  nature	  of	  ostracism.	  This	  issue	  will	  be	  thoroughly	  addressed	  in	  the	  Third	  Section	  of	  this	  research.	  59	  In	   particular,	   the	   petitioners	   claimed	   that:	   “Article	   109	   of	   the	   Civil	   Code	   confers	   the	   power	   to	  
represent	   the	  marital	   union	   upon	   the	   husband,	  while	   Article	   115	   sets	   forth	   the	   exceptional	   instances	  
when	   this	   authority	  may	   be	   exercised	   by	   the	  wife.	   	   Article	   131	   empowers	   the	   husband	   to	   administer	  
marital	  property,	  while	  Article	  133	  provides	   for	   limited	  exceptions	   to	   that	   rule.	   	  Article	  110	  addresses	  
responsibilities	  within	  the	  marriage,	  conferring	  upon	  the	  wife	  the	  special	  “right	  and	  obligation"	  to	  care	  
for	   minor	   children	   and	   the	   home.	   	   Article	   113	   provides	   that	   a	   married	   woman	  may	   only	   exercise	   a	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provided	   a	   discriminatory	   definition	   of	   the	   roles	   of	   spouses	   in	   marriage.	   In	  1992	   the	   Guatemalan	   Constitutional	   Court	   had	   ruled	   the	   provisions	  constitutional	   (Constitutional	   Court,	   Case	   84/92)	   since,	   “inter	   alia,	   they	  
provided	  juridical	  certainty	  in	  the	  allocation	  of	  roles	  within	  the	  marriage”	  (para.	  3).	   The	   petition	   alleged	   that	   such	   provisions	   of	   the	   Civil	   Code	   violated,	   in	  
abstracto,	  Articles	   1.1,	   2	   (Domestic	   Legal	   Effects),	   17,	   11	   and	   (for	   the	   second	  time	   in	  a	  petition	  on	  women’s	  human	  rights)	  Article	  24	  ACHR.	  Moreover,	   the	  petitioners	  extensively	  refer	  to	  CEDAW,	  with	  particular	  reference	  to	  Articles	  15	  (Equality	  of	  Women	  Before	  the	  Law)	  and	  16	  (Positive	  Obligations	  of	  the	  State	  to	  Eliminate	   Discrimination	   against	   Women	   in	   Family	   Relations).	   In	   1997,	   they	  filed	   a	   second	   petition	   concretely	   identifying	   the	   victim	   in	   María	   Eugenia	  Morales	  de	  Sierra.60	  They	  alleged	  that	  “as	  a	  married	  woman	  living	  in	  Guatemala,	  
a	  mother,	  a	  working	  professional,	  and	  the	  owner	  of	  property	  acquired	  jointly	  with	  
her	   husband	   during	   their	   marriage,	   Ms.	   Morales	   de	   Sierra	   is	   subject	   to	   the	  
immediate	  effects	  of	  this	  legal	  regime	  by	  virtue	  of	  her	  sex	  and	  civil	  status,	  and	  the	  
mere	  fact	  that	  the	  challenged	  provisions	  are	  in	  force	  (…)	  These	  articles	  prevent	  Ms.	  
Morales	   de	   Sierra	   from	   legally	   representing	   her	   own	   interests	   and	   those	   of	   her	  
family,	  and	  require	  that	  she	  depend	  on	  her	  husband	  to	  do	  so	  (…)	  her	  right	  to	  work	  
is	  conditioned	  on	  what	  the	  petitioners	  characterize	  as	  the	  anachronistic	  legislative	  
division	   of	   duties	   within	   marriage”	   (para.	   23).	   In	   arguing	   the	   discriminatory	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
profession	  or	  maintain	  employment	  where	  this	  does	  not	  prejudice	  her	  role	  as	  mother	  and	  homemaker.	  	  
They	  stated	  that,	  according	  to	  Article	  114,	  a	  husband	  may	  oppose	  his	  wife's	  activities	  outside	  the	  home,	  
as	  long	  as	  he	  provides	  for	  her	  and	  has	  justified	  reasons.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  a	  controversy	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  
foregoing,	  a	  judge	  shall	  decide.	   	  Article	  255	  confers	  primary	  responsibility	  on	  the	  husband	  to	  represent	  
the	  children	  of	  the	  union	  and	  to	  administer	  their	  property.	  	  Article	  317	  provides	  that,	  by	  virtue	  of	  her	  sex,	  
a	  woman	  may	  be	  excused	  from	  exercising	  certain	  forms	  of	  guardianship”	  (para.	  2).	  60	  This	  second	  petition	  was	  filed	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  limitations	  to	  Commission’s	  jurisdiction,	  which	  can	  only	  be	  exercised	  on	  cases	  involving	  breaches	  to	  rights	  of	  specific	  individuals.	  	  In	  the	  Merits	  of	  the	   case	   the	   Commission	   clarifies	   that:	   “The	   Commission	   entertains	   a	   broader	   competence	   under	  
Article	   41.b	   of	   the	   Convention	   to	   address	   recommendations	   to	   member	   states	   for	   the	   adoption	   of	  
progressive	  measures	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  protection	  of	  human	  rights.	  Pursuant	  to	  their	  original	  petition	  for	  
a	  decision	  in	  abstracto,	  which	  appeared	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  Commission's	  competence	  under	  Article	  41.b	  of	  the	  
American	   Convention	   rather	   than	   that	   under	   Article	   41.f,	   the	   petitioners	  modified	   their	   petition	   and	  
named	   María	   Eugenia	   Morales	   de	   Sierra	   as	   an	   individual	   victim,	   as	   previously	   noted,	   in	   their	  
communication	  of	  April	  23,	  1997.	   	  With	  the	  identification	  of	  an	  individual	  victim,	  the	  Commission	  may	  
advance	  with	  its	  decision	  on	  admissibility	  in	  the	  present	  case.	  	  As	  the	  Honourable	  Court	  has	  explained,	  in	  
order	   to	   initiate	   the	   procedures	   established	   in	   Articles	   48	   and	   50	   of	   the	   American	   Convention,	   the	  
Commission	   requires	   a	   petition	   denouncing	  a	   concrete	   violation	  with	   respect	   to	   a	   specific	   individual”	  (María	  Eugenia	  Morales	  de	  Sierra	  v.	  Guatemala,	  para.	  31).	  The	  Commission	  refers	  to	  IACrtHR	  Advisory	  Opinion	   14/94,	   International	   Responsibility	   for	   the	   Promulgation	   and	   Enforcement	   of	   Laws	   in	  Violation	   of	   the	   Convention	   (Arts.	   1	   and	   2	   ACHR).	   Similarly,	   the	   IACrtHR	   holds	   contentious	  jurisdiction	  only	  on	  cases	  involving	  breaches	  to	  individual	  rights	  and	  freedoms	  in	  concrete	  cases,	  and	  may	  not	  solve	  questions	  in	  abstracto.	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content	  of	  several	  norms	  of	  the	  domestic	  legal	  system,	  the	  petitioners	  explicitly	  presented	   them	   as	   contributing	   to	   reproduce	   those	   unbalanced	   relations	   of	  power	   that	   create	   a	   conductive	   context	   for	  VAW	  and,	   specifically,	   for	  domestic	  violence	  (para.	  25).	  	  At	   the	   time	  of	   the	  petition	  Guatemala	  was	  part	  of	  CEDAW	  and	  had	   ratified	   the	  BdPC.	   Moreover,	   with	   1992	   General	   Recommendation	   19,	   CEDAW	   Committee	  had	   officialised	   the	   link	   between	   discriminatory	   social	   structures	   and	   VAW.	  Notably,	   counting	   on	   a	   regional	   specific	   instrument	   on	   women’s	   rights,	   the	  Commission	  never	  mentions	  it,	  while	  it	  refers	  to	  CEDAW,	  in	  the	  terms	  proposed	  by	   the	   petitioners.	   After	   the	   Commission’s	   first	   recommendations,	   Guatemala	  derogated	  several	  controversial	  articles	  with	  Decree	  80	  in	  1998	  and	  Decree	  27	  in	   1999,	   reforming	   the	   Civil	   Code.	   Furthermore,	   in	   1999	   Decree	   Law	   7	  established,	  inter	  alia,	  the	  prohibition	  of	  any	  discrimination	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  civil	  status	  (Cotula,	  2007).	  	  In	   considering	   the	  merits	  of	   the	  case,	   the	   IACommHR	  clarified	   its	  position	  on	  several	  crucial	  issues,	  besides	  the	  reference	  to	  Article	  11	  ACHR	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  European	   case	   law.61	  After	   having	   (silently)	   discarded	   the	   evaluation	   under	  Article	  24	  ACHR	  in	  X	  and	  Y	  v.	  Argentina,	   in	  this	  case	  the	  Commission	  used	  the	  provision	   to	   tackle	   the	   issue	   of	   substantial	   equality,62	  as	   opposed	   to	   formal	  equality,	  and	  found	  the	  Guatemalan	  marital	  regime	  incompatible	  with	  the	  terms	  of	  Article	  17(4)	  ACHR,	  read	  in	  conjunction	  with	  Article	  16(1)	  CEDAW	  (para.	  45).	  The	  decision	  explicitly	   recalled	  CEDAW	  extensive	  definition	  of	  discrimination	  against	  women,	  explaining	  this	  choice	  as	  due	  to	  the	  fact	   that	  “responding	  as	  it	  
does	   to	   the	   specific	   causes	   and	   consequences	   of	   gender	   discrimination,	   covers	  
forms	   of	   systemic	   disadvantage	   affecting	  women	   that	   prior	   standards	  may	   not	  
have	  contemplated”	  (para.	  32).	  The	  Commission	  referred	  to	  the	  challenged	  Civil	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  See,	  inter	  alia,	  ECrtHR	  Gaskin	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  on	  the	  interest	  of	  applicant	  in	  accessing	  records	  concerning	   childhood	   and	   early	   development,	   and	  Niemetz	  v.	  Germany,	   where	   the	   ECrtHR	   notes	  that	  respect	  for	  private	  life	  includes	  the	  right	  to	  establish	  and	  develop	  relationships,	  both	  personal	  and	  professional.	  62	  In	  doing	  so,	  the	  Commission	  recognises	  that	  the	  distinction	  established	  by	  the	  Civil	  Code	  is	  not	  based	  on	  reasonable	  and	  objective	  criteria,	  i.e.	  it	  does	  not:	  (1)	  pursue	  a	  legitimate	  aim	  and	  (2)	  employ	  means	  which	  are	  proportional	   to	   the	  end	  sought,	   (para.	  31,	   referring	   to	  ECrtHR	  Belgian	  Linguistics	  case).	   The	   concept	   of	   substantive	   equality	   has	   also	   been	   used	   to	   argue	   the	   legitimacy	   of	  	  “affirmative	   actions”.	   For	   ECrtHR	   jurisprudence	   in	   this	   sense,	   refer	   to:	   Karlheinz	   Schmidt	   v.	  
Germany	   (1994),	   para	   24;	   Schuler-­‐Zgraggen	   v.	   Switzerland	   (1993),	   para.	   67	   and	   Burghartz	   v.	  
Switzerland	  (1994),	  para.	  27.	  
	   96 
Code	  provisions	   as	   “establish[ing]	  a	  situation	  of	  de	   jure	  dependency	  for	  the	  wife	  
and	   creat[ing]	   an	   insurmountable	   disequilibrium	   in	   the	   spousal	   authority	  within	  
the	  marriage”	   (para.	  44)	  and	   “reinforcing	  systemic	  disadvantages	  which	  impede	  
the	   ability	   of	   the	   victim	   to	   exercise	   a	   host	   of	   other	   rights	   and	   freedoms”	   (para.	  40),	   thus	   recognising	   a	   structural	   problem	   in	   the	   disadvantaged	   position	   of	  women	  in	  Guatemalan	  society.63	  	  Notably,	  the	  IACommHR	  reinforced	  the	  reasoning	  stating	  that	  “the	  dispositions	  
of	   the	  Civil	  Code	  apply	  stereotyped	  notions	  of	   the	  roles	  of	  women	  and	  men	  which	  
perpetuate	  de	  facto	  discrimination	  against	  women	  in	  the	  family	  sphere,	  and	  which	  
have	   the	   further	   effect	   of	   impeding	   the	  ability	   of	  men	   to	   fully	   develop	   their	   roles	  
within	   the	  marriage	  and	   family”	   (para.	   44),64	  and	   clarified	   that,	   although	   in	   the	  considered	   case	   the	   husband	   of	   the	   victim	   did	   not	  make	   use	   of	   the	   such	   Civil	  Code	  provisions,	  the	  mere	  fact	  that	  he	  might	  do	  so	  implied	  a	  discrimination	  that	  
“has	  consequences	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  her	  position	  in	  Guatemalan	  society,	  
and	   reinforces	   cultural	   habits	   (…)	  This	   situation	  has	  a	  harmful	   effect	   on	  public	  
opinion	   in	   Guatemala,	   and	   on	  María	   Eugenia	  Morales	   de	   Sierra’s	   position	   and	  
status	  within	  her	  family,	  community	  and	  society”	  (para.	  50).	  	  Gender-­‐discrimination	   is	   explicitly	  mentioned	  as	  operating	   “to	   impair	  or	  nullify	  
the	  ability	  of	  women	   to	   freely	  and	   fully	   exercise	   their	   rights,	   and	  gives	   rise	   to	  an	  
array	   of	   consequences”	   (para.	   51).	   	   Discrimination	   includes	   VAW,	   which	   the	  Commission	   defines	   according	   to	   BdPC	   “a	   manifestation	   of	   the	   historically	  
unequal	   power	   relations	   between	   women	   and	   men”	   (para.	   52),	   and	   recalling	  CEDAW	   Committee’s	   General	   Recommendation	   19,	   pointing	   at	   “Traditional	  
attitudes	   by	   which	   women	   are	   regarded	   as	   subordinate	   to	   men	   or	   as	   having	  
stereotyped	  roles	  perpetuate	  widespread	  practices	   involving	  violence	  or	   coercion,	  
such	  as	  family	  violence	  and	  abuse	  (…)	  De	  jure	  or	  de	  facto	  economic	  subordination,	  
in	  turn,	  forces	  many	  women	  to	  stay	  in	  violent	  relationships.”	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  The	  petitioner	  claimed	  that,	  while	  the	  relationship	  with	  her	  husband	  was	  based	  on	  mutual	  respect,	  her	  status	  in	  the	  family,	  community	  and	  society	  was	  conditioned	  by	  the	  attribution	  of	  authority	  to	  her	  husband	  to	  represent	  the	  marital	  union	  and	  their	  minor	  child	  (para.	  48).	  64	  Notably,	   the	   interpretation	   underlines	   that	   the	   social	   position	   of	   men	   is	   also	   affected	   by	   this	  arbitrary	   distinction,	   inhibiting	   their	   role	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   home	   and	   children	   and,	   inherently,	  depriving	  children	  of	  the	  full	  and	  equal	  attention	  of	  both	  parents	  (para.	  44).	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Maria	  da	  Penha	  Maia	  Fernandes	  vs.	  Brazil	  (2001)	  -­‐	  IACommHR	  	  The	  petitioners	  presented	  a	   case	  of	   reiterated	  domestic	  violence,	   alleging	   the	  violation	  of	  Articles	  1.1,	  8,	  24	  and	  25	  ACHR,	  several	  provisions	  of	  the	  American	  Declaration	   of	   the	   Rights	   and	   Duties	   of	  Men	   (ADHR)	   and,	   notably,	   Articles	   4	  (Equal	  Treatment	  of	  Women),	  5	  (Protection	  of	  Civil,	  Political,	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights)	  and	  7	  (Positive	  Obligations	  and	  Domestic	  Legal	  Effect)	  of	  the	  BdPC.	  	  The	  facts	  refer	  to	  a	  violation	  perpetrated	  by	  the	  victim’s	  husband,	  i.e.	  a	  private	  individual,	  in	  the	  intimate	  domain	  of	  the	  family,	  a	  case	  in	  which	  the	  traditional	  approach	   in	   international	   law	   would	   have	   limited	   State’s	   intervention.	   The	  victim	   suffered	   maltreatments	   from	   her	   husband	   throughout	   their	   whole	  married	   life,	   which	   culminated	   in	   her	   attempted	   murder,	   causing	   her	  irreversible	   paraplegia.	   The	   petitioners	   argued	   that	   the	   Brazilian	   justice	  system,	  notwithstanding	   the	  amount	  of	  evidence	  of	  his	   charges,	  did	  not	  hand	  out	   a	   final	   ruling.65	  Their	   analysis	   extended	   beyond	   the	   concrete	   case,	  which	  they	   presented	   as	   “an	   example	   of	   a	   pattern	   of	   impunity	   in	   cases	   of	   domestic	  
violence	  against	  women	  in	  Brazil”	  (para.	  20).	  	  In	  1983,	  when	  the	   facts	  occurred,	   the	  State	  had	  not	  ratified	  the	  CEDAW66	  and	  the	  BdPC	  had	  not	  been	  even	  drafted.	  However,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  petition	  Brazil	  had	  ratified	  the	  BdPC.	  Consequently,	  the	  Commission	  based	  its	  competence	  to	  hear	  the	  case	  pursuant	  the	  BdPC	  on	  the	  continuous	  nature	  of	  the	  violation67	  of	  the	  right	  to	  effective	  legal	  procedures,	  which	  manifested	  State’s	  tolerance	  of	  a	  situation	  of	   impunity,68	  implying	   the	   reproduction	  of	  a	   conductive	  contest	   for	  VAW.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65 	  They	   underlined	   that	   70%	   of	   the	   cases	   of	   VAW	   are,	   indeed,	   cases	   of	   domestic	   violence,	  denouncing	  that	  a	  police	  officer	  in	  Río	  de	  Janeiro	  had	  stated	  that	  of	  the	  more	  than	  2,000	  cases	  of	  rapes	   or	   beatings	   reported	   at	   his	   police	   station,	   only	   a	   few	   resulted	   in	   the	   punishment	   of	   the	  perpetrator	  (Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  Report	  on	  Brazil,	  1991,	  pp.	  351-­‐367).	  66	  As	   we	   will	   see	   in	   the	   Third	   Section	   of	   this	   research,	   Brazil	   ratified	   CEDAW	   in	   1984,	   with	  reservation	  on	  Article	  29.1,	  15	  and	  16.	  67	  For	  precedents	  in	  this	  sense	  involving	  Brazil,	  see	  Commission’s	  Ovelario	  Tames	  v.	  Brazil,	  Newton	  
Coutinho	  Mendes	  et	  al.	  v.	  Brazil,	  Alonso	  Eugenio	  da	  Silva	  v.	  Brazil,	  João	  Canuto	  de	  Oliveira	  v.	  Brazil.	  As	  we	  will	  see	  further	  on	  in	  this	  research,	  this	  doctrine	  has	  been	  elaborated	  by	  the	  IACrtHR	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  cases	  of	  the	  desaparecidos.	  	  68	  Case	  documents	  indicate	  that	  70%	  of	  the	  criminal	  complaints	  on	  domestic	  violence	  do	  not	  reach	  a	   conclusion	   and	   only	   2%	   of	   such	   complaints	   lead	   to	   criminal	   conviction	   of	   the	   responsibles	  (Report	  of	  the	  San	  Pablo	  Catholic	  University,	  1998).	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  The	   IACommHR	   referred	   to	   its	   own	  1997	  Report	   on	  Brazil	   to	   state	   that	   “The	  
crimes	  which	  fall	  within	  the	  heading	  of	  violence	  against	  women	  constitute	  human	  
rights	  violations	  (…),	  where	  conduct	  may	  not	  initially	  be	  directly	  imputable	  to	  a	  
state	   (for	   example,	   because	   the	   actor	   is	   unidentified	   or	   not	   a	   state	   agent),	   a	  
violative	   act	   may	   lead	   to	   state	   responsibility	   ‘not	   because	   of	   the	   act	   itself,	   but	  
because	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  due	  diligence	  to	  prevent	  the	  violation	  or	  respond	  to	  it	  as	  the	  
Convention	  requires’”	  (IACommHR,	  Report	  on	  the	  Situation	  of	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Brazil,	  1997,	  Chapter	  VIII).	  	  The	  evaluation	  of	   the	   facts	  presents	  extensive	  reference	   to	  documentation	  on	  the	   Brazilian	   social	   context,	   providing	   evidence	   of	   the	   fact	   that	  women	  were	  victims	  of	  domestic	  violence	  in	  disproportionate	  numbers,	  and	  that	  there	  “was	  
clear	   discrimination	   against	   women	   who	   were	   attacked,	   resulting	   from	   the	  
inefficiency	   of	   the	   Brazilian	   judicial	   system	   and	   inadequate	   application	   of	  
national	  and	  international	  rules,	  including	  those	  arising	  from	  the	  case	  law	  of	  the	  
Brazilian	  Supreme	  Court”	  (para.	  47).	  Tolerance	  by	  State	  organs	  is	  recognised	  as	  a	   pattern,	   which	   “only	   serves	   to	   perpetuate	   the	   psychological,	   social,	   and	  
historical	  roots	  and	  factors	  that	  sustain	  and	  encourage	  violence	  against	  women”	  (para.	   55),	   creating	   “a	   climate	   that	   is	   conducive	   to	   domestic	   violence,	   since	  
society	   sees	  no	  evidence	  of	  willingness	  by	   the	  State,	  as	   the	  representative	  of	   the	  
society,	  to	  take	  effective	  action	  to	  sanction	  such	  acts”	  (para.	  56).	  	  	  	  As	   in	   the	   previous	   cases,	   the	   IACommHR	   finds	   the	   State	   responsible	   for	   the	  violation	  of	  Articles	  1.1,	  8	  and	  25	  ACHR,	  because	  of	  the	  unwarranted	  delay	  and	  negligent	   processing	   of	   the	   case,	   whereas	   no	  mention	   in	  made	   to	   Article	   11	  (Right	  to	  Privacy).	  Notably,	  the	  Commission	  replaces	  it	  establishing	  a	  violation	  of	  Article	   7	   BdPC,	   including	   at	   the	   end	   of	   its	   recommendations	   a	   detailed	   list	   of	  public	  measures	  to	  enact	  for	  improving	  the	  judicial	  system’s	  response	  to	  VAW	  and	  eradicate	  impunity.69	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  The	   recommendations	   include:	   “Continue	  and	  expand	  the	  reform	  process	  that	  will	  put	  an	  end	  to	  
the	  condoning	  by	   the	  State	  of	  domestic	  violence	  against	  women	   in	  Brazil	  and	  discrimination	   in	   the	  
handling	   thereof.	   	   In	   particular,	   the	   Commission	   recommends:	   a.	   Measures	   to	   train	   and	   raise	   the	  
awareness	   of	   officials	   of	   the	   judiciary	   and	   specialized	   police	   so	   that	   they	   may	   understand	   the	  
importance	  of	  not	  condoning	  domestic	  violence;	  b.	  The	  simplification	  of	  criminal	  judicial	  proceedings	  
so	   that	   the	   time	  taken	   for	  proceedings	  can	  be	  reduced,	  without	  affecting	   the	  rights	  and	  guarantees	  
related	   to	   due	   process;	   c.	   The	   establishment	   of	   mechanisms	   that	   serve	   as	   alternatives	   to	   judicial	  
mechanisms,	  which	  resolve	  domestic	  conflict	  in	  a	  prompt	  and	  effective	  manner	  and	  create	  awareness	  
regarding	   its	   serious	  nature	  and	  associated	  criminal	  consequences;	  d.	  An	   increase	   in	   the	  number	  of	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Castro-­‐Castro	  v.	  Peru	  (2006)	  -­‐	  IACrtHR	  	  This	   is	  a	  crucial	  case	  for	  the	  development	  of	  women’s	  rights	  protection	  in	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  System.	  For	  the	  first	  time,	  the	  IACommHR	  submits	  to	  the	  Court	  a	   case	   that	   gives	   the	   occasion,	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   extensive	   documentation	  provided	  by	  the	  petitioners,	   to	  uncover	  the	  systematic	  discriminatory	  pattern	  of	  the	  violence	  inflicted	  to	  women	  detained	  in	  Castro-­‐Castro	  prisons	  and	  clarify	  the	  Court’s	  contentious	  jurisdiction	  on	  the	  BdPC.	  	  Submitted	  to	  the	  Court	  in	  2004,	  the	  case	  originates	  in	  two	  petitions,	  separately	  presented	  to	   the	   IACommHR	  in	  1992	  and	  1997,	  denouncing	   facts	  occurred	   in	  1992	   in	   the	  Miguel	  Castro-­‐Castro	  Prison.	  A	   large	  number	  of	   the	  victims	  were	  women,	   some	   of	   them	   pregnant,	   and	   Peru	   had	   ratified	   the	   BdPC	   in	   1996.	  Notwithstanding	   the	   arguments	   of	   the	   petitioners,	   the	   Commission’s	  application	  to	  the	  IACrtHR	  only	  referred	  to	  violations	  of	  the	  ACHR:	  Article	  1.1	  (Obligation	  to	  respect	  rights);	  Article	  4	  (Right	  to	  life);	  Article	  5	  (Right	  to	  human	  treatment);	   Article	   8.1	   (Right	   to	   a	   fair	   trial)	   and	   Article	   25	   (Right	   to	   judicial	  protection).	   However,	   based	   on	   the	   specific	   features	   of	   the	   facts	   and	   on	   the	  information	   gathered	   during	   the	   hearings,	   the	   Court	   evaluated	   the	   violations	  under	   provisions	   of	   the	   BdPC,	   clarifying	   its	   competence	   on	   the	   instrument	  through	  a	  detailed	  argumentation,	   that	   inaugurates	   its	   full	   justiciability	   in	  the	  Inter-­‐American	   System.	   This	   issue	  will	   be	   thoroughly	   addressed	   in	   the	   Third	  Section	  of	  this	  research.	  	  	  	  Although	  the	  Commission	  excluded	  BdPC	  provisions	  from	  its	  application	  to	  the	  Court,	  during	  IACrtHR’s	  hearings	  we	  found	  strong	  evidence	  of	   the	   integration	  of	  a	  gender	  perspective	  in	  its	  following	  contributions	  to	  Court’s	  proceedings	  as	  representative	  of	   the	  petitioners.	   Its	   arguments	   are	   cited	   in	   IACrtHR’s	   ruling,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
special	  police	  stations	  to	  address	  the	  rights	  of	  women	  and	  to	  provide	  them	  with	  the	  special	  resources	  
needed	  for	  the	  effective	  processing	  and	  investigation	  of	  all	  complaints	  related	  to	  domestic	  violence,	  as	  
well	  as	  resources	  and	  assistance	   from	  the	  Office	  of	   the	  Public	  Prosecutor	   in	  preparing	   their	   judicial	  
reports;	  e.	  The	  inclusion	  in	  teaching	  curriculums	  of	  units	  aimed	  at	  providing	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  
importance	  of	  respecting	  women	  and	  their	  rights	  recognised	  in	  the	  Convention	  of	  Belém	  do	  Pará,	  as	  
well	   as	   the	   handling	   of	   domestic	   conflict;	   f.	   The	   provision	   of	   information	   to	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  
Commission	  on	  Human	  Rights	  within	  sixty	  days	  of	   transmission	  of	   this	   report	   to	   the	  State,	  and	  of	  a	  
report	  on	  steps	  taken	  to	  implement	  these	  recommendations,	  for	  the	  purposes	  set	  forth	  in	  Article	  51	  (1)	  
of	  the	  American	  Convention”	  (point	  4	  of	  the	  Conclusions).	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which	  recalls	  Commission’s	  presentation	  of	  the	  facts	  stressing	  that	  the	  majority	  of	   the	   victims	   were	   women,	   which	   suffered	   the	   worst	   consequences	   of	   the	  breaches	   and	   emphasised	   the	   comprehensive	   connection	   between	   the	  guarantees	  established	  in	  the	  BdPC	  and	  the	  basic	  rights	  and	  liberties	  stipulated	  in	   the	   ACHR,	   when	   dealing	   with	   the	   violence	   against	   women	   as	   a	   breach	   to	  human	  rights.	  According	  to	  the	  Commission’s	  testimony:	  “even	  though	  the	  BdPC	  
was	   not	   in	   force	   in	   Peru	   at	   the	   time	   of	   the	   facts,	   it	   could	   be	   used	   in	   order	   to	  
analyse	  the	  State’s	  responsibility	  for	  the	  violations	  to	  Articles	  4,	  5,	  8,	  and	  25	  of	  the	  
American	  Convention,	   in	  virtue	  of	   the	  stated	   in	  Article	  29	  of	   the	  same;	  and	  that	  
the	  right	  to	  be	  exempt	  of	  violence	  in	  the	  public	  and	  private	  sphere,	  stipulated	  in	  
Article	  3	  of	  the	  Convention	  of	  Belém	  do	  Pará,	  includes	  the	  right	  to	  the	  protection	  
of	  other	  basic	  rights	  including	  life”	  (points	  p	  and	  r	  of	   the	  arguments	  submitted	  by	   the	   Commission).	   The	   petitioners	  were,	   somehow,	  more	   precise,	   invoking	  Article	  5	  ACHR	  and	  Articles	  1,	  6,	  7,	  8,	  and	  9	  of	  the	  BdPC,	  arguing	  that	  “covering	  
the	  period	  as	  of	  July	  12,	  1995,	  said	  violations	  constituted	  a	  violation	  to	  the	  object	  
and	  purpose	  of	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Convention	  to	  Prevent,	  Punish,	  and	  Eradicate	  
Violence	  Against	  Women,	  […]	  which	  was	  signed	  by	  Peru	  on	   July	  12,	  1995[,]	  and	  
violations	   [to]	   Article[s]	   4	   and	   7	   of	   the	   same	   Convention	   for	   the	   period	   that	  
covers	   from	   1996	   on,	   as	   of	   when	   Peru	   ratified	   said	   treat	   on	   June	   4,	   1996.	   The	  
State	  of	  Peru	  intentionally	  inflicted	  violence	  against	  the	  female	  political	  prisoners	  
as	  punishment	  for	  their	  double	  transgression	  of	  the	  prevailing	  system:	  the	  use	  of	  
the	   gender	   factor	   to	   cause	   damage	   and	   torture	   prisoners”	   (point	   t	   of	   the	  arguments	  of	  the	  Common	  Intervener).	  	  As	  we	  will	  see,	  while	  solving	  the	  impasse	  on	  the	  IACrtHR’s	  competence	  on	  the	  BdPC,	  the	  judgment	  shows	  the	  signs	  of	  a	  change	  in	  the	  interpretation	  of	  ACHR	  norms	   when	   addressing	   cases	   involving	   gender-­‐sensitive	   issues.	   Indeed,	   the	  Court	   affirms:	   “When	  analysing	  the	   facts	  and	  their	  consequences	   the	  Court	  will	  
take	   into	   account	   that	   the	   women	   that	   were	   affected	   by	   the	   acts	   of	   violence	  
differently	   than	   the	   men,	   that	   some	   acts	   of	   violence	   were	   directed	   specifically	  
toward	  the	  women	  and	  others	  affected	  them	  in	  greater	  proportion	  than	  the	  men.	  
Different	   Peruvian	   and	   international	   organisations	   have	   acknowledged	   that	  
during	   the	   armed	   conflicts	   women	   face	   specific	   situations	   that	   breach	   their	  
human	  rights,	   such	  as	  acts	  of	   sexual	  violence,	  which	   in	  many	  cases	   is	  used	  as	   ‘a	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symbolic	  means	  to	  humiliate	  the	  other	  party’”	  (para.	  223).70	  In	  setting	  the	  scope	  of	  Article	  5	  ACHR	  in	  cases	  of	  VAW,	  the	  Court	  mentions	  CEDAW,	  ratified	  by	  Peru	  in	   1982,	   as	   part	   of	   the	   international	   corpus	   juris	   on	   the	   matter	   (par.	   276).	  Referring	   to	   BdPC	   provisions	   as	   directly	   applicable	   to	   the	   case,	   the	   Court	  clarifies:	  “(…)	  they	  specify	  and	  complement	  the	  State’s	  obligation	  with	  regard	  to	  
the	  compliance	  of	  the	  rights	  enshrined	  in	  the	  American	  Convention”	  (par.	  346).	  	  	  The	  written	  deposit	  of	  the	  petitioners	  dedicates	  a	  whole	  chapter	  to	  the	  analysis	  of	   the	   facts	   as	   gender	   violence, 71 	  arguing	   BdPC	   breaches.	   They	   present	   a	  thorough	   interdisciplinary	   analysis,	   providing	   extensive	   documentation	   and	  emphasising	  gender-­‐specific	   features	  of	   the	  violations	  perpetrated.	  The	  Court	  quotes	  extensive	  pieces	  of	  documentation,	  such	  as:	  the	  evaluation	  submitted	  by	  Specialist	   in	   the	  Attention	   of	   Torture	  Victims	  Ana	  Deutsch,	   arguing	   that	   “The	  
fact	  that	  the	  attack	  started	  in	  the	  pavilion	  where	  the	  women	  that	  were	  political	  
prisoners	  were	  located	  and	  where	  several	  of	  them	  were	  pregnant,	  would	  indicate	  
an	   intentional	   selection	   against	   the	   women”	   (Section	   3	   of	   the	   experts’	  testimonies);	  the	  Final	  Report	  of	  the	  Commission	  for	  Truth	  and	  Reconciliation	  (CVR)	   indicating	   that	   “during	  the	  mentioned	  conflict	  the	  acts	  of	  sexual	  violence	  
against	  the	  women	  were	  intended	  to	  punish,	  intimidate,	  pressure,	  humiliate,	  and	  
degrade	  the	  population”	   (para.	  225)	  and	  the	  Report	  of	   the	  Ombudsman	  of	   the	  People	  of	  Peru,	  which	  concluded	   that	   “the	  involvement	  of	  women	  in	  the	  armed	  
conflict	  changed	  the	  perception	  of	  women	  and	  caused	   ‘a	  more	  cruel	  and	  violent	  
treatment	   regarding	   those	  women	   considered	   suspects’”	   (Ombudsman	   Defence	  Report	   N.	   80,	   p.	   33).	   The	   Common	   Intervener	   for	   the	   victims,	   argued	   that	  women	  were	  specifically	  punished	  for	  a	  double	  transgression:	  the	  transgression	  to	  the	  norms	  of	  society,	  i.e.	  status	  quo	  (common	  to	  the	  male	  political	  prisoners),	  and	   the	   transgression	   of	   the	   role	   assigned	   to	  women	   in	   Peruvian	   society,	   i.e.	  their	   supposed	   loss	   of	   femininity	   due	   to	   political	   activism.72	  The	   Intervener	  underlined	   symbolic	   elements,	   such	   as	   the	   deliberate	   confinement	   of	   the	  women	   prisoners	   in	   a	   men’s	   prison,	   the	   separation	   from	   their	   children,	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  The	  Commission	   argues	   this	   point	   referring	   to	  CEDAW	  Committee’s	  General	  Recommendation	  19,	   the	   2001	   Report	   of	   the	   UN	   Special	   Rapporteur	   on	   VAW	   Radhika	   Coomaraswamy	   and	   the	  Defence	  Report	  N.	  80	  of	  the	  Ombudsman	  the	  People	  of	  Peru,	  attached	  to	  the	  case	  file.	  71 	  See	   documents	   attached	   to	   the	   case	   file,	   available	   on-­‐line	   at:	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/expedientes/alefi_int.pdf	  (p.	  36).	  72	  The	   Court	   recognised	   that	   ”The	  use	  of	   state	  power	   to	  breach	   the	   rights	  of	  women	   in	  a	  domestic	  
conflict,	  besides	  affecting	  them	  directly,	  may	  have	  the	  purpose	  of	  causing	  an	  effect	  in	  society	  through	  
those	  breaches	  and	  send	  a	  message	  or	  give	  a	  lesson”	  (para.	  224).	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scheduling	   of	   the	  massacre	   in	   the	  week	   of	  Mother’s	   Day	   and	   its	   coincidence	  with	   the	  day	  of	  visit	  of	   the	   female	  relatives	  of	   the	   inmates,	   forced	   to	  assist	   to	  the	  cruelties	  suffered	  by	  their	  sons,	  daughters	  and	  spouses,73	  interpreting	  them	  as	   punishments	   for	   being	   “mothers	   and	  wives	   of	   terrorists”.	  According	   to	   the	  Commission:	   “women	   have	   been	   the	   victims	   of	   a	   history	   of	   discrimination	   and	  
exclusion	   due	   to	   their	   gender,	   which	   has	  made	   them	  more	   vulnerable	   to	   being	  
abused	   when	   violent	   acts	   are	   carried	   out	   against	   specific	   groups	   for	   different	  
reasons,	  such	  as	  inmates.	  The	  violence	  against	  women	  is	  a	  war	  strategy	  used	  by	  
the	  actors	  of	  the	  armed	  conflict	  to	  advance	  in	  their	  control	  of	  both	  territory	  and	  
resources.	   Additionally,	   these	   aggressions	   act	   as	   a	   tactic	   to	   humiliate,	   terrify,	  
destroy,	  and	  injure	  the	  ‘enemy’,	  the	  family	  or	  the	  community	  to	  which	  the	  victim	  
belongs”	  (point	   i	  of	   the	  Commission’s	  written	  arguments).	   In	   finding	  the	  State	  responsible	   of	   the	   violation	   of	   Article	   7.b	   of	   the	   BdPC	   (besides	   other	  provisions),	   the	   IACrtHR	   extensively	   adopted	   the	   suggested	   framework	   of	  analysis,	   recognising	   a	   complex	   structural	   problem	   rooted	   in	   the	   social	   and	  cultural	   patterns	   of	   society,	   preventing	   women	   to	   freely	   develop	   their	  personality	  and	  violating	  their	  human	  rights.	  
	  In	   his	   Concurring	   Vote,	   Judge	   Cançado	   Trindade	   puts	   a	   special	   emphasis	   in	  advocating	   the	  adoption	  of	  a	  gender	  perspective.	  Cançado	  Trindade	  recalls	   the	  holistic	   approach	   developed	   in	   1979	   with	   CEDAW,	   and	   the	   centrality	   of	  triggering	   change	   in	   the	   socio-­‐cultural	   patterns	   of	   behaviour.	   His	   reasoning	  explicitly	  provides	  an	  overview	  of	   the	  evolution	  of	   the	  approach	  to	   the	  subject,	  fixed	  in	  documents	  such	  as	  the	  Declaration	  and	  Action	  Programme	  of	  Vienna	  in	  1993	   (Global	   Conference	   on	   Human	   Rights),	   the	   Beijing	   Platform	   adopted	   in	  1995,	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   Convention	   to	   Prevent,	   Sanction	   and	   Eradicate	  Violence	   Against	  Women	   of	   1994	   and	   CEDAW	  Optional	   Protocol,	   entered	   into	  force	  in	  2000.	  	  
	  
Perozo	  et	  al.	  v.	  Venezuela	  and	  Ríos	  et	  al.	  v.	  Venezuela	  	  (2009)	  -­‐	  IACrtHR	  	  Both	   petitions	   alleged	   hindrance	   to	   broadcast	   and	   acts	   of	   harassment	   and	  physical	   and	   verbal	   assault	   against	   men	   and	   women	   working	   at	   Globovisión	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  Incidentally,	  as	  we	  will	  see	  further	  on	  in	  this	  research,	  feminist	  scholars	  tend	  to	  consider	  this	  line	  of	  argumentations	  paternalistic.	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television	   station.	   In	   the	   final	   judgement,	   the	   allegations	   invoking	   BdPC	  provisions	   in	   relations	   to	   women	   victims	   were	   discarded	   as	   unfounded.	  However,	   these	   cases	   are	  worth	   a	  mention,	   since	   they	  provide	   evidence	  of	   the	  Court’s	  careful	  attitude	  towards	  abusing	  the	  use	  of	  the	  new	  specific	  instrument.	  The	  IACommHR	  requested	  the	  Court	  to	  declare	  the	  violation	  of	  several	  articles	  of	  the	   ACHR,	   such	   as	   the	   right	   to	   freedom	   of	   thought	   and	   expression	   (Art.	   13).	  However,	   during	   the	  proceedings	  before	   the	  Court,	   the	   representatives	   alleged	  that	   “the	   physical	   and	   moral	   attacks	   the	   [female]	   reporters	   suffered	   ‘mainly	  
responded	  to	  the	  gender’”	  (Perozo,	  para.	  289)	  and	  were	   recurring	  and	   tolerated	  by	  the	  State.	  In	  this	  case	  the	  Court	  did	  not	  find	  the	  reference	  appropriate,	  noting	  that	  “the	  representative	  based	  their	  arguments,	  mainly,	  on	  quantitative	  criteria	  to	  
allege	   that	   the	   aggressive	   acts	   were	   caused	   ‘because	   of	   the	   sex’	   of	   the	   alleged	  
victims”	  (Perozo,	  para.	  292)	  and,	  in	  relation	  to	  one	  of	  the	  victims	  in	  particular,	  the	  Court	  considered	  that	  the	  facts	  related	  did	  not	  reveal	  ”a	  reason	  or	  purpose,	  or	  at	  
least,	   a	   connotation	   or	   effect	   based	   on	   the	   sex	   or	   gender	   of	   the	   victim	   or	   her	  
condition	   of	   pregnancy”	   (Perozo,	  para.	   289).	  Regarding	   the	   allegation	   that	   pro-­‐government	  newspapers	  had	  denigrated	  one	  of	  the	  victims	  as	  a	  woman	  (Perozo,	  para.	  289),	  the	  Court	  discards	  the	  argument	  due	  to	  the	  representatives’	  failure	  to	  provide	   documentation.	   Considering	   its	   conclusions,	   the	   Court	   recognised	   the	  need	   to	   clarify	   that	   “not	  all	  human	  right	  violation	  committed	  against	  a	  woman	  
implies	  necessarily	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  provisions	  established	  in	  the	  Convention	  of	  
Belém	  do	  Pará.	  Even	  though	  female	  reporters	  have	  been	  attacked	  in	  the	  facts	  of	  
this	   case,	   in	   all	   the	   situations,	   they	   were	   attacked	   together	   with	   their	   male	  
colleagues.	   The	   representatives	   have	   neither	   demonstrated	   in	   what	   way	   the	  
attacks	   were	   ‘especially	   address[ed]	   to	   women’	   nor	   have	   they	   explained	   the	  
reasons	  why	  women	  turned	  into	  a	  special	  target	  ‘[due	  to	  their]	  gender’.	  […]	  The	  
representatives	   did	   not	   specify	   the	   reasons	   for	   and	   the	  way	   in	  which	   the	   State	  
committed	  a	  ‘planned	  or	  directed’	  action	  towards	  the	  alleged	  female	  victims	  and	  
they	   neither	   explained	   to	   what	   extent	   the	   proven	   facts	   in	   which	   they	   were	  
impaired	   ‘were	   aggravated	   due	   to	   the	   condition	   of	   being	   a	   woman’.	   The	  
representatives	   also	   failed	   to	   specify	   which	   facts	   and	   in	  which	  way	   those	   facts	  
represent	  attacks	  that	   ‘disproportionately	  affected	  women’”	  (Perozo,	  para.	  295).	  These	   rulings	   represent	   an	   important	   warning	   from	   the	   Court	   that,	   while	  increasingly	   using	   the	   BdPC	   to	   guarantee	   appropriate	   protection	   to	   women	  victims	  of	  violence	  and	  endorsing	  the	  emerged	  international	  consensus	  on	  the	  link	   between	   discrimination	   and	   VAW,	   at	   the	   same	   time	   needs	   to	   protect	   its	  own	  legitimacy	  and	  that	  of	  the	  new	  available	  specific	  instrument.	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González	  et	  al.	  v.	  Mexico	  (2009)	  –	  Cotton	  field	  -­‐	  IACrtHR74	  	  The	  facts	  refer	  to	  the	  forced	  disappearance	  and	  death	  of	  Mss.	  González,	  Herrera	  and	  Ramos,	  whose	  bodies	  were	  found	  in	  2001	  in	  a	  cotton	  field	  in	  Ciudad	  Juárez,	  and	   to	   omissions	   to	   investigate	   on	   the	   facts.	   Besides	   referring	   to	   breaches	   of	  several	   ACHR	   provisions,	   including	   Article	   1	   (Obligation	   to	   Respect	   Rights	  without	  Discrimination),	  Article	  2	  (Domestic	  Legal	  Effects),	  Article	  5	  (Right	  to	  Humane	   Treatment	   and	   Article	   11	   (Right	   to	   Privacy),	   the	   Commission’s	  application	  to	  the	  Court	  includes	  the	  request	  to	  consider	  the	  facts	  under	  Article	  7	   (Positive	   Duties	   and	   Due	   Diligence	   to	   Eradicate	   Violence),	   8	   (Specific	  measures	   and	   Programmes)	   and	   9	   BdPC	   (Obligation	   to	   consider	   of	   Special	  Vulnerabilities).	  	  	  During	  the	  proceeding,	  the	  Court	  gathered	  an	  extensive	  amount	  of	  information	  and	  testimonies	  both	  from	  the	  representatives	  of	  the	  petitioners	  and	  from	  the	  State.	   The	   documentation	   provided	   evidence	   of	   gender	   being	   the	   common	  denominator	   of	   systematic	   violations	   (para.	   128).	  The	   representatives	   of	   the	  State	  recognised	  the	  problem,	  considering	  such	  facts	  as	  “influenced	  by	  a	  culture	  
of	  gender-­‐based	  discrimination”	  (para.	  128-­‐129),	  exacerbated	  by	  the	  structural	  factor	   of	   the	   change	   in	   family	   roles75	  in	   an	  essentially	  patriarchal	   society.	   The	  IACommHR	   Rapporteur,	   CEDAW	   Committee	   and	   Amnesty	   International,	  provided	   further	  analysis	  on	  the	  same	   line.	   In	  evaluating	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	   State,	   the	   IACrtHR	   referred	   to	   the	  definitions	  of	  due	  diligence	   adopted	  by	  CEDAW,	   to	   the	   1993	   Declaration	   on	   the	   Elimination	   of	   Violence	   Against	  Women	   of	   the	   UN	   General	   Assembly,	   to	   the	   Beijing	   World	   Conference	   on	  Women,	  to	  the	  2006	  statements	  of	  the	  UN	  Special	  Rapporteur	  on	  VAW	  and	  to	  IACommHR’s	  conclusions	  in	  Maria	  Da	  Penha	  v.	  Brazil.	  Additionally,	  considering	  the	   omissions	   of	   the	   national	   judicial	   system,	   the	   Court	   recalled	   ECrtHR’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  Incidentally,	  as	  we	  will	  see	  in	  detail	  in	  the	  Third	  Section	  of	  this	  research,	  we	  note	  that	  in	  this	  case	  Mexico	  raised	  a	  preliminary	  objection	  on	  IACrtHR’s	  contentious	  jurisdiction	  on	  the	  BdPC.	  	  75	  State’s	   rpresentatives	   explicitly	   refers	   to	   the	   changes	   occurred	   after	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	  
maquiladora	   industry,	   started	   in	   1965	   and	   increased	   in	   1993,	   with	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	  North	  American	  Free	  Trade	  Agreement	  (NAFTA).	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  employees	  in	  these	  industries	  are	   women	   and	   their	   increased	   economic	   independence	   triggered	   a	   sudden	   change	   in	   the	  traditional	   division	   of	   roles	   in	   the	   Mexican	   family,	   often	  making	   them	   the	   household	   providers	  (Cravey,	  2008).	  For	  an	  interesting	  analysis	  of	  the	  transformation	  of	  gender	  relations	  brought	  forth	  by	  globalization,	  specifically	  referred	  to	  rural	  areas,	  refer	  to	  Brenner,	  2004.	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jurisprudence	   on	  procedural	   obligations	   (Cotton	   field	   case,	  2009,	   par.	   292)	   to	  carry	  out	  effective	  official	  investigations	  in	  cases	  of	  violation	  of	  the	  right	  to	  life,	  and	   analogically	   adopted	   ECrtHR’s	   doctrine	   on	   the	   reinforced	   duty	   of	   due	  diligence	  in	  the	  investigation	  of	  racially	  motivated	  aggressions.	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  available	   evidence,	   the	  Court	   established	   that	   the	   lack	  of	  due	  diligence	   in	  investigating	  the	  facts	  originated	  in	  a	  general	  context	  of	  discrimination	  against	  women	   signalled,	   inter	   alia,	   by	   the	   stereotyped	   comments	   made	   by	   public	  officials	  to	  the	  family	  members	  of	  the	  victims	  (paras.	  201,	  408).	  	  Notably,	   as	   suggested	  by	  experts	  and	  civil	   society	  actors	  during	   the	  hearings,	  when	  defining	   the	  violations	  occurred	  the	  Court	  uses	   the	  concept	  of	   femicide:	  “In	   the	   light	  of	   the	  preceding	  paragraphs,	   in	   the	   instant	  case	   the	  Court	  will	  use	  
the	  expression	  ‘gender-­‐based	  murders	  or	  women’,	  also	  known	  as	  femicide”	  (para.	  143).	  In	  Section	  1.6	  of	  the	  judgment,	  “Regarding	  the	  alleged	  femicide”,	  the	  Court	  extensively	  refers	  to	  the	  analysis	  presented	  by	  the	  petitioner’s	  representatives,	  Art.	  21	  of	  Mexico’s	  General	  Law	  on	  “Access	  of	  Women	  to	  a	  Life	  Free	  of	  Violence”,	  enacted	   in	   2007,76	  Government	   agencies,	   experts’	   testimonies,	   international	  agencies	  and	  NGOs.	  	  The	  Court’s	  definition	  of	  discrimination	  against	  women	  follows	  that	  of	  CEDAW:	  
“any	  distinction,	  exclusion	  or	  restriction	  made	  on	  the	  basis	  of	   sex	  which	  has	   the	  
effect	  or	  purpose	  of	  impairing	  or	  nullifying	  the	  recognition,	  enjoyment	  or	  exercise	  
by	  women,	  irrespective	  of	  their	  marital	  status,	  on	  a	  basis	  of	  equality	  of	  men	  and	  
women,	   of	   human	   rights	   and	   fundamental	   freedoms	   in	   the	   political,	   economic,	  
social,	  cultural,	  civil	  or	  any	  other	  field”	  (para.	  394).	  The	  interpretive	  framework	  is	   further	   enriched	   with	   references	   to	   BdPC	   understanding	   of	   VAW	   as	   “a	  
manifestation	   of	   the	   historically	   unequal	   power	   relations	   between	   women	   and	  
men”,	  to	  Opuz	  v.	  Turkey,	  were	  the	  ECrtHR	  argued	  that	  “State’s	  failure	  to	  protect	  
women	  against	  domestic	  violence	  breaches	  their	  right	  to	  equal	  protection	  of	  the	  
law	  and	  that	  this	  failure	  does	  not	  need	  to	  be	  intentional”	  (para.	  396),	  as	  well	  as	  to	  its	  own	  precedent,	  the	  Castro-­‐Castro	  case.	  
	  The	   argumentative	   choice	   of	   explicitly	   referring	   to	   a	   wide	   range	   of	  authoritative	   sources	   contributed	   to	   ground	   a	   judgment	   of	   evolutionary	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  76	  National	  legislations	  on	  VAW	  are	  reviewed	  in	  the	  second	  part	  of	  this	  Section	  and	  analysed	  in	  the	  Third	  Section	  of	  this	  research.	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nature.77	  On	  this	  basis,	   the	  Court	  required	  Mexico	  to	  adopt	  measures	  directed	  to	  eradicate	  a	   context	  of	   entrenched	  social	   inequality,	   addressing	   its	   complex	  dimensions	  with	  a	  broad	   range	  of	   appropriate	  measures	  and	  overcoming	   the	  tendency	   to	   “naturalize”	   the	   issue	  of	  VAW,	   and	   to	  promote	   the	   adoption	  of	   a	  gender-­‐perspective	  in	  social	  policies	  and	  judicial	  proceedings.	  	  .	  
“Las	  dos	  Erres”	  Massacre	  v.	  Guatemala	  (2009)	  -­‐	  IACrtHR	  	  The	   case	   refers	   to	   the	   1982	   massacre	   of	   251	   inhabitants	   of	   the	   community	  (parcelamiento)	   of	   Las	   Dos	   Erres,	   perpetrated	   by	   a	   specialized	   group	   of	   the	  armed	  forces	  of	  Guatemala.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  the	  facts,	  the	  BdPC	  had	  not	  yet	  been	  drafted,	   however,	   Guatemala	   had	   ratified	   CEDAW	   just	   a	   few	  months	   earlier.	  Besides	  evaluating	  the	  facts	  under	  Articles	  25	  (Right	  to	  Judicial	  Protection)	  and	  8	   (Right	   to	   a	   Fair	   Trial),	   read	   in	   conjunction	   with	   Article	   1	   (Obligation	   to	  Respect	  Rights)	  ACHR,	  the	  Court	  considered	  breaches	  to	  the	  BdPC,	  ratified	  by	  the	   State	   well	   before	   the	   application	   to	   the	   Court,	   as	   requested	   by	   the	  Commission	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  continuous	  nature	  of	  the	  violation	  constituted	  by	  the	   lack	  of	  an	  exhaustive	   investigation,	  prosecution,	  and	  punishment	  of	   those	  responsible	  of	  acts	  of	  VAW.	  The	  Court	  found	  that	  the	  investigations	  carried	  out	  by	   the	   national	   judicial	   system	   disproportionately	   disregarded	   allegations	   of	  torture	  suffered	  by	  women	  victims	  (paras.	  18-­‐81),	  recognising	  that	  this	  neglect	  infringed	   “non-­‐revocable	  laws	  (jus	  cogens)	   [which]	  generate	  obligations	  for	  the	  
States	  in	  conformity	  with	  the	  American	  Convention	  and	  in	  this	  case	  in	  light	  of	  the	  
CIPST	  and	  the	  BdPC”	  (para.	  140).	  	  	  Again,	   the	  Court	   referred	   to	  experts’	  documentation,	  establishing	  as	  a	  proven	  fact	  that	  “during	  the	  armed	  conflict	  women	  were	  particularly	  chosen	  as	  victims	  of	  
sexual	  violence”	   (para.	   139)	   and	   recognising	   it	   as	   a	   systemic	   pattern78	  on	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77	  For	  an	  extensive	  analysis	  of	  this	  praxis	  in	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  System,	  refer	  to	  Garcia	  Roca,	  2012.	  78	  The	  Court	  argues:	  ”In	  this	  regard,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  in	  international	  law	  different	  courts	  have	  
ruled	   on	   this,	   such	   as	   the	   International	   Criminal	   Tribunal	   for	   the	   Former	   Yugoslavia,	   which	   has	  
qualified	   sexual	   violence	   as	   comparable	   to	   torture	   and	   other	   cruel,	   inhumane,	   and	   degrading	  
treatment,	  when	  it	  has	  been	  committed	  within	  a	  systematic	  practice	  against	  the	  civil	  population,	  or	  
with	   the	   intention	  of	   obtaining	   information,	   punishing,	   intimidating,	   humiliating,	   or	  discriminating	  
the	   victim	   or	   a	   third	   party”	   (para.	   140).	   The	   reference	   is	   to	   the	   case	   law	   of	   the	   International	  Criminal	  Tribunal	  for	  former	  Yugoslavia	  in:	  Prosecutor	  v.	  Anto	  Furundzija;	  Prosecutor	  v.	  Delalic	  et	  al	  
(Celebici	  case)	  and	  2001	  Appeals	  Ch.	  Prosecutor	  v.	  Delalic	  et	  al	  (Celebici	  case);	  Prosecutor	  v.	  Kunarac	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basis	   of	   1999	   CEH	   Report,	   submitted	   in	   occasion	   of	   another	   case	   involving	  Guatemala	   (Plan	   de	   Sánchez	   Massacre	   v.	   Guatemala),	   which	   stated	   that	   “the	  
rape	   of	   women	   was	   a	   State	   practice,	   executed	   in	   the	   context	   of	   massacres,	  
directed	   to	   destroying	   the	   dignity	   of	   women	   at	   a	   cultural,	   social,	   family,	   and	  
individual	  level”	  (para.	  139),	  reinforced	  by	  the	  testimony	  of	  psychologist	  Nieves	  Gómez	   Dupuis,	   who	   argued	   that	   “torture,	   rape,	   and	   acts	   of	   extreme	   cruelty	  
caused	   the	   victims	   […]	   grave	   damages	   to	   their	   mental	   integrity”	   (para.	   139)	  Notably,	  in	  Plan	  the	  Sanchez	  Massacre	  vs.	  Guatemala	  (2004),	  adopted	  two	  years	  before	   the	   path-­‐breaking	   Castro-­‐Castro	   case,	   similar	   facts	   occurred	   in	   1982	  were	  not	  given	  the	  same	  interpretation.	  	  In	   its	   conclusions	   on	   State’s	   responsibilities,	   the	   Court	   specified	   that	  investigations	   should	   have	   included	   specific	   and	   systemic	   violations	   against	  humane	   treatment	   of	   women	   victims	   adopting	   a	   gender	   perspective, 79 	  in	  abidance	   to	  Articles	   8(1)	   and	  25(1)	  ACHR,	   and	   to	   the	   specific	   obligations	   set	  forth	   in	  Articles	  1,	  6,	  and	  8	  of	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  Convention	  against	  Torture	  and	  Article	  7(b)	  BdPC.	  	  In	  his	  Concurring	  Opinion,	  the	  ad	  hoc	  Judge	  Cadena	  Rámila	  articulated	  further	  the	  reasoning	  on	  this	  requirement,	   linking	  it	  to	  the	  need	  to	  address	  the	  socio-­‐cultural	  roots	  of	  gender-­‐based	  violence,	  beyond	  the	   limits	  of	   the	  case:	  “It	  may	  
be	  asserted	  that	  the	  application	  of	  the	  gender	  perspective	  enriches	  the	  manner	  of	  
looking	  at	  reality	  and	  acting	  on	  it,	  hence	  the	  need	  to	  mention	  it	  and	  apply	  it	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  Las	  Dos	  Erres.	  In	  terms	  of	  human	  rights,	  it	  allows,	  among	  other	  things,	  to	  
visualize	   the	   inequities	   construed	   artificially,	   socio-­‐culturally,	   and	   to	   better	  
detect	   the	   specificity	   in	   the	  protection	  needed	  by	   those	  who	  suffer	   inequality	  or	  
discrimination.	  Thus,	  it	  offers	  large	  advantages	  and	  possibilities	  for	  the	  effective	  
protection	  of	  individuals	  and,	  concretely,	  of	  women”	  (p.	  4).	  According	  to	  Cadena	  Rámila	   the	   case	   provides	   evidence	   of	  what	   stated	   in	  BdPC	  Preamble,	   namely	  that	  VAW	  is	  “a	  manifestation	  of	  the	  historically	  unequal	  power	  relations	  between	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
et	  al;	  to	  the	  case	  law	  of	  the	  International	  Criminal	  Tribunal	  for	  Rwanda:	  Prosecutor	  v.	  Akayesu,	  Jean-­‐
Paul;	  and	  to	  ECrtHR’s	  Aydin	  v.	  Turkey	  and	  Maslova	  and	  Nalbandov	  v.	  Russia.	  79 	  At	   paragraph	   233,	   the	   Court	   recalls	   what	   established	   by	   CEDAW	   Committee’s	   General	  Recommendation	   19:	   “within	   the	   framework	   of	   armed	   conflicts	   States	  must	   adopt	   protective	   and	  
punitive	  measures;	  additionally,	  it	  recommended	  for	  the	  States	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  laws	  against	  attacks	  
respect	   the	   integrity	   and	  dignity	   of	   all	  women,	   and	  provide	  protection	   to	   the	   victims;	   as	  well	   as	   to	  
perform	  an	   investigation	   of	   the	   causes	   and	   effects	   of	   violence	   and	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   the	   response	  
measures;	  and	  that	  they	  enshrine	  efficient	  procedures	  for	  reparations,	  including	  compensation”.	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women	  and	  men”,	  showing	  that	  “this	  inequality	  indeed	  exists”	  (p.	  4).	  The	  opinion	  of	   Judge	  Ramón	  Cadena	  Rámila	   is	   noteworthy	   as	   it	   stresses	   the	   emphasis	   on	  the	  need	  to	  modify	  social	  and	  cultural	  patterns	  causing	  VAW,	  underlining	   the	  importance	   to	   intensify	   the	  use	  of	   a	  gender	  perspective	  not	  only	   in	  assessing	  the	  specific	  features	  and	  consequences	  of	  VAW,	  but	  also	  to	  eliminate	  its	  roots.	  He	   suggested	   to	   consider	   “more	   concrete	   aspects	   in	   relation	   to	   reparation	  
measures,	   and,	   concretely,	   of	   non-­‐repetition”	   (p.	   4),	   including	   training	  programmes	  for	  public	  functionaries	  and	  security	  forces	  on	  the	  causes,	  nature	  and	   consequences	   of	   gender-­‐based	   violence,	   and	   focused	   on	   the	  implementation	   of	   measures	   of	   protection	   and	   prevention	   to	   guarantee	   to	  women	  a	  life	  free	  from	  violence.80	  	  
	  
Fernández-­‐Ortega	  et	  al.	  v.	  Mexico	  and	  Rosendo-­‐Cantú	  et	  al.	  v.	  Mexico	  (2010)	  	  These	  are	  essentially	  twin	  sentences,	  given	  the	  analogy	  of	  the	  elements	  of	  the	  cases	  and	  of	  their	  proceedings	  before	  the	  Commission	  and	  the	  Court.	  Moreover,	  the	   judgments	   were	   delivered	   within	   one	   day	   of	   distance.81	  Besides	   some	  factual	  difference,	  not	  relevant	  for	  what	  concerns	  this	  analysis,	  the	  allegations	  referred	  to	  the	  rape	  and	  torture	  of	  Mss.	  Fernández-­‐Ortega	  and	  Rosendo-­‐Cantú,	  two	   indigenous	  women	  of	   the	   State	  of	  Guerrero,	   by	  members	  of	   the	  Mexican	  military	   forces,	   in	   a	   context	   of	   political	   tension.	   As	   in	   the	   previous	   case,	   the	  Commission’s	  application	   to	   the	  Court	   recognised	   the	   lack	  of	  due	  diligence	   in	  investigating	   the	   facts	   and	   punishing	   the	   perpetrators,	   and	   underlined	   the	  difficulties	  encountered	  by	   indigenous	  women	   in	  accessing	   justice	  and	  health	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  The	   Court	   referred	   to	   the	   obligation	   to	   adopt	   a	   permanent	   policy	   to	   train	   armed	   forces	   and	  judiciary	  personnel	  in	  human	  rights	  and	  international	  humanitarian	  law,	  to	  prevent	  the	  occurrence	  of	   similar	   facts	   and	   eradicate	   impunity	   (point	   b.4,	   para.	   250-­‐251).	  However	   it	   did	  not	  make	   any	  specific	  reference	  to	  the	  need	  of	  training	  on	  gender-­‐based	  violence.	  81	  These	   are	   the	   cases	   in	   which	   the	   Commission’s	   application	   explicitly	   refers,	   inter	   alia,	   to	  violations	   of	   Article	   7	   BdPC.	   Notably,	   as	   happened	   in	   the	   Cotton	   Field	   case,	   Mexico	   filed	   a	  preliminary	  objection	  to	  IACrtHR’s	  jurisdiction	  on	  the	  BdPC.	  However,	  after	  Court’s	  clarifications,	  the	   State	   withdrew	   its	   objections	   in	   both	   cases.	   Additionally,	   the	   State	   made	   a	   partial	  acknowledgment	   of	   its	   international	   responsibility,	   which	   the	   Court	   evaluated	   positively,	  notwithstanding	   the	   doubts	   expressed	   by	   both	   the	   Commission,	   considering	   the	   admission	  partially	   contradictory,	   and	   the	   petitioners,	   interpreting	   them	   as	   directed	   to	   achieve	   a	   lenient	  judgment.	   Given	   that	   the	   dispute	   between	   the	   parties	   remained	   with	   regard	   to	   several	   other	  alleged	  violations,	  the	  IACrtHR	  found	  necessary	  to	  deliver	  judgments	  evaluating	  the	  facts	  and	  the	  merits	  of	  the	  matters,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  possible	  reparations.	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care.82	  The	  Commission	  stressed	  that	  the	  perception	  of	  impunity	  “in	  the	  cases	  of	  
gender-­‐based	   violence	   has	   a	   particular	   level	   of	   violence,	   danger,	   fear,	   and	  
restriction	  of	  their	  activities”	  (Rosendo-­‐Cantú,	   para.	   84)	  and	   referred	   to	   sexual	  violence	  as	  having	  “specific	  gender	  based	  causes	  and	  consequences	  [given	  that]	  it	  
is	  used	  […]	  to	  submit	  and	  humiliate	  and	  as	  a	  method	  of	  destroying	  the	  autonomy	  
of	  the	  woman”	  (Rosendo-­‐Cantú,	  para.	  81),	  being	  used	  to	  send	  a	  warning	  to	  their	  communities.	   	   Intersectionality	   is	   explicitly	   mentioned	   defining	   rape	   as	   an	  extreme	  form	  of	  discrimination	  against	  the	  victim:	  “owing	  to	  her	  condition	  as	  an	  
indigenous	  person	  and	  owing	  to	  her	  condition	  as	  a	  woman”	   (Fernandez-­‐Ortega,	  para.	  92),	  and	  clarifying,	  in	  one	  case,	  that	  the	  violence	  suffered	  had	  the	  “effect	  
of	  humiliating	  and	  expressing	  domination	  over	  her,	   her	  husband,	  and	  all	   of	   the	  
indigenous	   men	   and/or	   members	   of	   organized	   groups,”	   (Rosendo-­‐Cantú,	   para.	  84)	  being	  “aggravated	  by	  her	  condition	  as	  an	  indigenous	  girl	  child	  in	  a	  situation	  
of	  poverty,	   ‘making	  her	  a	  victim	  at	  an	  intersection	  of	  discrimination’”	   (Rosendo-­‐
Cantú	  ,	  para.	  82).	  	  In	  relation	  to	  the	  indigenous	  origins	  of	  the	  victims,	  the	  Courts	  took	  into	  account	  that	   indigenous	   communities	   conserve	   their	   traditions	   and	   cultural	   identity	  and	  reside	  in	  the	  poorest	  and	  most	  marginalized	  municipalities,	  constituting	  an	  especially	  vulnerable	  group,83	  to	  which	  the	  national	  judicial	  system	  is,	  de	  facto,	  inaccessible,	   due	   to	   their	   distrust	   and	   fear	   of	   reprisals	   and	   to	   the	   language	  barrier.84	  The	  Court	  recognised	  that	  this	  context	  affected	  women	  in	  particular,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  82	  In	  Rosendo-­‐Cantú	  (para.	  169),	  the	  Court	  refer	  to	  Commission’s	  arguments	  about	  the	  barriers	  that	  indigenous	   women	   face	   to	   obtain	   access	   to	   justice,	   consequences	   of	   their	   social	   exclusion	   and	  ethnic	   discrimination:	   “these	   barriers	   can	   be	   particularly	   serious,	   since	   they	   represent	   forms	   of	  
‘multiple	  discrimination’	  because	  the	  alleged	  victims	  are	  women,	  indigenous,	  and	  poor.	  Particularly	  in	  
cases	  of	  the	  rape	  of	   indigenous	  women,	  the	  investigators	  frequently	  refute	  the	  complaints	  and	  place	  
the	  burden	  of	  proof	  on	  the	  victim,	  and	  the	  investigation	  mechanisms	  are	  flawed	  and	  even	  threatening	  
and	   disrespectful”.	   Evaluating	   the	   difficulties	   in	   accessing	   health	   care	   services,	   the	   Court	   recalls	  that:	   “the	   Inter-­‐American	  Commission	   argued	   that	   the	   State	   restricted	   the	   access	   to	   justice	   of	  Mrs.	  
Rosendo	  Cantú	  by	  denying	  her	  medical	  care	  and	  by	  not	  acting	  with	  due	  diligence	  to	  investigate	  and	  
punish	  the	  rape	  of	  which	  she	  was	  a	  victim”	  (para.	  168).	  83	  Refer	   to:	  Model	   of	   Reference	   of	   Cases	   of	   Gender	   Violence	   for	   the	   state	   of	   Guerrero	   [Modelo	   de	  Referencia	  de	  Casos	  de	  Violencia	  de	  Género	  para	  el	  Estado	  de	  Guerrero],	  Secretariat	  of	  Women’s	  Affairs	   for	   the	   State	   of	   Guerrero,	   December	   2008	   (file	   of	   annexes	   presented	   by	   the	   State	   at	   the	  public	  hearing,	  Tome	  V,	  Annex	  8).	  84	  The	  Court	  argues	  that:	  “Mrs.	  Rosendo-­‐Cantú,	  who	  did	  not	  speak	  Spanish	  fluently	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  
incident,	   was	   not	   provided	   with	   the	   assistance	   of	   an	   interpreter,	   but	   had	   to	   be	   assisted	   by	   her	  
husband,	  and	  in	  the	  Court’s	  opinion	  this	  was	  inappropriate	  to:	  respect	  her	  cultural	  diversity;	  ensure	  
the	  quality	  of	  the	  contents	  of	  the	  statement,	  and	  duly	  protect	  the	  confidentiality	  of	  the	  complaint.	  The	  
Court	  deems	  that	  it	  is	  particularly	  inappropriate	  that	  Mrs.	  Rosendo-­‐Cantú	  had	  to	  turn	  to	  her	  husband	  
to	  narrate	  the	  facts	  of	  the	  rape”	  (para.	  179).	  	  
	   110 
that	  needed	  to	  overcome	  additional	  problems	  to	  their	  access	  to	  justice,	  such	  as	  rejection	  from	  their	  communities,	  depending	  on	  the	  facts	  of	  their	  cases.85	  This	  latter	   clarification	   is	   significant,	   compared	   to	   the	   conclusions	   of	   the	  Commission	   in	   Ana,	   Beatriz,	   and	   Celia	   González	   Pérez	   v	   Mexico.	   While	   the	  Commission	   had	   considered	   the	   rejection	   of	   sexually	   abused	   women	   as	   an	  aggravating	   element	   considering	   the	   State’s	   duty	   to	   protect	   indigenous	  communities	  cultural	  diversity	  arguably	  incurring	  in	  a	  conceptual	  error,	  as	  we	  will	  explain	  in	  the	  Third	  Section	  of	  this	  research,	  in	  this	  case	  the	  Court	  refers	  to	  it	  as	  a	  problem	  and	  an	  additional	  obstacle	  for	  women.	  In	  Fernandez	  Ortega	  the	  Commission	  argues	   that:	   “in	  cases	  involving	  the	  rape	  of	  indigenous	  women,	  the	  
pain	  and	  humiliation	   is	  exacerbated	  because	  they	  are	   indigenous,	  since	   ‘they	  do	  
not	  know	  the	  language	  of	  their	  attackers	  and	  of	  the	  authorities	  that	  intervene	  [,	  
and]	  also	  owing	   to	   the	  repudiation	  of	   their	   community	  as	  a	   result	  of	   the	   facts’”	  (Fernandez-­‐Ortega,	   para.	   90)	   Moreover,	   the	   Court	   added,	   “sexual	   abuse	  
constitutes	  a	  paradigmatic	  form	  of	  violence	  against	  women,	  the	  consequences	  of	  
which	   even	   transcend	   the	   personhood	   of	   the	   victim”	   (Fernandez-­‐Ortega,	   para.	  119)	  	  In	   considering	   women’s	   particular	   exposure	   to	   violence,	   the	   Court	   refers	   to	  extensive	   documentation	   gathered	   from	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   sources	   during	   the	  proceedings	  of	  both	   cases,	   such	  as	   the	   Secretariat	   for	  Women’s	  Affairs	   in	   the	  state	   of	   Guerrero,	   arguing	   that	   “indigenous	   women	   continue	   to	   suffer	   the	  
consequences	   of	   a	   patriarchal	   structure	   that	   is	   blind	   to	   gender	   equity,	  
particularly	   within	   institutions	   such	   as	   the	   Armed	   Forces	   or	   police,	   whose	  
members	  are	  trained	  to	  defend	  the	  nation,	  and	  to	  combat	  or	  attack	  criminals,	  but	  
who	   are	   not	   sensitized	   to	   the	   human	   rights	   of	   the	   community	   and	   of	   women”	  (Fernandez-­‐Ortega,	  para.	  79).	  	  The	  Court	  defines	  the	  violations	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  BdPC	  as	  “an	  offense	  against	  
human	   dignity	   and	   a	  manifestation	   of	   the	   historically	   unequal	   power	   relations	  
between	  women	  and	  men	  (…)	   [that]	  pervades	  every	  sector	  of	  society,	  regardless	  
of	  class,	  race,	  or	  ethnic	  group,	  income,	  culture,	  level	  of	  education,	  age	  or	  religion,	  
and	   strikes	  at	   its	   very	   foundation”	   (Fernandez-­‐Ortega,	   para.	   79),	  and	   refers	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  85	  Refer	   to:	  Network	  Development	  2008,	  Secretariat	   for	  Women’s	   Affairs	   of	   the	   State	   of	   Guerrero	  (file	  of	  annexes	  presented	  by	  the	  State	  at	  the	  public	  hearing,	  Tome	  V,	  Annex	  8).	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CEDAW	  Committee’s	  position	  to	  strengthen	  its	  arguments	  on	  the	  link	  between	  VAW	  and	  discrimination	  against	  women.	  	  Both	   cases	   are	   evaluated	   also	   under	   Article	   11	   (Right	   to	   Privacy)	   ACHR.	   In	  Rosendo-­‐Cantú,	   the	   IACrtHR	   largely	   refers	   to	   ECrtHR’s	   jurisprudence	   (e.g.	  
Dudgeon	  v.	  the	  United	  Kingdom;	  X	  and	  Y	  v.	  the	  Netherlands;	  Niemietz	  v.	  Germany;	  
Peck	   v.	   United	   Kingdom)	   to	   recall	   the	   broad	   concept	   implied	   in	   Article	   11,	  including	   private	   life,	   sexual	   life,	   the	   right	   to	   establish	   and	   develop	  relationships	   with	   other	   human	   beings	   and	   the	   “right	   to	   decide	   freely	   with	  
whom	  to	  have	   intimate	  relations,	  causing	  her	  to	   lose	  complete	  control	  over	  this	  
most	  personal	  and	  intimate	  decisions,	  and	  over	  her	  basic	  bodily	  functions”	  (para.	  150,	  referring	  in	  particular	  to	  M.C.	  v.	  Bulgaria).	  In	  Mrs	  Fernández	  Ortega’s	  case,	  members	  of	  the	  Army	  invaded	  her	  residence,	  which	  gave	  the	  Court	  the	  basis	  to	  refer	   to	  Article	   11.2,	   considering	   “an	   individual’s	  home	  and	  private	  and	   family	  
life	   are	   intrinsically	   connected,	   because	   the	   residence	   is	   the	   space	   in	   which	  
private	  and	  family	  life	  can	  evolve	  freely”	  (para.	  157).	  	  	  Notably,	   when	   determining	   the	   obligations	   established	   in	   Articles	   8	   and	   25	  ACHR,	   the	   Court	   defines	   them	   as	   “complemented	   and	   enhanced	   by	   the	  
obligations	   arising	   for	   States	   parties	   from	   the	   specific	   obligations	   of	   the	   Inter-­‐
American	  treaty,	  the	  Convention	  of	  Belém	  do	  Pará.	  Article	  7(b)	  of	  this	  Convention	  
specifically	   obliges	   the	   States	   parties	   to	   apply	   due	   diligence	   to	   prevent,	   punish,	  
and	   eradicate	   violence	   against	   women”,	   given	   “society’s	   obligation	   to	   reject	  
violence	  against	  women	  and	  the	  State’s	  obligation	  to	  eliminate	   it	  and	  to	  ensure	  
that	   victims	   trust	   the	   State	   institutions	   there	   for	   their	   protection”	   (Fernandez-­‐
Ortega,	  para.	  193	  and	  Rosendo-­‐Cantú,	  para.	  177).	  	  Another	  peculiar	   feature	  of	   these	  cases	   is	  extensive	   treatment	   the	  guarantees	  of	   non-­‐repetition,	   based	   on	   which	   the	   Court	   requires	   the	   State	   to	   adapt	  domestic	  law	  to	  the	  established	  standards,	  and	  suggests	  policies,	  measures	  and	  programmes	   to	   improve	   access	   to	   justice	   for	   indigenous	  women,86	  guarantee	  multidisciplinary	  health	  services	   for	  women	  victims	  of	   rape	  and	  programmes	  of	   reinsertion	   in	   their	   communities,	   and	   develop	   training	   programmes	   for	  officials	  and	  armed	  forces,	  including	  specific	  human	  rights	  instruments	  related	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  86 	  And	   “(…)	   respect[ing]	   their	   cultural	   identity”	   (Rosendo-­‐Cantú,	   Point	   V,	   Guarantees	   of	   non-­‐repetition).	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to	   the	   protection	   of	   women’s	   rights,	   VAW	   and	   non-­‐discrimination.	   Notably,	  Mexico	   provided	   information	   and	   documentation	   about	   several	   programmes	  responding	  to	  those	  requested	  by	  the	  Court,	   implemented	  not	  long	  before	  the	  judgments	  and	  following	  the	  previous	  Commission’s	  Reports	  on	  the	  cases.	  	  
	  
Jessica	  Lenahan	  (Gonzales)	  et	  al.	  v.	  United	  States	  (2011)	  -­‐	  IACommHR	  	  In	   this	   decision	   the	   IACommHR	   finds	   that	   United	   States	   violated	   Articles	   I	  (Right	   to	   Life),	   II	   (Equality	   Before	   the	   Law),	   VII	   (Protection	   of	   Mother	   and	  Child),	   IX	   (Inviolability	   of	   the	   Home)	   and	   XVIII	   (Right	   to	   a	   Fair	   Trial)	   of	   the	  American	   Declaration	   of	   the	   Rights	   and	   Duties	   of	   Men	   (ADHR),87	  by	   having	  failed	   to	   exercise	   due	   diligence	   to	   protect	   Jessica	   Lenahan	   and	   her	   three	  daughters	   from	   repeated	   acts	   of	   domestic	   violence	   perpetrated	   by	   her	   ex-­‐husband,	   which	   culminated	   in	   the	   murder	   of	   the	   three	   children,	   never	   duly	  investigated.	  	  Although,	   concerning	  United	   States,	   this	   case	  was	   initially	   excluded	   from	  our	  review,	   we	   finally	   decided	   to	   include	   it	   because	   it	   provides	   evidence	   that,	  through	   a	   fifteen	   years	   long	  process,	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions	   internalised	  the	  current	   international	  consensus	  on	  VAW	  to	  a	  point	  of	  using	   it	  even	  when	  the	   BdPC	   cannot	   be	   applied,	   interpreting	   general	   norms	   through	   a	   gender-­‐perspective.	   This	   issue	   has	   significant	   implications	   for	   what	   concerns	   the	  usefulness	   of	   a	   specific	   instrument	   to	   guarantee	  women’s	   rights,	   and	  will	   be	  thoroughly	  addressed	  in	  the	  next	  Section	  of	  this	  research.	  	  	  After	   signing	   the	   BdPC	   in	   1977,	   the	   United	   States	   never	   ratified	   it,	   nor	   they	  submitted	   to	   the	   ACHR	   and	   IACrtHR	   jurisdiction.	   Petitioners	   can,	   therefore,	  only	   access	   the	   protection	   mechanism	   established	   by	   the	   ADHR	   (not	   the	  ACHR),	   ensured	   by	   the	   IACommHR,	   as	   a	   body	   of	   OAS.	   Notably,	   the	   State	  contested	   that	   the	  ADHR	   is	  a	  non-­‐binding	   instrument88	  and	   its	  provisions	  are	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  87	  The	   petitioners	   had	   also	   claimed	   breaches	   to	   Articles	   V	   (Right	   to	   Personal	   Integrity)	   and	   VI	  (Right	   to	   form	   a	   Family),	   but	   the	   Commission	   did	   not	   consider	   the	   information	   sufficient	   to	  establish	  these	  violations.	  88	  According	   to	   the	   State,	   the	   case	   law	   of	   both	   the	   IACrtHR	   (Cotton	   Field)	   and	   the	   IACommHR	  (Maria	   da	   Penha)	   could	   not	   be	   interpreted	   as	   imposing	   upon	   the	   United	   States	   an	   affirmative	  obligation	  to	  prevent	  private	  crimes	  (para.	  55).	  The	  State	  argued	  that:	  “it	  is	  essential	  to	  bear	  in	  mind	  
that	   the	   judging	  of	   governmental	   action	   such	  as	   in	   this	   case	  has	  been	  and	  will	   remain	  a	  matter	   of	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aspirational,	  arguing	  that	  non	  of	  them	  imposes	  an	  affirmative	  duty	  to	  prevent	  crimes	  perpetrated	  by	  private	  actors	  and	   that,	   even	   though	   the	  due	  diligence	  principle	   found	  expression	   in	  several	   international	   instruments	  related	  to	  the	  problem	   of	   VAW,	   its	   content	   was	   still	   unclear.	   Additionally,	   referring	   to	   the	  
Cotton	  field	  precedent,	  the	  State	  clarified	  that	  it	  did	  not	  consider	  IACrtHR’s	  case	  law	  as	  imposing	  an	  affirmative	  obligation	  to	  prevent	  private	  crimes.	  	  The	   IACommHR	   dedicates	   a	   long	   part	   of	   its	   reasoning	   to	   clarify	   ADHR	   legal	  effect,	   the	  binding	  nature	  of	   the	  principle	   of	   non-­‐discrimination,	   the	  negative	  and	   positive	   duties	   that	   it	   enshrines	   and	   the	   evolved	   standards	   of	  interpretation	  of	  norms	  and	  principles	  in	  cases	  of	  VAW.	  It	  defined	  the	  principle	  of	   non-­‐discrimination	   as	   the	  backbone	  of	   any	   system	  of	   protection	  of	   human	  rights	   and	   a	   fundamental	   principle	   of	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   System	   of	   human	  rights,	   implying	   not	   only	   an	   obligation	   for	   States	   to	   guarantee	   equal	   legal	  protection	   of	   the	   law,	   but	   also	   the	   positive	   duty	   to	   guarantee	   the	   effective	  enjoyment	   of	   such	   right.	   Evaluating	   the	   facts,	   the	   Commission	   referred	   to	  gender-­‐based	   violence	   as	   “one	   of	   the	   most	   extreme	   and	   pervasive	   forms	   of	  
discrimination,	   severely	   impairing	   and	   nullifying	   the	   enforcement	   of	   women’s	  
rights”	   (para.	  110),	   strengthening	   its	  arguments	   through	  extensive	  references	  to	   resolutions	   and	   declarations	   adopted	   in	   the	   Universal	   System. 89 	  	   The	  Commission	   determined	   State’s	   obligations	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   Article	   II	   ADHR,	  arguing	   that	   they	   “extend	  to	  the	  prevention	  and	  eradication	  of	  violence	  against	  
women,	  as	  a	  crucial	   component	  of	   the	  State’s	  duty	   to	  eliminate	  both	  direct	  and	  
indirect	  forms	  of	  discrimination”	   (para.	  120).	  Referring	   to	  Maria	  Da	  Penha	  and	  ECrtHR’s	  Opuz	  v.	  Turkey,	  the	  Commission	  argued	  that	  the	  same	  obligations	  hold	  in	   case	   of	   acts	   of	   violence	   perpetrated	   by	   private	   actors,	   being	   domestic	  violence	   internationally	  understood	  as	  a	  human	  rights	  violation.	  Additionally,	  the	   Commission	   clarified	   that	   “State	   failures	   in	   the	   realm	  of	  domestic	   violence	  
[are]	  not	  only	  discriminatory,	  but	  also	  violations	   to	   the	   right	   to	   life	  of	  women,”	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
domestic	   law	   in	   the	   fulfilment	   of	   a	   state’s	   general	   responsibilities	   incident	   to	   ordered	   government,	  
rather	  than	  a	  matter	  of	  international	  human	  rights	  law	  to	  be	  second-­‐guessed	  by	  international	  bodies”	  (para.	  57).	  	  89	  Amongst	   the	  many	  cited:	  2010	  UNGA	  Resolution,	  Human	  Rights	  Council,	  Accelerating	  efforts	  to	  
eliminate	   all	   forms	   of	   violence	   against	   women:	   ensuring	   due	   diligence	   in	   prevention;	   1994	   UN	  Declaration	  on	  the	  Elimination	  of	  Violence	  against	  Women,	  General	  Assembly	  Resolution	  48/104;	  1995	  Beijing	  Declaration	  and	  Platform	   for	  Action,	   Fourth	  World	  Conference	  on	  Women;	  CEDAW	  Committee,	  General	  Recommendation	  19:	  Violence	  against	  Women.	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(para.	  119)90	  considering	  the	  right	  to	  life	  as	  part	  of	  customary	  international	  law	  and	  “as	  the	  supreme	  right	  of	  the	  human	  being,	  respect	  for	  which	  the	  enjoyment	  of	  
all	   other	   rights	   depends”	   (para.	   38).	   In	   order	   to	   fulfil	   their	   obligation	   of	   due	  diligence	   with	   respect	   to	   VAW	   “States	   must	   adopt	   the	   required	   measures	   to	  
modify	   the	   social	   and	   cultural	   patterns	   of	   conduct	   of	   men	   and	   women	   and	   to	  
eliminate	  prejudices,	  customary	  practices	  and	  other	  practices	  based	  on	  the	   idea	  
of	  the	  inferiority	  or	  superiority	  of	  either	  of	  the	  sexes,	  and	  on	  stereotyped	  roles	  for	  
men	  and	  women”	  (para.	  126).	  
	  Significantly,	   the	  Commission	   recognised	   a	   generalised	  pattern	   tolerance	   and	  judicial	  inefficiency	  towards	  cases	  of	  domestic	  violence,	  which	  promoted	  their	  repetition,	   and	   reaffirmed	   the	   inextricable	   link	   between	   the	   problem	   of	  violence	  against	  women	  and	  discrimination	  in	  the	  domestic	  setting.	  	  	  Intersectionality	  is	  taken	  into	  account	  through	  Article	  VII	  ADHR,	  as	  giving	  rise	  to	   a	   reinforced	   duty	   of	   due	   diligence	   (para.	   164):	   “international	   and	   regional	  
systems	  have	   identified	  certain	  groups	  of	  women	  as	  being	  at	  particular	   risk	   for	  
acts	   of	   violence	   due	   to	   having	   been	   subjected	   to	   discrimination	   based	   on	  more	  
than	   one	   factor,	   among	   these	   girl-­‐children,	   and	   women	   pertaining	   to	   ethnic,	  
racial,	  and	  minority	  groups;	  a	   factor	  which	  must	  be	  considered	  by	  States	   in	   the	  
adoption	  of	  measures	  to	  prevent	  all	  forms	  of	  violence”	  (para.	  127).	  91	  	  	  While	  reaffirming	  that	  the	  organs	  of	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  System	  are	  not	  bound	  to	   follow	   the	   judgments	   of	   international	   supervisory	   bodies,	   IACommHR	  extensively	  referred	  to	  ECrtHR	  and	  CEDAW	  Committee’s	  case	  law	  as	  “providing	  
constructive	   insights	   into	   the	   interpretation	   and	   application	   of	   rights	   that	   are	  
common	  to	  regional	  and	  international	  human	  rights	  systems”	  (para.	  135).	  This	  is	  the	   case	   for	   such	   bodies	   case	   law	   on	   domestic	   violence,92	  with	   particular	  reference	   to	   the	   obligation	   to	   protect	   as	   an	   obligation	   to	   adopt	   reasonable	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90	  Referring	   to	   ECrtHR’s	   Opuz	   v.	   Turkey,	   Kontrová	   v.	   Slovakia	   and	   CEDAW	   Committee’s	   Sahide	  
Goekce	  v.	  Austia.	  91	  Referring	  to:	  2010	  UNGA	  Resolution,	  Human	  Rights	  Council,	  Accelerating	  efforts	  to	  eliminate	  all	  
forms	   of	   violence	   against	   women:	   ensuring	   due	   diligence	   in	   prevention;	   IACommHR,	   Violence	   and	  
Discrimination	   against	   Women	   in	   the	   Armed	   Conflict	   in	   Colombia,	   2006;	   IACommHR,	   Access	   to	  
Justice	   for	   Women	   Victims	   of	   Violence	   in	   the	   Americas,	   2007;	   CEDAW	   Committee,	   General	  Recommendation	  25,	  on	  Temporary	  Special	  Measures,	  2004.	  92	  Referring	  to:	  CEDAW	  Committee’s	  Sahide	  Goekce	  v.	  Austria,	  Fatma	  Yildrim	  v.	  Austria	  and	  ECrtHR’s	  
Branko	  Tomasic	  et	  al.	  v.	  Croatia,	  Kontrová	  v.	  Slovakia,	  Opuz	  v.	  Turkey,	  E.	  et	  al.	  v.	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  
Z	  et	  al.	  v.	  the	  United	  Kingdom.	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means,	  to	  the	  irrelevance	  of	  the	  intentionality	  of	  a	  State’s	  breach	  of	  the	  right	  to	  equal	   protection	   of	   the	   law,	  and	   to	   the	   hidden	   nature	   of	   domestic	   violence,	  which	  might	  imply	  a	  reason	  to	  bypass	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  a	  complaint.	  93	  	  In	   its	   conclusions,	   the	   IACommHR	   found	   the	   State	   responsible	   of	   systemic	  
failures	  to	  protect	  the	  petitioner,	  “particularly	  serious	  since	  they	  took	  place	  in	  a	  
context	   where	   there	   has	   been	   a	   historical	   problem	   with	   the	   enforcement	   of	  
protection	   orders;	   a	   problem	   that	   has	   disproportionately	   affected	   women	   -­‐	  
especially	   those	   pertaining	   to	   ethnic	   and	   racial	   minorities	   and	   to	   low-­‐income	  
groups	   -­‐	   since	   they	   constitute	   the	   majority	   of	   the	   restraining	   order	   holders”	  (para.	   161).	   Notably,	   in	   establishing	   the	   State’s	   inaction	   to	   protect	   the	  petitioner	   and	   her	   daughters,	   the	   Commission	   highlighted	   “the	   insensitive	  
nature	  of	  some	  of	  the	  CRPD	  comments	  to	  Jessica	  Lenahan’s	  calls,	  considering	  that	  
in	   her	   contacts	   she	   demonstrated	   that	   she	  was	   concerned	   for	   the	  well-­‐being	   of	  
her	   daughters”	   (para.	   164),	   fostering	   an	   environment	   of	   impunity	   and	  promoting	   the	   repetition	   of	   violence	   “since	   society	   sees	   no	   evidence	   of	  
willingness	   by	   the	   State,	   as	   the	   representative	   of	   the	   society,	   to	   take	   effective	  
action	  to	  sanction	  such	  acts”	  (para.	  168).	  	  	  	  
Maria	  Isabel	  Véliz	  Franco	  et	  al	  v.	  Guatemala	  (pending)	  -­‐	  IACrtHR	  	  The	   2012	   IACommHR’s	   application	   to	   the	   Court	   reports	   that	   the	   petitioner	  alleged	  State’s	   responsibility	   for	   its	   lack	  of	  due	  diligence	   in	   the	   investigations	  referred	  to	  the	  femicide	  of	  María	  Isabel	  Véliz	  Franco,	  15	  years	  old,	  disappeared	  in	   2001	   in	   Guatemala	   City,	   and	   whose	   body	   was	   found	   presenting	   signs	   of	  brutalities.	  According	  to	  the	  Commission,	  besides	  several	  Articles	  of	  the	  ACHR,	  Guatemala	  violated	  Article	  7	  BdPC,	  read	  in	  conjunction	  with	  Article	  24	  and	  1.1	  ACHR.	  In	  its	  Fifth	  Report	  on	  the	  Situation	  of	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Guatemala	  (para.	  59),	  the	  IACommHR	  reported	  that	  VAW	  is	  a	  severe	  problem	  in	  Guatemala	  and	  among	  the	  main	  causes	  of	  death	  and	  disability	  among	  women	  between	  the	  ages	  of	  15	  and	  44.	  	  Notably,	  in	  assessing	  the	  conduct	  of	  investigations,	  the	  Commission	  stated	  that	  there	   was	   evidence	   of	   discriminatory	   stereotypes,	   operating	   in	   the	   practice	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  93	  Referring	  to	  ECrtHR’s	  Opuz	  v.	  Turkey	  (para.	  136)	  and	  E.	  et	  al.	  v.	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  (para.	  99).	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during	   the	   investigation	   of	   the	   case.	   As	   maintained	   by	   the	   petitioners,	   the	  investigative	   corps	   had	   “endeavoured	   to	   discredit	   the	   victim	   and	   her	   family”	  (para.	   126),	   by	   insulting	   and	   humiliating	   her	   and	   her	   deceased	   daughter,	  devaluating	   the	   person,	   which	   led	   to	   the	   impunity	   of	   those	   responsible.	  According	   to	   Amnesty	   International	   “from	   the	   attitude	   of	   the	   state	   agents	  
toward	   these	   cases,	   one	   is	   left	   with	   the	   impression	   that	   a	   woman’s	   murder	   is	  
unimportant	  and	  not	  worth	  a	  deep	  and	   thorough	   investigation.	   	   This	   is	   largely	  
due	   to	   prejudices	   and	   rigid	   stereotypes	   about	   gender	   roles	   that	   factor	   into	   the	  
thinking	   of	   state	   agents	   when	   they	   conduct	   the	   investigations.	   	   Hence,	   gender	  
discrimination	  is	  itself	  an	  obstacle	  in	  the	  investigative	  process”	  (para.	  24).	  Public	  authorities	  discredited	  and	  blamed	  the	  victims	  for	  their	  actions,	  implying	  they	  did	   not	   deserve	   State’s	   protection.	   The	   petitioners	   underlined	   that	   in	  Guatemala	   femicide	   and	   “impunity	   that	   attends	   it	   are	   not	   isolated	   incidents;	  
instead	   they	   are	   an	   accurate	   and	   telling	   reflection	   of	   a	   pattern	   of	   gender	  
violence”	  (para.	  24).	  Indeed,	  in	  Access	  to	  Justice	  for	  Women	  Victims	  of	  Violence	  in	  
the	   Americas,	   the	   IACommHR	   observed	   that	   authorities	   in	   charge	   of	  investigations	   into	   incidents	   of	   VAW	   were	   neither	   competent	   nor	   impartial,	  which	  considerably	  foreshortened	  any	  possibility	  that	  these	  cases	  would	  ever	  be	   prosecuted	   and	   the	   guilty	   parties	   punished	   (para.	   91).	   This	   climate	   of	  impunity	   is	   considered	   conductive	   to	   VAW,	   as	   “society	   sees	   no	   evidence	   of	  
willingness	   by	   the	   State,	   as	   the	   representative	   of	   the	   society,	   to	   take	   effective	  
action	  to	  sanction	  such	  acts”	  (para.	  56).	  	  
	  Building	   on	   both	   BdPC	   and	   CEDAW	   framework	   of	   interpretation	   and	   on	  relevant	   jurisprudence,	   the	   Commission	   reasserted	   the	   link	   between	  discrimination,	  subjugation	  and	  VAW,	  and	  observed	  that	   traditionally	  unequal	  power	   relations	   lock	   women	   (and	   men)	   into	   stereotyped	   roles,	   perpetuating	  violence	   and	   abuse.	   Thus,	   VAW	   is	   a	   form	   of	   discrimination	   that	   seriously	  impairs	  women’s	  ability	   to	  exercise	  and	  enjoy	   their	   rights	  and	   freedoms.	  The	  IACommHR	  reaffirmed	  that	  due	  diligence	  obligations	  have	  special	  connotations	  in	   the	   case	   of	   VAW,	   including	   the	   duty	   to	   investigate	   and	   punish	   acts	  perpetrated	   by	   private	   persons.	   On	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   reasoning	   of	   the	   United	  Nations	   Commission	   on	   Human	   Rights,	   the	   IACommHR	   maintained	   that	   “all	  
forms	  of	  violence	  against	  women	  occur	  within	  the	  context	  of	  de	  jure	  and	  de	  facto	  
discrimination	  against	  women	  and	  the	  lower	  status	  accorded	  to	  women	  in	  society	  
and	  are	  exacerbated	  by	  the	  obstacles	  women	  often	  face	  in	  seeking	  remedies	  from	  
the	  State”	  (para.	  57).	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  In	  2004,	  the	  IACommHR	  Rapporteur	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  Women	  made	  a	  working	  visit	  to	  Guatemala	  and	  observed	  that	  several	  sources	  indicated	  that	  the	  degree	  of	   violence	   and	   cruelty	   inflicted	   on	   the	   bodies	   of	   many	   female	   victims	   had	  intensified,	   a	   situation	   of	   which	   the	   State	   was	   well	   aware.	   The	   Report	   cited	  documentation	   that	  provides	  evidence	   that	  women	  were	  murdered	   “to	  set	  an	  
example,”	  and	  that	  “abuse	  reflected	  by	  the	  state	  of	  the	  victim’s	  body	  and	  the	  areas	  
in	   which	   the	   corpses	   were	   left,	   is	   designed	   to	   send	   a	   message	   of	   terror	   and	  
intimidation.”94	  	  
	  In	  the	  2003	  Report	  on	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Guatemala,	  the	  IACommHR	  evaluated	  the	   measures	   undertaken	   by	   the	   government	   to	   address	   VAW:	   “a	   Law	   to	  
Prevent,	  Punish	  and	  Eradicate	  Intrafamily	  Violence	  (Decree	  97-­‐96)	  was	  enacted	  
in	  1996;	   in	  2000	  and	  2001,	  the	   legal	   framework	  was	  further	  expanded	  with	  the	  
addition	   of	   the	   regulations	   for	   enforcement	   of	   the	   law	   and	   the	   creation	   of	   the	  
Organ	   to	   Coordinate	   Prevention,	   Punishment	   and	   Eradication	   of	   Domestic	  
Violence	   and	   Violence	   against	   Women	   (CONAPREVI),	   which	   is	   charged	   with	  
coordinating	   the	   institutions	   active	   in	   this	   area.	   The	  Presidential	   Secretariat	   of	  
Women	  (SEPREM)	  was	  created	  by	  Government	  Agreement	  200-­‐2000.	  A	  National	  
Policy	   for	   Guatemalan	   Women’s	   Advancement	   and	   Development	   was	   also	  
established,	   as	   was	   their	   Equal	   Opportunity	   Plan	   (2001-­‐2006).	   In	   2005,	   the	  
Commission	   to	  Address	   the	   Problem	  of	   Femicide	  was	   created.	   	   It	   is	  made	  up	   of	  
representatives	  from	  the	  Attorney	  General’s	  Office,	  the	  Public	  Prosecutor’s	  Office,	  
and	   the	   Office	   of	   the	   Human	   Rights	   Ombudsperson.	   On	   March	   8,	   2006,	   the	  
‘Specific	  Commission	  to	  Address	  Femicide	  in	  Guatemala’	  was	  officially	  introduced.	  
On	  October	  6,	  2006,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  created	  the	  Women’s	  and	  Gender	  Analysis	  
Unit.	  On	  November	  23,	  2007,	  the	  Congress	  of	  the	  Republic	  adopted	  Resolution	  15-­‐
2007,	   in	   which	   it	   condemned	   femicide	   in	   Guatemala.	   Then,	   in	   2008,	   the	   Law	  
against	   Femicide	   and	   Other	   Forms	   of	   Violence	   against	  Women	  was	   approved”.	  However,	  the	  Commission	  was	  not	  satisfied	  with	  the	  information	  provided	  (as	  in	   the	   2010	   IACrtHR’s	   judgments	   against	   Mexico)	   given	   the	   lack	   of	  coordination	  and	  funding	  reported	  by	  institutions	  working	  in	  the	  field	  of	  VAW.	  Moreover,	  such	  measures	  had	  not	  been	  adopted	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  events	  of	  the	  case.	   The	   IACommHR	   Rapporteur	   argued	   that,	   while	   the	   State	   had	   taken	  measures	   to	  address	  violence	  against	  women,	   they	  were	  still	  not	  sufficient	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  94	  IAommCHR,	  Press	  Release	  No.	  20/04.	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deal	   with	   the	   problem.95	  In	   fact,	   in	   order	   to	   prove	   its	   abidance	   to	   Article	   7	  BdPC,	  evidence	  of	  the	  measures	  taken	  to	  eliminate	  society’s	  general	  tolerance	  of	  VAW	   are	   not	   sufficient,	   whereas	   it	   is	   demanded	   to	   prove	   it	   also	   for	   what	  concerns	  the	  facts	  of	  the	  concrete	  case.	  	  In	  its	  2004	  Report,	  the	  Commission	  noted	  that	  “the	  state	  must	  urgently	  intensify	  
its	  efforts	  to	  combat	  the	  violence	  and	  discrimination	  against	  women	  by	  measures	  
including	  applying	  due	  diligence	   to	   investigating	  and	   solving	  crimes	  of	   violence	  
against	  women,	  by	  bringing	   those	  responsible	   to	   justice	  and	  punishing	   them,	  as	  
well	   as	   by	   providing	   access	   to	   protection	   measures	   and	   support	   systems	   for	  
victims”	   underlining	   that	   it	   “is	   essential	   that	   the	   state	   should	  not	  only	   concern	  
itself	  about	  this	  problem	  of	  violence	  against	  women,	  but	  also	  should	  concern	  itself	  
with	  providing	  effective	  solutions.”	  (para.	  32).	  In	  establishing	  its	  view	  on	  State’s	  responsibility,	  the	  Commission	  stressed	  that	  authorities	  did	  not	  investigate	  the	  victim’s	  death	  as	  a	  case	  of	  gender	  violence	  and,	  while	  having	  ratified	  the	  BdPC,	  it	   did	   not	   adopt	   measures,	   protocols	   or	   directives	   on	   how	   to	   properly	  investigate	  violence	  of	  that	  kind.	  	  	  
Friendly	  settlements	  
	  As	  mentioned,	  the	  Commission	  has	  the	  duty	  to	  evaluate	  if	  a	  friendly	  settlement	  can	  be	  reached	  before	  initiating	  the	  proceedings	  established	  by	  the	  protection	  mechanism.	  Several	  petitions	  invoking	  the	  BdPC,	  indeed,	  resulted	  in	  a	  friendly	  settlement.	  In	  the	  following	  paragraphs	  we	  present	  only	  those	  relevant	  for	  the	  scope	  of	  our	  analysis.	  	  	  
María	  Mamérita	  Mestanza	  Chavez	  v.	  Peru	  (2003)	  	  The	  NGO	  Estudio	  para	  la	  Defensa	  de	  la	  Mujer	  (DEMUS),	  the	  Latin	  American	  and	  Caribbean	  Committee	   for	   the	  Defense	   of	  Women’s	  Rights	   (CLADEM),	   and	   the	  
Asociación	  Pro	  Derechos	  Humanos	   (APRODEH),	  with	   the	   co-­‐petitioners	  Centro	  
Legal	   para	  Derechos	  Reproductivos	   y	  Políticas	  Públicas	   (CRLP)	   and	   Center	   for	  Justice	   and	   International	   Law	   (CEJIL)	   alleged	   that	   the	   victim	   had	   been	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  95	  Id.	  supra	  note	  94.	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forcefully	  subjected	  to	  surgical	  sterilization,	  which	  ultimately	  caused	  her	  death.	  The	   petition	   invoked	   several	   provisions	   of	   the	   ACHR,	   the	   BdPC,	   the	   ACHR	  Protocol	   on	   Economic,	   Social	   and	   Cultural	   Rights	   (Protocol	   of	   San	   Salvador)	  and	   CEDAW.	   	   However,	   the	   Commission	   admitted	   the	   case	   on	   more	   limited	  grounds,	  evaluating	  the	  facts	  under	  Articles	  1,	  4,	  5,	  and	  24	  ACHR	  and	  Article	  7	  BdPC.	  	  Based	   on	   evidence	   provided	   by	   the	   Office	   of	   the	   Human	   Rights	   Ombudsman	  (Defensoría	  del	  Pueblo)	  and	  CLADEM,	  the	  petitioners	  argued	  that	  the	  case	  of	  the	  victim	   represented	   one	   example	   of	   a	   significant	   number	   of	   cases	   of	   women	  affected	   by	   the	   implementation	   of	   a	   systematic	   government	   policy	   to	  modify	  the	   reproductive	   behaviour	   of	   the	   population,	   especially	   of	   poor,	   indigenous,	  and	   rural	  women.	  According	   to	   the	  allegations,	  María	  Mamérita	  Mestanza,	   an	  indigenous	  women,	  mother	  of	  seven	  children,	  had	  been	  repeatedly	  threatened	  by	   the	  health	  centre	   for	   the	  District	  of	  La	  Encañada,	  part	  of	   the	  public	  health	  system,	  and	  had	  ultimately	  consented,	  under	  coercion,	  to	  undergo	  surgery	  for	  a	  tubal	   ligation.	   After	   the	   surgical	   procedure,	   the	   victim	   experienced	   serious	  anomalies,	   underestimated	   by	   the	   personnel	   of	   the	   health	   centre,	   which	  resulted	   in	   her	   death	   for	   sepsis.	   	   Following	   these	   events,	   the	   victim’s	  permanent	  partner	  was	  offered	  a	  sum	  of	  money	   for	  settling	   the	  problem.	  The	  man	  denounced	  the	  Chief	  of	  the	  health	  centre,	  but	  his	  claims	  were	  discarded	  as	  not	  providing	  grounds	  to	  open	  an	  investigation.	  	  A	   friendly	   settlement	   with	   the	   Peruvian	   government	   was	   signed	   in	   2003,	  where	   the	   State	   acknowledged	   its	   international	   responsibility	   and	   agreed	   to	  compensation	   to	   the	   victim’s	   partner	   and	   children,	   as	  well	   as	   to	   abide	   to	   the	  recommendations	   of	   the	   Human	   Rights	   Ombudsman	   concerning	   sterilization	  procedures.	  	  	  
MZ	  v.	  Bolivia	  (2008)	  	  In	   2001	   the	  Oficina	   Jurídica	  para	   la	  Mujer,	   the	   Latin	  American,	   the	  Caribbean	  Committee	   for	   the	  Defence	  of	  Women’s	  Rights	   (CLADEM),	   and	   the	  Center	   for	  Justice	  and	  International	  Law	  (CEJIL),	  presented	  a	  petition	  alleging	  the	  rape	  of	  MZ	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  impartiality	  of	  the	  national	  judicial	  system,	  invoking	  several	  ACHR	  provisions	  and	  Article	  7	  BdPC.	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  The	  facts	  occurred	  in	  1994	  and	  the	  victim	  claimed	  that,	  after	  appealing	  the	  first	  judgment,	   which	   had	   imposed	   a	   scant	   punishment	   to	   the	   perpetrator,	   the	  appeal	   court	   acquitted	   him	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   an	   arbitrary	   and	   discriminatory	  decision.	   The	   documentation	   and	   evidence	   provided	   by	   the	   petitioners	   and	  other	   testimonies	   presented	   a	   thorough	   analysis	   of	   the	   rape	  myths	  on	  which	  the	  appeal	  judges	  had	  based	  their	  decision	  (e.g.	  considering	  that	  rape	  cannot	  be	  established	   if	   the	   alleged	   victim	   failed	   to	   resist,	   that	   women	   generally	   resist	  sexual	   relations	   they	   are	   actually	  willing	   to	   have,	   etc.…).	   On	   the	   basis	   of	   the	  evidence	  provided,	  the	  friendly	  settlement	  focused	  on	  the	  lack	  of	  due	  diligence	  on	   the	   part	   of	   the	   justice	   system	   originating	   in	   discriminatory	   gender	  prejudice.	  Bolivia	  recognised	  its	  responsibility	  for	  the	  breaches,	  including	  BdPC	  provisions,	  and	  committed	  to	   implement	  measures	  to	  prevent	  reiteration	  and	  to	  provide	  training	  to	  judiciary	  officials.	  
	  	  
X	  and	  Relatives	  v.	  Colombia	  (2008)	  	  The	  facts	  refer	  to	  the	  sexual	  assault	  suffered	  by	  Ms.	  X	  from	  three	  members	  of	  the	   Colombian	   Military	   Forces.	   One	   of	   the	   perpetrators	   was	   convicted	   and	  sentenced,	   however,	   the	   petitioners	   alleged	   that	   the	   State	   had	   neither	  investigated	   nor	   prosecuted	   the	   other	   two	   individuals	   who	   took	   part	   in	   the	  assault.	  	  Although	   the	   facts	   occurred	   in	   2001,	   and	  Colombia	  was	   then	  part	   of	   CEDAW	  and	  BdPC,	  the	  petition	  only	  refers	  to	  provisions	  of	  the	  ACHR	  and	  the	  ADHR.	  In	  its	  short	  Report,	  the	  Commission	  does	  not	  provide	  any	  evidence	  of	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  specificities	  of	  the	  case,	  such	  as	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  perpetrators	  were	  members	   of	   the	   military	   forces,	   nor	   to	   the	   general	   context	   in	   which	   the	  violation	   occurred.	   However,	   the	   friendly	   agreement	   contains	   a	   reference	   to	  the	  BdPC	  for	  what	  concerns	  the	  elimination	  of	  discriminatory	  practices	  in	  the	  national	   judicial	   system,	   perpetuating	   the	   contexts	   in	  which	   VAW	   originates.	  However,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  previous	  friendly	  settlements,	  the	  Commission	  did	  not	  suggest	  specific	  measures	  to	  adopt	  to	  guarantee	  non-­‐reiteration.	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Marcela	  Andrea	  Valdés	  Díaz	  v.	  Chile	  (2009)	  
	  The	   facts	   relate	   to	   physical	   and	   psychological	   abuse	   of	   the	   victim	   by	   her	  husband,	  both	  members	  of	  Carabineros	  de	  Chile.	  She	  had	  obtained	  an	  order	  of	  permanent	   protection	   in	   1999,	   however,	   the	   police	   opened	   a	   proceeding	   to	  investigate	   her	   marital	   relationship,	   which	   resulted	   to	   her	   detention	   for	   ten	  days	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  “unbecoming	  private	  conduct”	   for	  having	  maintained	  a	  deep	  friendship	  with	  a	  Lieutenant	  and	  on	  the	  basis	  that,	  “’although	  the	  inquiry	  
was	   unable	   to	   establish	  whether	   the	   friendship	   had	   developed	   into	   a	   romance,	  
there	  were	  grounds	  to	  conclude	  that	  the	  relationship	  had	  provoked	  gossip	  to	  that	  
effect	   and	   led	   to	   the	   breakup	   of	   the	   marriage’	   with	   Captain	   Claudio	   Aurelio	  
Vásquez	   Cardinalli,	   and	   that	   the	   situation	   had	   grown	   to	   include	   officers	   and	  
certain	   civilians,	   thus	   disrupting	   the	   professional	  work	   of	   the	  Unit	   and	   sullying	  
the	  institution’s	  good	  name”	  (para.	  39).	  Her	  husband	  was	  also	  sentenced	  to	  four	  days	  of	  arrest	  for	  domestic	  violence	  and	  ten	  days	  of	  detention	  were	  ordered	  for	  the	   Lieutenant,	   for	   having	   “displayed	   a	   series	   of	   improper	   behaviours	   (…)	  
prejudicial	  to	  the	  institution’s	  reputation	  and	  to	  the	  work	  of	  the	  professionals	  in	  
the	  First	  Valdivia	  Precinct;	  by	  his	  attitude,	  he	  was	  responsible	  for	  the	  irreversible	  
breakup	  of	  the	  marriage.’”	  (para.	  16).	  Mrs	  Marcela	  Andrea	  Valdés	  Díaz	  appealed	  the	  decision,	  but	  only	  obtained	  an	  increase	  in	  her	  sanction.	  	  A	   later	   review	   carried	   by	   the	   Junior	   Officers	   Classifications	   Board	   led	   to	   her	  unconditional	   discharge	   from	  her	   post,	   based	   on	   her	   inappropriate	   “personal	  
and	  moral	  character	  and	  professional	  credentials”	  (para.	  22).	   She	   then	   filed	  an	  appeal	  alleging	  the	  violation	  of	  equality	  before	  the	  law,	  due	  process,	  the	  right	  to	  humane	   treatment	   and	   privacy,	   invoking	   protection	   against	   arbitrary	   and	  abusive	   interference	  with	  private	   life,	  home	  or	  personal	  correspondence.	  The	  appeal	  was	  denied	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  there	  were	  no	  procedural	  errors	  in	  the	  rating	  procedure,	  and	  that	  the	  conduct	  of	   the	  police	  authorities	  was	  based	  on	  
“substantive	  assessments	  that,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  are	  the	  exclusive	  purview	  of	  that	  
authority	  and,	   on	   the	  other	  hand,	   do	  not	  appear	   to	  be	  unreasonable	  or	  beyond	  
the	  realm	  in	  which	  the	  institution	  in	  question	  operates	  or	  moves.”	  (para.	  24)	  The	  Chilean	  Supreme	  Court	  upheld	  this	  decision	  in	  a	  ruling	  on	  April	  5,	  2000.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  IACommHR	  admitted	  the	  petition	  based	  on	  several	  provisions	  of	  the	  ACHR	  (including	  Article	  24),	  in	  connection	  with	  Articles	  1.1	  and	  2	  ACHR	  and	   7	   BdPC.	   Notably,	   amongst	   several	   measures	   prescribed	   to	   enhance	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protection	   for	   domestic	   violence	   victims	   and	   tackle	   VAW	   as	   a	   socio-­‐cultural	  phenomenon,	   the	  Commission	  addressed	   the	  problem	  of	   gender-­‐inequities	   in	  institutional	  rules	  and	  regulations.	  Once	  again,	  given	  the	  brevity	  of	  the	  Report,	  no	  attention	  is	  given	  to	  the	  specificities	  of	  the	  general	  context	  in	  Chile.	  	  	  	  
National	  legislations	  on	  VAW	  	  	  
The	  first	  generation	  of	  legislations	  on	  VAW	  (1994-­‐2005)	  	  In	  the	  first	  decade	  after	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  BdPC,	  all	  Latin	  American	  countries	  adopted	  new	  specific	  legislations	  on	  VAW,	  in	  abidance	  to	  its	  Article	  7.	  This	  first	  wave	  of	   legislations	  was	  focused	  on	  reforming	  Penal	  codes	  for	  what	  concerns	  sexual	   violence	   and	   harassment	   and	   on	   adopting	   specific	   laws	   on	   domestic	  violence,	   previously	   unaddressed.	   However,	   apart	   for	   what	   concerns	   sexual	  violence,	  already	  penalized	  in	  most	  Latin	  American	  national	  legal	  systems,	  the	  focus	   on	   domestic	   violence	   left	   uncovered	   VAW	   occurring	   in	   other	   contexts.	  Although	   some	   Latin	   American	   countries	   adopted	   specific	   laws	   to	   promote	  women’s	  equality,	  the	  link	  between	  discrimination	  and	  VAW	  is	  generally	  never	  explicit.	  Consequently,	  legislations	  on	  VAW	  present	  an	  overall	  scarce	  attention	  to	   the	   causes	   of	   VAW	   and	   an	   overall	   deficiency	  with	   respect	   to	  measures	   of	  prevention	  and	  eradication	  of	  this	  phenomenon.	  	  At	  the	  time	  of	  BdPC	  adoption,	  a	  few	  countries	  presented	  constitutional	  norms	  protecting	   the	   family	   and	   occasionally	   mentioned	   them	   in	   their	   successive	  legislation:	  	  	  
- Brazil	  with	  Article	  226	  of	  its	  1988	  Constitution,	  stating	  that	  “(…)	  5.	  The	  
rights	  and	  duties	  implied	  in	  the	  marital	  status	  are	  exercised	  by	  men	  and	  
women	  in	  equal	  conditions;	  (…)	  8.	  The	  State	  guarantees	  assistance	  to	  the	  
family	   and	   each	   one	   of	   its	   members,	   creating	   mechanisms	   to	   restrain	  
violence	  in	  the	  context	  of	  family	  relations”;	  
	  
- Article	   42	  of	   the	  1991	  Colombian	  Constitution,	   establishes	   that:	   “(…)	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and	  mutual	  respect	  of	  all	  the	  family	  members.	  Any	  form	  of	  violence	  in	  the	  
family	   is	   considered	   destructive	   of	   its	   harmony	   and	   unity,	   and	   is	  
sanctioned	  by	  law.	  (…)”;	  
	  
- Article	  32	  of	  El	  Salvador’s	  1983	  Constitution	  states:	  “The	  Family	  is	  the	  
basic	   foundation	   of	   society	   and	   the	   State	   will	   protect	   it	   providing	   the	  
necessary	   legislation	   and	   appropriate	   services	   for	   its	   integration,	  well-­‐
being	   and	   social,	   cultural	   and	   economic	   development.	   The	   legal	  
foundation	   of	   a	   family	   is	   the	  marriage	   and	   it	   is	   based	   on	   the	   juridical	  
equality	  of	  the	  spouses”;	  
	  
- Article	  60	  of	  Paraguay’s	  1992	  Constitution	  commits	  the	  State	  to	  “	  (…)	  
promote	   policies	   to	   prevent	   violence	   in	   the	   family	   and	   other	   factors	  
disrupting	  its	  solidarity”;	  
	  
- Article	  42	  of	  Guatemala’s	  1993	  Constitution,	  establishes	  the	  duty	  of	  the	  State	  to	  protect	  the	  family	  and	  the	  equal	  rights	  of	  spouses.	  	  	  We	  now	  proceed	  identifying	  the	  relevant	  legislations	  reviewed	  for	  each	  Inter-­‐American	  Member	  State.	  	  Argentina:	  Decree	  Law	  2385	  prohibiting	  sexual	  harassment	  in	  the	  public	  sector	  (1993);	   Law	  No.	   24.417,	   Protection	   against	   Family	   Violence	   (1994)	   and	  Law	  25.087	  amending	  the	  Penal	  code	  in	  relation	  to	  sexual	  violence	  (1999).	  	  
Bolivia:	  Law	  1674,	  Law	  against	  Domestic	  and	  Family	  Violence	  (1995);	  reforms	  of	  the	  Penal	  code	  for	  what	  concern	  crimes	  of	  sexual	  violence	  (1997)	  and	  Law	  2033	  Protection	  to	  Victims	  from	  Crimes	  against	  Sexual	  Liberty	  (1999).	  	  	  
Brazil:	  the	  BdPC	  becomes	  national	  legislation	  through	  Decree	  107	  (1995);	  Law	  10.224	   amending	   the	   Penal	   code	   to	   add	   sexual	   harassment	   (2001);	  amendments	   to	   the	   Penal	   code	   repealing	   inappropriate	   language	   from	   the	  norms	  referred	  to	  sexual	  violence,	  e.g.	  the	  expression	  “decent	  woman,”	  (2005).	  	  
Chile:	   Law	   19325	   Norms	   on	   procedures	   and	   sanctions	   related	   to	   acts	   of	  violence	   in	   the	   family	   (1994);	   Law	   19.617,	   amending	   the	   Penal	   code	   on	   the	  subject	   of	   sex	  offenses	  	   (1999);	  Law	  No.	  20.066,	   Law	  of	   Intra-­‐family	  Violence	  
	   124 
(2005)	   and	   Law	   20.005,	   including	   and	   sanctioning	   sexual	   harassment	   in	   the	  Penal	  code	  (2005).	  	  	  	  
Colombia:	  	  Law	  248	  reproduces	  the	  text	  of	  the	  BdPC	  (1995);	  Law	  294	  Prevent,	  Remedy	  and	  Punish	  Intra-­‐family	  Violence	  (1996);	  Law	  360	  on	  Crimes	  Against	  Sexual	  Freedom	  and	  Human	  Dignity	  (1997);	  Law	  575,	  partially	  amending	  Law	  294	  (2000).	  	  
Costa	   Rica:	   Law	   7142	   on	   Promotion	   of	   Women’s	   Social	   Equality,	   Chapter	   4,	  (1990);	  Law	  7586	  against	  Domestic	  Violence	  (1996).	  	  
Dominican	   Republic:	   Law	   24	   Against	   Violence	   in	   the	   Family,	   criminalizing	  domestic	  violence,	  sexual	  harassment	  and	  incest	  (1997).	  	  
Ecuador:	   Law	   Prohibiting	   Violence	   Against	   Women	   and	   Family	   (1995);	   Law	  105,	  which	  amends	   the	  Penal	   code	  on	   the	   subject	  of	   sex	  offenses	   (1998)	  and	  amendments	   of	   the	   Penal	   code	   repealing	   language	   considered	   inappropriate	  for	  what	  concerns	  VAW.96	  	  	  
El	  Salvador:	  Decree	  Law	  902	  against	  Intra-­‐family	  Violence	  (1996)	  and	  reforms	  the	  Penal	  code	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  sex	  offences	  (1998).	  	  	  
Guatemala:	   Decree	   Law	   97	   to	   Prevent,	   Punish	   and	   Eradicate	   Intra-­‐family	  Violence	   (1996);	   Decree	   Law	   7	   on	   the	   dignity	   and	   integral	   promotion	   of	   the	  woman	   (1999);	   Decree	   57	   (2002)	   introduces	   discrimination,	   in	   general,	   as	   a	  criminal	  offence.	  	  	  
Honduras:	   Decree	   Law	   132	   Prevention,	   Punishment	   and	   Eradication	   of	  Violence	   Against	   Women	   (1997)	   and	   amendments	   to	   the	   Penal	   code	   to	  introduce	  sexual	  harassment.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  96	  The	   Ecuadorian	   Penal	   code	  was	   amended	   on	   June	   1,	   2005,	   to	   remove	   the	   expression	   “decent	  women”	  and	  replace	  it	  with	  the	  word	  “victim”;	  in	  the	  case	  of	  sexual	  crimes,	  the	  language	  “attack	  on	  decency”	  was	  replaced	  with	  the	  expression	  “sexual	  abuse”;	  no	  exceptional	  circumstances	  can	  now	  be	   considered	   to	   reduce	   judgments	   in	   sexual	   crimes;	   discrimination	   on	   certain	   grounds	   may	  constitute	  an	  aggravating	  factor	  in	  the	  commission	  of	  sexual	  offenses,	  such	  as:	  place	  of	  birth,	  age,	  sex,	  ethnicity,	   colour,	   social	  origin,	   language,	   religion,	  political	  affiliation,	  economic	  status,	   sexual	  orientation,	  sexual	  health,	  disability	  and	  other	  differences.	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Mexico:97	  Law	  on	  Prevention	  of	  Family	  Violence	  and	  Related	  Assistance	  (1996),	  reforms	  of	  the	  Civil	  and	  Penal	  codes	  with	  respect	  to	   intra-­‐family	  violence	  and	  rape	  (1997).	  	  
Nicaragua:	   Law	   230	   Integrations	   to	   Prevent	   and	   Sanction	   Violence	   in	   the	  Family	  (1996),	  reforming	  the	  Penal	  code.	  	  
Panama:	  Law	   No.	   27	   Typifying	   Crimes	   of	   Violence	   in	   the	   Family	   and	   Child	  Abuse,	   establishing	   special	   institutions	   to	   attend	   victims	   of	   such	   crimes,	  reforming	   and	   integrating	   articles	   of	   the	   Penal	   code	   and	   adopting	   other	  measures	  (1995),	  reformed	  by	  Law	  3	  (1999)	  and	  Law	  38	  on	  Domestic	  Violence	  (2001).	  	  
Paraguay:	   Law	   1.160	   amending	   the	   Penal	   code	   to	   criminalize	   sexual	  harassment	  (1997)	  and	  Law	  1600	  Against	  Domestic	  Violence	  (2000).	  	  
Peru:	  Law	  26260	  Protection	  from	  Violence	   in	  the	  Family	  (1993),	  reformed	  by	  Law	   26.763	   (1997);	   Law	  27.115	   introduces	   public	   criminal	   prosecution	   of	  offenses	   against	   sexual	   freedom	   (1999);	   Law	   27.942	   on	   Sexual	   Harassment	  Prevention	  (2003).	  
	  
Uruguay:	  Law	   16707	  on	   Citizen’s	   Safety,	   introducing	   a	   reference	   to	   domestic	  violence	   and	   amending	   the	   Penal	   code	   (1995),	   replaced	   by	   Law	   17541	  Prevention,	   Early	   Detection,	   Attention	   and	   Eradication	   of	   Domestic	   Violence	  (2002).	  	  
Venezuela:	  Law	  on	  Violence	  Against	  Women	  and	  the	  Family	  (2000).	  	  	  The	   reviewed	   laws	   focus	   on	   domestic/intra-­‐family	   violence,	   although	   the	  definition	  of	  family	  tends	  to	  be	  broad,	  including	  former	  spouses,	  partners	  and	  former	   partners,	   relatives	   and	   persons	   living	   in	   the	   same	   household.	  Nicaraguan	   Law	   230	   (1996),	   a	   reform	   of	   the	   Penal	   code,	   adopts	   the	   most	  restrictive	  definition	  of	  family,	  limiting	  it	  to	  marital	  relations	  and	  partnerships	  (current	  or	  former)	  and	  parents	  of	  a	  common	  child.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  97	  Mexico	  had	  introduced	  more	  severe	  penalties	  for	  the	  crime	  of	  rape	  in	  1989,	  with	  a	  reform	  of	  the	  Penal	  code.	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  The	   majority	   of	   the	   legislations	   establish	   precautionary	   measures	   to	   avoid	  reiteration	  and,	  in	  some	  cases,	  provide	  for	  alternative	  punishments	  in	  cases	  of	  minor	  violence.	  However,	  only	  few	  include	  specific	  sanctions	  or	  reforms	  of	  the	  Penal	   codes,	   as	   required	  by	  Article	  7.d.	   Such	   cases	   are:	  Nicaragua’s	  Law	  230;	  Panama’s	   Law	   27	   and	   successive	   Law	   38;	   Dominican	   Republic’s	   Law	   24;	  Uruguay’s	   1995	   Law	   16.707	   and	   Law	   17541,	   replacing	   the	   previous	   one;	  Colombia’s	  Law	  294;	  El	  Salvador’s	  Decree	  Law	  902	  and	  Chile’s	  Law	  19325	  and	  successive	  Law	  No.	  20.066.	  
	  The	   language	   to	   define	   acts	   of	   domestic	   violence,	   their	   features,	   victims	   and	  perpetrators	   tends	   to	  be	  gender	  neutral.	  However,	   in	   some	   cases	  women	  are	  directly	   mentioned	   as	   the	   main	   victims	   of	   domestic	   violence	   such	   as	   in	  Ecuador’s	   Law	  103	   and	   in	   that	   adopted	  by	  Venezuela.	  Honduras’	   Decree	   Law	  132	   (reformed	   and	   reinforced	   by	   the	   later	   Law	  250),	   at	   Article	   5.2	   explicitly	  refers	   to	   the	   reproduction	   of	   unequal	   power	   relations	   as	   “(…)	  any	  behaviour	  
directed	  to	  affect,	  compromise	  or	  limit	  the	  free	  development	  of	  the	  personality	  of	  
a	  woman	  for	  reasons	  related	  to	  her	  gender”.	  Panama’s	  Law	  4,	  which	  addresses	  the	  shortcomings	  of	  previous	  Law	  27,	  dedicates	  Chapter	  VI	  to	  the	  social	  policy	  to	  be	  promoted	  by	   the	  State	  on	   the	   subject	  of	   gender	  violence	  and,	   similarly,	  Dominican	  Republic’s	  Law	  24	  introduces	  the	  term	  gender	  in	  its	  wording.	  	  Several	   legislations	   directly	   refer	   to	   the	  BdPC	   as	   an	   international	   instrument	  providing	   further	  measures	   to	   protect	   and	   guarantee	  women’s	   rights:	   Article	  3.e	  of	  Chile’s	  Law	  20.066;	   the	  Considerandum	  of	  El	  Salvador’s	  Law	  902;98	  the	  Considerandum	  of	  Guatemala’s	  Decree	  Law	  97;	  Article	  1	  of	  Honduras’	  Decree	  Law	   132;99	  Article	   1	   of	   Panama’s	   Law	   4;	   Article	   3	   of	   Peru’s	   Law	   26.763;	   the	  Considerandum	  of	  Dominican	  Republic’s	  Law	  24	  and	  Article	  2	  of	  Venezuela’s	  Law	  on	  VAW.	  Two	  countries	  reproduce	  the	  whole	  conventional	  text	  into	  their	  national	  legislations:	  Brazil	  with	  Decree	  Law	  1973	  and	  Colombia,	  through	  Law	  248.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  98	  However,	  it	  is	  worth	  mentioning	  that	  Decree	  Law	  902	  explicitly	  cites	  the	  previously	  mentioned	  Article	  32	  of	  the	  1983	  Constitution	  as	  its	  foundation.	  99	  Although	   the	   country	   did	   not	   count	   on	   a	   specific	   constitutional	   provision	   referred	   to	   the	  protection	  of	   the	   family,	  Decree	  Law	  132	  explicitly	   refers	   to	  Article	  59	  of	   the	  1982	  Constitution,	  establishing	  the	  obligation	  of	  the	  State	  to	  protect	  the	  individual’s	  inviolable	  dignity.	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Some	   of	   the	   texts	   extensively	   reproduce	   Article	   9	   BdPC	   when	   defining	   the	  duties	  of	   the	  State	  to	  “modify	  social	  and	  cultural	  patterns	  of	  conduct	  of	  men	  and	  
women,	   including	   the	  development	  of	   formal	  and	   informal	  educational	  programs	  
appropriate	   to	   every	   level	   of	   the	   educational	   process,	   to	   counteract	   prejudices,	  
customs	  and	  all	   other	  practices	  which	  are	  based	  on	   the	   idea	  of	   the	   inferiority	   or	  
superiority	  of	   either	  of	   the	   sexes	  or	  on	   the	   stereotyped	   roles	   for	  men	  and	  women	  
which	  legitimize	  or	  exacerbate	  violence	  against	  women”.	  These	  are	   the	  cases	  of:	  Article	  3	  of	  Bolivia’s	  Law	  1674;	  Article	  21	  of	  Costa	  Rica’s	  Law	  7586;	  Article	  13	  of	  Guatemala’s	  Decree	  Law	  97;	  the	  Considerandum	  of	  Honduras’	  Decree	  Law	  132;	   Article	   17	   of	   Mexico’s	   Law	   Prevention	   of	   Family	   Violence	   and	   Related	  Assistance;	   Article	   4	   and	   Article	   12	   of	   Panama’s	   Law	   4	   and	   Chapter	   II	   of	  Venezuela’s	  Law	  on	  Violence	  against	  Women	  and	  the	  Family.	  	  The	   legislative	   texts	   reviewed	   generally	   refer	   to	   several	   forms	   of	   violence,	  encompassing	   physical	   and	   psychological	   dimensions.	   Some	   of	   them	   provide	  noteworthy	  wording,	  such	  as:	  Article	  3	  of	  Mexico’s	  Law	  referring	  to	  “physical,	  
verbal,	   psycho-­‐emotional	   or	   sexual	   violence	   in	   its	   bio-­‐psycho-­‐sexual	   sphere”;	  Article	  2.e	  of	  Costa	  Rica’s	  Law	  7586,	   introducing	  patrimonial	  violence;	  Article	  16	   of	   Venezuela’s	   Law,	   that	   includes	   threat	   of	   violence	   and	   Article	   1	   of	  Ecuador’s	  Law	  103,	  mentioning	  the	  protection	  of	  women’s	  sexual	  freedom.	  	  
	  
Second	  generation	  of	  legislations	  on	  VAW	  (2006-­‐present)	  
	  In	   the	   following	   paragraphs	   we	   describe	   the	   additional	   changes	   introduced	  since	  2006,	  the	  year	  of	  IACrtHR’s	  first	  ruling	  using	  the	  BdPC	  (submitted	  to	  the	  Court	  in	  2004),	  which	  follows	  several	  relevant	  decisions	  of	  the	  IACommHR.	  	  In	   three	   countries	   constitutional	   reforms	   included	   specific	   provisions	   on	   the	  issue	  of	  VAW:	  	  	  Article	  15.2	  of	  the	  2009	  Constitution	  of	  Bolivia	  “Everyone,	  particularly	  for	  what	  
concerns	   women,	   have	   the	   right	   not	   to	   suffer	   from	   physical,	   sexual	   or	  
psychological	  violence,	  in	  the	  family	  as	  in	  the	  society”;	  
	  Article	   42.2	   of	   the	   2010	   Constitution	   of	   Dominican	   Republic	   “Any	   form	   of	  
violence	  in	  the	  family	  or	  based	  on	  gender	  is	  condemned.	  The	  State	  will	  guarantee	  
	   128 
by	  law	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  necessary	  measures	  to	  prevent,	  sanction	  and	  eradicate	  
violence	  against	  women”;	  
	  Article	   66.3.b	   of	   the	   2008	   Constitution	   of	   Ecuador	   “It	   is	   recognised	   and	  
guaranteed	  to	  all:	  (…)	  3.	  The	  right	  to	  personal	  integrity,	  which	  includes:	  (…)	  b.	  A	  
life	   free	  from	  violence	   in	  the	  private	  and	  public	  sphere.	  The	  State	  will	  adopt	  the	  
necessary	   measures	   to	   prevent,	   eliminate	   and	   sanction	   all	   forms	   of	   violence,	  
especially	   those	  against	  women,	  children	  (...)”.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   Ecuador	   did	  not	  enact	  a	  law	  replacing	  or	  reforming	  the	  one	  promulgated	  in	  1995.	  However,	  in	   2005	   Ecuador	   showed	   further	   commitment	   to	   internalise	   BdPC	   paradigm	  shift	   amending	   the	   Penal	   code	   and	   removing	   language	   considered	  inappropriate	  in	  the	  new	  understanding	  on	  VAW.	  	  
	  Following	  the	  same	  structure	  of	   the	  previous	  subsection,	  we	  now	  identify	  the	  relevant	  material	  reviewed:	  	  
Argentina:	   Law	   26.485	   Integral	   Protection	   of	   Women	   (2009),	   regulated	   by	  Decree	  1011	  (2010).	  	  
Bolivia:	  Law	  243	  Against	  Harassment	  and	  Violence	  Against	  Women	  in	  Politics	  (2012);	  Law	  348	  Guaranteeing	  to	  Women	  a	  Life	  Free	  From	  Violence	  (2013).	  	  
Brazil:	   Law	  11.340	  Mechanisms	   to	  Eradicate	  Domestic	  Violence	   and	  Violence	  Against	  Women	  in	  the	  Family	  –	  Maria	  da	  Penha	  (2006).	  	  
Chile:	  Law	  20.480,	  introducing	  the	  crime	  of	  femicide	  (2010).	  	  
Colombia:	   Law	   47.193	   dictating	   norms	   for	   raising	   awareness,	   prevent	   and	  sanction	  all	  forms	  of	  violence	  and	  discrimination	  against	  women,	  reforming	  the	  Penal	  code,	  the	  Penal	  Procedure	  Code	  and	  Law	  294/1996	  (2008).	  	  
Costa	  Rica:	  Law	  8589	  Penalizing	  Violence	  Against	  Women	  (2007).	  	  
El	  Salvador:	  Decree	  520	  Special	  Law	  for	  a	  Life	  Free	  from	  Violence	  for	  Women	  (2012).	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Guatemala:	   Decree	   22	   Law	   Against	   Femicide	   and	   other	   Forms	   of	   Violence	  Against	  Women	  (2008).	  	  	  
Mexico:	  Law	  for	  Equality	  between	  Men	  and	  Women	  (2006)	  and	  Law	  for	  a	  Life	  Free	  from	  Violence	  for	  Women	  (2007).	  	  
Nicaragua:	  Law	  779	  Against	  Violence	  Against	  Women	  and	  reforming	  the	  Penal	  code	  (2012).	  	  
Panama:	   Draft	   Law	   401	   reforming	   the	   penal	   code	   to	   typify	   femicide	   and	  sanction	  violence	  against	  women	  and	  dictating	  measures	  of	  prevention	  of	  this	  conducts	  (iter	  started	  in	  2011).	  	  
Paraguay:	   Draft	   Law	   to	   Prevent,	   Sanction	   and	   Eradicate	   Violence	   Against	  Women	  (submitted	  to	  the	  National	  Congress).	  	  	  
Venezuela:	  Law	  On	  the	  Right	  of	  Women	  to	  a	  Life	  Free	  from	  Violence	  (2007).	  	  	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  new	  legislative	  texts	  contain	  specific	  references	  to	  the	  BdPC	  or,	  in	  general,	  to	  specific	  international	  instruments	  ratified.	  These	  are	  the	  cases	  of:	  Article	  3	  of	  Argentina’s	  Law	  26.485;	  Article	  1	  of	  Bolivia’s	  Law	  348;	  Article	  1	  of	  Brazil’s	  Law	  11.340;	  Article	  4	  of	  Colombia’s	  2008	  Law	  47.193;	  Article	  1	  and	  3	   of	   Costa	   Rica’s	   Law	   8589;	   Article	   2	   of	   El	   Salvador’s	   Decree	   520;	   the	  Considerandum	  and	  Article	  1	  of	  Guatemala’s	  Decree	  22;	  Article	  4	  of	  Mexico’s	  2006	  Law	  and	  Article	  2	  of	  the	  2007	  Law;	  Considerandum	  II	  and	  Article	  4	  and	  5	  of	  Nicaragua’s	  Law	  779;	  Article	  2	  of	  Panama’s	  Draft	  Law	  401	  and	  Article	  3.6	  of	  Venezuela’s	  2007	  Law.	  	  Overall,	  VAW	  is	  addressed	  in	  the	  public	  and	  private	  dimension,	  independently	  from	   a	   family	   or	   affective	   (current	   or	   former)	   relationship.	   However,	   a	   few	  countries	   maintain	   the	   ambit	   of	   application	   limited	   to	   the	   family	   sphere,	  although	  broadly	  defined.	  It	  is	  the	  case	  of	  Chile’s	  Law	  20.480,	  which	  introduces	  the	   crime	   of	   femicide	   referring	   to	   spouses,	   relatives	   and	   co-­‐habitants	   and	   of	  Peru’s	  Law	  29.819,	  introducing	  the	  same	  crime	  in	  relation	  to	  spouses,	  relatives,	  co-­‐habitants	  or	  other	  people	  with	  whom	  the	  victim	  maintained	  a	  sentimental	  relationship.	  Notably,	  Costa	  Rica’s	  Law	  8589	  presents	  the	  most	  limited	  ambit	  of	  application,	   considering	   only	   the	   cases	   of	   spouses	   and	   partners.	   Brazil	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maintains	   the	  scope	  of	  Law	  11.340	   limited	   to	  domestic	  violence	  and	  violence	  within	   the	   family,	  although	  both	  the	   family	  nucleus	  and	  the	   forms	  of	  violence	  are	   broadly	   defined.	   In	   Brazil’s	   case,	   however,	   we	   should	   underline	   that	   the	  State	   did	   not	   have	   a	   law	   similar	   to	   the	   first	   generation	   of	   laws	   on	   domestic	  violence,	   described	   in	   the	   previous	   sub-­‐section,	   and	   that	   Law	   11.340	   was	  promulgated	   to	   follow-­‐up	   to	   the	   Commission’s	   decision	   in	  Maria	  da	  Penha	  v.	  
Brazil	  (2001).	  	  	  With	   the	   exception	   of	   those	   laws	   limited	   to	   reforming	   Penal	   codes,	   the	  reviewed	  texts	  explicitly	  mention	  discrimination	  against	  women	  as	  a	  structural	  element	  causing	  and	  reproducing	  VAW,	  and	  its	  elimination	  is	  set	  as	  a	  priority.	  A	  few	  countries	  further	  internalise	  this	  understanding,	  mentioning	  cultural	  and	  social	  patterns	  and	  the	  reproduction	  of	  stereotypes	  as	  the	  origins	  and	  roots	  of	  discrimination	  and	  gender-­‐based	  violence.	  This	  is	  the	  case	  of	  Argentina	  (Article	  2.e);	   Bolivia	   (Article	   4.12,	   introducing	   the	   term	   de-­‐patriarchalization);	   El	  Salvador	   (Article	  2);	  Guatemala	   (Considerandum);	  Mexico	   (Articles	  38.2,	  45.7	  and	  52.7);	  Nicaragua	  (Article	  1	  and	  4.l,	  8-­‐10);	  Panama	  (Articles	  3,	  4.7,	  8.4,	  31,	  32,	  38	  and	  39)	  and	  Venezuela	  (Articles	  1,	  20.6	  and	  20.8).	  	  	  With	   the	   exception	   of	   those	   limited	   to	   Penal	   code	   reforms,	   all	   new	   laws	  establish	  the	  need	  for	  inter-­‐institutional	  and	  interdisciplinary	  programmes	  and	  policies	   for	   prevention,	   as	   well	   as	   provisional	   measures	   to	   prevent	   acts	   of	  violence.	   Evidence	   of	   the	   adoption	   of	   a	   structural	   perspective	   is	   provided	   by	  the	  emphasis	  put	  on	  co-­‐responsibility,	   i.e.	   the	  responsibility	  of	   society,	   family	  and	  the	  State	  towards	  eradicating	  all	  forms	  of	  violence	  against	  women,	  and	  the	  centrality	   of	   societal	   proactive	   participation	   to	   the	   established	   programmes	  and	  policies.	  In	  particular,	  co-­‐responsibility	  is	  included	  in	  the	  principles	  of	  the	  legislations	   of	   Colombia	   (Article	   6.1),	   Panama	   (Article	   5)	   and	   Venezuela	  (Article	   18).	   Three	   countries	   explicitly	   refer	   to	   the	   participation	   of	   society,	  namely:	   Venezuela	   (Article	   6),	   Nicaragua	   (Article	   6)	   and	   Bolivia	   (Article	   15).	  The	  latter	  also	  includes	  the	  requirement	  of	  social	  control	  on	  actions	  performed	  in	   violation	   of	   the	   law.	   Argentina	   introduces	   a	   similar	   concept	   referring	   to	  cooperation	  between	  institutions	  and	  civil	  society	  (Article	  7).	  	  For	  what	  concerns	  the	  definition	  of	  violence,	  besides	  reflecting	  the	  inclusion	  of	  physical,	   psychological	   and	   domestic	   violence,	   five	   legislative	   texts	   consider	  
	   131 
more	   complex	   forms,	   significantly	   expanding	   the	   ambit	   of	   application	  suggested	  in	  the	  BdPC,	  referring	  to:	  	  
- Symbolic	   violence,	   intended	   as	   the	   transmission	   of	   messages,	   values,	  icons	   or	   signs	   reproducing	   relations	   of	   dominance,	   inequality	   and	  discrimination	   and	   presenting	   women	   subordination	   in	   society	   as	  natural,	   mentioned	   by:	   Argentina	   (Article	   5);	   Bolivia	   (Article	   7);	   El	  Salvador	  (Article	  9);	  Panama	  (Article	  4)	  and	  Venezuela	  (Article	  15).	  	  
- Violence	   in	   the	   field	   of	   health	   care	   or	   reproductive	   rights,	   i.e.	   acts	   or	  omission	  limiting	  or	  preventing	  women	  from	  being	  informed,	  oriented	  and	  attended	  before,	  during	  and	  after	  the	  pregnancy	  and	  to	  have	  free	  access	  to	  contraception,	  addressed	  in	  the	  same	  articles	  of	  the	  Laws	  of	  Bolivia,	  Argentina,	  Panama	  and	  Venezuela.	  	  	  
- Violence	   in	   the	   media,	   intended	   as	   the	   transmission	   of	   undignified,	  discriminatory,	   stereotypical	   messages,	   included	   by	   the	   same	   four	  countries.	   Although	   Article	   8.g	   BdPC	   suggests	   the	   use	   of	   media	   for	  campaigning	   and	   promoting	   women’s	   rights,	   the	   intention	   of	   the	  national	  legislators	  is	  far	  broader.	  	  
- Institutional	  violence	  and	  violence	  in	  the	  workplace,	   covering	   the	   issue	  of	   equal	   opportunities,	   besides	   harassment,	   again	   considered	   by	   the	  same	  four	  countries.	  	  
- Political	   violence,	   i.e.	   violence	   against	   political	   involvement	   and	  activism,	  equal	  opportunities	  and	  access	   to	  political	  rights	   in	  general,	  introduced	  in	  the	  Laws	  of	  Panama	  and	  Bolivia.	  Notably,	  at	  Article	  7.13	  of	   Law	   348,	   Bolivia	   establishes	   an	   explicit	   link	   with	   its	   Law	   243	  Against	  Harassment	  and	  Violence	  Against	  Women	  in	  Politics.	  	  Costa	  Rica	  provides	  an	  interesting	  case	  to	  introduce	  a	  crucial	  problem	  inherent	  to	   several	   new	   provisions:	   the	   indeterminacy	   of	   some	   of	   the	   concepts	   and	  terminology	   introduced	   and	   the	   difficulties	   in	   constructing	   clear	   definitions.	  Costa	   Rica’s	   Constitutional	   Court	   declared	   unconstitutional	   three	   articles	   of	  Law	  8589,	  namely:	  Article	  22	  (Maltreatment),	  Article	  25	  (Emotional	  Violence)	  and	   Article	   27	   (Threat	   Against	   a	   Woman).	   The	   mentioned	   articles	   were	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questioned	  on	   the	  basis	  of	   the	   lack	  of	   a	   rigid	  definition	  of	   the	  acts	  penalized,	  and	   the	   subsequent	   excess	   of	   discretionality	   left	   to	   the	   judiciary,	   possibly	  breaching	   the	   principle	   of	   legal	   certainty.	   Articles	   22	   and	   25	   have	   been	   re-­‐introduced	  in	  2011,	  after	  being	  reformed	  to	  meet	  the	  standards	  outlined	  by	  the	  Constitutional	   Court.	   The	   peculiarities	   of	   some	   countries’	   definition	   of	   the	  forms	  of	   violence	  and	  Costa	  Rica’s	   case,	   suggest	  possible	   future	  difficulties	   in	  applying	  the	  new	  laws.	  	  Addressing	  these	  questions	  will	  require	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  use	  of	  the	  new	  laws	  by	  national	  judicial	  systems,	  a	  task	  that	  we	  will	  develop	  in	  future	  stages	  of	  our	  research.	  	  Generally,	  new	  legislations	  abandon	  the	  neutrality	  of	  the	  terms	  identifying	  the	  victim,	  although	  this	  does	  not	   imply	  necessarily	  a	   limitation	  of	  the	  subjects	  to	  women.	  El	  Salvador	  is	  an	  exception,	  restricting	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  law	  to	  women	  in	  Article	  5.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  Bolivia	  explicitly	  considers	  other	  victims	  at	  Article	  5.4	   of	   Law	   348:	   “The	   provision	   of	   this	   law	   are	   applicable	   to	   any	   person	   that,	  
being	  in	  a	  vulnerable	  situation,	  suffers	  any	  of	  the	  forms	  of	  violence	  sanctioned	  in	  
this	  law,	  independently	  on	  gender”.	  	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  neutrality	  is	  maintained	  for	  what	  concerns	  the	  perpetrator,	  although	   this	  raises	  doubts	   for	  what	  concerns	   the	  specific	  provision	   typifying	  the	   crime	   of	   femicide,	   included	   in	   the	   legislations	   of:	   Bolivia	   (Article	   252	   bis	  P.C.),	  Chile	  (Article	  390	  P.C.);	  Colombia	  (Article	  134.e	  P.C.);	  Costa	  Rica	  (Article	  21	  of	  the	  Law);	  El	  Salvador	  (Articles	  45,	  46	  and	  48	  of	  the	  Law,	  the	  latter	  refers	  to	   suicidal	   femicide	   for	   induction	   or	   help);	   Nicaragua	   (Article	   9	   of	   the	   Law);	  Guatemala	  (Article	  6	  of	  the	  Law);	  Honduras	  (Article	  118A	  P.C.);	  Mexico	  (Article	  325	  P.C.);	  Nicaragua	  (Article	  9	  of	  the	  Law	  and	  Article	  162	  P.C.);	  Panama	  (Article	  41	  of	  the	  Draft	  Law)	  and	  Peru	  (Article	  107	  P.C.).	  Notably,	  Article	  7	  of	  Bolivia’s	  Law	   348	   refers	   to	   feminicide,	   a	   term	   which	   refers	   to	   a	   broader	   concept	  elaborated	   by	   feminist	   Mexican	   scholar	   Lagarde,	   that	   includes	   all	   severe	  discriminatory	   violence	   perpetrated	   against	   women	   for	   being	   women,	   not	  necessarily	   resulting	   in	   their	   death.	   However	   the	   language	   of	   the	   provision	  seems	  to	  use	  it	  as	  a	  synonym	  for	  femicide.	  The	  origins	  and	  implications	  of	  the	  use	  of	  this	  concept	  in	  the	  Latin	  American	  region	  will	  be	  thoroughly	  addressed	  in	  the	  following	  Section	  of	  this	  research.	  	  	  It	   is	   not	   within	   the	   scope	   of	   this	   research	   to	   address	   all	   the	   issues	   that	   the	  introduction	   of	   the	   crime	   of	   femicide	  might	   imply,	   i.e.	   the	   question	   on	   the	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neutrality	   of	   law,	   the	   inherent	   difficulties	   of	   discerning	   a	   femicide	   from	   a	  homicide	   of	   a	  woman	   in	   difficult	   cases,	   and	   the	   problems	   in	   “translating”	   an	  essentially	   anthropological,	   sociological	   and	   political	   concept	   into	   a	   juridical	  category	  (Spinelli,	  2008,	  p.	  122-­‐132).	  For	  what	  concerns	  the	  scope	  our	  analysis,	  as	  we	  will	   see,	   it	   is	   sufficient	   to	   register	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	   term	  by	   several	  national	   legislators,	   following	   the	   example	   set	   by	   of	   the	   IACrtHR,100 	  that	  endorsed	  the	  conceptual	  construction	  emerged	  in	  the	  regional	  debate	  (Cotton	  
field	  case).	  	  The	   current	   context	   of	   regional	   legislations	   on	   VAW	   shows	   an	   overall	  convergence	  towards	  a	  broad	  internalisation	  of	  the	  paradigm	  shift	  reproduced	  by	   the	   BdPC	   and	   progressively	   endorsed	   by	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions.	   As	  mentioned,	   indeed,	   this	   second	  generation	  of	   laws	   follows	   the	   first	   IACrtHR’s	  ruling	  using	  the	  BdPC,	  a	  “coincidence”	  that	  will	  be	  analysed	  in	  the	  next	  Section	  of	  this	  research.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  100	  The	  same	  request	  was	  presented	  by	  CEDAW	  in	  its	  2006	  Concluding	  Comments	  on	  Mexico.	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Section	  III	  -­‐	  Internalising	  BdPC	  
understanding	   on	  VAW	   in	   the	  
Inter-­‐American	  System	  	  	  
Introduction	  	  Based	  on	  the	  literature	  review	  on	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  paradigm	  shift	  reflected	  by	  the	   BdPC,	   in	   the	   First	   Section	   of	   this	   research	   we	   identified	   the	   minimum	  conditions	  that	  a	  human	  rights	  system	  adopting	  a	  Women’s	  Convention	  should	  present,	   in	   order	   to	   guarantee	   the	   plausibility	   of	   their	   socio-­‐legal	  transformative	   approach.	   We	   argued	   that	   the	   availability	   of	   such	   conditions	  allows	   drawing	   some	   preliminary	   conclusions	   for	   what	   concerns	   the	  expectations	   to	  place	  on	   the	   impact	  of	   such	   instruments.	  We	   then	   focused	  on	  the	  additional	  potentially	  favourable	  conditions	  that	  regional	  systems	  provide,	  with	   particular	   reference	   to	   their	  multi-­‐level	   structure	   and	   complementarity	  with	  national	  legal	  systems,	  feasible	  for	  the	  specificities	  of	  the	  new	  paradigm’s	  socio-­‐legal	   approach.	   Building	   on	   these	   considerations,	   we	   drew	   some	  conclusions	  on	  the	  structural	  causes	  of	  CEDAW	  limited	  impact	  in	  guaranteeing	  national	   implementation	   of	   its	   provisions,	   and	   addressed	   the	   issue	   of	   the	  relative	   underutilization	   of	   the	   new	   protection	   mechanism	   provided	   by	   its	  Optional	  Protocol.	  	  	  In	   the	  Second	  Section	  we	  presented	  a	  chronological	  review	  of	   Inter-­‐American	  case	  law	  on	  VAW	  and	  of	  the	  content	  of	  national	  legislations	  on	  VAW	  since	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  BdPC,	  in	  1994.	  We	  now	  proceed	  to	  develop	  our	  analysis	  of	  the	  dynamic	   process	   through	   which	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   System	   consolidated	   its	  experience	   with	   the	   BdPC,	   in	   order	   to	   assess	   to	   what	   extent	   the	   minimum	  conditions	   identified	   influenced	   it	   and	   single	  out	  other	   specific	   elements	   that	  had	  a	  positive	  or	  negative	   impact	  on	   the	  process.	  Our	  scope	   is	   to	  analyse	   the	  process	   of	   internalisation	   of	   the	   BdPC	   in	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   System	   and	   its	  national	   implementation,	   in	   order	   to	   shape	   regionalised	   proposal	   for	   its	  enhancement.	   We	   will	   then	   determine	   whether	   our	   analysis	   allows	   us	   to	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identify	   the	   features	   of	   a	   successful	   (exportable)	   method	   to	   respond	   to	   the	  challenges	  of	  the	  paradigm	  shift	  endorsed	  by	  the	  Women’s	  Conventions.	  	  	  In	  the	  present	  Section,	  therefore,	  we	  present	  our	  analysis	  of	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  experience	   with	   the	   BdPC,	   using	   the	   conceptual	   tools	   presented	   in	   the	   First	  Section	  and	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  approach	  and	  methodology	  adopted.	  We	  begin	  focusing	   on	   the	   type	   of	   enforcement	   mechanism	   provided	   by	   the	   BdPC,	   and	  analyse	   the	   issues	   concerning	   the	   contentious	   jurisdiction	   of	   the	   IACrtHR,	  which	  had	  to	  be	  officially	  clarified	  by	  the	  Court	  in	  2006.	  We	  then	  continue	  with	  an	   analysis	   of	   the	   reviewed	   case	   law,	   focusing	   on	   the	  process	   through	  which	  Inter-­‐American	   Institutions	   gradually	   internalised	   a	   gender	   perspective	   in	  their	   interpretation	  of	  VAW,	   the	  complexities	  emerging	   from	  intersectionality	  and	   the	   overcoming	   of	   the	   traditional	   public/private	   divide	   in	   international	  law,	   which	   previously	   prevented	   States’	   from	   acknowledging	   their	   positive	  obligations	   in	   eradicating	   VAW.	   In	   the	   third	   sub-­‐section	   we	   analyse	   the	  evolution	   of	   national	   legislations	   on	   VAW,	   considering	   both	   the	   hierarchical	  status	  of	   international	   instruments	  of	  human	  rights	   in	  domestic	   legal	  systems	  and	  the	  contemporary	  evolution	  the	  analysed	  Inter-­‐American	  jurisprudence	  on	  VAW.	  We	  identify	  a	  first	  and	  second	  generation	  of	  legislations,	  with	  distinctive	  features,	   and	   recognise	   a	   clear	   turning	   point	   in	   IACrtHR’s	   2006	   ruling	   on	   a	  petition	  invoking	  the	  BdPC	  (Castro-­‐Castro).	  	  Although	  a	  direct	  causal	  link	  can	  be	  difficult	  to	  establish	  conclusively,	  for	  what	  concerns	  VAW	  we	  are	  able	  to	  provide	  significant	  evidence	  of	  a	  direct	  influence	  of	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   System’s	   structure	   and	   procedures	   on	   national	  implementation	  of	  BdPC	  provisions.	  Given	  the	  suitable	  conditions	  provided	  by	  the	  rules	  of	  procedure	  of	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions,	  a	   “multi-­‐level	  coalition”	  of	  civil	  society	  actors	  and	  organisation	  contributed	  to	  facilitate	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	   gender	   perspective	   that	   such	   institutions	   had	   not	   yet	   internalised	   in	   their	  long	  experience	  in	  the	  region.	  This	  coalition	  directly	  influenced	  the	  process	  of	  internalisation	   of	   the	   new	   paradigm,	   contributing	   their	   understanding	   of	  gender-­‐related	   violations	   and	   even	   providing	   the	   IACrtHR	  with	   a	   favourable	  occasion	   to	   clarify	   its,	   ambiguously	   defined,	   contentious	   jurisdiction	   on	   the	  BdPC.	  This	  interaction	  triggered	  a	  mutual	  alimentation	  process	  that,	  providing	  regional	  actors	  with	  authoritative	  precedents,	  created	  favourable	  conditions	  to	  enhance	   the	   likelihood	   of	   a	   regional	   convergence	   of	   national	   legislations	   on	  VAW.	   We	   argue	   that	   the	   IACrtHR	   represented	   a	   crucial	   engine	   to	   fill	   the	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Contentious	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  IACrtHR	  on	  the	  BdPC	  	  
	  
The	  ambiguity	  of	  Article	  12	  BdPC	  	  Given	   IACrtHR’s	   function	   in	   interpreting	   Inter-­‐American	   instruments	   and	  shaping	   of	   standards	   of	   protection,	   it	   is	   crucial	   to	   address	   the	   issue	   of	   its	  competence	  on	   instruments	  other	   than	   the	  ACHR.	  For	   several	   years	   after	   the	  adoption	  of	  the	  BdPC,	  the	  question	  was	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  IACrtHR	  had	  been	  granted	   contentious	   jurisdiction	   on	   the	   convention,	   implying	   the	   power	   to	  consider	   cases	   regarding	   its	   infringement	   and,	   hence,	   to	   use	   it	   in	   the	  condemnatory	  part	  of	  the	  judgment.101	  	  The	   problem	   requires	   a	   careful	   evaluation,	   since	   it	   affects	   the	   legitimacy	   of	  IACrtHR’s	  rulings,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  institution	  itself.	  Differently	  from	   the	   issue	   of	   the	   Court’s	   jurisgenerativity,	   implied	   when	   its	   role	   of	  interpreter	   is	   uncontroversial	   and	   inherent	   feature	   of	   the	   application	   of	  international	   conventions	   as	   living	   instruments	   (IACrtHR,	   Advisory	   Opinion	  16/99),	  this	  question	  refers	  to	  the	  interpretation	  of	  procedural	  provisions	  and	  to	   the	   fact	   that	   a	   supranational	   jurisdictional	   body	   cannot	   generate	   its	   own	  competences,	  that	  need	  to	  be	  based	  on	  judicial	  norms.	  	  	  Before	  addressing	  the	  specific	  problem	  raised	  by	  the	  BdPC,	  we	  shall	  recall	  an	  early	  precedent	  of	  the	  Court	  that,	  although	  not	  concerned	  with	  its	  contentious	  jurisdiction,	   presents	   some	   important	   elements	   to	   understand	   the	   Court’s	  perception	  of	  its	  public	  function,	  concerning	  the	  limits	  of	  its	  advisory	  function.	  	  In	  1982	  Advisory	  Opinion	  on	   its	  advisory	   jurisdiction	  on	  “Other	  Treaties”,	   the	  IACrtHR	   made	   clear	   that	   “to	   exclude,	   a	   priori,	   from	   its	   advisory	   jurisdiction	  
international	  human	  rights	   treaties	   that	  are	  binding	  on	  American	  States	  would	  
weaken	  the	  full	  guarantee	  of	  the	  rights	  proclaimed	  in	  those	  treaties	  and,	  in	  turn,	  
conflict	  with	  the	  rules	  enunciated	  in	  Article	  29	  (b)	  of	  the	  Convention”	   (IACrtHR,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  101	  A	  recognition	  of	  the	  crucial	  function	  of	  the	  Court	  in	  shaping	  regional	  standards	  of	  protection	  of	  women’s	  rights	  is	  included	  in	  the	  Concurring	  Opinion	  of	  ad	  hoc	  Judge	  Cadena	  Rámila,	  attached	  to	  
Las	   dos	   Erres	   Massacre	   judgment:	   “I	   am	   convinced	   that	   the	   Jurisprudence	   of	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  
Court	   of	   Human	   Rights	   should	   continue	   to	   set	   precedents	   in	   this	   direction.	   The	   importance	   of	  
recognising	   the	   specific	   violations	   of	   women’s	   human	   rights	   within	   the	   framework	   of	   the	   Inter-­‐
American	  system	  lies	  in	  the	  development	  of	  specific	  standards	  to	  protect	  women”	  (para.	  5).	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Advisory	  Opinion	  1/82,	  p.	  42).	  The	  construction	  of	  its	  arguments	  suggests	  that	  the	   Court	   considers	   itself	   competent	   to	   use	   all	   human	   rights	   instruments	  signed	  by	  OAS	  Member	  States,	  even	   if	  not	  directly	  part	  of	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  System	  of	  Human	  Rights	  protection.102	  	  Besides	  the	  ACHR,	  hence,	  the	  Court	  considers	  interpretive	  sources	  of	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  System	  virtually	  any	  other	  international	  treaty	  imposing	  obligations	  related	  to	  human	  rights	  to	  OAS	  Member	  States.	  According	  to	  the	  Court,	  this	  is	  the	  meaning	  of	  Art.	  29.d	  ACHR,	  which	  prohibits	  excluding	  or	  limiting	  the	  extent	  of	   any	   such	   obligation.	   The	   literature	   recognises	   a	   reference	   to	   multiple	  international	  sources	  in	  the	  Convention.	  In	  this	  sense,	  Bidart	  Campos	  maintains	  that	   the	   sources	   of	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   System	   are	   the	   ACHR	   and	   “any	   other	  
convention,	   pact	   or	   treaty	   ratified	   by	   any	   State	   Party	   in	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  
system”	   (Bidart	   Campos,	   2000,	   p.	   67-­‐68),	   implying	   the	   competence	   of	   the	  IACrtHR	   to	   interpret	   the	   instrument	   creating	   that	   obligation,	   even	   if	   such	  instrument	  were	  not	  strictly	  referred	  to	  American	  States.	  	  However,	   the	   issue	   is	   more	   controversial	   for	   what	   concerns	   the	   Court’s	  
contentious	   jurisdiction	   on	   treaties	   other	   than	   the	   ACHR	   (Lixinski,	   2010;	  Malarino,	  2010;	  García	  Ramírez,	  2005).	  As	  we	  will	   see,	   the	  question	  has	  been	  raised	   with	   particular	   concern	   in	   relation	   to	   judgments	   adopted	   under	   the	  presidency	   of	   Judges	   García	   Ramírez	   (2004-­‐2007)	   and,	   previously,	   Cançado	  Trindade	   (1999-­‐2004).	   To	   address	   the	   problem	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   BdPC,	   we	  shall	   first	   briefly	   recall	   the	   relevant	   norms	   that	   establish	   the	   protection	  mechanism	  provided	  by	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   System.	  The	   IACommHR	  and	   the	  IACrtHR	   guarantee	   States’	   abidance	   to	   the	   ACHR	   (Article	   33	   ACHR).	   The	  IACommHR	   is	   an	   OAS	   consultative	   organ	   and	   the	   first	   instance	   of	   the	  protection	  mechanism	  established.	  The	  initial	  phases	  of	  the	  procedure	  for	  the	  submission	   and	   consideration	   of	   petitions	   alleging	   violation	   of	   the	   ACHR	   is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  102	  Moyer	  describes	  the	  process	  through	  which	  the	  Court	  came	  to	  this	  conclusion	  (Moyer,	  1986).	  He	  underlines	  that	  the	  Amici	  curiae	  briefs	  of	  the	  International	  Human	  Rights	  Law	  Group	  and	  the	  Inter-­‐American	   Institute	  of	  Human	  Rights	  provided	   the	  Court	  with	  useful	   insights	  on	   the	  possibility	   to	  receive	  requests	  of	  Advisory	  Opinions	  regarding	  treaties	  other	  than	  the	  ACHR,	  resulting	  in	  Court’s	  recognition	   of	   its	   advisory	   competence	   on	   all	   treaties	   in	   which	   one	   or	  more	   OAS	  members	   are	  parties.	  Arguably,	   this	   is	  the	  first	  example	  of	  IACrtHR’s	  tendency	  to	  expand	  its	  public	   function	  by	  means	   of	   extending	   its	   interpretive	   competence.	   Notably,	   however,	   in	   this	   case	   the	   critical	  argument	  provided	  by	  the	  International	  Human	  Rights	  Law	  Group	  was	  that	  such	  “external”	  norms	  had	  to	  be	  considered	  as	  already	  taken	  into	  account	  when	  drafting	  the	  ACHR.	  This	  argument	  had	  to	  be	  further	  developed	  when	  the	  Court	  came	  to	  establish	  its	  competence	  on	  the	  BdPC.	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regulated	  in	  Chapter	  VII,	  Section	  3	  of	  the	  Convention.	  	  	  	  Article	  44	  ACHR	  establishes:	  	  
Any	   person	   or	   group	   of	   persons,	   or	   any	   nongovernmental	   entity	   legally	  
recognised	   in	   one	   or	   more	   member	   states	   of	   the	   Organisation,	   may	   lodge	  
petitions	   with	   the	   Commission	   containing	   denunciations	   or	   complaints	   of	  
violation	  of	  this	  Convention	  by	  a	  State	  Party.	  	  The	  following	  Articles	  regulate	  the	  procedure	  to	  be	  followed	  for	  declaring	  the	  admissibility	   of	   a	   petition	   (Articles	   46-­‐47)	   and	   the	   actions	   the	   Commission	  shall	  take	  once	  a	  petition	  is	  admitted,	  such	  as	  conducting	  an	  investigation,	  prior	  consent	   of	   the	   State,	   to	   verify	   the	   facts	   and	   promoting	   the	   achievement	   of	   a	  friendly	  settlement	   (Article	  48).	   In	   those	  cases	   in	  which	  a	   friendly	  settlement	  cannot	  be	  reached,	  the	  Commission	  shall	  write	  a	  Report	  stating	  its	  conclusions	  and	  transmit	  it	  to	  the	  parties	  concerned	  (Article	  50).	  Following	  this	  Report,	  the	  Commission	  might	  set	  forth	  its	  considerations	  and	  recommendations,	  decide	  if	  the	  State	  has	  taken	  adequate	  measures	  to	  follow-­‐up	  and	  whether	  to	  publish	  the	  Report,	   or	   submit	   the	   case	   to	   the	   IACrtHR,	   in	   case	   the	   State	   involved	   has	  accepted	   its	   contentious	   jurisdiction	   (Article	   51).	   Hence,	   the	   Commission	  functions	  as	  a	  filter	  for	  the	  cases	  of	  violations	  of	  the	  ACHR	  to	  be	  submitted	  to	  IACrtHR’s	   jurisdiction.	   Chapter	   VIII,	   Section	   2	   of	   the	   ACHR,	   regulate	   the	  jurisdiction	  and	  functions	  of	  the	  IACrtHR,	  that	  can	  receive	  cases	  submitted	  by	  State	   Parties	   or	   by	   the	   Commission,	   after	   the	   procedures	   before	   the	  Commission	  have	  been	  completed	  (Article	  61),	  establish	  if	  the	  facts	  constitute	  a	  violation	   of	   the	   ACHR,	   adopt	   provisional	  measures	   if	   required	   by	   the	   gravity	  and	   urgency	   of	   the	   case	   (Article	   63)	   and	   issue	   a	   judgement	   according	   to	   the	  procedure	   established	   In	   Chapter	   VIII,	   Section	   3.	   The	   details	   of	   the	   judicial	  procedure	  are	  defined	  by	  the	  IACrtHR’s	  Rules	  of	  Procedure.	  	  	  However,	   following	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	   ACHR,	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   System	  developed	  several	  additional	  instruments	  that,	  through	  varying	  formulas,	  grant	  the	   competence	   on	   monitoring	   or	   enforcement	   mechanisms	   to	   the	   same	  bodies.	   The	   increased	   complexity	   of	   the	   System	   has	   been,	   therefore,	   further	  regulated	  through	  instruments	  other	  than	  the	  original	  ACHR.	  Considering	  that	  the	   Commission	   constitutes	   the	   first	   stage	   of	   the	   protection	   mechanism,	  selecting	   those	   cases	   that	   will	   be	   submitted	   to	   the	   Court’s	   jurisdiction,	   its	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regulations	  concerning	  the	  admission	  and	  consideration	  of	  petitions	  referring	  to	   treaties	   different	   from	   the	   ACHR	   are	   particularly	   relevant	   to	   analyse	  IACrtHR’s	  jurisdiction	  on	  the	  BdPC.	  	  Article	  23	  of	  IACommHR’s	  Rules	  of	  Procedure,	  regulating	  petitions’	  submission,	  establishes:103	  	  	  
Any	  person	  or	  group	  of	  persons	  or	  nongovernmental	  entity	  legally	  recognised	  in	  
one	   or	   more	   of	   the	   Member	   States	   of	   the	   OAS	   may	   submit	   petitions	   to	   the	  
Commission,	   on	   their	   behalf	   or	   on	   behalf	   of	   third	   persons,	   concerning	   alleged	  
violations	   of	   a	   human	   right	   recognised	   in,	   as	   the	   case	   may	   be,	   the	   American	  
Declaration	  of	  the	  Rights	  and	  Duties	  of	  Man,	  the	  American	  Convention	  on	  Human	  
Rights	   “Pact	   of	   San	   José,	   Costa	   Rica”,	   the	   Additional	   Protocol	   to	   the	   American	  
Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  in	  the	  Area	  of	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights	  
“Protocol	  of	  San	  Salvador”,	   the	  Protocol	   to	   the	  American	  Convention	  on	  Human	  
Rights	   to	   Abolish	   the	  Death	   Penalty,	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   Convention	   to	   Prevent	  
and	  Punish	  Torture,	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Convention	  on	  Forced	  Disappearance	  of	  
Persons,	   and/or	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   Convention	   on	   the	   Prevention,	   Punishment	  
and	  Eradication	   of	   Violence	  Against	  Women	   “Convention	   of	  Belém	  do	  Pará”,	   in	  
accordance	  with	   their	   respective	  provisions,	   the	  Statute	  of	   the	  Commission,	  and	  
these	   Rules	   of	   Procedure.	  	   The	   petitioner	   may	   designate	   an	   attorney	   or	   other	  
person	  to	  represent	  him	  or	  her	  before	  the	  Commission,	  either	  in	  the	  petition	  itself	  
or	  in	  a	  separate	  document.	  	  The	   text	   of	   Article	   23	   refers	   to	   all	   currently	   existing	   Inter-­‐American	  instruments.	  Notably,	  including	  those	  in	  force	  prior	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  Rules	  of	  Procedure	  (Acosta	  Lopez,	  2009).	  However,	  the	  same	  article	  clarifies	  that	  such	  submission	  has	  to	  be	  presented	  “in	  accordance	  with	  their	  respective	  provisions,	  
the	  Statute	  of	  the	  Commission,	  and	  these	  Rules	  of	  Procedure”,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  actual	  competence	  of	  the	  Commission	  should	  be	  specifically	  established	  in	  each	  instrument	  and	  contemporarily	  guaranteed	  by	  the	  Commission’s	  Statute.	  As	  we	  will	  see,	  in	  fact,	  the	  new	  Inter-­‐American	  instruments	  present	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  formulas	  regulating	  their	  monitoring	  and	  enforcement	  mechanisms.	  While	  the	  explicit	   listing	   of	   all	   existing	   Inter-­‐American	   instruments	   defines	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  103	  For	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	   problems	   that	   arise	   from	   Article	   23	   of	   the	   Commission’s	   Rules	   of	  Procedure,	  refer	  to:	  Acosta	  Lopez,	  2009.	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boundaries	   of	   Commission’s	   competences,	   requiring	   integration	   in	   case	   of	  adoption	   of	   an	   additional	   treaty,	   for	   what	   concerns	   the	   extent	   of	   such	  additional	  competences	  Article	  23	  represents	  an	  open	  provision,	  redefining	  the	  features	  of	  the	  protection	  mechanisms	  in	  case	  of	  modifications	  in	  any	  of	  them.	  However,	   in	   the	   practice,	   this	   rule	   created	   confusion,	   requiring	   occasional	  clarification	   when	   a	   treaty	   other	   than	   the	   ACHR	   established	   Institution’s	  competences	  with	  non-­‐univocal	   formulas.	  Given	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  Commission	  filters	   the	   cases	   submitted	   to	   the	   Court,	   and	   that	   the	   Court	   is	   not	   always	  explicitly	   mentioned	   in	   each	   instrument,	   this	   confusion	   occasionally	   affects	  Court’s	  procedures	  on	  petitions	  invoking	  an	  instrument	  other	  than	  the	  ACHR.	  	  Addressing	   the	   question	   of	   the	   Court’s	   contentious	   jurisdiction	   on	   the	   BdPC,	  Judge	  García	  Ramírez	  expressed	  its	  concern	  on	  the	  lack	  of	  clarity	  about	  judicial	  procedures,	   complicated	   through	   the	   diversification	   of	   Inter-­‐American	  instruments.	  His	  Concurring	  Opinion,	  attached	  to	  the	  final	  judgment	  on	  Castro-­‐
Castro,	   effectively	   summarizes	   the	   crucial	   issues	   at	   stake:	   “The	   powers	   of	   a	  
jurisdictional	   body	   derive,	   necessarily,	   of	   the	   norm	   that	   creates,	   organizes,	   and	  
governs	   it.	  This	   link	  between	  a	   juridical	  norm,	  on	  one	  part,	   and	   jurisdiction,	   on	  
the	   other	   –expression,	   in	   the	   jurisdictional	   order,	   of	   the	   principle	   of	   legality-­‐,	  
constitutes	  a	  precious	  guarantee	  for	  the	  defendants	  and	  a	  natural	  and	  necessary	  
element	   of	   the	   State	   of	   Law.	   It	   would	   be	   inadmissible	   and	   extraordinarily	  
dangerous	  for	  people	  that	  jurisdictional	  bodies	  intend	  to	  “construct”,	  as	  of	  its	  will,	  
the	  competence	  it	  considers	  convenient.	  This	  “voluntarism	  creator	  of	  jurisdiction”	  
would	   put	   the	   body	   of	   rights	   and	   liberties	   of	   human	   beings	   in	   risk	   and	   would	  
constitute	  a	   form	  of	   tyranny	  not	   less	  damaging	  than	  the	  one	  exercised	  by	  other	  
bodies	  of	   the	  public	  power.	   It	   is	  possible	   that	   it	  be	  advisable	   to,	  pursuant	  to	   the	  
evolution	  of	  the	  facts	  or	  the	  law,	  extend	  the	  jurisdictional	  realm	  of	  a	  body	  of	  this	  
nature,	   so	   that	   it	   may	   better	   serve	   the	   satisfaction	   of	   social	   needs.	   But	   this	  
extension	   must	   operate	   as	   of	   the	   normative	   reform	   and	   not	   simply	   from	   the	  
voluntary	  -­‐	  and	  essentially	  arbitrary	  -­‐	  decision	  of	  the	  jurisdictional	  body”	  (Castro-­‐
Castro	  case,	  Concurring	  Opinion,	  para.	  15).	  
	  Article	  12	  BdPC	  establishes:	  	  
Any	   person	   or	   group	   of	   persons,	   or	   any	   nongovernmental	   entity	   legally	  
recognised	   in	   one	   or	   more	   member	   states	   of	   the	   Organisation,	   may	   lodge	  
petitions	   with	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   Commission	   on	   Human	   Rights	   containing	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denunciations	   or	   complaints	   of	   violations	   of	   Article	   7	   of	   this	   Convention	   by	   a	  
State	  Party,	   and	   the	  Commission	   shall	   consider	   such	   claims	   in	   accordance	  with	  
the	   norms	   and	   procedures	   established	   by	   the	   American	   Convention	   on	   Human	  
Rights	   and	   the	   Statutes	   and	   Regulations	   of	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   Commission	   on	  
Human	  Rights	  for	  lodging	  and	  considering	  petitions.	  	  Based	   on	   Article	   12	   BdPC	   and	   on	   Article	   23	   of	   its	   Rules	   of	   Procedure,	   the	  IACommHR	   admits	   petitions	   invoking	   Article	   7	   BdPC,	   and	   uses	   other	   BdPC	   as	  complementary	  tools	  for	  the	  interpretation	  of	  ACHR	  norms.	  Acosta	  Lopez	  notes	  that	   such	   decision	   is	   not	   always	   followed	   coherently,	   citing	   the	   case	   of	   the	  rejected	   admissibility	   of	   the	   petition	  Marcia	  Barbosa	  de	   Sousa	   v.	   Brazil	   (2007)	  invoking,	  inter	  alia,	  Articles	  3,	  4,	  5,	  and	  7	  BdPC.	  	  
	  However,	   we	   shall	   point	   out	   that	   our	   review	   of	   the	   cases	   signals	   a	   relevant	  element	  that	  explains	  this	  apparent	  incoherence.	  We	  found	  that	  the	  admissibility	  of	   petitions	   is	   always	   established	   considering	   both	   the	   ACHR	   and	   the	   BdPC.	  
Marcia	   Barbosa	   de	   Sousa	   v.	   Brazil	   is	   found	   inadmissible	   for	   what	   concerns	  Article	   2	   ACHR	   and	   3,	   4	   and	   5	   BdPC,	   therefore,	   we	   do	   not	   believe	   this	   case	  signals	  an	   incoherence	   for	  what	  concerns	   the	  BdPC.	   In	   fact,	  although	  from	  the	  joint	  reading	  of	  Article	  23	  of	  the	  Commission’s	  Rules	  of	  Procedure	  and	  Article	  12	  BdPC,	  for	  what	  concerns	  Article	  7	  BdPC	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  Commission	  might	  also	  admit	  a	  case	  based	  only	  on	  a	  violation	  of	   that	  specific	   instrument,	   it	  does	  not	  seem	  likely	  that	  such	  a	  case	  would	  not	  contemporarily	  imply	  a	  violation	  of	  some	  provision	  of	  the	  ACHR,	  given	  the	  more	  general	  character	  of	  the	  latter.	  In	  other	  words,	  if	  a	  case	  is	  found	  inadmissible	  under	  ACHR	  provisions,	  it	  will	  also,	  by	  default,	  be	  inadmissible	  under	  the	  BdPC,	  since	  the	  latter	  specifies	  the	  content	  of	  the	  general	  norms	  to	  adapt	  them	  to	  the	  specificities	  of	  women’s	  rights.	  	  Therefore,	   the	   cases	   reviewed	   in	   this	   research	   do	   not	   provide	   evidence	   of	  incoherence	   in	   the	   Commission’s	   admissions	   pattern,	   nor	   the	   rejections	   are	  explicitly	  based	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  petition	  includes	  an	  invocation	  of	  articles	  of	  the	   BdPC	   other	   than	   Article	   7	   (which	   could	   have	   resulted,	   more	   likely,	   in	   the	  exclusion	   of	   those	   Articles	   from	   the	   evaluation	   of	   the	   Commission).	   From	   the	  pattern	   of	   admissibility,	   it	   emerges	   that	   the	   Commission	   considers	   Article	   12	  BdPC	  as	  establishing	  an	  interpretive	  link	  with	  the	  ACHR,	  given	  the	  specificity	  of	  the	   rights	   enshrined	   in	   the	   BdPC,	   hence	   providing	   the	   basis	   to	   consider	  provisions	   other	   than	   Article	   7	   BdPC	   as	   complementary	   interpretive	   tools,	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adapting	   the	   content	   of	   the	   rights	   established	   by	   the	   ACHR	   to	   the	   specific	  necessities	  of	  a	  case.	  	  We	  can	  now	  turn	  to	  the	  critical	  point	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  case	  involving	  alleged	  breaches	   of	   the	   BdPC,	   once	   concluded	   the	   procedures	   before	   the	   Commission,	  might	   be	   considered	   by	   the	   IACrtHR	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   BdPC	   provisions.	   The	  question	   is	   controversial,	   given	   that	  Article	   12	   does	   not	   explicitly	  mention	   the	  Court	   and	   considering	   the	   express	   jurisdiction	   rule	   established	   by	   Article	   62	  ACHR,	  which	  states:	  
A	  State	  Party	  may,	  upon	  depositing	  its	  instrument	  of	  ratification	  or	  adherence	  to	  
this	  Convention,	  or	  at	  any	  subsequent	  time,	  declare	  that	  it	  recognises	  as	  binding,	  
ipso	   facto,	  and	  not	  requiring	  special	  agreement,	   the	   jurisdiction	  of	   the	  Court	  on	  
all	   matters	   relating	   to	   the	   interpretation	   or	   application	   of	   this	   Convention.	   2.	  
Such	  declaration	  may	  be	  made	  unconditionally,	   on	   the	   condition	   of	   reciprocity,	  
for	  a	  specified	  period,	  or	  for	  specific	  cases.	  It	  shall	  be	  presented	  to	  the	  Secretary	  
General	   of	   the	   Organisation,	   who	   shall	   transmit	   copies	   thereof	   to	   the	   other	  
member	   states	   of	   the	   Organisation	   and	   to	   the	   Secretary	   of	   the	   Court.	   3.	   The	  
jurisdiction	   of	   the	   Court	   shall	   comprise	   all	   cases	   concerning	   the	   interpretation	  
and	   application	   of	   the	   provisions	   of	   this	   Convention	   that	   are	   submitted	   to	   it,	  
provided	   that	   the	   States	   Parties	   to	   the	   case	   recognise	   or	   have	   recognised	   such	  
jurisdiction,	   whether	   by	   special	   declaration	   pursuant	   to	   the	   preceding	  
paragraphs,	  or	  by	  a	  special	  agreement.	  
	  The	  occasion	  to	  address	  this	  question	  was	  provided	  by	  IACommHR’s	  decision	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  Court	  the	  Castro-­‐Castro	  case,	  in	  2004.	  Incidentally	  we	  note,	  as	  we	  will	  see,	   that	   the	   Commission’s	   application	   did	   not	   include	   a	   reference	   to	   BdPC	  provisions,	  which	  had	  been	  invoked	  by	  the	  petitioners.	  However,	  the	  particular	  features	  of	  the	  violations,	  and	  the	  information	  gathered	  during	  the	  hearings,	  led	  the	  Court	  to	  consider	  appropriate	  an	  evaluation	  of	  the	  facts	  which	  included	  the	  BdPC	  originally	   invoked,	  and	  forced	  the	  consideration	  of	   the	   issue	  of	   IACrtHR’s	  contentious	  jurisdiction	  on	  the	  instrument.	  	  Combining	   systematic	   and	   teleological	   interpretations,	   with	   regards	   to	   the	  application	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  effectiveness,	  the	  IACrtHR	  found	  the	  language	  in	  Article	   12	   BdPC	   sufficient	   to	   interpret	   it	   as	   implying	   its	   competence	   on	   the	  instrument.	   The	   question,	   however,	   raised	   several	   problems,	   which	   we	   will	  thoroughly	   addressed	   given	   that	   the	   enforcement	   mechanisms	   provided	   by	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international	   instruments	   constitute	   a	   critical	   element	   influencing	   their	  effectiveness	   and	   the	   development	   of	   their	   content,	   and	   considering	   that	   the	  terms	  in	  which	  a	  contentious	  jurisdiction	  is	  granted	  to	  a	  judicial	  body	  influence	  its	  legitimacy	  and	  the	  authority	  of	  its	  decisions.	  	  In	  his	  Concurring	  Opinion,	  Judge	  García	  Ramírez,	  President	  of	  the	  Court	  at	  the	  time	  of	   the	  Castro-­‐Castro	  case,	   focused	  on	  the	  problem	  raised	  by	   the	   fact	   that	  the	  BdPC	  does	  not	  contain	  a	  norm	  explicitly	  granting	  contentious	   jurisdiction	  to	  the	  IACrtHR,	  whilst,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  neither	  does	  it	  contain	  norms	  denying	  this	  possibility	  or	  granting	  jurisdiction	  to	  a	  different	  body	  (Concurring	  Opinion,	  para.	  16).	  	  The,	  prima	  facie,	  ambiguity	  of	  the	  formula	  used	  in	  Article	  12	  BdPC,	  required	  the	  Court’s	  interpretation	  to	  uncover	  its	  meaning.	  Judge	  García	  Ramírez	  clarified:”	  
[…]	   I	   am	  not	   saying,	   of	   course,	   that	   [the	  Court]	  must	   “complete”	   the	   legal	   code	  
and	  create,	  based	  on	  its	  will	  or	  imagination,	  a	  competence	  that	  is	  not	  included,	  at	  
all,	  in	  the	  norm	  on	  the	  control	  of	  conventionality	  of	  State	  acts.	  Its	  power	  does	  not	  
go	  so	  far:	  it	  must	  only	  untangle	  the	  sense	  of	  the	  obscure	  or	  elusive	  provision	  and	  
establish,	  through	  that	  logical-­‐juridical	  process,	  its	  sense	  and	  scope.	  This	  is	  what	  
the	   Inter-­‐American	  Court	  does	  with	  regard	   to	   the	  Convention	  of	  Belém	  do	  Pará	  
and	   its	   application	   to	   the	   present	   [Castro-­‐Castro]	   case”	   (Concurring	   Opinion,	  para.	  17).	  
	  In	   the	   following	   paragraphs,	   Judge	   García	   Ramírez	   reviewed	   the	   diversity	   of	  formulas	   presented	   by	   the	   American	   corpus	   juris	   to	   address	   States’	  international	   responsibility	   and	   to	   establish	   protection	   mechanisms,	   when	  there	   is	   a	   failure	   to	   comply	   with	   the	   duties	   assumed.	   He	   expressed	   the	  desirability	   of	   counting	   on	   instruments	   presenting	   unequivocal	   orders,	   to	  guarantee	   “the	   transparency	  of	   the	  meaning	  of	   the	  norm,	   in	   favour	  of	  all	   those	  
obliged	   or	   favoured	   by	   it,	   a	   transparency	   convenient	   at	   all	   levels	   of	   juridical	  
regulation”	   (Concurring	   Opinion,	   para.	   18).	   Indeed,	   as	   mentioned,	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   System	   includes	   treaties	   that	   allow	   processing	   individual	  petitions,104	  others	   that	   do	   not	   provide	   this	   possibility105	  and	   treaties	   that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  104These	  instruments	  are:	  Inter-­‐American	  Convention	  to	  Prevent	  and	  Punish	  Torture	  (CIPST),	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Convention	  on	  Forced	  Disappearance	  of	  Persons	  (CIDFP)	  and,	  considering	  Court’s	  interpretation	  of	  Article	  12,	  the	  BdPC.	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restrict	  it	  to	  certain	  rights,106	  a	  diversity	  that	  had	  often	  posed	  questions	  similar	  to	  that	  raised	  by	  the	  ambiguity	  of	  Article	  12	  BdPC.107	  	  	  We	  saw	  that	  the	  first	  phase	  of	  the	  protection	  mechanism	  provided	  by	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  System	  consists	  in	  the	  admission	  and	  consideration	  of	  petitions	  by	  the	  Commission,	   which	   might	   refer	   a	   case	   to	   the	   Court.	   Article	   45	   of	   the	  Commission’s	  Rules	  of	  Procedure	  further	  regulates	  this	  option:	  
	  
If	  the	  State	  in	  question	  has	  accepted	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Court	  
in	  accordance	  with	  Article	  62	  of	   the	  American	  Convention,	  and	   the	  Commission	  
considers	   that	   the	   State	   has	   not	   complied	   with	   the	   recommendations	   of	   the	  
report	   approved	   in	   accordance	   with	   Article	   50	   of	   the	   American	   Convention,	   it	  
shall	   refer	   the	   case	   to	   the	   Court,	   unless	   there	   is	   a	   reasoned	   decision	   by	   an	  
absolute	  majority	  of	  the	  members	  of	  the	  Commission	  to	  the	  contrary.	  
	  Judge	   García	   Ramírez	   referred	   to	   Article	   45	   to	   explain	   that,	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  Commission	   can	   receive	   petitions	   concerning	   Article	   7	   BdPC,	   implies	   the	  possibility	   of	   such	   cases	   being	   referred	   to	   the	   Court,108	  otherwise	   the	   ACHR	  mechanism	   of	   protection	   would	   be	   incomplete.	   Hence,	   the	   Court	   shares	   the	  same	  competence	  that	  Article	  12	  BdPC	  grants	  to	  the	  Commission	  in	  relation	  to	  Article	   7	   BdPC.	   Similarly,	   for	   what	   concerns	   evaluations	   of	   the	   facts	   under	  other	  BdPC	  provisions,	  they	  shall	  be	  used	  by	  the	  Court	  as	  complementary	  tools	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  105	  The	   Inter-­‐American	   Convention	   on	   the	   Elimination	   of	   all	   Forms	   of	   Discrimination	   against	  Persons	  with	  Disabilities	  (CIETFDPD)	  does	  not	  mention	  an	  individual	  petitions	  mechanism,	  while	  its	  Article	  VI	  establishes	  that	  a	  Committee	  for	  the	  Elimination	  of	  all	  Forms	  of	  Discrimination	  against	  Persons	  with	  Disabilities	   “shall	  be	  the	   forum	  for	  assessment	  of	  progress	  made	   in	  the	  application	  of	  
the	  Convention.”	  106	  The	   Additional	   Protocol	   to	   the	   American	   Convention	   in	   the	   Area	   of	   Economic,	   Social	   and	  Cultural	  Rights	  (Protocol	  of	  San	  Salvador)	  restricts	  the	  jurisdiction	  for	  processing	  petitions	  ratione	  
materiae.	   Its	   Article	   19(6)	   permits	   the	   submission	   of	   petitions	   only	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   right	   to	  education	  and	  trade	  union	  rights.	  107 	  For	   cases	   sharing	   similar	   features	   with	   the	   question	   raised	   by	   the	   BdPC,	   see	   IACrtHR’s	  reasoning	  concerning	  the	  complementary	  interpretation	  of	  CIPST	  provisions	  in:	  Gómez	  Palomino	  v.	  
Peru.	  (para.	  110);	  Ticona	  Estrada	  et	  al.	  v.	  Bolivia	  (para.	  85);	  Anzualdo	  Castro	  v.	  Peru	  (para.	  61).	  	  108	  The	  mechanism	   of	   referral	   has	   changed	   with	   the	   2001	   reform	   of	   the	   Commission’s	   Rules	   of	  Procedure.	  Whereas	  previously	  they	  required	  a	  majority	  vote	  in	  favour	  of	  referral,	  since	  2001	  the	  rule	  was	  reversed,	  requiring	  majority	  to	  prevent	  a	  case	  from	  being	  referred	  to	  the	  Court.	  Zuloaga	  found	  an	  increased	  tendency	  of	  the	  Commission	  to	  refer	  gender-­‐sensitive	  cases	  to	  the	  Court	  since	  2001	  (Zuloaga,	  2004).	  While	  we	  can	  agree	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  reform	  made	  the	  procedure	  easier,	  we	  should	  not	  disregard	  that	  a	  number	  of	  other	  elements	  might	  have	  played	  a	  similar	  role	  in	  this	  change,	   not	   last	   petitioners’	   familiarity	   with	   the	   instrument	   and	   the	   generalized	   increasing	  international	  awareness	  on	  women’s	  rights.	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to	   interpret	   ACHR	   norms,	   when	   the	   specificity	   of	   the	   facts	   so	   requires.	  Incidentally,	  we	  note	  that	  the	  ACHR	  also	  allows	  States	  Party	  to	  submit	  a	  case	  to	  the	   Court,	   although	   this	   possibility	   has	   rarely	   been	   used.109	  In	   the	   current	  context	   it	   seems	   that	   this	   possibility	   cannot	   be	   used	   for	   what	   concerns	  breaches	   to	   the	  BdPC	  and	   that,	   if	   it	   could,	   it	  would	  probably	   create	   a	   further	  problem	  on	   the	   contentious	   jurisdiction	   of	   the	   IACrtHR	  on	   the	  BdPC,	   since	   it	  could	   not	   be	   based	   on	   its	   direct	   link	   with	   the	   Commission’s	   competence	  established	  by	  Article	  12	  BdPC.	  	  The	   pro	   personae	   principle	   allows	   the	   consideration	   of	   ACHR	   and	   BdPC	   as	  complementary	  instruments,	  with	  the	  specific	  content	  of	  the	  latter	  integrating	  the	   provision	   of	   the	   first,	   general	   one.	   In	   Judge	   García	   Ramírez’	   words,	   the	  BdPC	   is	  a	   type	  of	  specific	  Magna	  Charta	  on	  women’s	  rights	   “that	  constitutes	  a	  
separate	  and	  substantial	  chapter	  in	  the	  complete	  corpus	  juris	  that	  makes	  up	  the	  
statute	   of	   the	   contemporary	   human	   being,	   based	   on	   the	   double	   foundation	  
offered	  by	  the	  worldwide	  human	  right’s	  order	  and	  the	  continental	  version	  in	  the	  
order	  of	  the	  same	  specialty	  […]	  The	  joint	  reading	  of	  the	  ACHR,	  with	  its	  catalogue	  
of	  general	  rights	  and	  guarantees,	  and	  the	  BdP	  Convention,	  with	  its	  declaration	  of	  
specific	  State	  duties,	  to	  which	  women’s	  rights	  correspond,	  results	  both	  natural	  an	  
obligatory	   for	   the	   application	   of	   both.	   The	   second	   determines,	   illustrates	   or	  
complements	  the	  content	  of	  the	  first	  in	  what	  refers	  to	  women’s	  rights	  that	  derive	  
from	  the	  ACHR”	  (García	  Ramírez,	  Concurring	  Opinion,	  Castro-­‐Castro	  case,	  2006,	  para.	  5	  and	  30).	  	  
	  The	   Court	   had	   already	   been	   presented	   with	   similar	   issues	   concerning	   its	  jurisdiction	   on	   international	   instruments	   other	   than	   the	   ACHR.	   In	   2000,	  addressing	  Colombia’s	  preliminary	  objections	   to	  Las	  Palmeras	   case,	   the	  Court	  maintained	  that	  other	  conventions,	  such	  as	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Convention	  on	  Forced	  Disappearance	  of	  Persons,	  granting	  competence	  to	  the	  IACrtHR	  or	  the	  Commission	  to	  hear	  violations	  of	  the	  rights	  protected,	  cannot	  be	  considered	  to	  be	   excluded	   from	   the	   procedure	   established	   by	   Articles	   33,	   44,	   48.1	   and	   48	  ACHR. 110 	  Therefore,	   although	   these	   articles	   refer	   specifically	   to	   rights	  enshrined	   in	   the	   ACHR,	   other	   conventions	   establishing	   a	   similar	  mechanism,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  109	  The	  first	  such	  case	  was	  Viviana	  Gallardo	  et	  al.,	  which	  Costa	  Rica	  presented	  against	  itself	  in	  1981.	  110	  Las	  Palmeras	  v.	  Colombia	  (Preliminary	  Objections,	   para.	   34).	   See	   also	  Paniagua	  Morales	   (para.	  136)	   and	  Villagrán	  Morales	  et	  al.	  (para.	   252),	  where	   the	   Court	   declared	   that	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  Convention	  to	  Prevent	  and	  Punish	  Torture	  had	  been	  violated.	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such	   as	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   Convention	   to	   Prevent	   and	   Punish	   Torture,	  constitute	  exceptions	  to	  such	  requirement.111	  	  This	  decision	  of	  the	  Court	  provides	  another	  interesting	  element,	  if	  we	  consider	  that	  the	  BdPC	  was	  not	  in	  force	  in	  Peru,	  the	  State	  involved	  in	  the	  Castro-­‐Castro	  case,	   at	   the	   time	   of	   the	   facts	   related	   in	   the	   petition.	   As	   we	   will	   see	   in	   the	  following	   sections,	   the	   Court	   overcame	   this	   apparent	   obstacle	  with	   a	   double	  motivation.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  use	  of	  the	  BdPC	  as	  an	  interpretive	  tool	  for	  the	  ACHR,	   whose	   norms	   are	   considered	   to	   need	   the	   integration	   of	   a	   gender	  perspective,	   in	   order	   to	   guarantee	   their	   intended	   effect	   with	   substantially	  equal	  standards,	  does	  not	  violate	  Article	  28	  (Non-­‐retroactivity	  of	  Treaties)112	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Treaties	  (VCLT).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	   continuous	   nature	   of	   the	   violations	   of	   Articles	   8	   (due	   process)	   and	   25	  (effective	  remedy)	  ACHR	  implies	  that	  evaluating	  the	  lack	  of	  effective	  remedies	  in	   cases	  of	  VAW,	   covered	  by	   the	  BdPC,	   cannot	  be	   considered	  as	   retroactively	  binding	  the	  State	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  fact	  that	  ceased	  to	  exist	  before	  its	  ratification	  of	  the	  specific	  instrument.	  	  The	   expansion	   of	   the	   IACrtHR’s	   public	   function	   builds	   on	   its	   crucial	   2003	  Advisory	  Opinion	  n.	  18,	  on	  the	   Juridical	  Condition	  and	  Rights	  of	  Undocumented	  
Migrants	  (IACrtHR,	  Advisory	  Opinion	  18/2003,	  par.	  97-­‐101).	  In	  this	  pioneering	  precedent	   the	   Court	   had	   recognised	   the	   principles	   of	   equality	   and	   non-­‐discrimination	   as	   belonging	   to	   the	   domain	   of	   jus	   cogens,	   thus	   implying	  obligations	   erga	   omnes.	   	   In	   this	   sense,	   through	   Article	   1.1	   ACHR,	   the	   Court	  could	  count	  on	  a	  sufficient	  normative	  framework	  to	  justify	  the	  extension	  of	  its	  competence	  on	  the	  BdPC	  without	   implying	  arbitrariness.	   Indeed,	   the	  doctrine	  increasingly	  agrees	  on	  the	  need	  to	  adopt	  an	  axiological-­‐substantial	  perspective	  when	   assessing	   the	   influence	   of	   human	   rights	   treaties,	   considering	  more	   the	  subject	  matter	   they	   regulate	   than	   their	   formal	   features,	   since	   it	   is	   because	  of	  their	  subject	  matter	  that	  they	  generate	  specific	  obligations	  (Ruggeri,	  2008).	  As	  Acosta	  Lopez	  notes,	  the	  question	  is	  to	  what	  extent,	  for	  the	  good	  functioning	  of	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  System,	  such	  substantial	  criterion	  should	  be	  also	  applied	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  111 	  Incidentally,	   we	   note	   that	   in	   Las	   Palmeras	   v.	   Colombia	   the	   IACrtHR	   excluded	   the	   Geneva	  Convention	  from	  its	  jurisdiction.	  112	  Article	  28	  VCLT:	  Unless	  a	  different	  intention	  appears	  from	  the	  treaty	  or	  is	  otherwise	  established,	  
its	  provisions	  do	  not	  bind	  a	  party	  in	  relation	  to	  any	  act	  or	  fact	  which	  took	  place	  or	  any	  situation	  which	  
ceased	  to	  exist	  before	  the	  date	  of	  the	  entry	  into	  force	  of	  the	  treaty	  with	  respect	  to	  that	  party.	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procedural	   provisions.	   Advisory	   Opinion	   18/2003	   constitutes	   a	   critical	  precedent	  for	  what	  concerns	  the	  development	  of	  several	  doctrinal	  elaborations	  that	  had	  significant	  influence	  on	  the	  development	  of	  the	  protection	  of	  women’s	  rights	  in	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  System.	  	  In	  the	  2008	  interpretation	  of	   its	  ruling	  on	  the	  Castro-­‐Castro	  case,	  the	  IACrtHR	  explicitly	  refers	  to	  the	  reasoning	  developed	  in	  Advisory	  Opinion	  18/2003:	  “The	  
States	   Parties	   to	   the	   American	   Convention	   have	   proclaimed	   and	   assumed	   the	  
duty	  to	  acknowledge	  and	  guarantee	  these	  rights	  in	  favour	  of	  all	  people,	  without	  
distinction,	   regardless	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   they	   are	   or	   not	   responsible	   for	   criminal	  
acts.	   This	   is	   a	   fundamental	   principle	   of	   International	   Human	   Rights	   Law.	   The	  
States	   themselves	   -­‐	   that	  make	  up	   the	   collective	  guarantee	   in	   this	  matter	   -­‐	  gave	  
the	   Inter-­‐American	   Court	   the	   sole	   and	   exclusive	   power	   to	   hear	   and	   decide	   on	  
applications	  regarding	  facts,	  attributed	  to	  the	  States,	  that	  violate	  the	  rights	  and	  
freedoms	   protected	   by	   that	   international	   treaty.	   That	   is	   its	   contentious	  
jurisdiction.	   Not	   any	   other.	   When	   exercising	   the	   judicial	   protection	   of	   human	  
rights,	   the	   Court	   must	   abide	   by	   the	   stipulations	   of	   the	   Convention,	   just	   as	  
domestic	  courts	  must	  observe	  the	  regulations	  of	  the	  criminal	  system”	  (para.	  12).	  	  In	   a	   later	   case,	   Cotton	   field	   (2008),	   the	   preliminary	   objection	   raised	   by	   the	  Mexican	   State,	   questioning	   IACrtHR’s	   contentious	   jurisdiction	   on	   the	   BdPC,	  forced	   the	   Court	   to	   readdress	   the	   question.	   The	   arguments	   presented	   by	  Mexico	  provide	  an	  evidence	  of	  the	  delicate	  nature	  of	  the	  issue.	  Notwithstanding	  the	  decision	  adopted	  by	  the	  Court	  in	  Castro-­‐Castro,	  and	  the	  lengthy	  supporting	  arguments	   provided	   in	   the	   Concurring	   Opinions	   attached	   to	   the	   judgment,	  Mexico	  claimed	  that	  the	  IACrtHR	  could	  only	  interpret	  and	  apply	  the	  ACHR	  and	  other	  instruments	  explicitly	  granting	  its	   jurisdiction.	  It	   followed	  that,	   for	  what	  concerned	   the	   BdPC,	   the	   Court	   might	   exercise	   its	   advisory	   function,	   as	  established	  by	  Article	  11	  BdPC,	  but	  it	  could	  not	  attribute	  to	  itself	  a	  contentious	  jurisdiction	  that	  had	  not	  been	  established	   in	   the	  BdPC	  and	  to	  which	  the	  State	  Parties	  had	  not	  expressed	  their	  consent.	  	  Indeed,	  Article	  11	  grants	  the	  Court	  with	  the	  competence	  on	  adopting	  Advisory	  Opinions	   on	   the	   interpretation	   of	   the	   BdPC,	   including	   all	   its	   provisions.	  Notably,	  this	  provision	  is	  partially	  redundant,	  given	  that	  the	  advisory	  function	  of	  the	  Court	  had	  been	  already	  interpreted	  as	  including	  treaties	  other	  than	  the	  ACHR,	  since	  the	  mentioned	  1982	  Advisory	  Opinion.	  However,	  it	  introduces	  the	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possibility	   of	   such	   a	   request	   being	   submitted	   by	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  Commission	  of	  Women,	  which	  we	  interpret	  as	  a	  further	  attempt	  to	  increase	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  System’s	  gender-­‐sensitiveness.	  However,	  this	  competence	  does	  not,	   per	   se,	   imply	   the	   possibility	   of	   exercising	   contentious	   jurisdiction.	  Implicitly	   recalling	   García	   Ramírez	   concerns,	   expressed	   in	   the	   mentioned	  Concurring	  Opinion	   to	  Castro-­‐Castro,	  Mexico	   pointed	   at	   the	   principle	   of	   legal	  certainty,	  which	  guarantees	  the	  stability	  of	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  System	  and	  “the	  
certainty	   of	   the	   State’s	   obligations	   deriving	   from	   its	   submission	   to	   the	  
international	  organs	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  human	  rights”	  (Cotton	  Field,	  para.	  35).	  	  Article	  11,	  explicitly	  referring	  to	  the	  Court’s	  Advisory	  function	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  BdPC,	   might	   provide	   an	   additional	   argument,	   besides	   those	   presented	   by	  Mexico,	   to	   criticize	   the	   grounds	   on	   which	   the	   IACrtHR	   established	   its	  competence	  on	   the	  BdPC.	  This	  provision	  pertains	   to	   the	   same	  Chapter	   as	   the	  mentioned	   Article	   12.	   Whereas,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   it	   can	   be	   considered	   an	  evidence	  of	   the	   intention	  of	   the	  drafters	  not	   to	  exclude	   the	   IACrtHR	   from	  the	  mechanism	  provided	  by	  the	  BdPC,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  one	  might	  argue,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Court	  has	  been	  explicitly	  mentioned	  in	  Article	  11,	  but	  not	  in	  Article	  12,	  might	  imply	  that	  it	  was	  not	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  drafters	  to	  grant	  to	  the	  IACrtHR	  the	  contentious	  jurisdiction	  on	  such	  instrument.	  However,	  as	  seen,	  the	  IACrtHR	  did	   not	   consider	   Article	   11	   as	   suggesting	   such	   possibility,	   and	   considered	   it	  overshadowed	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  no	  provision	  in	  the	  BdPC	  explicitly	  excludes	  its	  competence,	  while	  Article	  12	  implies	  it	  given	  that	  it	  provides	  the	  possibility	  to	  
start	   the	   individual	   petitions	   procedure	   before	   the	   Commission	   and	   cannot,	  hence,	  be	  interpreted	  as	  to	  prevent	  it	  to	  be	  concluded,	  if	  appropriate,	  before	  the	  Court.113	  	  Indeed,	  whereas	   arguably	   the	   terms	   in	  which	   the	  BdPC	  has	   been	   included	   in	  the	  competences	  of	  the	  IACrtHR	  abide	  to	  Article	  31114	  VCLT,	  strictly	  speaking,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  113	  In	  Cotton	  Field,	  the	  IACrtHR	  briefly	  addresses	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  drafter’s	  intent	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  BdPC,	   concluding	   that	   the	   travaux	   préparatoires	   provide	   no	   evidence	   of	   an	   objection	   to	   its	  contentious	  jurisdiction.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  Court	  emphasises	  that,	  given	  the	  arguments	  provided	  in	  its	   lengthy	   systematic	   and	   teleological	   interpretation,	   subsidiary	   references	   to	   the	   preparatory	  work	  would	  not,	  in	  fact,	  be	  necessary	  (para.	  72).	  114	  Article	   31	   (General	   Rule	   of	   Interpretation):	   1.	   A	   treaty	   shall	   be	   interpreted	   in	   good	   faith	   in	  
accordance	  with	  the	  ordinary	  meaning	  to	  be	  given	  to	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  treaty	  in	  their	  context	  and	  in	  
the	  light	  of	  its	  object	  and	  purpose.	  2.	  The	  context	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  interpretation	  of	  a	  treaty	  shall	  
comprise,	   in	  addition	  to	  the	  text,	   including	  its	  preamble	  and	  annexes:	  (a)	  any	  agreement	  relating	  to	  
the	  treaty	  which	  was	  made	  between	  all	  the	  parties	  in	  connection	  with	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  treaty;	  (b)	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States	   might	   consider	   it	   a	   forceful	   stretching	   of	   their	   consent115	  to	   a	   BdPC,	  which,	  without	   doubt,	   does	   not	   explicitly	   refer	   to	   the	   IACrtHR.	  However,	   the	  grounds	   on	  which	   the	   Court	   establishes	   its	   competence	   on	   the	   BdPC,	   after	   a	  teleological	   and	   systematic	   interpretation	   and	   revising	   all	   the	   different	  formulas	   used	   in	   the	   specific	   instruments	   of	   the	   American	   corpus	   juris,	  diminishes	  the	  strength	  of	  these	  arguments	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  BdPC.	  	  In	  discarding	  Mexico’s	   arguments,	   the	  Court	   stated	   that	   “it	  appears	  clear	  that	  
the	   literal	  meaning	  of	  Article	  12	  of	   the	  Convention	  of	  Belém	  do	  Pará	  grants	   the	  
Court	   jurisdiction,	   by	   not	   excepting	   from	   its	   application	   any	   of	   the	   procedural	  
requirements	   for	   individual	   communications”	   (para.	   41),	   and	   further	   clarified	  that	   ”based	   on	   a	   systematic	   interpretation,	   there	   is	   nothing	   in	   Article	   12	   to	  
indicate	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Commission	  should	  apply	  Article	  
51	  of	   the	  American	  Convention	  only	  partially.	   It	   is	   true	   that	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  
Commission	   can	   decide	   not	   to	   forward	   a	   case	   to	   the	   Court,	   but	   there	   is	   no	  
provision,	  in	  the	  American	  Convention,	  or	  in	  Article	  12	  of	  the	  Convention	  of	  Belém	  
do	  Pará	  that	  prohibits	  a	  case	  being	  forwarded	  to	  the	  Court	  if	  the	  Commission	  so	  
decides.	   Article	   51	   is	   clear	   on	   this	   point”	   (para.	   54).	   Hence,	   once	   a	   case	  concerning	   breaches	   to	   the	   BdPC	   is	   referred	   to	   the	   Court,	   the	   latter	   “cannot	  
refrain	   from	   exercising	   jurisdiction	   (…),	   because	   this	   would	   be	   contrary	   to	   the	  
principle	  of	  effectiveness”	  (para.	  63).	  116	  
	  Incidentally,	   we	   note	   that	   such	   attitude	   of	   the	   Court	   should	   not	   be	  misinterpreted	  as	  an	  excessive	  emphasis	  directed	  specifically	  on	  the	  BdPC.	  As	  mentioned,	   in	  Las	  Palmeras	  the	   IACrtHR	  had	  used	  the	  same	  argumentation	  to	  clarify	   the	   Commission’s	   competence	   on	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   Convention	   on	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
any	   instrument	   which	   was	  made	   by	   one	   or	  more	   parties	   in	   connection	   with	   the	   conclusion	   of	   the	  
treaty	  and	  accepted	  by	  the	  other	  parties	  as	  an	  instrument	  related	  to	  the	  treaty.	  3.	  There	  shall	  be	  taken	  
into	  account,	  together	  with	  the	  context:	  (a)	  any	  subsequent	  agreement	  between	  the	  parties	  regarding	  
the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  treaty	  or	  the	  application	  of	  its	  provisions;	  (b)	  any	  subsequent	  practice	  in	  the	  
application	  of	  the	  treaty	  which	  establishes	  the	  agreement	  of	  the	  parties	  regarding	  its	  interpretation;	  
(c)	  any	  relevant	  rules	  of	  international	  law	  applicable	  in	  the	  relations	  between	  the	  parties.	  4.	  A	  special	  
meaning	  shall	  be	  given	  to	  a	  term	  if	  it	  is	  established	  that	  the	  parties	  so	  intended.	  115	  For	   analyses	   of	   other	   cases	   in	   which	   the	   Court	   controversially	   “bypassed”	   the	   traditional	  concept	  of	  the	  explicit	  consent,	  refer	  to:	  Drnas	  de	  Clément,	  2010	  and	  to	  Judge	  Cançado	  Trindade’s	  Concurring	  Opinion	  to	  Caesar	  v.	  Trinidad	  y	  Tobago,	  where	  he	  argues	  that	  the	  traditional	  concept	  of	  
consensualism	   is	   “an	   issue	   of	   the	   past”	   and	   that	   the	   VCLT	   should	   be	   subtracted	   from	   the	   mere	  voluntarism	  of	  States	  (para.	  3).	  116	  Refer	  to	  IACrtHR	  jurisprudence	  on	  the	  institutional	  integrity	  of	  the	  protection	  system	  enshrined	  in	  the	  ACHR:	   	  Viviana	  Gallardo	  et	  al.	  (paras.	  12,	  16,	  20,	  21	  and	  22),	  Acevedo	  Jaramillo	  et	  al.	  v.	  Peru,	  (para.	  174).	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Forced	  Disappearance	  of	  Persons,	  which	  Colombia	  had	  questioned	  on	  similar	  grounds.117	  	  Moreover,	   in	   the	   relevant	   jurisprudence,	  we	   found	  evidence	   that,	  while	   the	   Court	   considers	   established	   its	   competence	   on	   the	   BdPC,	   it	   shows	  caution	   towards	   the	   abuse	   of	   references	   to	   such	   instrument.	   In	   Ríos	   et	   al.	   v.	  
Venezuela	  (2009)	  and	  Perozo	  v.	  Venezuela	  (2009),	   the	  Court	  does	  not	   analyse	  the	  facts	  under	  the	  invoked	  BdPC	  provisions,	  given	  that	  the	  evidence	  provided	  by	   the	   representatives	   did	   not	   support	   the	   allegations	   that	   the	   attacks	  were	  especially	  directed	  against	  women,	  based	  on	  (or	  aggravated	  by)	  their	  condition	  of	   being	   women,	   or	   that	   the	   violations	   affected	   women	   in	   an	   different	   or	  disproportional	  manner.	  Moreover,	  no	  evidence	  had	  been	  provided	  to	  point	  at	  laws,	   regulations	   or	   practices	   sustaining	   the	   persistence	   and	   tolerance	   of	  violence	  against	  women.118	  	  In	   Cotton	   field,	   the	   Court	   shows	   its	   self-­‐restrain,	   clarifying	   the	   distinction	  between	  Article	  7	  and	  other	  BdPC	  provisions,	  excluding	  the	  latters	  as	  possible	  bases	   to	   initiate	   an	   individual	   petition	   procedure.	   While	   recalling	   the	   pro	  
personae	  principle,	  which	  allows	  their	  use	  for	  complementary	  interpretation	  of	  the	  ACHR,	  the	  Court	  argues:	  “[…]	  that	  the	  systematic	  and	  teleological	  criteria	  are	  
insufficient	   to	  give	   them	  preference	  over	  what	   is	   clearly	   indicated	  by	   the	   literal	  
meaning	  of	  Article	  12	  of	  the	  Convention	  of	  Belém	  do	  Pará,	  which	  establishes	  that	  
the	  petition	  system	  shall	  relate	  exclusively	  to	  possible	  violations	  of	  Article	  7	  of	  the	  
Convention.	   In	   this	   regard,	   the	  Court	  underscores	   that	   the	  principle	  of	   the	  most	  
favourable	   interpretation	  cannot	  be	  used	  as	  a	  basis	   for	  an	   inexistent	  normative	  
principle;	  in	  this	  case,	  the	  integration	  of	  Articles	  8	  and	  9	  into	  the	  literal	  meaning	  
of	   Article	   12.	   And	   this	   is	   despite	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   different	   Articles	   of	   the	  
Convention	   of	   Belém	   do	   Pará	   may	   be	   used	   to	   interpret	   it	   and	   other	   pertinent	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  117	  The	   same	   line	   of	   argumentation,	   according	   to	   which	   Article	   41.f	   ACHR	   allows	   to	   consider	  IACrtHR’s	   contentious	   jurisdiction	   as	   implicitly	   granted	   when	   other	   instruments	   establish	   a	  petition	   mechanism	   to	   be	   initiated	   before	   the	   Commission,	   can	   be	   found	   in	   Las	   Palmeras	   v.	  
Colombia	  (par.	   34).	   In	   relation	   to	   the	   BdPC,	   in	  Cotton	  Field	   the	   Court	  maintains	   that	   Article	   41.f	  ACHR	   “[…]	   refers	   to	   a	   sphere	   in	   which	   the	   powers	   of	   both	   the	   Commission	   and	   the	   Court	   are	  
streamlined	  at	  their	  respective	  moments”	  (par.	  55).	  Article	  XIII	  of	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Convention	  on	  Forced	  Disappearance	  of	  Persons	  is	  cleared	  than	  Article	  12	  BdPC,	  stating	  that:	  “For	  the	  purposes	  of	  
this	   Convention,	   the	   processing	   of	   petitions	   or	   communications	   presented	   to	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  
Commission	   on	  Human	  Rights	   alleging	   the	   forced	   disappearance	   of	   persons	   shall	   be	   subject	   to	   the	  
procedures	   established	   in	   the	   American	   Convention	   on	   Human	   Rights	   and	   to	   the	   Statue	   and	  
Regulations	   of	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   Commission	   on	   Human	   Rights	   and	   to	   the	   Statute	   and	   Rules	   of	  
Procedure	  of	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights,	   including	   the	  provisions	  on	  precautionary	  
measures”.	  118	  Ríos	  et	  al.	  v.	  Venezuela	  (Preliminary	  Objections,	  para.	  274-­‐280);	  Perozo	  et	  al.	  v.	  Venezuela	  (para.	  291-­‐296).	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Inter-­‐American	   instruments”	   (para.79).119	  Arguably,	   this	   self-­‐restrain	   adds	   to	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  Court’s	  previous	  argumentations.	  	  	  Although	   the	   contentious	   jurisdiction	   of	   the	   IACrtHR	   appears	   to	   be	   currently	  consolidated,	   the	   “unfortunate”	   ambiguity	  of	  Article	  12	  did	  have	   the	  negative	  outcome	  of	  requiring	  the	  Court’s	  interpretation	  of	  its	  meaning,	  and	  the	  defence	  of	  its	  conclusions	  to	  confront,	  non	  spurious,	  objections.	  This	  is	  an	  undesirable	  and	  avoidable	  problem,	  exposing	   the	  Court	   to	   the	  risk	  of	  a	  negative	   influence	  on	   its	   legitimacy	  and	  on	   that	  of	   the	  BdPC	   itself.	  Furthermore,	   considering	   the	  way	   in	   which	   the	   occasion	   for	   clarifying	   the	   issue	   was	   provided,	   i.e.	   a	  Commission’s	   application	   to	   the	   Court	   that	   did	   not	   include	   references	   to	   the	  BdPC,	   we	   can	   further	   argue	   that	   this	   ambiguity	   might	   have	   influenced	  Commission’s	  previous	  decisions	  to	  limit	  to	  its	  competence	  the	  proceedings	  of	  possibly	  crucial	  cases,	  preventing	  their	  referral	  to	  the	  Court	  and,	  thus,	  actually	  delaying	   the	   full	   development	   of	   the	   BdPC	   as	   a	   justiciable	   instrument	   in	   the	  Inter-­‐American	  System.	  	  	  Reviewing	  the	  cases	  that	  ended	  in	  a	  Commission’s	  Report,	  we	  found	  grounds	  to	  support	   this	  claim.	   Indeed,	  submitting	   to	   the	  Court	  a	  path-­‐breaking	  case	  such	  as	  Maria	  da	  Penha	  v.	  Brazil	  (2001),	  the	  first	  case	  concerning	  domestic	  violence	  in	   the	   new	   framework	   provided	   by	   the	   BdPC	   and	   CEDAW	   General	  Recommendation	   19,	   would	   have	   been	   more	   appropriate,	   given	   the	   higher	  resonance	   and	   impact	   of	   IACrtHR’s	   judgments	   compared	   to	   Commission’s	  Reports.	  We	  believe	  that	  such	  argument	  finds	  grounds	  in	  the	  disappointment,	  expressed	  by	   Judge	  Cançado	  Trindade,	   former	  President	  of	   the	   IACrtHR,	  who	  goes	   as	   far	   as	   to	   question	   the	   desirability	   of	   the	   filter	   constituted	   by	   the	  Commission,	   praising	   petitioners	   and	   representatives’	   increased	   ability	   in	  presenting	   the	   facts	   in	   the	   most	   appropriate	   manner	   (Concurring	   Opinion,	  
Castro-­‐Castro,	  paras.	   38-­‐39).	  We	   cannot	  but	   read	   in	  his	   statement	   an	   implicit	  disappointment	   for	   the	   late	   occasion	   provided	   to	   the	   Court	   to	   use	   the	   new	  instrument.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  119	  Therefore,	  whereas	  the	  Court	  clarified	  its	  compulsory	  jurisdiction	  to	  examine	  alleged	  violations	  of	  Article	  7	  BdPC,	  it	  does	  not	  do	  the	  same	  for	  what	  concerns	  Articles	  8	  and	  9	  BdPC,	  which,	  as	  the	  other	  conventional	  provisions,	  might	  only	  be	  used	  as	  interpretive	  tools	  for	  ACHR	  norms.	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A	  matter	  of	  wording	  or	  neglect	  	  Considering	   feminist	   legal	   scholars	   critiques	   on	   the	   shortcomings	   of	  international	  human	  rights	  law	  in	  protecting	  and	  promoting	  women’s	  rights,	  it	  is	   interesting	   to	   analyse	   the	   question	   of	   the	   delayed	   use	   of	   the	   BdPC	   as	   a	  justiciable	   instrument	   in	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   System	   taking	   into	   account	  feminist	  perspectives.	  	  Zuloaga	   focuses	  her	  criticism	  on	   the	   IACrtHR,	   interpreting	   its	  behaviour	  after	  the	   adoption	   of	   the	   BdPC	   “negligent,”	   given	   the	   increased	   international	  awareness	   on	   women’s	   and	   compared	   to	   the	   Commission’s	   performance.120	  This	  author	  argues	  that:	  “The	  Commission’s	  track	  record	  in	  the	  field	  of	  women’s	  
rights	  is	  better	  than	  the	  Court’s,	  particularly	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  violence	  
against	  women;	  in	  addition	  to	  having	  established	  a	  Rapporteurship	  on	  the	  Rights	  
of	   Women,	   the	   Commission	   has	   referred	   to	   the	   situation	   of	   women	   in	   country	  
reports	   since	   1995	   (Haiti)	   and	   there	   are	   several	   cases	   that	   were	   resolved	  
favourably	  for	  victims	  before	  the	  Commission.	  The	  element	  that	  is	  clearly	  lacking	  
in	  its	  history	  is	  a	  will	  to	  refer	  women’s	  rights	  complaints	  to	  the	  Court”	  	  	  (Zuloaga,	  2008).	  We	  shall	  argue	  that,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  our	  considerations	  on	  the	  problem	  created	  by	  Article	  12	  ambiguity	   and	   considering	   the	   interpretive	   effort	  made	  by	   the	   Court	   to	   clarify	   its	   contentious	   jurisdiction	   on	   the	   BdPC,	   Zuloaga’s	  arguments	   excessively	   underestimate	   the	   influence	   of	   technical	   factors	   that	  affected	   BdPC	   early	   life	   in	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   System,	   which	   substantially	  overshadowed	  the	  role	  that	  the	  alleged	  Court’s	  neglect	  might	  have	  played.	  On	  the	   contrary,	   we	   find	   that	   the	   Court’s	   strong	   intervention	   in	   establishing	   its	  competence	   on	   the	   BdPC,	   when	   provided	   with	   the	   occasion	   to	   do	   so	   by	   the	  
Castro-­‐Castro	   case,	   constitutes	   an	   evidence	   of	   its	   open	   attitude	   towards	   the	  BdPC,	  notwithstanding	   the	  extreme	  caution	  recognisable	   in	   the	  Commission’s	  behaviour.	  Nevertheless,	  as	  explained,	  the	  Court	  could	  have,	  motu	  proprio,	  used	  the	  BdPC	   as	   an	   interpretive	   tool	   for	  ACHR	  norms,	   even	  while	   its	   contentious	  jurisdiction	  was	   still	   uncertain.	   Although,	   as	   seen,	   in	   the	   first	   years	   after	   the	  adoption	  of	   the	  BdPC	   cases	   explicitly	   referred	   to	   facts	   of	  VAW	  concluded	   the	  procedures	   with	   Commission’s	   decisions,	   it	   is	   possible	   that,	   reviewing	   the	  totality	   of	   the	   cases	   submitted	   to	   the	   Court	   after	   the	   entry	   into	   force	   of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  120	  As	  we	  will	  see	  in	  detail	  in	  the	  following	  paragraphs,	  the	  first	  case	  in	  which	  the	  petitioners	  (but	  not	  the	  Commission’s	  application)	  invoke	  BdPC	  provisions,	  reaches	  the	  Court	  only	  in	  2004	  (Castro-­‐
Castro).	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convention,	   one	  might	   individuate	   specific	   violations	   based	   on	  which	   a	  more	  gender-­‐sensitive	   Court	   could	   have	   integrated	   the	   new	   perspective	   in	   the	  analyses.	   The	   likelihood	   of	   this	   possibility	   is	   suggested	   by	   a	   detail	   in	   Judge	  García	  Ramírez’	  Concurring	  Opinion	  to	  the	  Castro-­‐Castro	  case,	  who	  argues	  that,	  although	   the	   Court	   addressed	   several	   cases	   in	   which	   there	   were	   women	  victims,	   none	   concerned	   “directly	   and	   immediately	   (…)	   the	   victim’s	   female	  
condition”	   (García	   Ramírez,	   Concurring	   Opinion,	   Castro-­‐Castro	   case).121	  We	  argue	  that	  we	  cannot	  completely	  overlook	  the	  possibility	  that,	  were	  such	  cases	  examined	  by	  an	  expert	   in	  gender	  studies,	  García	  Ramírez’	  statement	  might	  be	  proved	  inaccurate.	  However,	  as	  we	  will	  see,	  the	  internalisation	  of	  the	  paradigm	  shift	   endorsed	   by	   the	   BdPC	   took	   several	   years,	   even	   in	   the	   case	   of	  Commission’s	  analyses	  of	  “easy”	  cases.	  	  	  Let	   us	   evaluate	   Zuloaga’s	   statement	   through	   a	   test:	   supposing	   to	   be	   able	   to	  single	  out	  one	  case	  in	  which	  the	  Court	  might	  have	  used	  motu	  proprio	  the	  BdPC	  as	  an	  additional	  tool	  of	  analysis,	  being	  able	  to	  argue	  its	  negligence	  would	  imply:	  a)	   that	   the	   Court	   considered	   its	   contentious	   jurisdiction	   uncontroversial	   or	  easily	   derivable	   as	   implied	   in	  Article	   12	  BdPC;	   b)	   that	   the	   Court	   had	   already	  developed	   its	   gender-­‐sensitiveness	   to	   the	   point	   of	   being	   able	   to	   individuate	  “gendered-­‐violations”	   in	   cases	   concerning	   completely	   different	   issues	   (and	  without	   it	   being	   suggested	   by	   the	   petitioners,	   the	   representatives,	   the	  Commission	   or	   in	   the	   Amici	   Curiae	   briefs),	   given	   that	   none	   of	   the	   petitions	  specifically	  concerning	  cases	  of	  VAW	  presented	  after	  the	  entry	  into	  force	  of	  the	  BdPC,	   was	   referred	   to	   the	   Court	   before	   the	   Castro-­‐Castro	   case.	   The	   first	  hypothesis	   can	   be	   rejected	   considering	   the	   complex	   interpretation	   through	  which	   the	   Court	   came	   to	   establish	   its	   contentious	   jurisdiction	   on	   the	   BdPC,	  unclear	   given	   the	   non-­‐univocal	   interpretation	   that	   the	  wording	   of	   Article	   12	  allowed.	   Moreover,	   the	   interpretation	   of	   the	   Court	   has	   been	   questioned	   on	  several	  grounds,	  providing	  evidence	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  “implicit	  competence”	  issue	  was	  not	  easily	  solvable.	  The	  second	  hypothesis,	  considering	  that	  the	  “easy	  gendered-­‐cased”	  had	  not	  been	  referred	  to	  the	  Court,	  constitutes	  an	  excessively	  high	  expectation,	  given	  the	   fact	   that	   feminist	   legal	  scholarship	  broadly	  agrees	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  121	  Contrary	  to	  what	  argued	  by	  Zuloaga,	  we	  point	  out	  that,	  in	  the	  analysed	  case,	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Court	  dos	  not	  argue	  “that	  the	  case	  in	  hand	  was	  the	  first	  one	  to	  ever	  present	  the	  Court	  with	  women’s	  
rights	   issues”	   (Zuloaga,	   2008,	   p.	   3).	   Somehow	   less	   controversially,	   the	   President	   states	   that	   no	  previous	  case	  was	  presented	  as	  concerning	  “directly	  and	  immediately	  the	  victim’s	  female	  condition”	  (Castro-­‐Castro	  case,	  Concurring	  Opinion,	  Judge	  García	  Ramírez,	  para.6).	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on	  recognising	  an	  inherent	  gender	  bias	   in	   international	   institutions.	  Zuloaga’s	  argument	  would	  require	  the	  IACrtHR	  to	  outshine	  in	  gender-­‐sensitiveness,	  in	  a	  period	  in	  which	  both	  the	  universal	  and	  regional	  systems	  were	   just	  starting	  to	  deal	   with	   the	   transformational	   understanding	   of	   women’s	   rights.	   Hence,	   we	  find	  this	  hypothesis	  partially	  acceptable,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  we	  cannot	  reject	  the	  claim	  of	  lack	  of	  gender	  sensitiveness,	  since	  it	  would	  require	  a	  thorough	  review	  of	  the	  totality	  of	  the	  cases	  submitted	  to	  the	  Court	  after	  the	  entry	   into	  force	  of	  the	   BdPC	   providing	   evidence	   of	   the	   non-­‐existence	   of	   a	   possibly	   gendered-­‐violation	   overlooked	   by	   the	   Court.	   However,	   we	   do	   not	   find	   this	   conclusion	  sufficient	  to	  blame	  the	  Court	  of	  negligence	  in	  its	  use	  of	  the	  BdPC,	  or	  a	  particular	  lack	  of	  gender-­‐sensitiveness	  in	  the	  Court.	  In	  fact,	  there	  are	  also	  cases	  before	  the	  adoption	   of	   the	   BdPC	   in	   which	   the	   Court	   satisfactorily	   addressed	   issues	   of	  gender	  equality	  (e.g.	  Advisory	  Opinion	  4/84).	  	  In	   conclusion,	   we	   shall	   add	   another	   interesting	   element	   that	   supports	   the	  influence	   of	   the	   technical	   obstacle	   in	   BdPC	   early	   history,	   and	   provides	   an	  acceptable	  justification	  for	  the	  long	  process	  that	  led	  to	  its	  full	  justiciability.	  Let	  us	   recall	   that	   the	   Commission	   did	   not	   include	   a	   reference	   to	   the	   BdPC	  provisions	   invoked	  by	  the	  petitioners	  when	  submitting	   the	  Castro-­‐Castro	  case	  to	  the	  Court.	  However,	  analysing	  the	  documents	  of	  the	  proceedings	  in	  front	  of	  the	  Court,	  we	  found	  evidence	  of	  a	  clear	  adoption	  of	  a	  gender	  perspective	  in	  the	  Commission’s	  argumentations.	  Moreover,	  after	  the	  competence	  issue	  had	  been	  settled,	   the	   Commission	   started	   to	   regularly	   submit	   to	   the	   Court	   cases	  involving	  breaches	   to	   the	  BdPC.	  We	  argue	   that	   the	  contradiction	  between,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  exclusion	  of	  a	  reference	  to	  BdPC	  provision	  and,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	   the	   keen	   gender-­‐sensitiveness	   that	   the	  Commission	   showed	  during	   the	  proceedings	   in	   front	   of	   the	   Court,	   provides	   grounds	   to	   suggest	   that	   the	  Commission	   purposely	   avoided	   the	   technical	   obstacle,	   in	   order	   to	   allow	   the	  Court	  to	  clarify	  what	  established	  by	  Article	  12	  BdPC,	  given	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  evidence	   provided	   in	   support	   of	   the	   allegation	   that	   the	   violations	   where	  especially	   directed	   to	   women	   and	   affected	   women	   in	   a	   disproportionate	  manner.	  In	  this	  perspective,	  both	  Institutions	  appear	  to	  have	  worked	  in	  tandem	  to	   overcome	   the	   problem	   created	   by	   the	   ambiguity	   of	   Article	   12	   BdPC.	  Admittedly,	   this	   approach	   might	   seem	   too	   optimistic,	   but	   it	   deserved	  mentioning.	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As	  seen	  in	  the	  reviewed	  cases,	  besides	  the	  delay	  in	  referring	  a	  case	  to	  the	  Court,	  and	  although	  the	  Commission	  waited	  for	  the	  petitioners	  to	  directly	  invoke	  the	  BdPC	   to	   inaugurate	   its	   use,	   the	   Commission	   soon	   showed	   an	   open	   attitude	  towards	   the	   new	   instrument,	   including	   it	   amongst	   its	   interpretive	   tools,	  besides	  the	  direct	  competence	  on	  Article	  7	  established	  by	  Article	  12	  BdPC.	  The	  procedures	  within	   the	   Commission	   often	   resulted	   in	   important	   advances	   for	  women’s	  rights	  (Medina	  Quiroga,	  1993,	  2003),	  as	  in	  the	  crucial	  Maria	  da	  Penha	  (2001),	   the	   first	   case	   of	   domestic	   violence	   addressed.	   However,	   we	   share	  Zuloaga’s	   concern	   about	   their	   minor	   symbolic	   meaning	   if	   compared	   to	   a	  judgement	   of	   the	   IACrtHR	   and,	   hence,	   their	   lower	   potential	   to	   extend	   their	  outcome	  beyond	   the	   limits	  of	   the	  concrete	  case.	  This	   shortcoming	   is	  partially	  counter-­‐balanced	  by	  the	  political	   influence	  of	   the	  Commission	   in	  the	  OAS	  and	  the	   critical	   function	   it	   performs	   through	   the	   preparation	   of	   Country	   Reports	  and	  Thematic	  Reports,	  as	  we	  shall	  see	  further	  on	  in	  this	  research.	  	  Zuloaga	   points	   out	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   Human	   Rights	   Instruments	   in	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   System	   are	   (still)	   mainly	   created	   and	   developed	   by	   men.	   In	  particular,	   the	   author	   emphasises	   the	   gender	   imbalance	   in	   Inter-­‐American	  Institutions,	   considering	   it	   one	   of	   the	   primary	   causes	   for	   the	   System’s	  shortcomings	  in	  gender-­‐related	  cases.	  In	  line	  with	  most	  feminist	  legal	  scholars	  (e.	   g.	   Charlesworth,	   1995;	   Coomaraswamy,	   Kois,	   1999),	   she	   argues	   that	   the	  gender-­‐bias	  is	  inherent	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  international	  control	  is	  allowed	  through	  consent	   of	   Latin	   American	   States,	   characterized	   by	   patriarchal	   structures	  (Zuloaga,	  2004)	  	  Reviewing	   the	   historical	   composition	   of	   Inter-­‐American	   Institution	  we	   found	  strong	   evidence	   of	   the	   gender	   imbalance	   argued	   by	   Zuloaga.	   Nevertheless,	  currently,	  four	  out	  of	  seven	  Commissioners	  of	  the	  IACrtHR	  are	  women122.	  This	  is	   not	   the	   result	   of	   some	   specific	   rule	   adopted	   to	   guarantee	   balanced	  representation	   of	   man	   and	   women,	   but	   a	   spontaneous	   sudden	   change,	  triggered	  by	  the	  raising	  international	  awareness,	  after	  years	  of	  severe	  women	  under-­‐representation	  in	  the	  institution.	  From	  1960	  to	  2011	  only	  six	  out	  of	  fifty-­‐seven	   commissioners	   were	   women.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   there	   is	   currently	   no	  women	   judge	   amongst	   the	  7	   of	   the	   IACrtHR	  and	   since	   its	   establishment	   only	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  122 	  We	   updated	   the	   data	   reviewed	   in	   Zuloaga’s	   study	   to	   include	   the	   period	   2007-­‐2013.	   The	  chronology	   of	   Commission’s	   composition	   can	   be	   consulted	   in	   the	  website	   of	   the	  Organization	   of	  American	  States	  at:	  www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/composition.asp	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four	  out	  of	  thirty-­‐three	  judges	  were	  women.	  No	  specific	  rule	  has	  been,	  to	  date,	  devised	   to	   increase	   female	  representation.	   Interestingly,	   the	   first	  woman	  was	  appointed	  to	  the	  bench	  in	  1989,	  and	  served	  for	  the	  period	  1989-­‐1994,	  in	  direct	  coincidence	   with	   the	   raising	   international	   awareness	   on	   the	   structural	  discrimination	  experienced	  by	  women,	  both	  in	  the	  region,	  with	  the	  preparatory	  works	   for	   the	   Belém	   do	   Pará	   Convention,	   and	   internationally,	   with	   the	  increased	   efforts	   in	   promoting	   CEDAW	   implementation,	   that	   resulted	   in	  General	   Recommendation	   19.	   Cecilia	   Medina	   Quiroga,	   who	   had	   previously	  served	   on	   the	   UN	   Human	   Rights	   Committee	   at	   the	   time	   of	   General	  Recommendation	  28	  and	  presented	  extensive	  previous	  experience	  in	  the	  field	  of	   women’s	   rights,	   was	   appointed	   in	   2004,	   ten	   years	   later,	   and	   served	   as	  President	   in	  2008-­‐2009.	  Again,	   although	   it	  would	  be	  excessive	   to	   recognise	  a	  direct	  link,	  we	  shall	  notice	  that	  her	  appointment	  follows	  another	  big	  step	  in	  the	  Universal	   System	  of	   protection	   of	  women’s	   right,	   namely	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	  2000	  Option	  Protocol	  to	  CEDAW.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  issue	  of	  women’s	  rights	  was	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  human	  rights	  discourse	  in	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  System,	  following	   the	   IACommHR’s	   path-­‐breaking	   2001	   Maria	   da	   Penha	   decision,	  which	  inaugurated	  BdPC	  use.	  The	  last	  two	  women	  judges	  served	  in	  the	  period	  2007-­‐2013,	  nominated	  and	  appointed	  while	  Judge	  Cecilia	  Medina	  Quiroga	  was	  President	  of	  the	  Court.	  	  The	  gender	  imbalance	  in	  Inter-­‐American	  Institutions	  reflects	  that	  recognised	  in	  all	   international	   institutions	   by	   feminist	   legal	   scholars,	   and	   gives	   rise	   to	   the	  same	   criticisms.	   Zuloaga	   stresses	   it	   as	   one	   of	   the	   main	   reasons	   of	   what	   she	  considers	   the	   early	   negligent	   attitude	   of	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   Court	   towards	  VAW	  and	  the	  BdPC,	  disregarding	  the	  technical	  explanation	  previously	  analysed	  (Zuloaga,	  2004).	  Notably,	  the	  author	  points	  at	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  crucial	  decision	  on	  the	  Castro-­‐Castro	  case	  was	  taken	  when	  Cecilia	  Medina	  Quiroga	  was	  a	  Judge	  in	  the	  Court.123	  	  	  However,	   from	   our	   analysis	   of	   the	   documents	   of	   the	   case,	   we	   do	   not	   find	  evidence	  of	  a	  crucial	  contribution	  on	  her	  behalf,	  whereas,	  as	  noticed,	  the	  actual	  evolutionary	   content	   of	   the	   judgement	   can	   be	   directly	   attributed	   to	   the	  contributions	   of	   Judges	   García	   Ramírez	   and	   Cançado	   Trindade’s	   mentioned	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  123	  For	  analysis	  on	  the	   influence	  of	  gender	  on	  the	  outcome	  of	  cases	  see:	  Phyllis	  Coontz,	  2000	  and	  Minow,	  1990.	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Concurring	  Opinions,	  both	  men.	  In	  addition,	  we	  underline	  that	  the	  occasion	  for	  this	  path-­‐breaking	  decision	  was	  offered	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Commission,	  for	  the	  first	   time,	  had	  referred	   to	   the	  Court	  a	  case	   in	  which	   the	  petitioners,	  women’s	  rights	  organisations,	  invoked	  the	  BdPC	  (although,	  we	  recall,	  without	  including	  these	  provisions	  in	  its	  application	  to	  the	  Court).	  Therefore,	  there	  is	  no	  way	  to	  establish	   that	   the	   decision	   would	   have	   been	   different	   if	   it	   were	   not	   for	   the	  presence	   of	   a	   woman	   judge	   on	   the	   bench,	   given	   that	   there	   are	   no	   similar	  previous	   experiences.	   Additionally,	   as	   the	   same	   author	   points	   out,	   when	   the	  
Aloeboetoe	   case	   was	   decided,	   in	   1993,	   before	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	   BdPC,	   a	  women	   Judge	   integrated	   the	   composition	   of	   the	   Court.	   In	   Aloeboetoe,	   a	  potentially	  gender-­‐sensitive	  issue	  concerning	  reparations	  to	  spouses	  of	  victims	  in	  a	  context	  of	  polygamy,	  was	  not	  solved	  in	  a	  favourable	  way	  for	  what	  concerns	  women’s	  rights.	  	  	  On	   the	   contrary,	   one	   might	   argue	   that	   all	   events,	   i.e.	   Judge	   Cecilia	   Medina	  Quiroga’s	   appointment,	   the	   petitioners	   reference	   to	   the	   BdPC	   and	   IACrtHR	  path-­‐breaking	   ruling	   in	   Castro-­‐Castro,	   should	   be	   read	   as	   an	   evidence	   of	   the	  effects	  of	  the	  international	  and	  regional	  efforts	  to	  disseminate	  and	  promote	  the	  recently	  emerged	  understanding	  on	  gender	  issues,	  evidenced	  by	  the	  mentioned	  turning	  points	   in	   the	  history	  of	  women’s	   rights	   in	   international	  human	  rights	  law.	  While	  Zuloaga	  stresses	  the	  disappointing	  neglect	  of	  a	  gender-­‐perspective	  in	   the	   IACrtHR,	   given	   the	   general	   raised	   concern	   on	   women’s	   rights,	   we	  consider	   this	   changing	   context	   the	   framework	   in	   which	   the	   IACrtHR	   finds	  conclusive	   arguments	   to	   ground	   its	   (otherwise	   not	   univocally	   established)	  competence	  on	  the	  BdPC.	  	  	  Notably,	   it	   was	   after	   a	   lengthy	   debate	   on	   the	   need	   to	   guarantee	   CEDAW	  effectiveness	   that	   the	   Optional	   Protocol	   was	   adopted	   in	   2000,	   attributing	   to	  CEDAW	   Committee	   (previously	   only	   a	   monitoring	   body)	   the	   competence	   to	  receive	   and	   consider	   complaints	   from	   individuals	   or	   groups	   within	   the	  jurisdiction	  of	   the	  countries	  ratifying	  this	  additional	   instrument.	  Although	  the	  IACrtHR	  does	  not	  explicitly	  mention	  this	  change	  in	  Universal	  System	  amongst	  the	  arguments	  used	  to	  establish	  its	  competence,	  we	  are	  allowed	  to	  imagine	  that	  the	   debate	   on	   CEDAW	   justiciability,	   triggered	   by	   its	   disappointing	   impact	   on	  member	  countries	  (Merry,	  2003,	  2006),	   increased	  the	  urgency	  and	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  Court’s	   final	  decision	  allowing	  BdPC	  justiciability	   in	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  System.	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  Given	   the	   problem	   created	   by	   the	   ambiguous	   wording	   of	   Article	   12	   BdPC,	  capable	  of	  negatively	   influencing	   the	   legitimacy	  of	   the	  Court’s	  on	   the	  basis	  of	  States	  Party’s	  controversial	  consent,	   it	  would	  have	  been	  inappropriate	  for	  the	  IACrtHR	   to	   refer	   to	  a	  change	   in	  CEDAW	  enforcement	  mechanism	  as	  a	   further	  argument	  to	  ground	  its	  contentious	  jurisdiction	  on	  the	  BdPC.	  In	  fact,	  in	  no	  way	  could	   such	  an	  argument,	   on	   the	  grounds	  of	   the	  desirability	  of	   a	   judicial	   body	  with	  competence	  on	  the	  convention,	  overcome	  the	  problem	  represented	  by	  the	  possible	   criticisms	  based	  on	   the	   lack	  of	   an	   explicit	   consent.	   Indeed,	   a	   judicial	  body	  cannot	  extend	  its	  contentious	  jurisdiction	  on	  a	  treaty	  because	  it	  has	  been	  proven	   to	   be	   a	  more	   suitable	   solution	   to	   guarantee	   its	   effectiveness,	   since	   it	  would	  imply	  an	  unjustifiable	  arbitrariness.	  The	  point	  is	  self-­‐evident,	  and	  made	  even	   cleared	   by	   the	   fact	   that,	   in	   order	   to	   give	   to	   CEDAW	   Committee	   the	  competence	   to	   receive	   complaints,	   the	   Universal	   System	   needed	   to	   adopt	   a	  further	  treaty,	  with	  its	  own	  ratification	  iter,	  to	  which	  CEDAW	  States	  Party	  can	  optionally	   consent.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   correctly,	   the	   IACrtHR	   derives	   its	  competence	   through	   the	   “implicit	   complete	   procedure”	   argumentation,	   and	  after	  a	   lengthy	  systematic	  and	   teleological	   interpretation,	  which	   legitimize	   its	  decision	   on	   consistent	   grounds.	   Zuloaga	   recognises	   the	   significance	   of	   this	  effort,	   although	   in	   a	  way	   that	   could	  be	   considered	   as	   actually	  diminishing	   its	  legitimacy,	  and	  contributing	  to	  the	  arguments	  of	  those	  who	  claim	  the	  IACrtHR	  tendency	   to	   judicial	   activism,	   since	   she	   defines	   it	   an	   act	   of	   “considerable	  
creativity	  and	  political	  bravery”	  (Zuloaga,	  2008,	  p.	  56).	  	  Considering	  that	   is	  up	  to	  the	  Commission	  to	  refer	  a	  case	  to	   the	  Court,	  a	  more	  conclusive	   analysis	   should	   focus	   on	   establishing	   if	   the	   gender	   bias	   in	  Commission’s	   membership	   influenced	   its	   reluctance	   to	   refer	   to	   the	   Court	  petitions	  invoking	  the	  BdPC	  received	  before	  Castro-­‐Castro,	  besides	  those	  ended	  with	  a	  friendly	  settlement.	  Arguably,	  for	  instance,	  the	  peculiar	  features	  of	  Maria	  
Da	   Penha,	   the	   first	   case	   of	   domestic	   violence,	   should	   have	   encouraged	   the	  Commission	   to	   submit	   it	   to	   Court.	   However,	   the	   difficulty	   in	   establishing	   an	  uncontroversial	  causal	  relation,	  given	  the	  unavailability	  of	  separate	  individual	  positions	   such	  as	   those	   represented	  by	   the	  Concurring	  Opinions	   in	   IACrtHR’s	  case	  law,	  might	  constitute	  an	  obstacle	  to	  such	  analysis.	  For	  instance,	  looking	  at	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  Commission	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Maria	  da	  Penha	  petition,	  we	   find	   a	  woman	  Commissioner	   (the	   previous	   one	   dated	   back	   to	   1984).	   The	  fact	   that	   the	   BdPC	   is	   invoked	   in	   the	   petitioners	   submission,	   diminishes	   its	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relevance	   as	   a	   piece	   of	   evidence	   of	   a	   particular	   influence	   of	   the	   presence	   of	  women	  in	  Inter-­‐American	  Institutions	  in	  triggering	  the	  use	  and	  development	  of	  the	  BdPC,	  since	  the	  documents	  of	  the	  case	  do	  not	  provide	  evidence	  of	  her	  role	  in	   the	   decision.	   A	   further	   assessment	   of	   the	   argued	   negative	   influence	   of	   the	  gender-­‐bias	  on	   the	   status	   and	  effectiveness	  of	  women’s	   right	   in	   international	  law	  might	  focus	  on	  the	  composition	  of	  OAS	  Assembly,	  during	  the	  voting	  of	  each	  proposed	  article	  of	  the	  BdPC	  draft	  text.	  In	  fact,	  the	  original	  version	  of	  Article	  15	  explicitly	   granted	   contentious	   jurisdiction	   to	   the	   IACrtHR,124	  but	   it	   did	   not	  reach	   the	   required	   number	   of	   favourable	   votes	   to	   be	   adopted.	   A	   thorough	  review	  of	   the	  discussion	  and	  voting	  on	  Article	  15,	  combined	  with	  a	  review	  of	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  Assembly,	  might	  provide	  some	  interesting	  elements	  to	  understand	  why	  that	  unambiguous	  wording	  was	  questioned,	  and	  highlight	  the	  factors	   that	   might	   have	   caused	   its	   discarding	   (amongst	   which,	   women	  underrepresentation	  might	  appear).	  	  	  Although	  we	   do	   not	   believe	   that	   the	   elimination	   of	   gender	   imbalance	  would	  undoubtedly	  facilitate	  these	  Institutions’	  gender	  sensitiveness,	  we	  do	  share	  the	  view	   that	   a	   judge	   (or	   Commissioner)	   “whose	   experiences	   and	   consequent	  
perception	   of	   the	  world	   [allow]	   to	   appreciate	   the	   gender	   aspects	   of	   the	   cases”	  (Zuloaga,	   2008)	   would	   increase	   its	   likelihood.	   Admittedly,	   the	   probability	   of	  such	  experiences	  being	  in	  the	  background	  of	  a	  woman	  judge	  is	  higher.	  On	  this	  line,	   we	   signal	   that,	   although	   the	   Court	   has	   adopted	   no	   rule	   to	   eliminate	  gender-­‐imbalance,	   it	   recently	   began	   to	   support	   specialized	   capacity-­‐building	  studies	  by	  its	  lawyers.	  	  In	  conclusion,	  and	  having	  considered	  several	  possible	  criticisms,	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	   process	   that	   led	   to	   BdPC	   justiciability	   in	   the	   Inter	   American	   System	  provides	  strong	  evidence	  of	  the	  crucial	  effect	  that	  the	  lack	  of	  clarity	  of	  Article	  12	   BdPC	   had	   on	   BdPC	   early	   history.	   In	   the	   following	   paragraphs	   we	   shall	  analyse	  the	  process	  through	  which	  the	  BdPC	  has	  been	  internalised	  in	  the	  Inter-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  124	  In	   the	   draft	   version	   of	   the	   BdPC	   Article	   15	   stated:	   “Any	   State	   Party	  may,	   at	   any	   time	   and	   in	  
accordance	  with	  the	  norms	  and	  procedures	  stipulated	  in	  the	  American	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights,	  
declare	   that	   it	   accepts	   as	   obligatory,	   automatically	   and	   without	   any	   special	   convention,	   the	  
jurisdiction	   of	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   Court	   of	   Human	   Rights	   over	   all	   the	   cases	   relating	   to	   the	  
interpretation	  or	  application	  of	  the	  present	  Convention”.	  The	  article	  obtained	  16	  votes	  in	  favour	  and	  4	  abstentions,	  not	  reaching	  the	  threshold	  of	  18	  votes	  in	  favour	  required	  to	  be	  included	  in	  the	  final	  text.	  This	  detail	  allowed	  the	  IACrtHR	  to	  argue	  that,	  given	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  OAS	  is	  constituted	  by	  22	  countries,	   “it	   is	   incorrect	   to	   say	   that	  a	  majority	  was	  not	   in	   favour	  of	  approving	   this	  Article;	   it	  was	  
merely	  that	  it	  did	  not	  obtain	  a	  sufficient	  number	  of	  votes”	  (Cotton	  Field,	  para.	  72).	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American	  System	  and	  implemented	  in	  the	  region.	  	  	  	  
Technical	  shortcomings	  through	  a	  gender	  perspective	  	  Zuloaga	   considers	   the	   early	   shortcomings	   of	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions	   in	  using	   the	   BdPC	   a	   further	   prove	   of	   the	   undesirability	   of	   a	   specific	   separate	  convention,	  providing	  a	  catalogue	  of	  rights	  already	  included	  in	  the	  ACHR	  and,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  not	  encompassing	  all	  the	  general	  norms.	  In	  her	  view,	  in	  line	  with	  the	  reviewed	  feminist	   literature,	   this	  choice	  carries	   the	  risk	  of	  excluding	  such	  rights	  from	  the	  general	  coverage	  provided	  by	  the	  ACHR.125	  	  	  The	   findings	   from	   our	   analysis	   on	   Inter-­‐American	   case	   law	   on	   VAW	   do	   not	  support	   this	   view.	  On	   the	   contrary,	   there	   is	   extensive	   evidence	   of	   the	   crucial	  function	   performed	   by	   the	   BdPC	   as	   a	   tool	   to	   promote	   the	   progressive	  interpretation	  of	  ACHR	  norms	  by	  Inter-­‐American	  Institutions.	  	  In	  all	  cases	   in	  which	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions	  refer	   to	  Article	  7	  BdPC,	  such	  provision	   is	   read	   in	   conjunction	   with	   general	   ACHR	   provisions	   prohibiting	  discrimination.	   In	   particular,	   both	   the	   Commission	   and	   the	   Court	   establish	   a	  direct	   link	   with	   Article	   1.1	   ACHR	   (Obligation	   to	   Respect	   Rights)	   stating	   that	  “The	   States	   Parties	   to	   this	   Convention	   undertake	   to	   respect	   the	   rights	   and	  
freedoms	   recognised	   herein	   and	   to	   ensure	   to	   all	   persons	   subject	   to	   their	  
jurisdiction	   the	   free	  and	   full	   exercise	  of	   those	   rights	  and	   freedoms,	  without	  any	  
discrimination	   for	   reasons	   of	   race,	   colour,	   sex,	   language,	   religion,	   political	   or	  
other	  opinion,	  national	  or	  social	  origin,	  economic	  status,	  birth,	  or	  any	  other	  social	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  125 	  Interestingly,	   considering	   the	   arguments	   provided	   by	   the	   Court	   when	   establishing	   its	  contentious	   jurisdiction	   on	   the	   BdPC,	   Zuloaga	   expresses	   concern	   about	   the	   possible	   negative	  outcome	  on	   the	  Court’s	  credibility.	  However,	   she	   recognises	   that	   the	   arguments	  of	   the	  Court	   are	  not,	  per	  se,	   illegitimate.	  She	  considers	  this	  event	  as	  an	  evidence	  of	  the	  Court’s	  continuous	  attempt	  to	   “catch	  up	  to	   its	  contemporaries	   in	   the	   field	  of	  gender	   justice,	  and	  this	   type	  of	   situation	  generally	  
creates	  a	  risk	  of	  overcompensation	  that	  could,	  in	  fact,	  be	  detrimental	  to	  the	  initial	  purpose”	  (Zuloaga,	  2008,	   p.	   78).	   We	   can	   only	   partially	   agree	   with	   this	   view.	  While	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   we	   share	   the	  concern	  about	  the	  necessity	  of	  clearer	  rules	  on	  the	  competences	  of	  Inter-­‐American	  Institutions,	  to	  avoid	   the	   risk	   of	   their	   actions	   to	   be	   perceived	   as	   arbitrarily	   exceeding	   their	   limits,	   on	   the	   other	  hand	  we	  do	  not	  consider	  the	  analysed	  issue	  as	  an	  evidence	  of	  the	  Court’s	  delay	  compared	  to	  a	  more	  advanced	   general	   consensus,	   given	   that	   it	   was	   the	   first	   international	   body	   recognizing	   full	  justiciability	  to	  a	  specific	  convention	  on	  women’s	  rights.	  Additionally,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  our	  previous	  analysis	  of	  IACrtHR’s	  systematic	  and	  teleological	  argumentation	  to	  clarify	  its	  competence,	  neither	  we	  find	  strong	  bases	  to	  consider	  it	  an	  act	  of	  overcompensation.	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condition”.	  The	  same	  link	  is	  explicitly	  argued	  in	  reference	  to	  Article	  24	  (Equal	  Protection)	  ACHR,	  and	  used	  in	  several	  cases,	  such	  as:	  Maria	  da	  Penha	  v.	  Brazil,	  
Marcela	   Andrea	   Valdés	   Díaz	   v.	   Chile	   and	   the	   still	   pending	   Maria	   Isabel	   Véliz	  
Franco	  et	  al	  v.	  Guatemala.	  
	  Given	  the	  critical	  role	  of	  States’	  positive	  obligations	  and	  due	  diligence	  for	  what	  concerns	   the	   right	   to	  effective	   judicial	  proceedings,	   and	   recognising	   impunity	  as	   a	   generalised	   structural	   pattern	   in	   cases	   of	   VAW,	   all	   reviewed	   cases	   are	  contemporarily	   evaluated	   under	   Articles	   8	   (Right	   to	   a	   Fair	   Trial)	   and	   25	  (Judicial	   Protection)	   ACHR.	   This	   link	   is	   assertively	   clarified	   in	   Fernández-­‐
Ortega	  et	  al.	  v.	  Mexico	  and	  Rosendo-­‐Cantú	  et	  al.	   v.	  Mexico,	  where	   the	   IACrtHR	  argues	   that,	   in	   cases	  of	  VAW,	  Articles	  8	  and	  25	  ACHR	  are	   “complemented	  and	  
enhanced	   by	   the	   obligations	   arising	   for	   States	   parties	   from	   the	   specific	  
obligations	  of	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  treaty,	  the	  Convention	  of	  Belém	  do	  Pará.	  Article	  
7(b)	   of	   this	   Convention	   specifically	   obliges	   the	   States	   parties	   to	   apply	   due	  
diligence	   to	   prevent,	   punish,	   and	   eradicate	   violence	   against	   women”,	   given	  “society’s	  obligation	  to	  reject	  violence	  against	  women	  and	  the	  State’s	  obligation	  
to	   eliminate	   it	   and	   to	   ensure	   that	   victims	   trust	   the	   State	   institutions	   there	   for	  
their	  protection”	  (Fernández-­‐Ortega,	  para.	  193,	  Rosendo-­‐Cantú,	  para.	  177).	  	  These	  elements	  are	  of	  particular	  interest	  if	  we	  consider	  the	  concerns	  about	  the	  risk	   of	   marginalization	   of	   women’s	   rights,	   implied	   in	   the	   adoption	   of	   a	  specialized	  instrument	  (e.g.	  Johnstone,	  2006).	  The	  praxis	  of	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  System	   effectively	   diminishes	   the	   likelihood	   of	   such	   possibility.	   The	   BdPC	  appears	   to	   be	   used,	   in	   fact,	   to	   integrate	   ACHR’	   shortcomings,	   due	   to	   its	  historical	   formation	   and	   the	   reasons	   for	   this	   choice	  have	   several	   dimensions.	  On	   the	   one	   hand,	   once	   established	   that	   VAW	   represents	   a	   manifestation	   of	  discrimination	   against	  women	   due	   to	   unequal	   relations	   of	   power,	   it	   appears	  uncontroversial	   that	   such	   human	   rights	   violations	   imply	   breaches	   of	   general	  non-­‐discrimination	   provisions,	   uncontroversially	   implying	   States’	  responsibility	  when	  perpetrators	  are	  public	  agents.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  in	  more	  difficult	   cases	   of	   violations	   perpetrated	   by	   private	   individuals,	   given	   that	  States’	   responsibility	   emerges	   in	   case	   of	   proved	   failure	   to	   adopt	   positive	  measures	  or	  to	  guarantee	  the	  right	  to	  effective	  judicial	  proceedings,	  the	  critical	  link	  between	  the	  two	  conventions	  is	  established	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  
due	   diligence.	   In	   the	   framework	   we	   can	   interpret	   the	   reference	   to	   Article	   2	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ACHR	   (Domestic	   Legal	   Effects)	   in	   Marcela	   Andrea	   Valdés	   Díaz	   v.	   Chile	   and	  
Cotton	  Field.	  	  	  The	  process	  through	  which	  the	  BdPC	  came	  to	  be	  included	  in	  the	  competences	  of	   the	  Court	   is	  another	  noteworthy	  element.	  The	   IACrtHR,	  as	  mentioned,	  was	  not	  explicitly	  granted	  competence	  on	   the	   instrument,	  but	  had	   to	  construct	   its	  arguments	   in	   order	   to	   ground	   an	   expansion	   of	   its	   own	   functions.	   Without	  recalling	  all	  the	  reasoning	  developed	  in	  the	  Castro-­‐Castro	  case,	  analysed	  in	  the	  previous	  sub-­‐section,	  we	  note	  that	  the	  crucial	  point	  to	  argue	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  Court’s	  decision,	   clarified	  by	   Judge	  García	  Ramírez	   in	  his	  Concurring	  Opinion,	  was	  based	  on	   the	  pro	  personae	   criterion.	  On	   this	  grounds,	  he	  argued	   that	   the	  ACHR	  and	  the	  BdPC	  can	  be	  considered	  two	  complementary	  instruments,	  with	  the	  specific	  content	  of	   the	   latter	   integrating	   the	  provision	  of	   the	   first,	  general	  one:	   “The	   joint	   reading	   of	   the	   ACHR,	   with	   its	   catalogue	   of	   general	   rights	   and	  
guarantees,	  and	  the	  BdP	  Convention,	  with	  its	  declaration	  of	  specific	  State	  duties,	  
to	  which	  women’s	   rights	   correspond,	   results	   both	  natural	   an	  obligatory	   for	   the	  
application	   of	   both.	   The	   second	   determines,	   illustrates	   or	   complements	   the	  
content	  of	  the	  first	  in	  what	  refers	  to	  women’s	  rights	  that	  derive	  from	  the	  ACHR”	  (García	  Ramírez,	  Concurring	  Opinion,	  Castro-­‐Castro,	  2006,	  par.	  30).	  	  	  Such	   a	   strict	   interpretive	   connection	   has	   particular	   implications	   when	  established	   by	   an	   authoritative	   regional	   Court,	   which	   then	   comes	   to	   have	  interpretive	   and	   enforcement	   powers	   on	   both	   the	   ACHR	   and	   the	   BdPC.	   A	  similar	  connection	  exists	  between	  the	  UDHR	  and	  CEDAW,	  but	  can	  doubtfully	  be	  used	  with	   the	  same	  strength,	   lacking	  a	  unified	   judicial	  body	  with	  competence	  to	  enforce	  such	  treaties.	  	  In	  Cotton	  Field	  and	  Castro-­‐Castro	  the	  Court	  also	  refers	  to	  Article	  4	  (Right	  to	  life)	  ACHR	  and,	  in	  Castro-­‐Castro,	  the	  reasoning	  is	  further	  developed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  Article	  5	   (Right	   to	  Human	  Treatment)	  ACHR	   in	   relation	   to	  VAW,	   enriched	  by	  the	   direct	   reference	   to	   both	  BdPC	   and	   CEDAW,	  which	   the	   Court	   identifies	   as	  part	  of	  the	  corpus	  juris	  on	  the	  subject.126	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  126	  Breaches	  to	  both	  articles	  are	  under	  consideration	  in	  the	  pending	  Maria	  Isabel	  Véliz	  Franco	  et	  al	  
v.	  Guatemala.	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In	  Fernández-­‐Ortega	  et	  al.	  v.	  Mexico	  and	  Rosendo-­‐Cantú	  et	  al.	  v.	  Mexico	  the	  Court	  considers	   the	   facts	   under,	   inter	   alia,	   Article	   11	   (Right	   to	   Privacy)	   ACHR,	  drawing	  on	  ECrtHR’s	   jurisprudence	  to	  ground	  the	  broad	   interpretation	  of	   the	  concept	  of	  privacy,	  including	  private	  life,127	  sexual	  life,128	  the	  right	  to	  establish	  and	  develop	  relationships	  with	  other	  human	  beings	  129	  and	  the	  “right	  to	  decide	  
freely	  with	  whom	  to	  have	  intimate	  relations,	  causing	  her	  to	  lose	  complete	  control	  
over	   this	   most	   personal	   and	   intimate	   decisions,	   and	   over	   her	   basic	   bodily	  
functions”	   (ECrtHR,	   M.C.	   v.	   Bulgaria,	   para.	   150).	   Not	   counting	   on	   a	   specific	  convention	  in	  the	  European	  System,	  the	  ECrtHR	  largely	  relies	  on	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  interpretation	  of	  Article	  8	  ECHR	  (Right	  to	  a	  Private	  Life),	  a	  solution	  that	  has	   directly	   challenged	   the	   issue	   of	   the	   public/private	   divide,	   particularly	  evident	  in	  the	  European	  Convention	  given	  the	  time	  of	  its	  adoption.130	  	  Although	  it	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  Latin	  American	  countries,	   focus	  of	   this	  research,	  the	   Commission’s	   decision	   Jessica	   Lenahan	   (Gonzales)	   et	   al.	   v.	   United	   States	  provides	   the	   ultimate	   argument	   to	   conclusively	   drop	   the	   criticisms	   of	   the	  choice	   of	   a	   specialized	   instrument.	   Indeed,	   based	   on	  more	   then	   ten	   years	   of	  “training”	   in	   integrating	   a	   gender	   perspective	   in	   its	   evaluations,	   the	  Commission	  manages	   to	  develop	  a	  strongly	  gendered	  analysis	  although	  being	  allowed	   to	   refer	   only	   to	   provisions	   of	   the	   1948	  ADHR,131	  due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	  United	   States	   ratified	   no	   legally-­‐binding	   instrument,	   regional	   or	   universal,	  general	  or	  specific,	  nor	  recognised	  the	  competence	  of	  the	  IACrtHR.	  In	  our	  view,	  such	  a	  result	  could	  not	  have	  been	  obtained	  without	  the	  crucial	  influence	  of	  the	  BdPC	   in	   triggering	   a	   “learning	   process”	   that	   contributed	   to	   construct	   Inter-­‐American	  Institutions’	  gender-­‐sensitivity,	  beyond	  written	  provisions.	  	  	  Although,	  as	  clarified,	  we	  do	  not	  share	  all	  the	  conclusions	  drawn	  from	  feminist	  legal	  theory,	  we	  included	  this	  brief	  review	  in	  the	  analysis	  given	  the	  interesting	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  127	  Refer	  to:	  Ituango	  Massacres	  v.	  Colombia	  (para.	  193);	  Tristán	  Donoso	  v.	  Panama	  (para.	  55);	  Escher	  
et	  al.	  (para.	  113).	  128	  Refer	   to	   ECrtHR,	  Dudgeon	  v.	   the	  United	  Kingdom	  (para.	   41);	  X	  and	  Y	  v.	   the	  Netherlands,	   (para.	  22).	  129	  Refer	  to	  ECrtHR,	  Niemietz	  v.	  Germany	  (para.	  29);	  Peck	  v.	  United	  Kingdom	  (para.	  57).	  130	  Article	   8:	   1.	   Everyone	   has	   the	   right	   to	   respect	   for	   his	   private	   and	   family	   life,	   his	   home	   and	   his	  
correspondence.	  2.	  There	  shall	  be	  no	  interference	  by	  a	  public	  authority	  with	  the	  exercise	  of	  this	  right	  
except	  such	  as	  is	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  law	  and	  is	  necessary	  in	  a	  democratic	  society	  in	  the	  interests	  
of	   national	   security,	   public	   safety	   or	   the	   economic	  well-­‐being	   of	   the	   country,	   for	   the	   prevention	   of	  
disorder	   or	   crime,	   for	   the	   protection	   of	   health	   or	   morals,	   or	   for	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   rights	   and	  
freedoms	  of	  others.	  131	  The	  ADHR	  pre-­‐dates	  the	  UDCH.	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Internalising	   the	   paradigm	   shift	   in	   the	   Inter-­‐
American	   System:	   How	   the	   IACommHR	   and	   the	  
IACrtHR	  learnt	  to	  use	  the	  BdPC	  	  	  
The	  multi-­‐level	  coalition	  	  The	   participation	   of	   civil	   society	   and	   active	   academic	   communities	   often	  produced	   innovative	  strategies	   to	  make	  use	  of	  new	   international	   instruments	  (Nelson	   and	   Dorsey,	   2006;	   Risse,	   Sikkink,	   1999;	   Sikkink,	   2003).	   For	   what	  concerns	  the	  BdPC,	  the	  development	  of	  principles	  and	  standards	  of	  protection	  emerged	   through	   a	   process	   of	   mutual	   alimentation	   between	   Inter-­‐American	  Institutions	   and	   other	   actors,	   facilitated	   by	   structural	   and	   procedural	  conditions.	   MacDowell	   Santos	   argues	   that	   “multi-­‐level	   coalitions”	   of	   local,	  regional	  and	  international	  organisations,	  can	  be	  credited	  for	  some	  of	  the	  most	  successful	   decisions	   in	   terms	   of	   social	   impact	   (MacDowell	   Santos,	   2007).	   On	  the	   one	   hand,	   these	   actors	   often	   influenced	   public	   opinion	   and	   national	  governments,	   but	   they	   also	   contributed	   their	   expertise	   to	   the	   Court.	   On	   the	  other	  hand,	   the	  Court’s	   endorsement	  of	   external	   inputs	   let	   them	  come	  out	   of	  specific	   fields	   and	   enter	   that	   of	   law, 132 	  presenting	   States	   with	   newly	  constructed	   shared	   understandings,	   and	   providing	   women’s	   human	   rights	  movements	  with	  material	  to	  set	  international	  judicial	  precedents,	  that	  could	  be	  held	  in	  front	  of	  national	  institutions	  (Pinto	  Coelho	  et	  al.	  2008).	  	  	  	  Analysing	   Inter-­‐American	   jurisprudence	   on	   VAW,	   we	   identified	   external	  analytical	   contributions	   coming	   from	   a	   variety	   of	   sources.	   These	   documents	  are	  usually	  attached	  to	  petitions	  files,	  referred	  by	  petitioners’	  representatives,	  or	  presented	  in	  Amici	  Curiae	  briefs.	  	  Although	   neither	   the	   ACHR	   nor	   the	   Court’s	   Rules	   of	   Procedure	   originally	  mentioned	   Amici	   Curiae	   briefs,	   the	   IACrtHR	   began	   immediately	   to	   consider	  them	   implied	   by	   Article	   34.1	   of	   its	   Rules	   of	   Procedure.	   This	   rule	   allows	   the	  IACrtHR	  to	  rely	  on	  different	  sources	  to	  gather	  information	  and	  testimonies	  that	  would	   facilitate	   its	   adjudicatory	   function.	  Originally	   these	   briefs	   dealt	  mainly	  with	  legal	  issues,	  but	  through	  time	  the	  Court	  admitted	  briefs	  containing	  other	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  132	  The	  strength	  of	  such	  process	  is	  about	  to	  be	  tested	  in	  the	  still	  pending	  Véliz	  Franco	  v.	  Guatemala.	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types	  of	  relevant	  information,	  received	  from	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  sources,	  ranging	  from	  NGOs	  to	  experts,	  scholars,	  prominent	  persons	  with	  special	  knowledge	  on	  the	  issue	  and	  advocacy	  groups.	  	  The	   influence	   of	   Amici	   Curiae	  briefs	   in	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   System	   has	   been	  often	   emphasised.	   As	   early	   as	   in	   1985,	   IACrtHR’s	   Judge	   Buerghental	   argued	  that	  contributors	  of	  Amici	  Curiae	  could	  have	  a	  crucial	  role	   in	  the	  proceedings,	  coordinating	   their	   efforts	   with	   the	   Commission,	   as	   representatives	   of	   the	  victims	   (Buerghental,	   1985;	   see	   also	   Moyer,	   1986).	   These	   briefs	   usually	  provide	   experts’	   analyses,	   extensive	   evidence	   and	   empirical	   research,	   or	  underline	  original	  elements	  to	  be	  considered	  by	  the	  Court,	  promoting	  dynamic	  interpretations	   based	   on	   specific	   contextual	   elements	   and,	   in	   some	   cases,	  grounding	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   Court’s	   endorsement	   of	   transformative	  understandings.133	  Additionally,	   given	   that	   they	   generally	   support	   victims’	  interests	   in	   the	  case,	   they	  provide	  a	   significant	   tool	   to	  equalize	   their	  position	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  State	  in	  a	  contentious	  case.	  	  
Amici	  Curiae	   briefs	   have	   been	   explicitly	   introduced	   in	   the	   IACrtHR’s	   Rules	   of	  Procedure	  in	  2009,134	  and	  Article	  2.3	  defines	  the	  term:	  	  
	  
‘amicus	   curiae’	   refers	   to	   the	   person	   who	   is	   unrelated	   to	   the	   case	   and	   to	   the	  
proceeding	  and	  who	  submits	  to	  the	  Court	  a	  reasoning	  about	  the	  facts	  contained	  
in	   the	   application	   or	   legal	   considerations	   over	   the	   subject-­‐matter	   of	   the	  
proceeding,	  by	  means	  of	  a	  document	  or	  an	  argument	  presented	  in	  the	  hearing.	  	  
	  Article	   41	   (Arguments	   of	   Amicus	   Curiae)	   regulates	   the	   submission	   of	   Amici	  
Curiae	  briefs:	  	  	  
The	   brief	   of	   one	   who	   wishes	   to	   act	   as	   amicus	   curiae	  may	   be	   submitted	   to	   the	  
Tribunal,	   together	   with	   its	   annexes,	   at	   any	   point	   during	   the	   contentious	  
proceedings,	  but	  within	   the	   term	  of	  15	  days	   following	   the	  public	  hearing.	   If	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  133	  Moyer	  underlines	  the	  critical	  function	  Amici	  Curiae	  played	  in	  the	  United	  States	  Supreme	  Court,	  when	  broad	  social	  problems	  such	  as	  racial	  discrimination	  or	  voting	  rights	  were	  discussed	  (Moyer,	  1986).	  134	  The	  first	  Rules	  of	  Procedure	  of	  the	  Court	  were	  approved	  in	  1980,	   in	  the	  III	  Ordinary	  Period	  of	  Sessions.	  The	  Rules	  were	  then	  amended	  in	  the	  1991	  XXIII	  Ordinary	  Period	  of	  Sessions,	  in	  the	  1996	  XXXIV	  Ordinary	  Period	  of	  Sessions,	  in	  the	  2000	  XLIX	  Ordinary	  Period	  of	  Sessions,	  in	  the	  2003	  LXI	  Ordinary	  Period	  of	  Sessions	  and,	  finally,	  in	  the	  2009	  LXXXII	  Ordinary	  Period	  of	  Sessions.	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Court	  does	  not	  hold	  a	  public	  hearing,	  amicus	  briefs	  must	  be	  submitted	  within	  the	  
term	  of	  15	  days	   following	  the	  Resolution	  setting	  deadlines	   for	  the	  submission	  of	  
final	   arguments	   and	   documentary	   evidence.	   Following	   consultation	   with	   the	  
President,	   the	   amicus	   curiae	   brief	   and	   its	   annexes	   shall	   be	   immediately	  
transmitted	  to	  the	  parties,	  for	  their	  information.	  	  In	   the	   field	   of	   VAW,	   a	  wide	   variety	   of	   actors	   interacting	  with	   Inter-­‐American	  Institutions	   played	   a	   crucial	   role	   in	   the	   elaboration	   of	   Inter-­‐American	  standards	   of	   protection	   of	   women’s	   rights,	   based	   on	   the	   BdPC	   and	   in	   the	  framework	   of	   the	   instruments	   and	   procedures	   established	   in	   the	   Universal	  System.	   Scholars	   and	   human	   rights	   organisations	   often	   performed	   a	   critical	  role	   in	   the	   cases,	   contributing	   needed	   specific	   expertise,	   both	   in	   directly	  representing	   victims	   of	   VAW	   and	   providing	   crucial	   evidence	   for	   their	  allegations,	   presenting	   context-­‐based	   analyses.	   As	   we	   will	   see,	   our	   case	   law	  review	   provides	   evidence	   of	   this	   process,	   as	   well	   as	   of	   its	   incremental	  influence,	  which	  parallels	  regional	  actors’	  increased	  familiarity	  with	  the	  BdPC.	  	  In	  Raquel	  Martín	  de	  Mejía	  v.	  Peru	  (1996),	  with	  the	  BdPC	  just	  entered	  into	  force,	  no	  previous	   experience	   with	   the	   instrument	   and	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   other	  international	   bodies’	   case	   law	   on	   a	   similar	   convention,135	  given	   the	   type	   of	  violation	  involved	  in	  the	  case,	  the	  Commission	  largely	  draws	  from	  international	  humanitarian	   law	   to	   consider	   sexual	   abuse	   in	   a	   case	   of	   armed	   conflict.136	  In	  particular,	   the	   reasoning	   refers	   to	   Article	   27137	  and	   147138	  of	   the	   1949	   Fourth	  Geneva	   Convention,	   Article	   76139	  of	   Additional	   Protocol	   I	   and	   to	   Article	   3,140	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  135	  CEDAW	  Optional	  Protocol	  was	  adopted	  several	  years	  later.	  136	  Citing	   the	   1993	   United	   Nations	   Secretary	   General	   Report	   considerations	   on	   establishing	   an	  international	   tribunal	   for	   the	   prosecutions	   of	   persons	   responsible	   for	   serious	   violations	   of	  International	  Humanitarian	  Law	  committed	  in	  the	  territory	  of	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia.	  137	  Article	   27:	   (…)	  Protected	  persons	  are	   entitled,	   in	  all	   circumstances,	   to	   respect	   for	   their	   persons,	  
their	   honour,	   their	   family	   rights,	   their	   religious	   convictions	   and	   practices,	   and	   their	   manners	   and	  
customs.	  They	  shall	  at	  all	  times	  be	  humanely	  treated,	  and	  shall	  be	  protected	  especially	  against	  all	  acts	  
of	   violence	   or	   threats,	   thereof	   and	   against	   insults	   and	   public	   curiosity.	  Women	   shall	   be	   especially	  
protected	  against	  any	  attack	  on	  their	  honour,	  in	  particular,	  against	  rape,	  enforced	  prostitution	  or	  any	  
form	  of	  indecent	  assault	  (…).	  138	  According	  to	  Article	  147,	  serious	  offenses	  are	  those	  (…)	  committed	  against	  persons	  or	  property	  
protected	  by	  the	  present	  Convention:(...)	  torture	  or	  inhuman	  treatment,	  including	  (...)	  wilfully	  fact	  of	  
causing	  great	  suffering	  or	  serious	  injury	  to	  body	  or	  health	  (…).	  139	  Article	   76	   (Protection	   of	  Women):	  1.	  Women	  shall	  be	  afforded	  special	   respect	  and	  protected	   in	  
particular	  against	  rape,	  forced	  prostitution	  and	  any	  other	  form	  of	  indecent	  assault	  (…).	  140	  Article	  3	  establishes	  acts	  prohibited	  at	  any	  time	  and	  in	  any	  place:	  (…)	  a.	  Attacks	  against	  life	  and	  
bodily	  integrity,	  especially	  homicide	  in	  all	  its	  forms,	  mutilations,	  cruel	  treatment,	  torture	  and	  ordeals;	  
(…)	  c.	  Attacks	  against	  personal	  dignity	  (…)	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common	  to	  the	  Geneva	  Conventions.	  Moreover,	  the	  Commission	  refers	  to	  Article	  5	   of	   the	   Statute	   of	   the	   International	   Criminal	   Tribunal	   for	   former	   Yugoslavia	  (ICTY),	   recognising	   rape	  practiced	  on	  a	   systematic	   and	   large	   scale	  as	  a	   crime	  against	   humanity.	   Adopting	   the	   extended	   interpretation	   elaborated	   by	   the	  ECrtHR	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  Article	  8	  ECHR,141	  the	  Commission	  further	  evaluates	  the	  facts	  under	  Article	  11	  ACHR.	  	  	  Let	   us	   recall	   that,	   until	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	  BdPC,	   neither	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  System,	  nor	  the	  European	  System	  presented	  a	  specific	  regional	  instrument	  on	  women’s	  rights	  or	  VAW,	  thus,	  evaluations	  of	  cases	  such	  as	  that	  of	  Raquel	  Martín	  
de	   Mejía,	   had	   to	   be	   carried	   out	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   respective	   general	  conventions	   and	   existing	   additional	   instruments.	   Incidentally,	   as	  we	  will	   see,	  we	  note	  that	  this	  is	  still	  the	  case	  for	  what	  concerns	  the	  ECrtHR.	  	  Using	   external	   sources	   the	   Commission	   focuses	   on	   the	   dimension	   of	   sexual	  abuses	   that	   had	   been,	   at	   the	   time,	   extensively	   addressed	   and	   analysed	   with	  reference	   to	   contexts	   of	   conflict,	   i.e.	   the	   interpretation	   of	   rape	   as	   a	   form	   of	  torture	  used	  by	  public	  officials	   in	  emergency	  areas.	  The	  Commission	  refers	  to	  additional	  evidence	  provided	  by	  the	  1992	  United	  Nations	  Report	  of	  the	  Special	  Rapporteur	   against	   Torture	   and	   the	   1993	   specific	   analysis	   on	   Peru,	   several	  Amnesty	  International	  reports	  on	  sexual	  abuses	  against	  women	  in	  emergency	  areas,	   Human	   Rights	  Watch	   studies	   on	   the	   use	   of	   rape	   in	   counterinsurgency	  campaigns	  in	  Peru,	  and	  its	  own	  1993	  Report	  on	  human	  rights	  in	  Peru.	  The	  type	  of	   documentation	   used	   in	   the	   decision,	   and	   the	   normative	   framework	   set	   by	  the	  Commission,	  define	  the	  boundaries	  within	  which	  the	  evaluation	  is	  carried	  out.	  	  Notwithstanding	   the	   paradigm	   shift	   on	   VAW	   already	   endorsed	   both	   at	  universal	   and	   regional	   level,	   the	   features	   of	   the	   case	   and	   the	   extensive	  documentation	  available	  on	  rapes	   in	  armed	  conflict,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	   lack	  of	  analyses	   of	   concrete	   cases	   of	   VAW	   as	   a	   manifestation	   of	   unequal	   social	  relations,	   discourages	   a	   reference	   to	   the	   still	   largely	   unfamiliar	   and	   just	  adopted	   BdPC.	   Notably,	   the	   petitioners	   themselves	   do	   not	   refer	   to	   the	   new	  understanding	  of	  VAW.	  A	  gendered	  analysis	  would	  have	  captured	  the	  difference	  between	   the	  occasion	  of	   the	  violence,	   its	  causes,	  its	  motivation	   and	   its	   form.	  The	  IACommHR’s	   reasoning	   completely	   revolves	   around	   the	   form	   of	   the	   violation,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  141	  Refer,	  inter	  alia,	  to	  ECrtHR	  X	  and	  Y	  vs.	  The	  Netherlands.	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rape.	  Based	  on	  the	  1992	  Report	  of	  the	  UN	  Special	  Rapporteur	  against	  Torture	  and	  on	   documentation	   provided	   by	   non-­‐governmental	   bodies	   such	   as	   Amnesty	  International	   and	   Human	   Rights	   Watch,	   the	   Commission	   recognises	   rape	   as	   a	  common	   practice	   in	   areas	   under	   state	   of	   emergency	   in	   Peru,	   and	   as	   a	   form	   of	  intimidation	   and	   punishment	   against	  women	   belonging	   to	   groups	   suspected	   of	  collaborating	   with	   insurgent	   forces,	   which	   humiliates	   and	   degrades	   them.	   For	  what	  concerns	  rapes,	  disproportionately	  affecting	  women,	  no	  particular	  gender-­‐sensitiveness	  is	  required	  to	  identify	  the	  sex	  of	  the	  victim	  as	  a	  determinant	  factor	  of	   the	   form	   violence	   used	   against	   “suspects”.	   The	   occasion	   for	   the	   violation	   is	  described	   in	   detail	   in	   Commission’s	   investigations	   and	   in	   the	   extended	  documentation	  attached	  to	  the	  case	  file.	  The	  facts	  occurred	  in	  areas	  under	  state	  of	  emergency	   in	  Peru,	  where	  military	   forces	  were	  not	   subjected	   to	   control.	   In	   this	  early	   case,	   the	   Commission	   does	   not	   consider	   the	   causes	   at	   the	   origin	   of	   that	  particular	  form	  of	  violence,	  nor	  it	  evaluates	  in	  depth	  its	  motivation,	  allegations	  of	  belonging	  to	  insurgent	  groups.	  The	  Dianna	  Ortiz	  vs.	  Guatemala	   (1996)	  decision	  presents	   similar	   features,	   being	   analysed	   in	   the	   framework	   of	   the	   pattern	   of	  repression	   of	   representatives	   of	   the	   Church	   working	   in	   indigenous	  communities.	   Again,	   none	   of	   the	   sources	   of	   information	   and	   documentation	  takes	   into	  account	   the	  gender	  of	   the	  victim	   in	   the	  evaluation	  of	   the	   facts,	  nor	  such	  a	  reference	  is	  made	  by	  the	  petitioners,	  or	  in	  Amici	  curiae	  briefs.	  	  
Ana,	  Beatriz,	  and	  Celia	  González	  Pérez	  v	  Mexico	  (2001)	  represents	  the	  first	  case	  in	   which	   a	   Commission’s	   reference	   to	   the	   BdPC	   would	   have	   been	  uncontroversial.	   The	   case	   did	   not	   present	   any	   particular	   obstacle	   to	   the	  application	   of	   the	   BdPC	   framework	   of	   analysis	   and,	   we	   argue,	   actually	  represented	   an	   “easy	   case”.	   Indeed,	   several	   of	   the	  problems	  we	   addressed	   in	  the	   First	   Section	   of	   this	   research	   do	   not	   concern	   this	   case:	   the	   violation	   is	  clearly	  identifiable	  as	  rape	  and	  torture	  and	  the	  perpetrators	  are	  public	  officials,	  which	  avoids	  problems	  in	  identifying	  State’s	  responsibility.	  Moreover,	  the	  facts	  had	  occurred	  in	  1994,	  Mexico	  was	  Party	  to	  CEDAW	  since	  1981	  and,	  although	  it	  ratified	  the	  BdPC	  in	  1998,142	  the	  Commission	  could	  have	  referred	  to	  it	  given	  the	  
continuous	  nature	  of	  the	  State’s	  violation	  of	  the	  right	  to	  a	  fair	  trial	  and	  the	  right	  to	   judicial	  protection,	  a	   concept	   thoroughly	  elaborated	  by	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  142	  Mexico	  signed	   the	  BdPC	  on	   June	  10,	  1994,	  six	  days	  after	   the	  submission	  of	   the	  petition	   to	   the	  Commission,	  and	  deposited	   its	   instrument	  of	   ratification	  on	  November	  12,	  1998.	   	  Article	  4	  BdPC	  states	   that	   "every	  woman	  has	  the	  right	  to	  the	  recognition,	  enjoyment,	  exercise	  and	  protection	  of	  all	  
human	  rights	  and	  freedoms	  embodied	  in	  regional	  and	  international	  human	  rights	  instruments."	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Institutions	   in	   the	   cases	   of	   desaparecidos	   (see,	   for	   instance,	   the	   Velazquez-­‐
Rodriguez	  case).	   Given	   the	   lack	   of	   familiarity	  with	   the	  BdPC	   and	   the	   pending	  status	   of	   Mexico’s	   ratification	   at	   the	   time	   of	   the	   petition’s	   submission,	   the	  Centre	   for	   Justice	   and	   International	   Law	   (CEJIL),	   which	   represented	   the	  victims,	  did	  not	  invoke	  BdPC	  provisions.	  In	  evaluating	  the	  facts	  the	  Commission	  considered	   them	   also	   under	   Article	   1.1	   ACHR	   and	   Article	   8	   of	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   Convention	   to	   Prevent	   and	   Punish	   Torture,	   which	   Mexico	   had	  ratified	  in	  1987,	  which	  had	  not	  been	  invoked	  by	  the	  petitioners.	  The	  reasoning	  largely	   draws	   on	   ICTY143	  and	   ECrtHR’s144	  case	   law	   and	   on	   UN	   documents	  analysing	  rape	  as	  a	  form	  of	  torture,	  although	  showing	  and	  increased	  sensitivity	  to	   its	   psychological	   dimensions	   and	   to	   the	   problem	   of	   re-­‐victimization	   in	  medical	  examinations	  and	  judicial	  proceedings.	  	  	  Although	  the	  Commission	  briefly	  mentions	  the	  BdPC,	   it	  does	  not	  elaborate	  on	  its	   content	   and	   the	   analysis	   does	   not	   present	   any	   reference	   to	   the	   gendered	  nature	   of	   the	   violations.	   Notably,	   the	   Commission	   quotes	   in	   the	   footnotes	   a	  statement	   of	   the	   Special	   Rapporteur	   on	   VAW	   that,	   arguably,	   contained	   the	  essence	   of	   the	   paradigm	   shift	   on	   VAW,	   diminishing	   the	   reliance	   of	   the	  traditional	   “honour	   and	   humiliation”	   interpretation	   of	   rapes	   and	   pointing	   at	  their	   discriminatory	   nature:	   “Perhaps	  more	   than	  the	  honour	  of	   the	  victim,	   it	   is	  
the	  perceived	  honour	  of	  the	  enemy	  that	  is	  targeted	  in	  the	  perpetration	  of	  sexual	  
violence	   against	   women;	   it	   is	   seen	   and	   often	   experienced	   as	   a	   means	   of	  
humiliating	   the	   opposition.	   	   Sexual	   violence	   against	   women	   is	   meant	   to	  
demonstrate	  victory	  over	  the	  men	  of	  the	  other	  group	  who	  have	  failed	  to	  protect	  
their	  women.	  	  It	  is	  a	  message	  of	  castration	  and	  emasculation.	  	  It	  is	  a	  battle	  among	  
men	   fought	   over	   the	   bodies	   of	   women”	   (UN	   Special	   Rapporteur	   Report	   1998,	  para.	   13).	   As	  mentioned,	   the	   quote	   is	   placed	   in	   the	   footnotes	   of	   the	  decision,	  signalling	  the	  scarce	  consideration	  of	  its	  evolutionary	  content.	  	  On	   the	   contrary,	   in	   1998,	   CEJIL	   and	   the	   Latin	   American	   and	   Caribbean	  Committee	  for	  the	  Defence	  of	  Women’s	  Rights	  (CLADEM)	  submitted	  the	  Maria	  
da	  Penha	  vs.	  Brazil	  petition,	   directly	   invoking	   several	   provisions	   of	   the	  ACHR	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  143	  ICTY,	  Prosecutor	  v.	  Anto	  Furudzija,	  1998	  (para.	  163);	  the	  decision	  was	  confirmed	  in	  2000	  by	  the	  ICTY	  Court	  of	  Appeals.	  144	  ECrtHR,	  Aydin	  v.	  Turkey,	  1997	  (para.	  83).	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and	   Article	   4,145	  5,146	  and	   7	   (Positive	   Obligations	   and	   Domestic	   Legal	   Effect)	  BdPC.	  Due	   to	   the	   peculiar	   features	   of	   the	   case,	   concerning	   domestic	   violence	  and	   impunity,	   and	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   evidence	   provided	   by	   the	   victim’s	  representatives,	  in	  this	  occasion	  the	  Commission	  considers	  the	  case	  under	  the	  new	   instrument.	   Although	   the	   facts	   had	   taken	   place	   several	   years	   before	  Brazil’s	   ratification	   of	   the	   BdPC,	   the	   Commission	   grounds	   its	   competence	  pursuant	  the	  convention	  on	  the	  continuous	  nature	  of	  violations	  of	   the	  right	  to	  effective	   legal	   remedies,	   extensively	   documented	   by	   the	   victim’s	  representatives.	   Notably,	   hence,	   victim’s	   representatives	  were	   responsible	   of	  triggering	   the	   use	   of	   BdPC	   normative	   framework	   and	   the	   reference	   to	   the	  systematic	   and	   on-­‐going	   Brazilian	   judicial	   system’s	   generalised	   attitude	   of	  tolerance	  towards	  domestic	  violence.	  	  	  Considering	   the	   complex	   issue	   constituted	   by	   the	   traditional	   public/private	  “dilemma”	  in	  international	  law,	  addressed	  in	  the	  First	  Section	  of	  this	  research,	  it	   might	   seem	   paradoxical	   that	   the	   path-­‐breaking	   case	   in	   Inter-­‐American	  analyses	  on	  VAW	  involves	  a	  case	  of	  domestic	  violence	  perpetrated	  by	  a	  private	  individual.	   However,	   it	   is	   indeed	   because	   of	   the	   attention	   attracted	   by	   the	  dilemma	   and	   the	   international	   awareness	   on	   the	   issue	   of	   domestic	   violence,	  raised	  by	  CEDAW	  Committee’s	  General	  Recommendation	  19,	  that	  the	  Maria	  da	  
Penha	   case	   constituted,	   in	   fact,	   an	   “easier”	   case	   to	   experiment	   the	   new	  approach	   to	   VAW	   as	   a	   human	   rights	   violation	   and	   to	   States’	   positive	  obligations.	  	  In	  MZ	  v.	  Bolivia	  (2001),	  the	  Oficina	  Jurídica	  para	  la	  Mujer,	  CLADEM	  and,	  again,	  CEJIL	  invoked	  Article	  7	  BdPC.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  another	  element	  provides	  evidence	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  145	  Article	   4:	  Every	  woman	  has	   the	   right	   to	   the	   recognition,	   enjoyment,	   exercise	   and	  protection	   of	   all	  
human	  rights	  and	   freedoms	  embodied	   in	  regional	  and	   international	  human	  rights	   instruments.	   	  These	  
rights	   include,	  among	  others:	  	  a.	  The	  right	  to	  have	  her	   life	  respected;	  b.	  The	  right	  to	  have	  her	  physical,	  
mental	  and	  moral	  integrity	  respected;	  c.	  The	  right	  to	  personal	  liberty	  and	  security;	  d.	  The	  right	  not	  to	  be	  
subjected	   to	   torture;	  e.	  The	  rights	   to	  have	   the	   inherent	  dignity	  of	  her	  person	  respected	  and	  her	   family	  
protected;	  f.	   The	   right	   to	   equal	   protection	   before	   the	   law	   and	   of	   the	   law;	  g.	   The	   right	   to	   simple	   and	  
prompt	  recourse	  to	  a	  competent	  court	  for	  protection	  against	  acts	  that	  violate	  her	  rights;	  h.	  The	  right	  to	  
associate	  freely;	  i.	  The	  right	  of	  freedom	  to	  profess	  her	  religion	  and	  beliefs	  within	  the	  law;	  and	  	  j.	  The	  right	  
to	  have	  equal	  access	  to	  the	  public	  service	  of	  her	  country	  and	  to	  take	  part	  in	  the	  conduct	  of	  public	  affairs,	  
including	  decision-­‐making.	  	  146	  Article	  5:	  Every	  woman	  is	  entitled	  to	  the	  free	  and	  full	  exercise	  of	  her	  civil,	  political,	  economic,	  social	  
and	   cultural	   rights,	   and	  may	   rely	   on	   the	   full	   protection	   of	   those	   rights	   as	   embodied	   in	   regional	   and	  
international	   instruments	  on	  human	  rights.	   	  The	  States	  Parties	  recognise	  that	  violence	  against	  women	  
prevents	  and	  nullifies	  the	  exercise	  of	  these	  rights.	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of	   the	   crucial	   role	   of	   organisations	   and	   advocacy	   networks	   in	   appropriately	  presenting	  the	   facts.	  The	  NGO	  Equality	  Now	  submitted	  an	  Amicus	  Curiae	  with	  an	  original	  analysis	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  effective	  judicial	  proceedings,	  contributing	  its	  specific	   expertise	   to	   the	   evaluation	   of	   the	   facts.	   The	   brief	   reports	   that,	   after	  MZ’s	  sexual	  violation	  had	  been	  established	  in	  a	  proceeding	  that	  fully	  complied	  with	   the	   rights	   of	   the	   accused,	   reviewing	   courts	   “rather	  than	   identifying	   legal	  
defects,	  employed	  rape	  myths	  –	  a	  form	  of	  sex	  inequality	  through	  gender	  bias	  –	  to	  
reverse	  that	  finding”	  (p.	  3).147	  The	  NGO	  argues	  the	  use	  of	  rape-­‐myths	   in	  Appeal	  Courts’	   proceedings	   proving	   evidence	   of	   reasoning	   based	   on	   discriminatory	  assumptions,	  i.e.	  only	  certain	  women	  are	  raped,	  women	  resist	  sexual	  relations	  that	   they	   actually	   consent	   to,	   unwanted	   sexual	   relations	   imply	   forceful	  reactions,	  women	  routinely	  invent	  allegations	  of	  rape	  out	  of	  embarrassment	  or	  revenge.	   In	   the	  NGO’s	   interpretation,	  endorsed	  by	  the	  Commission,	   the	  use	  of	  
rape-­‐myths	   not	   only	   prevents	   victims	   from	   obtaining	   justice,	   but	   also	  reproduces	   and	   promotes	   a	   conductive	   context	   for	   sexual	   abuses.148 	  The	  quality	   of	   the	   analysis	   provides	   the	   Commission	   with	   an	   accurate	   gender-­‐sensitive	   perspective,	   based	   on	   the	   specific	   experience	   on	   the	   issue	   of	   a	  women’s	  rights	  organisation.	  	  Further	   evidence	   of	   the	   influence	   of	   external	   actors	   in	   the	   development	   of	  Inter-­‐American	   Institutions	   analytical	   tools	   emerges	   from	   the	   proceedings	   of	  the	  Castro-­‐Castro	  case.	   Let	   us	   recall	   that,	   although	   the	  wording	   of	   Article	   12	  created	   ambiguity	   for	   what	   concerns	   the	   competence	   of	   the	   IACrtHR	   on	   the	  BdPC,	   the	   lack	   of	   clarity	   did	   not	   affect	   the	   competence	   of	   the	   Commission,	  explicitly	  allowed	  to	  receive	  petitions	  based	  on	  Article	  7	  BdPC.	  In	  Castro-­‐Castro,	  the	  petitioners	  provide	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions	   the	  occasion	   to	  overcome	  the	  impasse	  created	  by	  the	  ambiguous	  wording	  of	  Article	  12	  BdPC.	  The	  petition	  invokes	   BdPC	   provisions,	   supporting	   allegations	   with	   documentation	   and	  testimonies	   provided	   by,	   inter	   alia,	   the	   Association	   of	   Relatives	   of	   Missing	  Political	  Inmates	  and	  Victims	  of	  Genocide.	  As	  seen	  previously	  in	  this	  research,	  it	   is	   in	   this	   case	   that	   the	   IACrtHR	  extends	   its	   competence,	   inaugurating	  BdPC	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  147 	  The	   Amicus	   curiae	   is	   available	   on	   the	   NGO	   website	   at:	  www.equalitynow.org/sites/default/files/mz_en.pdf.	  148	  In	  2010	  CEDAW	  Committee	  decided	  on	  similar	  case,	  Vertido	  v.	  Philippines,	  where	  the	  petitioner	  alleged	   the	   violation	  of	   her	   right	   to	   a	   fair	   trial	   arguing	   the	  use	   of	   rape	  myths	  by	  national	   courts.	  However,	  the	  Committee	  never	  mentioned	  the	  precedent	  with	  MZ	  v.	  Bolivia.	  Given	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  latter	   ended	   in	   a	   Friendly	   Settlement,	   it	   is	   unsurprising	   that	   it	   did	   not	   achieve	   resonance	   as	   an	  authoritative	  precedent.	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full	   justiciability.	   Notably,	   the	   Commission	   did	   not	   include	   provisions	   of	   the	  BdPC	  in	  its	  application	  to	  the	  Court.	  As	  mentioned,	  this	  exclusion	  was	  arguably	  mainly	  due	  to	  the	  Commission’s	  doubts	  on	  the	  competence	  of	  the	  Court	  on	  the	  instrument.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   extensive	   documentation	   provided	   by	   experts,	  psychologists,	  scholars	  and	  the	  Commission	  for	  Truth	  and	  Reconciliation,	  both	  during	  the	  hearings	  and	  in	  the	  documents	  attached	  to	  the	  case	  file,	  convinced	  the	  Court	   that	  “women	  […]	  were	  affected	  by	  the	  acts	  of	  violence	  differently	  than	  
the	  men,	  that	  some	  acts	  of	  violence	  were	  directed	  specifically	  toward	  the	  women	  
and	  others	  affected	  them	  in	  greater	  proportion	  than	  the	  men	  (…)”(Castro-­‐Castro	  case,	   2006,	   par.	   223),	   providing	   the	   occasion	   to	   interpret	   Article	   12	  BdPC	   as	  implying	  the	  Court’s	  contentious	  jurisdiction.	  	  Notably,	  in	  his	  Concurring	  Opinion,	  Judge	  Cançado	  Trindade	  explicitly	  referred	  to	  the	  crucial	  role	  played	  by	  the	  petitioners,	  and	  even	  questioned	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Commission	   as	   a	   representative	   of	   the	   victims:	   “(…)	  Within	   the	  context	  of	   the	  
present	  case	  of	  the	  Prison	  of	  Castro-­‐Castro,	  the	  representation	  of	  the	  victims	  and	  
their	  next	  of	  kin,	  through	  their	  common	  intervener	  (Mrs	  Mónica	  Feria	  Tinta),	  also	  
a	   victim	   of	   this	   specific	   case,	   captured,	   besides	   the	   facts	   (cf.	   supra),	   the	   legal	  
grounds	   applicable,	   with	   greater	   precision	   and	   success	   than	   the	   Commission,	  
with	  regard	  to	  this	  specific	  matter.	  This	  may	  not	  go	  unnoticed	  and	  it	  constituted	  
for	  me	  a	  encouraging	  fact,	  since,	  -­‐	  as	  I	  have	  been	  insisting	  for	  years	  in	  the	  bosom	  
of	   this	   Court	   and	   in	   my	   books,149	  -­‐	   the	   true	   plaintiff	   before	   the	   Court	   are	   the	  
petitioners	  (and	  not	  the	  Commission),	  who,	  as	  indicated	  in	  the	  present	  case,	  have	  
reached	  a	  level	  of	  maturity	  considered	  sufficient	  to	  present	  their	  arguments	  and	  
evidence	   in	   an	   autonomous	   manner,	   not	   only	   in	   factual	   matters,	   but	   also	   in	  
juridical	   subjects	   (cf.	   supra),	   and	   in	   some	   cases	   –	   as	   is	   the	   present	   case	   –	  with	  
greater	  precision	  and	   success	   than	   the	  Commission.	  Therefore,	   the	  paternalistic	  
and	   anachronistic	   vision	   that	   in	   the	   past	   stated	   that	   the	   petitioners	   always	  
needed	  a	  body	  such	  as	  the	  Commission	  to	  “represent	  them”	  has	  been	  completely	  
overcome.	   Not	   always.	   The	   present	   case	   proves	   it	   beyond	   doubt”	   (Concurring	  Opinion,	  par.	  38-­‐39).	  	  	  The	   “level	   of	   maturity”	   to	   which	   Judge	   Cançado	   Trindade	   refers	   is,	   also,	  inherently	  dependent	  on	   the	  petitioners’	   familiarity	  with	   the	  new	   instrument	  and	  a	  specific	  framework	  of	  analysis.	  Let	  us	  underline,	  that	  in	  Ana,	  Beatriz,	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  149	  See	  Cançado	  Trindade,	  2001.	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Celia	   González	   Pérez	   vs.	   Mexico	   CEJIL	   did	   not	   mention	   the	   BdPC,	   whereas,	  shortly	   afterwards,	   the	   same	   organisation	   and	   the	   Latin	   American	   and	  Caribbean	   Committee	   for	   the	  Defence	   of	  Women’s	   Rights	   (CLADEM)	   invoked	  the	  convention	  when	  submitting	  the	  Maria	  da	  Penha	  petition.	  Although	  the	  two	  cases	  refer	  to	  very	  different	  facts,	  the	  continuous	  nature	  of	  the	  violation	  of	  the	  rights	   to	   effective	   legal	   remedies,	   on	   which	   the	   Commission	   bases	   the	  applicability	   of	   the	  BdPC,	   could	  have	  been	   similarly	  used	   in	  Ana,	  Beatriz,	  and	  
Celia	  González	  Pérez	  vs.	  Mexico,	  both	  by	  the	  petitioners	  and	  by	  the	  Commission	  itself.	  In	  this	  sense,	  considering	  Judge	  Cançado	  Trindade’s	  argument,	  we	  argue	  that,	  while	  the	  long	  experience	  of	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  System	  led	  petitioners	  to	  reach	   a	   sufficient	   level	   of	   maturity	   to	   accurately	   present	   their	   arguments,	  possibly	   eliminating	   the	   need	   for	   an	   intermediate	   institution	   such	   as	   the	  Commission,	   such	   maturity	   is	   not,	   per	   se,	   sufficient	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   the	  capability	   to	   use	   new	   international	   instruments	   and	   specific	   frameworks	   of	  analysis,	   that	   also	   depend	   on	   petitioners’	   familiarity	   with	   evolutionary	  understandings	   and	   availability	   of	   specific	   expertise.	   Besides	   the	   obvious	  difference	  made	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  Maria	   da	  Penha	  petition	  was	   submitted	  after	  Ana,	  Beatriz,	  and	  Celia	  González	  Pérez	  vs.	  Mexico,	  when	  the	  BdPC	  was	  two	  years	  older	   in	   the	  system,	   the	  crucial	   “shifting”	  contribution	  was	  provided	  by	  the	   direct	   involvement	   of	   a	  women’s	   rights	   organisation	  with	  more	   then	   ten	  years	   experience	   on	   the	   issue:	   the	   Latin	  American	   and	   Caribbean	   Committee	  for	   the	   Defence	   of	   Women’s	   Rights	   (CLADEM).	   These	   elements,	   and	   the	  Commission’s	  discarding	  of	  BdPC	  provisions	  in	  referring	  the	  Castro-­‐Castro	  case	  to	  the	  Court,	  provide	  the	  basis	  to	  recognise	  a	  crucial	  role	  of	  organisations	  and	  advocacy	   networks,	   with	   specific	   expertise,	   in	   signalling	   the	   path	   to	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions,	   presenting	   cases	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   new	   instrument	  available	   and	   suggesting	   appropriate	   frameworks	   of	   analyses,	   when	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions	   could	  not	   count	  on	  previous	  endogenous	  or	   exogenous	  experiences	  of	  gendered	  analysis	  of	  concrete	  cases.	  	  Following	  the	  increased	  visibility	  of	  the	  BdPC	  following	  Castro-­‐Castro,	  and	  due	  to	  the	  incremented	  familiarity	  with	  women’s	  rights	  instruments	  in	  the	  region,	  the	   Commission	   received	   several	   petitions	   presenting	   cases	   of	   VAW	   and	  invoking	   the	   BdPC.	   In	  Las	  dos	  Erres	  Massacre	  v.	  Guatemala	   (2009),	   the	   Court	  considers	  the	  facts	  under	  the	  BdPC,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  arguments	  provided	  in	  a	  brief	  by	  CEJIL	  and	  the	  Association	  of	  Relatives	  of	  the	  Detained-­‐Disappeared	  of	  Guatemala.	  Eventually,	  referring	  Fernández-­‐Ortega	  et	  al.	  v.	  Mexico	  and	  Rosendo-­‐
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Cantú	  et	  al.	   v.	  Mexico	   (2010)	   to	   the	   Court,	   the	   Commission	   itself,	   for	   the	   first	  time	   and	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   provisions	   invoked	   by	   the	   petitioners,	   includes	  BdPC	  provisions	  in	  its	  application.	  	  	  All	  case	  files	  provide	  evidence	  of	  the	  crucial	  role	  of	  civil	  society	  organisations,	  experts	   and	   women’s	   rights	   advocacy	   groups,	   contributing	   contextual	  information	   and	   specific	   analyses,	   in	   developing	   Inter-­‐American	   Institution’s	  gender-­‐perspective.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   previously	   mentioned	   bi-­‐directional	  process	   of	  mutual	   alimentation	   is	   particularly	   evident	   for	  what	   concerns	   the	  use	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  femicides,	  analysing	  killings	  of	  women	  presenting	  specific	  features.	   In	   the	   Cotton	   field	  case,	   an	   actual	   coalition	   of	   experts,	   scholars	   and	  advocacy	  groups,	  provided	  the	  Court	  with	  a	  new	  conceptual	  tool	  of	  analysis.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  Court’s	  endorsement	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  femicide,	  introducing	  an	   essentially	   anthropological	   and	   social	   conceptual	   elaboration	   in	   the	   legal	  discourse	  on	  women’s	  human	  rights,	   enhancing	   its	   legitimacy	  and,	  as	  we	  will	  see	  further	  on	  in	  this	  research,	  providing	  an	  authoritative	  precedent	  to	  trigger	  regional	  convergence	  on	  the	  national	  reception	  of	  the	  new	  juridical	  category.	  In	  the	   following	   paragraphs	   we	   shall	   briefly	   describe	   the	   development	   of	   the	  concept	  in	  the	  Latin	  American	  and	  its	  content.	  	  Originally	  (not	  often)	  used	  simply	  to	  indicate	  the	  homicide	  of	  women,	  in	  1992	  the	  term	  was	  adopted	  by	  Diana	  Russell	  to	  name	  the	  killing	  of	  females	  by	  males	  
because	   they	   are	   females150 	  (Radford,	   Russell,	   1992).	   The	   term	   does	   not	  indicate	   solely	   the	   killings	   following	   sexual	   violence,	   but	   those	   generated	   by	  hatred,	  misogyny	  and	  discrimination	  in	  essentially	  patriarchal	  societies.	  In	  the	  following	   years,	   scholars	   and	   feminist	   movements	   throughout	   the	   Americas	  elaborated	   the	   concept,	   beginning	   precisely	   with	   Mexico.	   Feminist	   scholar	  Marcela	   Lagarde	   translated	   the	   term	   with	   the	   Spanish	   word	   feminicidio	  
(feminicide),	   and	   later	   extended	   its	   definition,	   based	   on	   the	   features	   of	   the	  killings	  in	  Ciudad	  Juárez.	  Incidentally,	  we	  note	  that	  the	  area	  of	  Ciudad	  Juárez	  is	  the	   location	  of	   the	   facts	   concerning	  Cotton	  field,	  and	   that	  Lagarde	  was	  one	  of	  the	  experts	  providing	  testimonies	  to	  the	  Court	  during	  the	  hearings	  of	  the	  case.	  This	  author	  added	  to	  the	  concept	  the	  issue	  of	   impunity,	  defining	  feminicide	  as	  “a	  hate	  crime	  against	  women,	  a	  misogynous	  crime	  forged	  by	  the	  enormous	  social	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  150	  Russel	  uses	   the	   term	  “female”	   intentionally,	   to	  underline	   the	   inclusion	  of	  young	  girls,	  children	  and	  older	  women.	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and	   state	   tolerance	   of	   gender	   violence,	   fostered	   by	   impunity,	   by	   haphazard	  
investigations	  and	  mishandled	   findings.	  Access	   to	   justice	  and	   fair	   trial	  have	  not	  
become	   a	   reality	   because	   the	   authorities	   do	   not	   pay	   attention	   to	   the	   victims	  
charges	   and	   seem	   to	   see	   women's	   lives	   as	   secondary	   or	   are	   biased	   against	  
women,	   discrediting	   and	   blaming	   them.	   Silence,	   omission,	   negligence	   and	   the	  
collusion	  of	  authorities	  responsible	  for	  preventing	  and	  eradicating	  crimes	  against	  
women	  contribute	  to	  feminicide”	  (in	  Spinelli,	  2008).	  	  	  Lagarde	  considers	  that	  patriarchal	  ideology	  plays	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  the	  impunity	  that	  surrounds	   feminicides,	   founded	  on	  a	  conception	  of	  women	  as	  expendable	  social	   subjects	   (Lagarde,	   2006).	   De	  Miguel	   Alvarez	  	   observes	   that	   hegemonic	  ideologies,	   such	   as	   patriarchy,	   are	   so	   deeply	   anchored	   in	   people’s	  understandings	   that	   they	   normalize	   VAW,	   even	   in	   the	   perception	   of	   women	  themselves	   (De	  Miguel	   Alvarez,	   2005).	   In	   these	   views,	   patriarchal	   ideologies	  legitimate	  the	  punishment	  of	  women	  who	  resist	  violence,	  blaming	  them	  as	  the	  inciters	  of	  male	  violence	   (Lagarde,	  2006).	   Social	   structures	   create	   conductive	  contexts	   for	   VAW	   and	   impunity;	   therefore,	   in	   order	   to	   eradicate	   the	  phenomenon,	   it	   is	   crucial	   to	   delegitimize	   a	   system	   founded	   upon	   women’s	  assumed	  inferiority	  and	  their	  subordination	  to	  men.	  Notably,	  this	  framework	  of	  analysis	  is	  reflected	  in	  all	  Women’s	  Conventions,	  reviewed	  in	  the	  First	  section	  of	   this	   research,	   and	   emerged	   from	   the	   dominance	   approach	   elaborated	   by	  feminist	   legal	  scholars.	  VAW	  presents	  specific	   forms	  of	   implicit	   legitimization,	  based	   on	   women’s	   subjugated	   social	   position,	   which	   requires	   them	   to	   show	  respect	  and	  obedience.	  Therefore,	  as	  Torres	  Falcón	  argues,	  VAW	  does	  not	  have	  the	   same	   weight	   as	   the	   violence	   occurring	   between	   two	   equals.	   Because	   of	  women’s	   discrimination,	   VAW	   ceases	   to	   be	   perceived	   as	   violence	   against	  human	   beings	   and	   becomes	   naturalized	   as	   a	   cultural	   expression,	   rendering	  legal	   equality	   an	   unaccomplished	   project	   (Torres	   Falcón,	   2004).	   Referring	   to	  the	  Mexican	  case,	  Lagarde	  raises	  the	  traditional	  gender-­‐bias	  criticism,	  pointing	  at	   it	  as	  an	  enhancing	   factor	   for	   the	  perpetuation	  of	   impunity,	  given	   that	  most	  members	  of	  the	  judiciary	  and	  media	  are	  men	  (Lagarde,	  2006).	  Lagarde’s	  main	  contribution	  to	  the	  development	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  femi(ni)cide,	  was	  to	  make	  it	  independent	   from	   the	  death	  of	   the	  woman.	   In	   this	   sense,	   feminicide,	  refers	   to	  extreme	   (discriminatory)	   VAW,	   of	   which	   killings	   are	   the	   most	   dramatic	  outcome,	   violating	   women’s	   rights	   in	   the	   public	   and	   private	   sphere	   and	  originating	  in	  structural	  misogyny	  and	  social	  impunity,	  which	  place	  women	  in	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vulnerable	  social	  positions.151	  	  	  Although	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions	  adopted	   the	  more	  restrictive	  concept	  of	  
femicide,	   better	   suited	   to	   be	   translated	   into	   a	   juridical	   category,	   the	   choice	  comes	   as	   an	   endorsement	   of	   a	   particular	   framework	   of	   analysis,	   (regionally)	  elaborated	  in	  the	  field	  of	  gender	  studies	  and	  feminist	  movements.	  	  	  Inter-­‐American	   Institutions	   use	   the	   concept	   of	   femicide	   in	   González	   et	   al.	  
(Cotton	  Field)	  v.	  Mexico	  (2009)	  and	  Maria	  Isabel	  Véliz	  Franco	  et	  al	  v.	  Guatemala	  (pending).	  In	  Cotton	  Field	  victims	  are	   represented	  by	   the	  Asociación	  Nacional	  de	  Abogados	  Democráticos,	  the	  Latin	  American	  and	  Caribbean	  Committee	   for	  the	   Defense	   of	  Women’s	   Rights,	   the	   Red	   Ciudadana	   de	   No	   Violencia	   y	   por	   la	  Dignidad	  Humana	  and	  the	  Centro	  para	  el	  Desarrollo	  Integral	  of	  the	  Mujer,	  and	  
Amici	   Curiae	   briefs	   were	   submitted	   by:	   CEJIL,	   the	   University	   of	   Toronto	  International	  Reproductive	  and	  Sexual	  Health,	  TRIAL-­‐Track	   Impunity	  Always,	  the	   World	   Organisation	   against	   Torture,	   the	   Legal	   Research	   Institute	   of	   the	  Universidad	  Nacional	  Autónoma	  de	  Mexico,	  UNAM	  Postgraduate	  Department,	  Women’s	   Link	   Worldwide,	   the	   Women’s	   Network	   of	   Ciudad	   Juárez,	  Universidad	   de	   los	   Andes	   Global	   Justice	   and	   Human	   Rights	   Program,	   the	  Universidad	   Iberoamericana	   of	   Mexico	   Human	   Rights	   Program	   and	   Master’s	  Program	   in	   Human	   Rights,	   Human	   Rights	   Watch,	   Horvitz	   and	   Levy,152	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  151	  Refer	  to	  Puentes	  Aguilar,	  2007.	  The	  author	  analyses	  femicides	  and	  feminicides	  in	  Mexico	  in	  the	  context	   of	   direct,	   structural	   and	   cultural	   violence.	   Building	   upon	   Lagarde’s	   conceptualization	  (Lagarde,	   2006),	   she	   distinguishes	   between	   femicides	   (murders	   of	   women)	   and	   feminicides	  (murders	   of	   women	   by	   men	   and	   because	   they	   are	   women).	   Her	   study	   rigorously	   analyses	  information	  on	   feminicides	  published	   in	   the	  written	  press	  and	   includes	  an	  analysis	  of	  homicides	  perpetrated	   by	  women	   against	  men	   (VAM),	   breaking	   new	   ground	   in	   its	   comparative	   analysis	   of	  VAW	  and	  VAM.	  152	  Notably,	   this	  brief	  was	  supported	  by	  an	  outstanding	  number	  of	   institutions	  and	  organizations,	  such	  as:	  Amnesty	  International,	  the	  Center	  for	  Gender	  and	  Refugee	  Studies,	  the	  Center	  for	  Justice	  and	   Accountability,	   the	   Human	   Rights	   Center	   of	   the	   Universidad	   Diego	   Portales,	   Columbia	   Law	  School	  Human	  Rights	  Clinic,	  Cornell	  Law	  School	   International	  Human	  Rights	  Clinic,	   the	  Domestic	  Violence	   and	  Civil	   Protection	  Order	  Clinic	   of	   the	  University	   of	   Cincinnati,	   the	  Human	  Rights	   and	  Genocide	   Clinic,	   Benjamín	  N.	   Cardozo	   School	   of	   Law,	  Human	  Rights	   Advocates,	   the	   Immigration	  Clinic	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Maryland	  School	  of	  Law,	  the	  Immigration	  Justice	  Clinic,	  IMPACT	  Personal	  Safety,	   the	   International	   Human	   Rights	   Clinic	   at	   Willamette	   University	   College	   of	   Law,	   the	  International	   Mental	   Disability	   Law	   Reform	   Project	   of	   New	   York	   Law	   School,	   the	   International	  Women’s	  Human	  Rights	  Clinic	  at	  Georgetown	  Law	  School,	  Latinojustice	  PRLDEF,	  the	  Legal	  Services	  Clinic	  at	  Western	  New	  England	  College	  School	  of	  Law,	  the	  Leitner	  Center	  for	  International	  Law	  and	  Justice	  at	  Fordham	  Law	  School,	   the	  Allard	  K.	  Lowenstein	   International	  Human	  Rights	  Clinic,	  Yale	  Law	  School,	  the	  National	  Association	  of	  Women	  Lawyers,	  the	  Los	  Angeles	  Chapter	  of	  the	  National	  Lawyers	  Guild,	  the	  National	  Organisation	  for	  Women,	  Seton	  Hall	  University	  School	  of	  Law	  Center	  for	  Social	   Justice,	   the	  Urban	  Morgan	   Institute	   for	  Human	  Rights,	   the	  U.S.	  Human	  Rights	  Network,	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International	   Commission	   of	   Jurists,	   Amnesty	   International,	   the	   Essex	  University	  Human	  Rights	  Centre	  and	  the	  International	  Center	  for	  Transitional	  Justice.	  Moreover,	  the	  IACrtHR	  received	  testimonial	  evidence	  of	  witnesses	  and	  experts	   from	   twenty-­‐nine	   individuals.	   	   Notably,	   as	   mentioned,	   Mexican	  Feminist	   scholar	  Marcela	   Lagarde	   appears	   in	   the	   list	   of	   the	   submitted	   expert	  statements.	  	  The	   evidence	   found	   in	   our	   analysis	   of	   case	   files,	   signals	   the	   crucial	   role	   that	  civil	   society	  and	  an	  active	  academic	   community	  played	   in	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  experience	  with	   the	  BdPC,	  with	  particular	   reference	   to	   its	  early	   stage.	  On	   the	  one	   hand,	   the	   maturity	   reached	   by	   victims’	   representatives	   in	   framing	   their	  analyses	   in	   the	   language	  of	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions,	  and	   the	   familiarity	  of	  women’s	   rights	   organisation	   with	   gendered-­‐violations,	   allowed	   them	   to	  appropriately	  present	  cases	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  previously	  unavailable	  provisions,	  such	   as	   the	  Maria	   da	   Penha	   case.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   specific	   expertise	  provided	  to	  Institutions	  with	  a	  general	  mandate,	  and	  no	  previous	  experience	  in	  gendered	   analyses,	   triggered	   a	   learning	   process	   that	   contributed	   to	   the	  construction	   of	   gender-­‐specific	   standards	   of	   protection.	   Notably,	   victims’	  representatives	  even	  successfully	  overcame	  Commission’s	   filtering,	  such	  as	   in	  
Castro-­‐Castro	   and	  Las	  dos	  Erres	  Massacre,	  creating	   the	  conditions	   to	   solve	   the	  
impasse	  on	  IACrtHR’s	  contentious	  jurisdiction	  on	  the	  BdPC.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	   quality	   of	   their	   gender-­‐sensitive	   analyses	   contributed	   valuable	   additional	  conceptual	   tools	   to	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions,	   as	   happened	   with	   the	  documented	   insight	   on	   rape	   myths	   presented	   in	   M.Z.	   vs.	   Bolivia,	   and	   the	  reference	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  femicide	  in	  Cotton	  field.	  
	  The	  permeability	  to	  external	  contributions	  coming	  from	  civil	  society	  actors	  and	  scholars	   strengthens	   Latin	   American	   societies’	   perception	   of	   the	   System’s	  accessibility,	   while	   also	   providing	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions	   with	   relevant	  perspectives	   on	   specific	   issues,	   such	   as	   the	  discriminatory	  nature	   of	  VAW,	   in	  absence	   of	   consolidated	   previous	   experience.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   Institutions’	  endorsement	   of	   elaborations	   coming	   from	   specific	   fields	   strengthened	   their	  legitimacy,	  translating	  them	  in	  the	  language	  of	  human	  rights	  law,	  and	  providing	  lawyers,	  advocacy	  groups	  and	  public	  officials	  with	  authoritative	  precedents	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  the	   Women’s	   Law	   Project,	   the	   Women	   Lawyers	   Association	   of	   Los	   Angeles,	   and	   the	   World	  Organisation	  for	  Human	  Rights	  USA.	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trigger	  reforms	  in	  national	  legal	  systems	  and	  public	  policies	  (Pinto	  Coelho	  et	  al.	  2008;	  Zuloaga,	  2004),	  enhancing	  the	   impact	  of	  BdPC	  and	  Inter-­‐American	  case	  law	   at	   national	   level,	   as	   we	   will	   see	   analysing	   national	   legislations	   on	   VAW.	  This	   mutual	   alimentation	   process	   provides	   a	   valuable	   support	   for	   the	  development,	   regionalisation	   and	   effectiveness	   of	   the	   BdPC	   and	   the	   new	  paradigm	   offered	   to	   interpret	   and	   promote	   women’s	   rights.	   In	   this	   sense,	   a	  Court	   with	   procedural	   rules	   such	   as	   those	   of	   the	   IACrtHR,	   which	   allow	   to	  consider	  a	  wide-­‐variety	  of	  sources	  of	  relevant	  information,	  and	  competence	  on	  interpreting	   and	   enforcing	   the	   BdPC	   in	   a	   multilevel	   system	   of	   human	   rights	  protection,	   constitutes	   a	   favourable	   institutional	   precondition	   for	   the	  development	   of	   standards	   of	   protection	   of	   women’s	   rights	   at	   regional	   and	  national	  level.	  	  In	   reviewing	   case	   law	   on	  VAW,	  we	   found	   evidence	   of	   the	   incremental	   use	   of	  Commission’s	   Reports,	   besides	   external	   contributions,	   in	   Commission’s	  decisions	  and	  in	  IACrtHR’s	  judgements153.	  In	  its	  Second	  Report	  on	  the	  Situation	  of	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Peru	  (2000)	  and	  in	  the	  Report	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  Women	  in	  Chile:	   Equality	   in	   the	   Family,	   Labour	   and	   Political	   Spheres	   (2009),	   the	  IACommHR	   grounded	   on	   empirical	   research	   the	   understanding	   of	   VAW	   as	  manifestation	   of	   gender-­‐based	   discrimination.	   In	   Situation	   of	   the	   Rights	   of	  Women	  in	  Ciudad	  Juárez	  (2003),	  it	  evidenced	  the	  features	  of	  a	  specific	  context	  in	  which	   generalised	   patterns	   of	   VAW	   represent	   a	   constant	   risk	   as	   a	   human	  security,	   social	   and	   public	   health	   problem.154	  In	   Violence	   and	   Discrimination	  against	   Women	   in	   the	   Colombian	   Armed	   Conflict	   (2006),	   the	   Commission	  provided	   information	   on	   the	   impact	   of	   VAW	   on	   the	   full	   enjoyment	   of	   other	  fundamental	   rights	   (para.	   29).	   Country	   Reports	   have	   proven	   crucial	   when	  assessing	  States’	  due	  diligence	  with	  respect	  to	  VAW,	  in	  identifying	  appropriate	  overarching	  measures	   of	   prevention	   (see	   the	   2003	   Report	   on	   Ciudad	   Juárez,	  paras.	  154-­‐155)	  and	  necessary	   legislative	  reforms	  (see	  2009	  Report	  on	  Chile,	  para.	  42).	  In	  Violence	  and	  Discrimination	  against	  Women	  in	  the	  Armed	  Conflict	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  153	  Let	  us	  recall	  that	  the	  IACommHR	  participates	  as	  a	  representative	  to	  all	  cases	  heard	  by	  the	  Court	  (Article	  57	  ACHR).	  154	  The	  Report	  states:	  “It	  has	  been	  accorded	  priority	  in	  the	  region	  as	  such,	  with	  the	  conviction	  that	  its	  
eradication	   is	   essential	   to	   ensure	   that	   women	   may	   fully	   and	   equally	   participate	   in	   all	   spheres	   of	  
national	  life.	  Violence	  against	  women	  is	  a	  problem	  that	  affects	  men,	  women	  and	  children;	  it	  distorts	  
family	   life	   and	   the	   fabric	   of	   society,	   with	   consequences	   that	   cross	   generations.	   Studies	   have	  
documented	  that	  having	  been	  exposed	  to	  violence	  within	  the	  family	  during	  youth	  is	  a	  risk	  factor	  for	  
perpetrating	  such	  violence	  as	  an	  adult.	  It	  is	  a	  human	  security	  problem,	  a	  social	  problem	  and	  a	  public	  
health	  problem”	  (para.	  122).	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in	   Colombia	   (2006),	   the	   Commission	   analysed	   the	   State’s	   responsibility	   in	   a	  context	   of	   conflict	   and	   observed	   that:	   “Within	   the	   armed	   conflict,	   all	   the	  
circumstances	   that	   have	   historically	   exposed	   women	   to	   discrimination	   and	   to	  
receive	   an	   inferior	   treatment	   –	   above	   all	   their	   bodily	   differences	   and	   their	  
reproductive	   capacity,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   civil,	   political,	   economic	   and	   social	  
consequences	  of	   this	  situation	  of	  disadvantage	  –	  are	  exploited	  and	  manipulated	  
by	   the	   actors	   of	   the	   armed	   conflict	   in	   their	   struggle	   to	   control	   territory	   and	  
economic	  resources”	  (para.	  46).	  	  	  The	  outcome	  of	  such	   interaction	   is	  exemplified	   in	  the	  proceedings	  of	   the	  case	  
Maria	   Isabel	   Véliz	   Franco	   et	   al	   v.	   Guatemala,	   currently	   pending	   before	   the	  Court,	   in	  which	   the	  mother	   of	   the	   victim	   is	   assisted	  by	   the	   Centre	   for	   Justice	  and	   International	   Law	   (CEJIL)	   and	   the	  Red	  de	  No	  Violencia	  Contra	  Mujeres	  en	  
Guatemala.	  To	  ground	  its	  Report,	  the	  Commission	  uses	  its	  own	  Fifth	  Report	  on	  the	   Situation	   of	   Human	   Rights	   in	   Guatemala,	   the	   2007	   Report	   on	   Access	   to	  Justice	  for	  Women	  Victims	  of	  Violence	  in	  the	  Americas,	  the	  2004	  Report	  of	  the	  Special	  Rapporteur	  on	   the	  effectiveness	  of	   the	   rights	  of	  women	   in	  Guatemala	  and	  the	  testimony	  of	  Amnesty	  International,	  identifying	  a	  context	  conductive	  to	  VAW	   in	   which	   killings	   are	   largely	   tolerated	   by	   society	   and	   discriminatory	  practices	  operate	  in	  the	  practice	  of	  the	  conduct	  of	  investigations.	  In	  identifying	  a	   context	   of	   impunity,	   the	   Commission	   refers	   to	   the	   definition	   supported	   by	  CEDAW	   Committee	   and	   General	   Recommendation	   19,	   its	   own	   precedents	  
Maria	   Da	   Penha	   Fernandes	   v.	   Brazil,	   María	   Eugenia	   Morales	   de	   Sierra	   vs.	  
Guatemala	  and	  Jessica	  Lenahan	  (Gonzales)	  et	  al.	  v.	  United	  States,	  and	  IACrtHR’s	  
Cotton	   Field.	   To	   argue	   the	   special	   connotations	   of	   due	   diligence	   in	   cases	   of	  VAW,	   the	   Commission	   refers	   to	   Resolution	   2003/45	   of	   the	   United	   Nations	  Commission	  on	  Human	  Rights	  and	  ECrtHR’s	  case	  law	  in	  Opuz	  v.	  Turkey	  (2009).	  	  External	   sources	   and	   Commission’s	   reports	   contribute	   providing	   the	   specific	  documentation	   necessary	   to	   construct	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions’	  understanding	  on	  the	  origins	  and	  features	  of	  VAW	  in	  local	  contexts.	  Notably,	  in	  these	  documents	  the	  Commission	  draws	  on	  a	  variety	  of	  sources,	  including	  the	  United	   Nations,	   Amnesty	   International,	   scholars,	   NGOs	   and	   civil	   society	  organisations	   that	   identify,	   describe,	   and	   document	   the	   contextual	   and	  subjective	  features	  of	  VAW	  in	  concrete	  contexts.	  The	  increasing	  production	  of	  Commission’s	   thematic	   and	   country	   reports,	   represents	   a	   significant	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opportunity	   to	   organize	   and	   structure	   the	   collection	   of	   relevant	   evidence,	  beyond	  the	  contingent	  efforts	  of	  different	  actors	  in	  each	  given	  case.	  
	  	  
Grasping	  intersectionality	  	  We	   argued	   that	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   System	   provides	   a	   suitable	   context	   for	  dialogue	   between	   regional	   institutions	   and	   several	   actors	   in	   Latin	   American	  societies.	   During	   the	   long	   and	   successful	   experience	   of	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  multilevel	   protection	   system,	   NGOs,	   civil	   society	   movements,	   advocacy	  networks,	   scholars	   and	   legal	   practitioners,	   reached	   a	   level	   of	   maturity	   and	  familiarity	  with	  regional	   instruments	  that	  enabled	  them	  to	  autonomously	  and	  appropriately	  present	  arguments	  and	  evidence	  to	  support	  victim’s	  allegations.	  For	   what	   concerns	   the	   jurisprudence	   on	   VAW,	   we	   found	   evidence	   of	   their	  critical	   role	   in	   compensating	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions’	   lack	   of	   previous	  experience	   with	   the	   BdPC	   and	   specific	   expertise	   on	   gendered-­‐analyses,	   and	  triggering	  BdPC	   full	   justiciability.	  We	  also	  noticed	   the	  significant	  contribution	  that	  organisations	  and	  scholars	  with	  specific	  experience	  on	  women’s	  rights	  and	  gender	   studies	   brought	   to	   the	   development	   of	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions’	  gender-­‐sensitivity	   in	   evaluating	   cases	   of	   VAW.	   If	   we	   consider	   the	   criticisms	  raised	   by	   feminist	   legal	   scholar	   on	   the	   inherent	   gender-­‐blindness	   of	  international	   human	   rights	   law,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   due	   to	   the	   male-­‐bias	   of	  “neutral”	   general	   norms,	   and	   international	   institutions,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	  given	  women’s	  overall	  underrepresentation,	  we	  can	  argue	  that	  the	  availability	  of	  a	  specific	  instrument	  complementing	  general	  norms	  and	  the	  permeability	  of	  Inter-­‐American	  Institutions	  to	  external	  sources,	  constitute	  significant	  elements	  compensating	   such	   shortcomings	   and	   developing	   the	   System’s	   capability	   to	  address	  appropriately	  gendered	  violations.	  	  In	   the	   following	   paragraphs,	   we	   shall	   consider	   the	   implications	   of	   a	   further	  analytical	   tool	   developed	   by	   feminist	   legal	   scholars,	   the	   concept	   of	  intersectionality,	  analysed	  in	  the	  First	  Section	  of	  this	  research.	  Although	  Inter-­‐American	  performance	  in	  evaluating	  intersectional	  factors	  influencing	  VAW	  is	  still	  largely	  unsatisfactory,	  we	  argue	  that	  the	  same	  mutual	  alimentation	  process	  previously	   described	   can	   successfully	   overcome	   current	   shortcomings.	   As	   it	  was	   the	   case	  when	   gender	   had	   yet	   to	   be	   included	   as	   a	   relevant	   factor	   in	   the	  evaluation	  of	  specific	  cases,	  we	  consider	  the	  scarce	  sensitivity	  to	  intersectional	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factors	   largely	   due	   to,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	   obvious	   increased	   complexity	   of	  multi-­‐factorial	  analyses,	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	   the	   inherent	  unlikeliness	   (current	  and	   future)	   to	   be	   able	   to	   count	   on	   Institutions	  with	   the	   appropriate	   level	   of	  expertise,	   or	  previous	   experience,	   on	   an	   enormous	   amount	   of	   specific	   issues,	  necessary	   to	   grasp	   interconnections	   in	   any	   given	   context	   at	   any	   given	   time.	  Intersectionality	   appears	   to	   be	   one	   of	   the	   biggest	   challenges	   in	   increasingly	  complex	   societies,	   constituting	   an	   element	   that,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   cannot	   be	  overlooked,	  given	  the	  current	  evolved	  understanding	  of	  human	  rights	  and,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  seems	  to	  “ask	  too	  much”	  to	  human-­‐made	  institutions.	  	  	  Not	   only	   intersectional	   perspectives	   require	   multi-­‐factorial	   analyses	   able	   to	  address,	   at	   the	   same	   level	   of	   elaboration,	   issues	   belonging	   to	   completely	  different	   fields,	   but	   the	   additional	   element	   of	   cultural	   diversity	   might	   also	  occasionally	   imply	   clashes	   of	   fundamental	   rights	   for	   which	   appropriate	   (or	  acceptable)	   solutions	   still	   need	   elaboration.	   For	   what	   concerns	   the	   object	   of	  this	   research,	   let	   us	   consider,	   for	   instance,	   the	   conflicts	   that	   might	   emerge	  between	  women’s	  rights	  and	  cultural	  or	  religious	  rights	  in	  concrete	  cases,	  and	  the	   further	  complexity	   introduced	  by	  Article	  8	  BdPC	  and	  Article	  5(a)	  CEDAW	  (unsurprisingly	  one	  of	  those	  CEDAW	  provisions	  collecting	  the	  highest	  number	  of	  reservations),	  transformative	  provisions	  that	  require	  States	  to	  change	  socio-­‐cultural	  patterns	  and	  traditional	  practices	  that	  reproduce	  unequal	  relations	  of	  power	  between	  the	  sexes.	  The	  complexity	  of	  intersectional	  analyses	  is	  two	  fold:	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  as	  mentioned,	  it	  requires	  multiple	  sensitivities	  and	  expertise,	  on	   the	   other	   hand,	   intersectionality	   impedes	   standardisation,	   since	   the	  multiplicity	  of	  relevant	  factors,	  and	  their	  relative	  influence	  (or	  “weight”),	  varies	  in	  each	  concrete	  case,	  depending	  on	  subjective	  and	  context-­‐related	  features.	  	  To	  guarantee	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  gender	  perspective,	  feminist	  legal	  scholars	  have	  often	  called	   for	   increased	  women	  representation	   in	   international	   institutions.	  Beyond	  the	  “add	  women	  and	  stir”155	  issue,	  there	  is	  wide	  consensus	  on	  the	  fact	  that	   a	   woman	   would	   be	   more	   likely	   to	   hold	   useful	   experience	   to	   facilitate	  gendered	   analyses.	   If	   such	   partial	   solution	   does	   not	   present	   particular	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  155	  The	  “add	  women	  and	  stir	  approach”	  is	  an	  unsatisfactory	  response	  to	  national	  and	  international	  institutions’	  gender	  bias.	  The	  wording	  underlines	  that	   the	  emphasis	  on	   increasing	  the	  number	  of	  women	   in	   public	   decision	   processes	   should	   not	   overshadow	   the	   hows	   and	   whys	   of	   balanced	  representation,	  since	  it	  cannot	  be	  considered	  to	  guarantee,	  per	  se,	  the	  internalisation	  of	  a	  gendered	  approach.	  	  For	  general	  reference	  see	  Tint,	  2004,	  whereas	  for	  a	  perspective	  on	  the	  feasibility	  of	  such	  approach	  to	  address	  intersectional	  see	  Motmans,	  Woodward,	  2009.	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obstacles	   to	   be	   implemented,	   other	   than	   the	   will	   to	   promote	   women’s	  participation,	  it	  is	  hardly	  a	  viable	  option	  to	  ensure	  intersectional	  perspectives,	  since	   it	   would	   imply	   being	   able	   to	   design	   institution’s	   compositions	  representing	   all	   possible	   subjective	   identities.	   Intersectionality	   is	   a	   more	  complex	  problem,	  requiring	  more	  complex	  solutions.	  	  On	   the	   basis	   of	   our	   previous	   considerations,	   in	   our	   view,	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  System	   provides	   a	   suitable	   context	   to	   develop	   a	   method	   to	   overcome	   such	  complexity.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  System	  includes	  States	  with	  a	  certain	   degree	   of	   socio-­‐cultural	   homogeneity	   and	   developed	   an	   extreme	  familiarity	  with	  national	  contexts	  and	  local	  specificities.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  as	  seen,	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions	   provide	   appropriate	   institutional	   and	  procedural	  preconditions	  to	  encourage	  a	  dialogue	  with	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  societal	  actors,	  which	  “inform”	  the	  cases	  contributing	  specific	  expertise	  and	  support	  to	  the	   development	   of	   context-­‐related	   analyses.	   As	  we	   saw	   in	   the	   case	   of	   VAW,	  this	   is	  a	  successful	  praxis	  in	  the	  System,	  already	  experienced	  on	  several	  other	  specific	   issues,	   such	   as	   collective	   property	   rights	   of	   indigenous	   communities,	  where	  it	  enabled	  the	  IACrtHR	  to	  construct	  evolutionary	  interpretations.156	  We	  argue	   that,	   while	   the	   issue	   of	   intersectionality	   is	   inherently	   unsuitable	   to	   be	  standardised	   in	   a	   norm	   or	   solved	   “once	   and	   for	   all,”	   at	   procedural	   level	   it	   is	  possible	  to	  provide	  a	  coherent	  solution	  to	  its	  complexity.	  An	  increased	  focus	  on	  coordinating	  different	  expertise	  in	  a	  “multi-­‐level	  coalition,”	  as	  it	  happens	  in	  the	  case	  of	   the	  elaboration	  of	  Commission’s	  Reports	  on	  VAW,	  can	  prove	  useful	   in	  providing	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions	   with	   the	   appropriate	   tools	   to	  consistently	   evaluate	   concrete	   cases,	   in	   which	   several	   subjective	   and	  contextual	  factors	  concur	  to	  determine	  the	  facts.	  	  In	   the	   following	   paragraphs,	   we	   shall	   analyse	   the	   performance	   of	   Inter-­‐American	  Institutions	   in	  considering	  the	   influence	  of	  multiple	   factors	   in	  cases	  of	  VAW.	  From	  the	  analysis	  of	  relevant	  jurisprudence,	  we	  find	  that	  the	  need	  to	  develop	   intersectional	   analyses	   has	   been	   largely	   overshadowed	   by	   the,	  somehow	  propaedeutic,	  efforts	  to	  provide	  Inter-­‐American	  Institutions	  with	  the	  appropriate	   tools	   to	   develop	   a	   gender-­‐perspective.	   However,	   such	   restrictive	  focus	  presents	  conceptual	  limitations	  that	  should	  not	  be	  underestimated,	  given	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  156	  For	  an	  extensive	  in-­‐depth	  study	  of	  the	  contribution	  of	  Inter	  American	  case	  law	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  indigenous	  rights	  refer	  to:	  Oliva-­‐Martínez,	  2012.	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the	   transformative	   approach	   of	   the	   BdPC	   and	   its	   Article	   8.	   As	  we	   saw	   in	   the	  First	   Section	   of	   this	   research,	   the	   critique	   raised	   by	   feminist	   legal	   scholars	  concerned	  with	   the	   issue	  of	   cultural	   relativism	  and	   the	   implicit	  grounding	  on	  white/Western	   female	   experiences	   of	   the	   doctrinal	   conceptualisation	   of	   sex-­‐discrimination,	   provides	   relevant	   elements	   to	   contribute	   developing	   an	  adequate	   theory	  and	  praxis	   to	  address	   the	  problem	  of	   intersectionality	   in	   the	  Inter-­‐American	   System.	   The	   critical	   element	   lies	   in	   coherently	   using	   the	  conceptual	   tool	   provided	  by	   the	  dominance	   approach,	   and	   endorsed	   in	  BdPC	  and	   CEDAW	   with	   the	   recognition	   of	   the	   women’s	   structural	   social	  discrimination.	  The	  origins	  of	  this	  approach,	  and	  its	  reception	  in	  international	  instruments	   on	   women’s	   rights,	   promoted	   its	   use	   to	   ground	   the	   new	  understanding	   of	   women’s	   discrimination,	   however,	   limiting	   its	   scope	   to	   the	  analysis	   of	   women’s	   unequal	   position	   in	   societies,	   is	   bound	   to	   prove	  insufficient	   to	  consistently	  address	  complex	  concrete	  social	  contexts.	  Women,	  as	  man,	  have	  multiple	  identities,	  constructed	  by	  the	  contemporary	  interaction	  between	   class,	   culture,	   religion	   and	   other	   ideological	   institutions	   and	  frameworks	  (Mohanty,	  1988).	  Brazilian	  scholar	  Carneiro	  argues	  that	  racism	  is	  a	   constitutive	   element	   of	   Latin	   American	   societies	   and	   determines	   gender	  hierarchies	   (Carneiro,	   2001).	   A	   contextualised	   analysis	   should,	   therefore,	   be	  able	  to	  consider	  how	  (and	  if)	  gender	  and	  other	  societal	  structures	  contribute	  to	  place	  in	  a	  subjugated	  position	  a	  particular	  woman	  in	  a	  concrete	  context.	  	  	  In	  his	  Concurring	  Opinion	  to	  the	  pioneering	  Advisory	  Opinion	  18/2003,	  Judge	  Cançado	   Trindade,	   who	   was	   President	   of	   the	   Court	   at	   that	   time,	   argues	   the	  shortcomings	   of	   single-­‐factor	   analyses	   in	   providing	   informative	   basis	   for	   the	  eradication	   of	   discriminatory	   social	   structures:	   “	   […]	   despite	   the	   search,	   by	  
international	  doctrine	  and	  case-­‐law,	  of	  the	  identification	  of	   illegitimate	  bases	  of	  
discrimination,	   this	   does	   not	   appear	   sufficient	   to	   me;	   one	   ought	   to	   go	   beyond	  
that,	   as	   discrimination	   hardly	   occurs	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   a	   sole	   element	   (e.g.,	   race,	  
national	   or	   social	   origin,	   religion,	   sex,	   among	   others),	   being	   rather	   a	   complex	  
mixture	  of	  several	  of	  them	  (and	  there	  also	  being	  cases	  of	  discrimination	  de	  jure).	  
Moreover,	   when	   the	   clauses	   of	   non-­‐discrimination	   of	   the	   international	  
instruments	  of	   human	   rights	   contain	  a	   list	   of	   the	   illegitimate	  bases	   referred	   to,	  
what	   they	   really	   aim	   at	   thereby	   is	   to	   eliminate	   a	   whole	   discriminatory	   social	  
structure,	  having	  in	  mind	  the	  distinct	  component	  elements.	  It	  is	  perfectly	  possible,	  
besides	  being	  desirable,	   to	   turn	  the	  attentions	  to	  all	   the	  areas	  of	  discriminatory	  
human	  behaviour,	  including	  those	  which	  have	  so	  far	  been	  ignored	  or	  neglected	  at	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international	  level	  (e.g.,	  inter	  alia,	  social	  status,	  income,	  medical	  state,	  age,	  sexual	  
orientation,	  among	  others)	  […]”	   (Concurring	  Opinion,	  Cançado	  Trindade,	  para.	  62-­‐63).	  	  The	   BdPC	   internalises	   this	   problem,	   explicitly	   mentioning	   it	   at	   Article	   9,	  Chapter	  III	  (Duties	  of	  the	  States):	  	  
With	  respect	   to	   the	  adoption	  of	   the	  measures	   in	   this	  Chapter,	   the	  States	  Parties	  
shall	  take	  special	  account	  of	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  women	  to	  violence	  by	  reason	  of	  
among	   others,	   their	   race	   or	   ethnic	   background	   or	   their	   status	   as	   migrants,	  
refugees	   or	   displaced	   persons.	   Similar	   consideration	   shall	   be	   given	   to	   women	  
subjected	  to	  violence	  while	  pregnant	  or	  who	  are	  disabled,	  of	  minor	  age,	  elderly,	  
socio-­‐economically	  disadvantaged,	  affected	  by	  armed	  conflict	  or	  deprived	  of	  their	  
freedom.	  	  The	   article	   refers	   to	   the	   duty	   of	   States	   to	   consider	   intersectionality	   when	  defining	  appropriate	  measures	  to	  eradicate	  women’s	  discrimination	  and	  VAW.	  This	  provision	   implies	   that	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions	  should	  also	  be	  able	   to	  do	   so,	   when	   evaluating	   the	   origins	   of	   a	   violation	   and	   assessing	   States’	   due	  diligence.	  However,	   the	  convention	  does	  not	  explain	  how,	  and	   it	   could	  hardly	  do	   so.	  The	  multiplicity	   of	   possible	   cases	   cannot	  be	   addressed	  unambiguously	  by	   a	   written	   text,	   such	   as	   a	   convention,	   which	   requires	   a	   high	   level	   of	  standardisation	  and	  can	  only	  suggest	   the	  need	   for	  an	   interpretation	  based	  on	  multiple	  factors.	  The	  crucial	  interpretive	  function,	  to	  guarantee	  the	  effect	  utile	  of	  a	  specialized	  convention	  in	  the	  broader	  framework	  of	  multiple	  international	  human	   rights	   instruments,	   needs	   to	   be	   performed	  by	   a	   judicial	   body,	   able	   to	  articulate	   a	  decision	  once	   crucial	   additional	   information	  has	  been	   added	   to	   a	  case.	  While,	   in	   some	   cases,	   sex	   (or	   gender)	   is	   the	   determinant	   element	   for	   a	  specific	   form	   of	   violence,	   in	   others	   it	   might	   be	   the	   interaction	   between	  sex/gender,	   race,	   class,	   political	   activities	   or	   some	   other	   factor	   to	   cause	   and	  determine	  the	  form	  of	  women’s	  rights	  violations	  (Byrnes,	  2010).	  	  Article	  9	  BdPC	  recognises	  that	  discrimination	  and	  violence	  do	  not	  always	  affect	  women	   in	   the	  same	  measure.	  However,	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions’	  case	   law,	  although	   increasingly	   evolutionary	   in	   terms	   of	   integrating	   a	   gender	  perspective,	   presents	   evident	   shortcomings	   for	   what	   concerns	  intersectionality.	  Arguably,	  as	  we	  will	  see,	  there	  have	  been	  cases	  in	  which	  their	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analyses	   implicitly	   legitimized	  other	  structural	   inequalities	  affecting	  women’s	  social	  position.	  	  
Women	  and	  (real	  or	  alleged)	  political	  activism:	  transgressing	  roles	  	  After	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  BdPC	  in	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  System,	  Raquel	  Martín	  de	  
Mejía	  v.	  Peru	  (1996)	  and	  Diana	  Ortiz	  v.	  Guatemala	   (1996)	   are	   the	   first	   cases	   in	  which	   the	   Commission	   could	   have	  mentioned	   the	   interaction	   of	   gender	  with	  other	   factors	   in	   originating	   the	   violations	   alleged.	   In	   neither	   occasion,	   as	  previously	  argued,	  the	  Commission	  effectively	  applies	  a	  gender	  perspective	  in	  the	  analysis,	   hence,	   it	   is	   not	   surprising	   that	   the	   decisions	   perform	   poorly	   for	  what	  concerns	   the	   consideration	   of	   intersectionality.	   However,	   we	   take	   them	   into	  account	  as	  suitable	  cases	  for	  experimenting	  such	  a	  multi-­‐factorial	  perspective.	  	  	  In	  Raquel	  Martín	  de	  Mejía,	  the	  victim	  had	  been	  repeatedly	  raped	  and	  tortured	  by	  members	   of	   the	   army,	  who	  were	   accusing	   her	   and	   her	   husband	   (a	   lawyer	   and	  political	  activist,	  who	  was	  murdered	  in	  the	  same	  occasion)	  of	  being	  members	  of	  the	   Movimiento	   Revolucionario	   Tupac	   Amarú.	   As	   mentioned,	   although	   the	  Commission	   recognises	   the	   crime	   perpetrated	   as	   “an	   attack	   against	   human	  
dignity”	   with	   long-­‐term	   psychological	   effects,	   the	   decision	   cannot	   be	  considered	  an	  example	  of	  gendered-­‐analysis.	  In	  pointing	  at	  the	  victim’s	  public	  humiliation	  and	  society’s	  attitude	   towards	  victims	  of	   sexual	  abuse	   in	  general,	  the	  Commission	  does	  not	  add	  a	  mention	   to	   the	  discriminatory	  nature	  of	  such	  patterns,	   while	   they	   are	   considered	   aggravating	   circumstances	   of	   the	   fact.	  Although	   the	   sex	   of	   the	   victim	   is	   related	   to	   the	   cause	   of	   the	   violation,	   the	  Commission	  considers	  it	  only	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  influenced	  the	  form	  that	  the	  violation	   took.	   As	   Byrnes	   notices	   for	   what	   concerns	   general	   tendencies	   in	  international	   institutions,	   the	   gender	   dimension	   was	   not	   systematically	  analysed,	   nor	   was	   the	   violation	   seen	   as	   (potentially)	   significantly	   different	  from	  similar	  violations	  inflicted	  on	  men	  (Byrnes,	  1992).	  The	  Commission	  fails	  to	   consider	   that,	   although	   alleged	   subversive	   activities	   gave	   the	   occasion	   for	  both	   the	   killing	   of	   the	   victim’s	   husband	   and	   her	   rape,	   the	   cause	   of	   her	  “punishment”	  might	  be	   interpreted	  as	  originating	   in	  the	   failure	  to	  respect	   the	  socially	  defined	  role	  of	  a	  woman.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  an	  analysis	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  intersection	   between	   gender	   and	   the	   political	   factor	   could	   uncover	   crucial	  features	  of	  this	  violation.	  In	  a	  later	  analysis	  proposed	  by	  the	  common	  intervener	  in	   the	  Castro-­‐Castro	  case,	  women	  accused	  of	  subversion	  suffer	  violations	  caused	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by	   the	   perception	   of	   their	   double	   transgression:	   that	   of	   the	   political	   status	   quo,	  which	   they	   share	   with	   men,	   and	   that	   of	   their	   role,	   determined	   by	   the	   social	  construction	  of	   their	   gender.	   In	   this	  perspective,	   following	  our	   example,	  Raquel	  Martín	   de	   Mejía’s	   sex	   determines	   the	   specific	   form	   of	   her	   punishment	   but,	   as	  opposed	   to	  men	   in	   the	   same	   situation,	   she	   is	   punished	   for	   two	   reasons,	   one	   of	  which	   uncovers	   the	   discriminatory	   features	   of	   the	   acts.	   We	   do	   not	   mean	   to	  assume	  that	  such	  an	  evaluation	  would	  have	  necessarily	  led	  the	  Commission	  to	  adopt	  different	  conclusions,	  or	  to	  actually	  endorse	  the	  double	  discrimination157	  analysis,	   but	   to	   signal	   how	   the	   facts	   of	   the	   case	   could	   have	   allowed	   an	  intersectional	  analysis	  	  
Dianna	   Ortiz	   v.	   Guatemala	   (1996)	   represents	   another	   unsatisfactory	   example,	  both	  for	  what	  concerns	  the	  integration	  of	  the	  gender-­‐factor	  in	  the	  analysis	  and	  for	  the	  failure	  to	  address	  any	  possible	  influence	  of	  the	  intersection	  of	  multiple	  factors	   influencing	  and	  causing	   the	  violation.	  The	  Commission	   fails	   to	  give	   the	  appropriate	   weight	   to	   some	   statements	   of	   public	   agents,	   which	   arguably	  constituted	   evidence	   of	   the	   acts	   being	   a	   manifestation	   of	   discrimination,	   and	  misused	   the	  possibly	   critical	   information	  provided	  by	   the	   fact	   the	   victim	  was	   a	  Catholic	  nun	  working	  in	  indigenous	  communities.	  Let	  us	  recall	  that,	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	   disprove	   the	   victim’s	   allegations,	   the	   hence	   Minister	   of	   Defence	   stated	   that:	  
“Sister	  Ortiz	  had	  invented	  her	  story	  to	  cover	  up	  her	  involvement	  in	  a	  ‘lesbian	  tryst’.	  	  
He	   suggested	   that	   her	   facial	   injuries	   resulted	   from	   a	   love	   affair”	   (para.	   43).	   The	  Commission	  refers	  to	  this	  element	  as	  an	  aggravation	  of	  the	  violation	  perpetrated	  since,	   being	   the	   victim	   a	   nun,	   it	   hindered	   her	   reputation.	   A	   multidimensional	  analysis	   would	   have	   taken	   into	   consideration	   the	   possibility	   that,	   again,	   such	  statements	  might	   suggest	  her	  double	   transgression,	  one	  related	   to	  her	   religious	  function,	   since	   it	   is	   possible	   that	   she	   was	   targeted	   because	   her	   activity	   was	  considered	   inappropriate	   to	  her	  religious	  role,	  which	  was	   indeed	  considered	  by	  the	  Commission	  as	  a	  breach	  of	  her	  right	  to	  freedom	  of	  religion,	  and	  one	  related	  to	  the	   transgression	  of	   her	   gender	   role,	  possibly	  hinted	  by	  her	   alleged	   lesbianism.	  We	  stress	  that	  we	  do	  not	  have	  sufficient	  information	  to	  argue	  that	  this	  was,	  in	  fact,	  a	  more	  appropriate	  analysis.	  Our	  objective	  here	  is	  to	  provide	  concrete	  examples	  of	  the	  complexity	  of	  an	  intersectional	  analysis.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  157	  To	  discuss	  this	  point	  we	  are	  adopting	  the	  framework	  of	  analysis	  presented	  by	  the	  petitioners	  in	  the	  later	  Castro-­‐Castro	  case,	  although	  it	  was	  not	  fully	  endorsed	  by	  the	  IACrtHR.	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As	  mentioned,	  in	  neither	  of	  these	  two	  cases	  we	  found	  evidence	  of	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	   gender	   perspective.	   Therefore,	   it	   is	   somehow	   unsurprising	   the	   absence	   of	  further	   elements	   of	   complexity.	   However,	   the	   gradual	   improvement	   in	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions’	   internalisation	  of	   the	  new	  understanding	  of	  VAW,	  brings	  about	   parallel	   progresses	   in	   their	   identification	   of	   the	   interrelations	   between	  gender	  and	  (real	  or	  alleged)	  political	  activities.	  	  It	   is	   in	  the	  path-­‐breaking	  Castro-­‐Castro	  case	  that	  we	  find	  the	  first	  example	  of	  an	  analysis	  taking	  into	  consideration	  the	  possible	  intersections	  between	  gender	  and	  other	  factors.	  During	  the	  hearings	  of	  the	  case,	  the	  common	  intervener	  presents	  a	  complex	   interpretation	   of	   the	   facts,	   contributing	   to	   provide	   the	   Court	   with	   the	  opportunity	   to	   establish	   its	   competence	   on	   the	   BdPC	   and,	   for	   the	   first	   time,	  include	   a	   gender	   perspective	   in	   its	   reasoning.158	  The	   intervener	   points	   at	   the	  gendered	  nature	  of	  the	  violations	  and	  introduces	  the	  previously	  mentioned	  notion	  of	   double	   transgression,	   according	   to	   which	   the	   female	   political	   prisoners	   had	  been	   punished	   for	   their	   transgression	   to	   the	   norms	   of	   society	   and	   the	   status	  
quo,	   common	   to	   the	  male	   political	   prisoners,	  and	   to	   the	   transgression	   of	   the	  role	  assigned	  to	  women	  in	  Peruvian	  society,	  i.e.	  their	  “loss	  of	  femininity”	  due	  to	  political	  activism.	  However,	  while	  developing	  a	  gendered	  analysis,	  the	  IACrtHR	  does	   not	   consider	   this	   suggestions	   with	   the	   same	   attention	   that,	   on	   the	  contrary,	  directs	  towards	  other	  symbolic	  features	  of	  the	  violations,	  such	  as	  the	  particular	  choice	  of	  Mother’s	  day	  to	  perpetrate	  them.	  	  	  
Gender	  and	  indigenous	  communities	  	  In	   Ana,	   Beatriz,	   and	   Celia	   González	   Pérez	   v	   Mexico	   (2001),	   the	   Commission	  considers	   cases	   of	   sexual	   abuses	   of	   indigenous	   women	   by	   members	   of	   the	  military,	  for	  their	  alleged	  participation	  in	  a	  dissident	  group.	  Although	  this	  case	  represents	   an	   attempt	   to	   consider	   the	   influence	   of	   sex,	   political	   issues	   and	  ethnic	   origins	   on	   the	   violations	   suffered,	   we	   argue	   that	   the	   absence	   of	   a	  structured	   method	   to	   address	   intersectionality	   created	   the	   conditions	   for	  incoherencies	   in	   the	   Commission’s	   conclusions.	   As	   in	   the	   previous	   cases,	   the	  Commission	  considers	  the	  sex	  of	  the	  victims	  as	  a	  determinant	  of	  the	  form	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  158	  However,	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  facts	  presents	  some	  shortcomings.	  As	  discussed	  in	  the	  First	  Section	  of	   this	  research,	   from	  a	   feminist	  perspective,	   the	  Court’s	  emphasis	  on	  the	  victims’	  role	  of	  mothers	  when	  interpreting	  the	  symbolic	  meaning	  of	  the	  violations	  suffered,	  might	  be	  interpreted	  as	  reproducing	  the	  traditional	  division	  of	  roles	  in	  the	  family.	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violations,	   and	   takes	   into	   account	   the	   political	   factor	   only	   in	   grounding	   the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  facts	  as	  torture.	  While	  we	  found	  no	  evidence	  of	  particular	  gender	   sensitivity,	   the	   indigenous	  origins	  of	   the	   victims	   are	   explicitly	   singled	  out	   as	   aggravating	   the	   State’s	   responsibility.	   This	   particular	   gravity	   is	  established	   on	   two	   grounds:	   a)	   because	   the	   abuses	   “led	   [the	   victims]	   to	   flee	  
their	  community	  in	  a	  situation	  of	  fear,	  shame,	  and	  humiliation”	  (para.	  52),	  given	  the	  ostracism	  experienced	  in	  their	  communities	  of	  origin	  because	  of	  their	  rape	  and	  b)	  given	  the	  State’s	  obligation	  to	  respect	  indigenous	  cultures.	  Let	  us	  point	  at	  the	  conceptual	  error	  in	  the	  grounding	  of	  such	  conclusions.	  The	  Commission	  applies	   the	   traditional	  analysis	  of	   rape,	   recognised	  as	  a	   form	  of	   torture	  when	  intentional,	  oriented	   to	  a	  purpose	  and	  perpetrated	  by	  a	  public	  agent,	  without	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  social	  context	  originating	  it,	  i.e.	  the	  unequal	  position	  of	  women	  and	  indigenous	  people	  in	  society.	  As	  mentioned,	  it	  is	  not	  until	  Maria	  da	  
Penha	  that,	  in	  evaluations	  of	  cases	  of	  VAW,	  the	  Commission	  starts	  applying	  the	  innovative	   understanding	   of	   the	   BdPC.	   In	   Ana,	   Beatriz,	   and	   Celia	   González	  
Pérez,	   the	   victims’	   social	   context	   and	   indigenous	   origins	   are	   used	   as	  informative	  elements	  when	  establishing	  the	  gravity	  of	  the	  consequences	  of	  the	  violations,	   rather	   than	   to	   analyse	   the	   causes	   of	   the	   violation	   itself.	   This	  restrictive	   consideration	   signals	   the	   absence	   of	   an	   approach	   based	   on	   the	  discriminatory	   causes	   of	   human	   rights	   violations	   suffered	   by	   indigenous	  women.	   From	   a	   feminist	   perspective,	   the	   Commission	   attributes	   a	   particular	  gravity	  to	  rape	  given	  its	  disruptive	  consequences	  on	  the	  community	  of	  origin	  of	  the	   victim,	   implying	   a	   minor	   gravity	   in	   absence	   of	   this	   element	   (e.g.	  Charlesworth,	  1999;	  Chesterman	  1997).	  	  	  Additionally,	   the	   arguments	   used	   to	   establish	   the	   aggravating	   circumstances	  uncover	  a	  substantial	  conceptual	  error.	  While	  the	  Commission	  argues	  that	  the	  victims’	   rejection	   by	   their	   communities	   aggravates	   the	   consequences	   of	   the	  sexual	   abuses,	   it	   fails	   to	   recognise	   that	   the	   ostracism	   constitutes	   a	   second	  violence	   they	   suffer,	   presenting	   an	   autonomous	   nature,	   perpetrated	   by	   their	  communities	   of	   origin.	   Furthermore,	   the	   Commission	   considers	   State’s	  responsibility	   particularly	   grave	   given	   its	   obligation	   to	   respect	   indigenous	  cultures.	   In	   this	   argumentation	   lays	   the	   crucial	   conceptual	   error,	   which	  implicitly	   justifies	   (and	   even	   legitimises)	   the	   discriminatory	   nature	   of	   the	  
ostracism	  suffered.	  Although,	  as	  previously	   see,	   the	  BdPC	   is	  not	  mentioned	   in	  this	   reasoning,	   we	   can	   use	   its	   framework	   of	   analysis	   to	   understand	   the	  shortcomings	   of	   the	   Commission’s	   decisions:	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   there	   is	   no	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reference	   to	   unequal	   power	   relations	   originating	   discrimination	   and	   causing	  VAW,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   emphasis	   on	   respecting	   indigenous	   cultures	  overshadows	  the	  requirement	  to	  modify	  social	  and	  cultural	  patterns,	  customs,	  prejudices	   or	   traditions	   based	   on	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   inferiority	   of	  women	   or	   on	  stereotyped	  roles	  for	  women	  and	  men	  which	  legitimize	  or	  exacerbate	  VAW,	  in	  
all	  its	  forms.	  This	  positive	  obligation	  implies	  the	  need	  for	  a	  complex	  evaluation	  of	   social	   structures	   discriminating	  women,	   in	   national	   societies	   as	  well	   as	   in	  specific	  communities.	  Such	   judgments	  carry	  the	  risk	  of	   incurring	   in	  clashes	  of	  fundamental	  rights,	  as	  it	  is	  occasionally	  the	  case	  for	  what	  concerns	  cultural	  and	  women’s	  rights.	  While	  such	  clashes	  can	  be	  settled	  singling	  out	  the	  predominant	  interest	  to	  safeguard,	  there	  might	  be	  more	  controversial	  cases.159	  This	  problem	  has	   been	   largely	   bypassed	   in	   the	   international	   discourse	   on	  women’s	   rights,	  which	   traditionally	   focused	   on	   particular	   culture-­‐specific	   harmful	   practices,	  such	   as	   Female	   Genital	   Mutilation,	   considered	   unacceptable	   beyond	   any	  cultural	   right.	   Notably,	   for	   what	   concerns	   the	   Universal	   System,	   the	   high	  number	  of	  reservations	  on	  Article	  5(a)	  CEDAW	  and	  the	  absence,	  until	  recently,	  of	  a	   judicial	  body	  with	  competence	  on	  deciding	  concrete	  cases,	  decreased	  the	  occasions	   of	   such	   controversies.	   However,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  System,	   with	   a	   supranational	   Court	   granted	   contentious	   jurisdiction	   on	   the	  BdPC,	   ratified	   with	   no	   reservations,	   an	   incremental	   improvement	   in	  Institutions’	  ability	   to	  develop	   intersectional	  multi-­‐factorial	  analyses	   is	  bound	  to	  multiply	  the	  occasions	  to	  uncover	  fundamental	  clashes.	  In	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  address	   this	   challenges,	  without	   incurring	   in	   contradictions,	   such	   Institutions	  need	  to	  develop	  appropriate	  methods	   to	  provide	  balanced	  coherent	  solutions	  to	  complex	  problems.	  Shaping	  an	  acceptable	  and	  legitimate	  method	  is	  essential	  in	   order	   to	   be	   able	   to	   produce	   a	   constructive	   debate	   on	   the	   substance	   and	  scope	  of	  the	  transformational	  approach	  to	  women’s	  rights,	  avoiding	  the	  risk	  of	  being	  opposed	  and	  rejected	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  ethnocentrism,	  paternalism	  or	  Western	  ideology.	  	  In	  Rosendo-­‐Cantú	  et	  al.	  v.	  Mexico	  (2010)	  and	  Fernández-­‐Ortega	  et	  al.	  v.	  Mexico	  (2010),	   we	   found	   the	   first	   explicit	   reference	   to	   intersectionality.	   In	   the	   first	  case,	   the	   IACrtHR	  recognised	   that	   the	  victim’s	  “condition	  as	  an	  indigenous	  girl	  
child	   in	   a	   situation	   of	   poverty	   [makes]	   her	   a	   victim	   at	   an	   intersection	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  159	  As	   we	   will	   see	   further	   on	   in	   this	   Section,	   complexities	   arise	   in	   those	   countries	   were	   the	  recognition	   of	   indigenous	   jurisdiction	   creates	   a	   context	   of	   legal	   pluralism	   within	   the	   State,	   i.e.	  Bolivia	  and	  Colombia.	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discrimination’”	   (Rosendo-­‐Cantú,	   para.	   82).	   In	   the	   second	   case,	   the	   IACrtHR	  defines	   rape	   as	   an	   extreme	   form	   of	   discrimination	   owing	   to	   the	   victim’s	  “condition	   as	   an	   indigenous	   person	   and	   owing	   to	   her	   condition	   as	   a	   woman”	  (Fernández-­‐Ortega,	   para.	   92).	   These	   rulings	   constitute	   examples	   of	   a	   more	  complex	   analysis,	   considering	   multiple	   forms	   of	   discrimination	   and	   violence	  suffered	  by	   indigenous	  women	  because	  of	   their	  subjugated	  social	  role,	  due	  to	  their	   sex,	   race,	   ethnicity,	   and	   economic	   position.	   As	   opposed	   to	   the	   previous	  Commission’s	  reasoning	  in	  Ana,	  Beatriz,	  and	  Celia	  González	  Pérez	  v	  Mexico,	  nine	  years	   later	   the	   IACrtHR	   considers	   the	  victims’	   indigenous	   identity	   as	   a	   factor	  aggravating	   their	   subjugated	   position	   in	   the	   national	   societal	   structure.	   In	  particular,	   the	   IACrtHR	   considers	   that	   both	   gender	   and	   ethnicity	   constituted	  obstacles	   to	   their	   access	   to	   justice,	   requiring	   the	   State	   to	   adopt	   protection	  measures	   taking	   into	   account	   victim’s	   particularities,	   economic	   and	   social	  characteristics,	  situation	  of	  special	  vulnerability,	  customs	  and	  values.	  Although	  the	   Court	   does	   not	   get	   involved	   into	   an	   evaluation	   of	   the	   social	   position	   of	  women	  within	  their	  indigenous	  communities,	  it	  correctly	  addresses	  indigenous	  women’s	   social	   position	   in	   the	   Mexican	   society.	   	   These	   two	   cases	   present	  evidence	  of	  a	  significant	  development	  of	  Inter-­‐American	  Institution’s	  ability	  to	  articulate	   multidimensional	   analysis	   and	   avoid	   conceptual	   errors	   and	  inconsistencies.	  	  Let	   us	   clarify	   the	   implications	   of	   the	   different	   focuses	   presented	   in	   the	  reviewed	   cases:	   while	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   both	   gender	   and	   race	   (and	   possibly	  other	  factors)	  determine	  the	  position	  of	  the	  victim	  in	  a	  given	  society	  at	  a	  given	  time,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   only	   gender	   (and	   possibly	   other	   factors,	   but	   not	  racism)	   intervenes	   in	   defining	   an	   indigenous	   women’s	   social	   position	   in	   her	  community,	  since	  her	  ethnic	   identity	   is	  shared	  with	   the	  male	  members	  of	   the	  same	  community.	  In	  this	  sense,	  while	  cases	  of	  ostracism	  suffered	  by	  victims	  of	  rape	   undoubtedly	   increase	   their	   suffering	   and	   are	   a	   symptom	   of	   women’s	  vulnerable	  position	  in	  a	  given	  community,	  this	  manifest	  discrimination	  cannot	  be	   used	   to	   argue	   States’	   aggravated	   responsibility	   due	   to	   their	   obligation	   to	  respect	  indigenous	  cultures	  without	  incurring	  in	  a	  conceptual	  error	  against	  the	  substance	   and	   scope	   of	  Women’s	   Conventions.	   Therefore,	   evaluations	   of	   the	  first	   and	   second	   violence	   suffered	   should	   be	   kept	   carefully	   distinguished.	   	   In	  
Ana,	   Beatriz,	   and	   Celia	   González	   Pérez,	   victims	   suffered	   a	   double	  discrimination:	  the	  sexual	  abuses	  originate	   in	   their	  subjugated	  social	  position	  as	   indigenous	   and	   women,	   whilst	   ostracism	  manifests	   their	   unequal	   social	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position	   as	   women	   in	   their	   communities	   of	   origin.	   In	   this	   perspective,	   the	  responsibility	   of	   the	   State	   emerges	   from	   its	   omissions	   related	   to	   the	   need	   to	  modify	   discriminatory	   social	   structures	   and	   practices	   in	   the	   general	   society	  
and	   for	   those	   related	   to	   the	   failure	   to	   adopt	   effective	   measures	   to	   promote	  changes	   in	  culture-­‐specific	  traditional	  practices,	   that	   further	  victimize	  women	  who	  suffered	  a	  sexual	  abuse,	  e.g.	  education	  programmes.	  The	  paradigm	  shift	  on	  VAW,	  endorsed	  by	  Women’s	  Conventions,	  extended	  States’	  positive	  obligations	  beyond	   the	   range	   of	   measures	   normally	   suggested	   as	   appropriate	   in	   cases	  involving	   infringements	   of	   the	   right	   to	   physical	   integrity	   (Byrnes,	   2010).	  Provisions	  such	  as	  Article	  8	  BdPC,	  or	  5(a)	  CEDAW,	  are	   inherently	   incomplete	  norms,	   needing	   to	   be	   informed	   with	   contextualised	   analyses	   in	   order	   to	   be	  implemented	  at	  national	  level	  and	  ensured	  by	  a	  supranational	  judicial	  body.	  	  Social	  structures	  and	  cultural	  patterns,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  content	  of	   human	   rights	   norms,	   are	   historically	   and	   culturally	   determined,	   thus,	  dynamically	  adaptable.	  Recognising	  this	  limitation	  does	  not	  imply	  delegitimizing	  attempts	   to	   provide	   remedies	   to	   human	   rights	   violations,	   but	   it	   does	   require	  further	   efforts	   to	   develop	   multi-­‐dimensional	   complex	   approaches	   to	   construct	  acceptable	  balanced	  solutions.	  Furthermore,	   it	   requires	  assuming	  such	  attempts	  as	   inherently	   fallible,	   a	   work	   in	   progress	   that	   needs	   to	   be	   elaborated	   through	  localized	   informed	   experimental	   solutions	   to	   concrete	   cases.	  160	  Until	   recently,	  international	  institutions	  have	  not	  treated	  systematically	  issues	  of	  sex,	  gender	  and	  culture	  (Byrnes,	  2010).	  Nevertheless,	   in	   the	  reviewed	  case	   law,	  we	  found	  elements	   suggesting	   a	   progressive	   attempt	   of	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions	   to	  develop	   multi-­‐factorial	   analyses,	   although	   with	   controversial	   outcomes.	  Improvements	   ran	   parallel	   to	   increasing	   availability	   of	   specific	   documental	  evidence	   presented	   by	   petitioners,	   representatives,	   advocacy	   groups,	   experts	  and	   inter-­‐governmental	   institutions,	  which	  progressively	   enables	   the	   gradual	  construction	  of	  complex	  analyses.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  160	  Through	   General	   Recommendations	   12	   and	   19,	   CEDAW	   Committee	   used	   Article	   5	   to	   give	  substance	  to	  States	  Party’s	  positive	  obligations	  to	  guarantee	  women’s	  substantive	  equality.	  In	  this	  perspective,	  appropriate	  measures	  include	  those	  needed	  to	  protect	  general	  rights,	  shared	  without	  distinction	  by	  men	  and	  women,	  and	  those	  related	  directly	  or	  exclusively	  to	  the	  condition	  of	  women	  of	  their	  holders.	  This	  second	  dimension	  is	  covered	  introducing	  special	  measures,	  re-­‐establishing	  or	  actively	  promoting	  equality	  between	  men	  and	  women,	  in	  contexts	  of	  unequal	  social	  relations.	  The	  international	   consensus	   on	   the	   issue	   recognises	   that	   the	   principle	   of	   equality	   and	   non-­‐discrimination	   implies	   that	   inequality,	  marginalization	   and	   vulnerability	   should	   be	   compensated	  through	  policies	  that	  generate	  equal	  conditions	  (including	  affirmative	  actions).	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  We	   previously	   identified	   Commission’s	   Rapporteurship	   as	   an	   opportunity	   to	  coordinate	   thematic	   contributions	  of	   external	   sources	  with	   specific	   expertise.	  When	  preparing	  reports,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  those	  focused	  on	  specific	  countries	  or	  circumscribed	   contexts,	   the	   Commission	   engages	   in	   an	   active	   and	   fruitful	  dialogue	  with	  local	  and	  international	  stake-­‐holders,	  collects	  experts’	  opinions,	  interacts	   international	   political	   and	   technical	   bodies,	   and	   national	   public	  officials	   ultimately	   responsible	   for	   generating	   relevant	   policies.	   In	   Access	   to	  
Justice	  for	  Women	  Victims	  of	  Violence	  in	  the	  Americas	   (2007),	   for	   instance,	   the	  Commission	  presents	   a	   regional	   evaluation	  of	   social	   customs	   that	   perpetuate	  women’s	  subordinate	  position	  in	  societies	  (para.	  26).161	  Such	  thematic	  reports,	  covering	  topics	  of	  regional	   interest,	  have	  enormous	  potential	  to	  set	  standards	  and	   principles	   and	   to	   address	   situations	   involving	   collective	   or	   structural	  problems	  that	  may	  not	  be	  adequately	  reflected	  in	  individual	  cases.	  Articulating	  and	  extending	  the	  issues	  covered	  is	  one	  of	  the	  primary	  instruments	  to	  inform	  and	   enable	   intersectional	   analyses,	   both	   for	  what	   concerns	   issues	   of	   gender-­‐based	   violence	   and	   for	   a	   generalised	   improvement	   of	   the	   System’s	   analytical	  tools	   when	   addressing	   other	   problems.	   Indeed,	   the	   current	   socio-­‐legal	  approach	   of	   the	   BdPC	   demands	   interdisciplinary	   approaches	   and	   context-­‐based	  analyses,	  that	  should	  not	  depend	  on	  the	  occasional	  availability	  of	  specific	  evidence	  and	  data,	   in	  contingent	  cases,	  nor	  solely	   rely	  on	  documentation	  and	  analyses	  provided	  by	  the	  petitioners.	  Indeed,	  as	  seen,	  while	  in	  several	  cases	  the	  petitioners	   proposed	   appropriate	   innovative	   approaches	   and	   offered	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions	   the	   occasion	   to	   articulate	   evolutionary	   interpretations,	  on	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   lack	   of	   institutional	   “self-­‐sufficiency”	   could	   create	   the	  conditions	  for	  a	  slower	  progress	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  consistent	  method	  to	  address	  complex	  cases.	  	  During	  their	  long	  experience,	  Inter-­‐American	  Institutions	  proved	  to	  be	  able	  to	  adapt	  the	  content	  of	  human	  rights	  norms	  to	  the	  particular	  situation	  of	  specific	  vulnerable	  groups,	  such	  as	  afro-­‐descendants,	  concerning	  generalised	  patterns	  of	   racial	   discrimination	   (Arias,	   Yamada,	   Tejerina,	   2004),	   and	   indigenous	  communities,	   in	   relation	   to	   collective	   property	   rights.	   The	   challenge	   is	   to	  construct	  an	  approach	  capable	  of	  holding	  together	  the	  analytical	  tools	  already	  developed	  by	   the	  Court,	   complementing	   them	  with	   those	  emerging	   from	  new	  international	   instruments.	   The	   dominance	   approach,	   elaborated	   by	   feminist	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  161	  See	  also,	  IACommHR’s	  Report	  on	  Haiti,	  2009	  (para.	  44).	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legal	  scholars	  in	  relation	  to	  sex	  discrimination,	  provides	  a	  suitable	  framework	  to	   construct	   a	   complex	   analytical	  method	   able	   to	   encompass	  multiple	   factors	  influencing	   social	   relations	   of	   power.	   Nevertheless,	   such	   method	   cannot	   be	  developed	  on	  purely	   theoretical	   or	   abstract	   grounds,	   but	  needs	   to	  be	   shaped	  through	   the	   practice	   in	   adjudicating	   complex	   violations	   originating	   in	  discrimination.	  Therefore,	   research	  efforts	  and	  a	  structured	  regional	  dialogue	  with	   scholars	   and	   movements,	   harmonised	   with	   the	   evolving	   international	  understanding	   of	   discrimination,	   are	   crucial	   to	   provide	   adequate	   procedural	  conditions	  to	  appropriately	  construct	  a	  generalizable	  method.	  	  
	  
States’	  positive	  obligations	  and	  due	  diligence	  
	  Inter-­‐American	   Institutions	   overcame	   the	   public/private	   dilemma	   both	  elaborating	  standards	  on	  States’	  positive	  obligations	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  adoption	  of	   measures	   to	   prevent	   VAW,	   eradicating	   its	   discriminatory	   causes,	   and	  applying	   the	  due	  diligence	  principle	  when	  evaluating	   States’	   responsibility	   in	  guaranteeing	  equal	  access	  to	  effective	  legal	  remedies	  to	  occurred	  violations.	  	  	  The	   regional	   debate	   on	   States’	   responsibility	   in	   cases	   of	   human	   rights	  violations	  perpetrated	  by	  private	  individuals	  dates	  back	  to	  the	   ‘70s,	  when	  the	  issue	  was	  at	   the	   forefront	  of	   the	  discussion	   in	  comparative	  doctrine	  and	  case	  law	   (Zamudio,	   1988).	   The	   regional	   approach	   to	   the	   issue	   developed	   through	  phases	   (Mijangos,	  González,	   2008;	  Massolo,	   2012),	   reflecting	   the	   evolution	  of	  the	   doctrine	   in	   international	   human	   rights	   law,	   which	   extended	   the	   concept	  States’	  positive	  obligations	  to	  guarantee	  the	  enjoyment	  of	   fundamental	  rights,	  overcoming	  the	  traditional	  limitations	  to	  their	  intervention	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  
erga	   omnes	   nature	   of	   the	   principles	   of	   equality	   and	   non-­‐discrimination.	  Institutions’	  reasoning	  came	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  substance	  of	  the	  violation,	  instead	  of	   on	   the	   perpetrator,	   (Cançado	   Trindade,	   1999;	   Mijangos,	   González,	   2008),	  interpreting	   conventional	   duties	   as	   implying	   erga	   omnes	   obligations.	   In	   the	  view	  of	  Judge	  Cançado	  Trindade,	  this	  evolution	  represents	  “the	  overcoming	  of	  a	  
pattern	  of	  conduct	  erected	  on	  the	  alleged	  autonomy	  of	  the	  will	  of	  the	  State,	  from	  
which	   International	   Law	   itself	   sought	   gradually	   to	   liberate	   itself	   in	   giving	  
expression	   to	   the	   concept	   of	   jus	   cogens”	   (Advisory	   Opinion	   18/03,	   Concurring	  Opinion,	  para.	  80).	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In	   Velásquez	   Rodríguez	   (1988),	   the	   first	   contentious	   case	   presented	   to	   the	  Court,	   and	   Godínez	   Cruz	   (1989),	   both	   addressing	   cases	   of	   desaparecidos,	   the	  IACrtHR	   articulated	   the	   effects	   of	   the	   ACHR	   in	   relation	   to	   third	   parties,	  interpreting	   Article	   1.1	   ACHR	   as	   entailing	   a	   double	   obligation	   to	   respect	  fundamental	  rights	  and	  guarantee	  their	  enjoyment,	  so	  that	  “any	  impairment	  of	  
those	  rights	  which	  can	  be	  attributed	  under	  the	  rules	  of	   international	   law	  to	  the	  
action	   or	   omission	   of	   any	   public	   authority	   constitutes	   an	   act	   imputable	   to	   the	  
State”	   (Velásquez	   Rodríguez,	   para.	   164).	  The	   Court	   maintained:	   “in	   principle,	  
any	   violation	   of	   rights	   recognised	   by	   the	   Convention	   carried	   out	   by	   an	   act	   of	  
public	  authority	  or	  by	  persons	  who	  use	  their	  position	  of	  authority	  is	  imputable	  to	  
the	  State.	  However,	  this	  does	  not	  define	  all	  the	  circumstances	  in	  which	  a	  State	  is	  
obligated	   to	  prevent,	   investigate	  and	  punish	  human	   rights	   violations,	   or	   all	   the	  
cases	  in	  which	  the	  State	  might	  be	  found	  responsible	  for	  an	  infringement	  of	  those	  
rights.	   An	   illegal	   act	   which	   violates	   human	   rights	   and	   which	   is	   initially	   not	  
directly	   imputable	   to	   a	   State	   (for	   example,	   because	   it	   is	   the	   act	   of	   a	   private	  
person	   or	   because	   the	   person	   responsible	   has	   not	   been	   identified)	   can	   lead	   to	  
international	  responsibility	  of	  the	  State,	  not	  because	  of	  the	  act	  itself,	  but	  because	  
of	  the	  lack	  of	  due	  diligence	  to	  prevent	  the	  violation	  or	  to	  respond	  to	  it	  as	  required	  
by	   the	   Convention”	   (Velásquez	   Rodríguez,	   para.	   172	   and	   Godínez	   Cruz,	   paras.	  181,	  182	  and	  187).	  	  While	   fundamental	   rights	   were	   still	   interpreted	   as	   limits	   to	   States’	  intervention,	  their	  responsibility	  emerges	  when	  omissions	  imply	  impunity	  for	  violations,	  hence,	  both	  in	  cases	  of	  violations	  perpetrated	  by	  public	  agents	  and	  in	  case	  of	  violations	  by	  private	  individuals.	  	  For	   what	   concerns	   the	   effects	   of	   Inter-­‐American	   doctrinal	   elaborations	   on	  cases	   involving	   VAW,	   this	   conceptualisation	   of	   States’	   duties	   grounds	   both	  petitioners’	   claims	   and	   Commission’s	   reasoning	   in	   Maria	   da	   Penha	   Maia	  
Fernandes	  vs.	  Brazil	  (2001).	  The	  negligence	  of	  the	  State	  in	  providing	  access	  to	  effective	   judicial	   remedies	   in	   a	   case	   of	   reiterated	   domestic	   violence,	   with	  irreversible	   consequences,	   is	   recognised	   as	   implying	   State’s	   tolerance	   of	   a	  situation	   of	   impunity,	   providing	   the	   Commission	   with	   the	   arguments	   to	  establish	  its	  competence	  to	  hear	  the	  case	  pursuant	  the	  BdPC	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  continuous	   nature	   of	   the	   violation	   of	   the	   right	   to	   effective	   legal	   procedures	  (Maria	  da	  Penha,	  par.	  27).	  However,	  the	  boundaries	  of	  State’s	  responsibility	  are	  clarified	   by	   the	   Commission’s	   reference	   to	   Velásquez	   Rodríguez	   doctrinal	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construction,	  reiterating	  that	  State’s	  responsibility	  does	  not	  emerge	  “because	  of	  
the	  act	  itself,	  but	  because	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  due	  diligence	  to	  prevent	  the	  violation	  or	  
respond	   to	   it	   as	   the	   Convention	   requires’”	   (para.	   55).	   State’s	   due	   diligence	   is	  evaluated	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   documentation	   providing	   evidence	   of	   Brazil’s	  omissions	  for	  what	  concerns	  the	  right	  to	  effective	  legal	  remedies,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  Articles	  1.1,	  8	  and	  25	  ACHR.	  While	  there	  is	  no	  mention	  to	  Article	  11	  (Right	  to	  Privacy)	  ACHR,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  normative	  framework	  provided	  by	  BdPC,	  the	  Commission	   elaborates	   its	   interpretation	   of	   the	   nature	   and	  meaning	  of	   such	  omissions,	   identifying	   a	   discriminatory	   pattern	   in	   the	   judicial	   system’s	  tolerance	   of	   VAW,	  which	   perpetuates	   “the	  psychological,	   social,	   and	  historical	  
roots	  and	  factors	  that	  sustain	  and	  encourage	  violence	  against	  women”	  (para.	  55)	  and	   reproduces	   “a	  climate	   that	   is	   conducive	   to	  domestic	   violence,	   since	   society	  
sees	  no	  evidence	  of	  willingness	  by	  the	  State,	  as	  the	  representative	  of	  the	  society,	  to	  
take	  effective	  action	  to	  sanction	  such	  acts”	   (para.	   56).	  Omissions,	   hence,	   cause	  discrimination	   in	   guaranteeing	   access	   to	   effective	   legal	   remedies	   and	  reproduce	  a	  generalised	  normalization	  on	  the	  social	  perception	  of	  VAW.	  	  States’	  duty	   to	  guarantee	  equal	  access	   to	  effective	   legal	   remedies	   is	   crucial	   in	  cases	  of	  VAW,	  since,	  to	  abide	  to	  the	  BdPC,	  it	  is	  imperative	  to	  reinforce	  societies’	  condemnation	   of	   the	   phenomenon	   and	   to	   maintain	   women’s	   confidence	   in	  authorities’	  ability	  to	  protect	  them	  from	  the	  threat	  of	  violence.	  On	  this	  issue,	  in	  the	  mentioned	  2007	  Report,	  the	  Commission	  clarified:	  “the	  influence	  exerted	  by	  
discriminatory	   socio-­‐cultural	   patterns	   may	   cause	   a	   victim’s	   credibility	   to	   be	  
questioned	   in	   cases	   involving	  violence,	   or	   lead	   to	  a	   tacit	  assumption	   that	   she	   is	  
somehow	  to	  blame	  for	  what	  happened,	  whether	  because	  of	  her	  manner	  of	  dress,	  
her	  occupation,	  her	  sexual	  conduct,	  relationship	  or	  kinship	  to	  the	  assailant	  and	  so	  
on.	  	   The	   result	   is	   that	   prosecutors,	   police	   and	   judges	   fail	   to	   take	   action	   on	  
complaints	   of	   violence.	  	   These	   biased	   discriminatory	   patterns	   can	   also	   exert	   a	  
negative	   influence	   on	   the	   investigation	   of	   such	   cases	   and	   the	   subsequent	  
weighing	   of	   the	   evidence,	  where	   stereotypes	   about	   how	  women	   should	   conduct	  
themselves	  in	  interpersonal	  relations	  can	  become	  a	  factor”	  (para.	  155).	  	  Notwithstanding	   the	   significance	  of	  Maria	  da	  Penha	  Maia	  Fernandes	  vs.	  Brazil	  in	   developing	   the	   understanding	   of	  women’s	   human	   rights	   in	   the	   region,	   the	  restricted	   interpretation	   of	   State’s	   positive	   obligations	   limited	   Commission’s	  recommendations	  to	  public	  measures	  to	  enact	  for	  improving	  judicial	  response	  to	  VAW,	  which	   established	   the	   need	   to:	   “continue	   and	   expand	   the	   reform	  process	  
	   199 
that	  will	  put	  an	  end	   to	   the	  condoning	  by	   the	  State	  of	  domestic	  violence	  against	  
women	   in	   Brazil	   and	   discrimination	   in	   the	   handling	   thereof.	   In	   particular,	   the	  
Commission	   recommends:	   a.	   Measures	   to	   train	   and	   raise	   the	   awareness	   of	  
officials	  of	   the	   judiciary	  and	  specialized	  police	   so	   that	   they	  may	  understand	  the	  
importance	  of	  not	  condoning	  domestic	  violence;	  b.	  The	  simplification	  of	  criminal	  
judicial	   proceedings	   so	   that	   the	   time	   taken	   for	   proceedings	   can	   be	   reduced,	  
without	   affecting	   the	   rights	   and	   guarantees	   related	   to	   due	   process;	   c.	   The	  
establishment	  of	  mechanisms	   that	   serve	  as	  alternatives	   to	   judicial	  mechanisms,	  
which	   resolve	   domestic	   conflict	   in	   a	   prompt	   and	   effective	   manner	   and	   create	  
awareness	  regarding	  its	  serious	  nature	  and	  associated	  criminal	  consequences;	  d.	  
An	   increase	   in	   the	   number	   of	   special	   police	   stations	   to	   address	   the	   rights	   of	  
women	  and	   to	  provide	   them	  with	   the	   special	   resources	  needed	   for	   the	   effective	  
processing	   and	   investigation	   of	   all	   complaints	   related	   to	   domestic	   violence,	   as	  
well	   as	   resources	   and	   assistance	   from	   the	   Office	   of	   the	   Public	   Prosecutor	   in	  
preparing	  their	  judicial	  reports;	  e.	  The	  inclusion	  in	  teaching	  curriculums	  of	  units	  
aimed	  at	  providing	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  respecting	  women	  and	  
their	   rights	   recognised	   in	   the	   Convention	   of	   Belém	   do	   Pará,	   as	   well	   as	   the	  
handling	   of	   domestic	   conflict;	   f.	   The	   provision	   of	   information	   to	   the	   Inter-­‐
American	  Commission	  on	  Human	  Rights	  within	  sixty	  days	  of	  transmission	  of	  this	  
report	   to	   the	   State,	   and	   of	   a	   report	   on	   steps	   taken	   to	   implement	   these	  
recommendations,	   for	   the	   purposes	   set	   forth	   in	   Article	   51	   (1)	   of	   the	   American	  
Convention”	  (Recommendations,	  point	  4).	  
	  The	   influence	   of	   the	   regional	   and	   international	   understanding	   of	   States’	   erga	  
omnes	  obligations,	  and	   the	   impact	  of	   the	  path-­‐breaking	  Castro-­‐Castro	  case	   for	  what	  concerns	  BdPC	  full	  justiciability,	  can	  be	  identified	  in	  successive	  case	  law.	  	  	  As	   seen,	   VAW	   perpetrated	   by	   public	   officials	   does	   not	   cause	   theoretical	  problems	   in	   establishing	   States’	   responsibility,	   if	   the	   violation	   contravenes	  established	   human	   rights	   guarantees,	   then	   the	   State	  will	   be	   liable	   for	   having	  violated	   them.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   changed	   understanding	   on	   positive	  obligations	  with	  respect	   to	  women’s	  rights	  can	  be	  singled	  out	  also	   in	  cases	   in	  which	  States’	  responsibility	  emerges	  from	  the	  perpetrator	  being	  a	  public	  agent	  (e.g.	  Castro-­‐Castro,	  Fernández-­‐Ortega	  et	  al.	  v.	  Mexico	  and	  Rosendo-­‐Cantú	  et	  al.	  v.	  
Mexico).	   	   Indeed,	  progressively,	   States’	   responsibility	   comes	   to	  be	  established	  on	   the	   basis	   of	   its	   omissions	   to	   guarantee	   equal	   access	   to	   effective	   legal	  remedies	   and,	   eventually,	   on	   its	   failure	   to	   adopt	   all	   appropriate	  measures	   to	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eradicate	   the	   discriminatory	   causes	   of	   VAW,	   regardless	   of	   the	   perpetrator,	  considering	   unequal	   social	   relations	   between	   men	   and	   women	   a	   complex	  structural	  problem	  constituting,	  per	  se,	  represents	  a	  violation	  of	  women’s	  right	  to	  equally	  enjoy	  fundamental	  rights.	  	  	  This	  structural	  understanding	  is	  explicitly	  argued	  in	  the	  Concurring	  Opinion	  of	  
ad	   hoc	   Judge	   Cadena	   Rámila	   to	   Las	   Dos	   Erres	   Massacre,	   who	   underlines	   the	  necessity	  to	  design	  broad	  appropriate	  measures	  to	  guarantee	  non-­‐repetition	  of	  acts	  of	  gender-­‐based	  violence,	  analysing	  artificially	  constructed	  inequities	  and	  considering	   the	   specificities	   of	   adequate	   protection	   of	   vulnerable	   individuals	  and	  groups.	  This	  approach	  extends	  the	  range	  of	  measures	  that	  can	  be	  required	  to	  a	  State	  to	  ensure	  effective	  protection	  of	  vulnerable	  groups	  and,	  in	  this	  case,	  of	   women.	   Evaluating	   States’	   responsibilities	   in	   cases	   of	   VAW	   comprehends,	  therefore,	  assessing	  the	  State’s	  performance	   in	   fulfilling	   its	  positive	  duties	   for	  what	   concerns	   modifying	   unequal	   relations	   of	   power	   between	   sexes	   in	   the	  general	   context	   of	   national	   society,	  without	   limiting	   recommendations	   to	   the	  facts	  of	  a	  given	  case	  (Las	  Dos	  Erres	  Massacre,	  Concurring	  Opinion,	  ad	  hoc	  Judge	  Cadena	  Rámila,	  point	  2).	  	  	  Advisory	   Opinion	   18/2003	   on	   the	   Juridical	   Condition	   and	   Rights	   of	  
Undocumented	   Migrants	   represents	   a	   crucial	   advancement	   in	   the	   doctrinal	  construction	  of	   States’	   positive	  obligations	   in	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  System,	   can	  be	  The	  Court’s	   reasoning	   is	  based	  on	   the	  Drittwirkung	   doctrine,	   consolidated	  by	  the	  German	  Federal	  Constitutional	  Court	  in	  the	  Lüth	  case	  of	  1958	  (Massolo,	  2012).	  In	  its	  Advisory	  Opinion,	  the	  IACrtHR	  argued	  that	  the	  rights	  enshrined	  in	  the	  ACHR	  entail	  erga	  omnes	  obligations,	   imposed	  not	  only	  in	  relation	  to	  States	  but	   also	   to	   the	   actions	   of	   third	   party	   individuals.	   162 	  In	   Judge	   Cançado	  Trindade’s	  words,	   this	   evolution	  affects	   the	  vertical	  dimension	  of	   the	  general	  obligation	   set	   forth	   in	  Article	  1.1	  ACHR,	  generating	  erga	  omnes	   effects,	  which	  encompass	  the	  relations	  of	  the	  individual	  both	  with	  the	  public	  (State)	  power	  as	  well	  as	  with	  other	  individuals	  (Advisory	  Opinion	  18/2003,	  Cançado	  Trindade,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  162	  In	  the	  European	  context,	  the	  ECrtHR	  recognised	  that,	  although	  the	  object	  of	  Article	  8	  (Right	  to	  private	   and	   family	   life)	   is	   essentially	   that	   of	   protecting	   the	   individual	   against	   State’s	   arbitrary	  interference,	   in	   addition	   to	   the	   obligation	   to	   abstain	   “there	   are	   positive	   obligations	   inherent	   in	  
effective	   respect	   for	   private	   or	   family	   life	   that	   may	   involve	   the	   adoption	   of	   measures	   designed	   to	  
secure	  respect	  for	  private	  life	  even	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  the	  relations	  of	  individuals	  among	  themselves”	  (X	  
and	  Y	  v.	  The	  Netherlands,	  para.	  23).	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Concurring	   Opinion,	   par.	   1;	   Cançado	   Trindade,	   1997).	  163	  On	   the	   basis	   of	   this	  approach	  the	  IACrtHR	  came	  to	  require	  States	  to	  adopt	  provisional	  measures	  to	  protect	  members	  of	  particular	  communities	  or	  detained	  persons,	  and	  persons	  that	   provide	   services	   to	   them,	   from	   threats	   of	   death	   and	   harm	   to	   personal	  safety	   from	   public	   officials	   or	   third	   parties.164 	  The	   evolution	   reflects	   the	  developments	   at	   the	   universal	   level,	   recalled	   in	   Advisory	   Opinion	   18/2003.	  Indeed,	   the	  United	  Nations	   Committee	   on	  Human	  Rights	   had	   interpreted	   the	  right	  to	  freedom	  and	  personal	  safety,	  embodied	  in	  article	  9	  of	  the	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Civil	  and	  Political	  Rights,	  as	   imposing	  on	  the	  State	  the	  obligation	  to	  adopt	  adequate	  measures	  to	  ensure	  the	  protection	  of	  individuals	  threatened	  with	  death.	  Consequently,	  ignoring	  threats	  against	  the	  life	  of	  individuals	  within	  their	   jurisdiction	  would	  violate	   the	  guarantees	  established	   in	   the	  Covenant	  of	  any	  effectiveness,	  implying	  States’	  responsibility.165	  	  Concerning	   the	   principles	   of	   equality	   and	   non-­‐discrimination,	   Advisory	  Opinion	  18/2003	  represents	  a	  crucial	  contribution	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  object	  of	  this	  research.	  In	  arguing	  States’	  positive	  obligations	  erga	  omnes	  as	  affecting	  the	  relations	  between	  States	  and	  individuals	  subject	  to	  their	  jurisdiction	  as	  well	  as	  the	   relations	   between	   individuals	   themselves,	   the	   Court	   recalls	   the	  interpretation	  elaborated	  by	   the	  United	  Nations	  Committee	  on	  Human	  Rights	  in	   its	   1990	   General	   Comments	   18	   and	   20	   on	   non-­‐discrimination	   as	   well	   as	  Article	   7	   of	   the	   International	   Covenant	   on	   Civil	   and	   Political	   Rights.	   The	  Committee	   established	   that	   States	   parties	   must	   punish	   public	   officials	   and	  private	   individuals,	   who	   carry	   out	   torture	   and	   cruel,	   inhuman	   or	   degrading	  treatments,	   and	   should	   also	   “take	   affirmative	   action	   in	   order	   to	   diminish	   or	  
eliminate	  conditions	  which	  cause	  or	  help	  to	  perpetuate	  discrimination	  prohibited	  
by	  the	  Covenant”	  (General	  Comment	  18,	  para.	  10).	   Furthermore,	   in	   a	  decision	  on	  the	  obligation	  to	  investigate	  acts	  of	  racial	  discrimination,	  the	  Committee	  for	  the	  Elimination	  of	  Racial	  Discrimination	   indicated	   that	   “when	  threats	  of	  racial	  
violence	  are	  made,	  and	  especially	  when	  they	  are	  made	  in	  public	  and	  by	  a	  group,	  it	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  163	  With	  the	  horizontal	  dimension	  identifying	  obligations	  erga	  omnes	  partes.	   In	  this	  sense	  see	  also	  
Peace	  Community	  of	  San	  José	  de	  Apartadó,	  (Provisional	  measures,	  2002,	  Concurring	  Opinion,	  Judge	  Cançado	  Trindade,	  para.	  3).	  164	  Refer	  to	  the	  provisional	  measures	  ordered	  by	  the	  IACrtHR	  in	  the	  cases	  Peace	  Community	  of	  San	  
José	  de	  Apartadó;	  Communities	  of	  the	  Jiguamiandó	  and	  the	  Curbaradó;	  Urso	  Branco	  Prison.	  165	  Refer	  to	  UN	  Human	  Rights	  Committee,	  Delgado	  Páez	  v.	  Colombia,	  para.	  5.5.	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is	   incumbent	   upon	   the	   State	   to	   investigate	   with	   due	   diligence	   and	   expedition”	  (L.K.	  v.	  The	  Netherlands,	  Communication	  4/1991,	  paras.	  6.3	  and	  6.6).	  166	  	  Although	   Advisory	   Opinion	   18/2003	   concerns	   private	   employment	  relationships,	  under	  which	  the	  employer	  must	  respect	  workers’	  human	  rights,	  it	  holds	  direct	  implications	  for	  what	  concerns	  women’s	  rights	  and	  international	  responses	   to	   VAW.	   The	   IACrtHR	   interprets	   erga	  omnes	   States’	   obligations	   as	  arising	   from	   their	   power	   in	   determining	   the	   laws	   that	   regulate	   relations	  between	  individuals.	  Therefore,	  States	  must	  also	  ensure	  that	  human	  rights	  are	  respected	   in	   private	   relationships	   between	   third	   parties.	   The	   Commission’s	  reasoning	   in	  María	   Eugenia	   Morales	   de	   Sierra	   v.	   Guatemala	   is	   based	   on	   the	  same	   approach.	   Its	   decision	   establishes	   that	   the	   disputed	   articles	   of	   the	  Guatemalan	   Civil	   Code	   had	   “a	  continuous	  and	  direct	   effect	  on	   the	  victim	   in	   this	  
case,	   in	   contravening	   her	   right	   to	   equal	   protection	   and	   to	   be	   free	   from	  
discrimination,	   in	   failing	   to	   provide	   protections	   to	   ensure	   that	   her	   rights	   and	  
responsibilities	  in	  marriage	  are	  equal	  to	  and	  balanced	  with	  those	  of	  her	  spouse,	  and	  
in	  failing	  to	  uphold	  her	  right	  to	  respect	  for	  her	  dignity	  and	  private	  life	  ”	  (par.	  52).	  Therefore,	   although	   in	   this	   case	   the	   husband	   of	   the	   victim	   does	   not	  make	   use	  such	  provisions,	  the	  mere	  fact	  that	  he	  might	  do	  so	  implies	  a	  discrimination	  that	  
“has	  consequences	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  her	  position	  in	  Guatemalan	  society,	  
and	   reinforces	   cultural	   habits	   (…)	  This	   situation	  has	  a	  harmful	   effect	   on	  public	  
opinion	   in	   Guatemala,	   and	   on	  María	   Eugenia	  Morales	   de	   Sierra’s	   position	   and	  
status	  within	  her	  family,	  community	  and	  society”	  (paras.	  50	  and	  52).	  	  Considering	   the	   Commission’s	   interpretation	   of	   the	   meaning	   and	   broader	  implications	   of	   State’s	   negligence	   as	   a	   manifestation	   of	   a	   pattern	   of	  discrimination	   and	   reproducing	   a	   conductive	   climate	   for	   VAW,	   IACrtHR’s	  reasoning	   in	   Advisory	   Opinion	   18/2003	   allows	   further	   articulations	   of	   such	  interpretation.	   Indeed,	   reading	   the	   two	   argumentations	   in	   conjunction,	   we	  deduce	   that	   States’	   omissions,	   as	   well	   as	   laws,	   contribute	   to	   determining	  relations	  between	   individuals.	  States’	  omissions	  perpetuate	   the	  psychological,	  social,	  and	  historical	  patterns	  that	  sustain	  and	  encourage	  VAW,	  thus	  giving	  rise	  to	   State’s	   international	   responsibility	   also	   “because	   of	   the	   act	   itself.”	   This	  perspective	   is	   argued	  by	   Judge	  Cançado	  Trindade	   in	  his	  Concurring	  Opinions	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  166 	  Besides	   CEDAW,	   see	   International	   Convention	   on	   the	   Elimination	   of	   All	   Forms	   of	   Racial	  Discrimination;	   Convention	   No.	   111	   concerning	   Discrimination	   in	   respect	   of	   Employment	   and	  Occupation	  of	  the	  International	  Labor	  Organisation	  (ILO).	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attached	   to	   a	   later	   case:	   “just	   as	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   law	   that	   is	   manifestly	  
incompatible	   with	   the	   American	   Convention	   entails	   per	   se	   a	   violation	   of	   said	  
Convention	  (under	  the	  general	  duty	  of	   its	  Article	  2,	  to	  harmonise	  domestic	   legal	  
provisions	  with	   the	   Convention),	   the	   lack	   of	   positive	   protection	  measures	   –and	  
even	   preventive	   ones	   -­‐	   by	   the	   State,	   in	   a	   situation	   that	   reveals	   a	   consistent	  
pattern	  of	  violent	  and	  flagrant	  and	  grave	  human	  rights	  violations,	  entails	  per	  se	  a	  
violation	   of	   the	   American	   Convention	   (under	   the	   general	   duty	   to	   guarantee	  
rights,	  set	  forth	  in	  Article	  1(1),	  that	  is,	  to	  respect	  and	  insure	  respect	  for	  the	  rights	  
protected)	   […]	   this	   Court	   […]	   has	   in	   fact	   acknowledged	   the	   broad	   and	  
autonomous	  meaning	  of	  the	  general	  duties	  set	  forth	  in	  Articles	  1(1)	  and	  2	  of	  the	  
American	   Convention,	   whose	   abridgment,	   rather	   than	   being	   subsumed	   in	  
individual	  violations	  of	   specific	   rights	  under	   the	  convention,	   instead	   is	  added	   to	  
said	   violations.”	   (Mapiripán	   Massacre,	   Judge	   Cançado	   Trindade,	   Concurring	  Opinion,	   par.	   6	   and	   7).	   Article	   2	   ACHR	   establishes	   the	   general	   obligation	   of	  States	   Party	   to	   adapt	   their	   domestic	   legal	   systems	   in	   order	   to	   abide	   to	  conventional	   provisions	   and	   ensure	   the	   rights	   therein	   embodied,	   i.e.	   States	  must	   guarantee	   the	   effect	   utile	   of	   the	   convention,	   adopting	   all	   appropriate	  measures	   to	   introduce	   adequate	   norms,	   eliminating	   practices	   of	   any	   nature	  that	  entail	  the	  violation	  of	  enshrined	  guarantees	  and	  enacting	  policies	  leading	  to	   the	   effective	   observance	   of	   the	   said	   guarantees.	   In	   this	   respect,	   the	   Court	  often	  emphasised	  that	  such	  obligation	  to	  guarantee	  conventional	  effectiveness	  constitutes	  a	  customary	  rule	  of	  international	  law.167	  	  	  In	  Advisory	  Opinion	  18/03	  the	  IACrtHR	  reiterates	  States’	  obligation	  to	  comply	  with	   every	   international	   instrument	   applicable	   to	   them	   (par.	   171),	   adapting	  both	   national	   legislation	   and	   State	   practices	   to	   their	   requirements.	  	  Consequently,	   States	  may	  not	   subordinate	  or	   condition	   the	  observance	  of	   the	  principle	  of	  equality	  before	  the	  law	  and	  non-­‐discrimination	  to	  achieving	  public	  policies	  goals,	  whatever	   these	  may	  be	   (para.	  172).	  The	   implications	  of	   such	  a	  perspective	   have	   a	   significant	   influence	   in	   identifying	   States’	   positive	  obligations	  for	  what	  concerns	  the	  transformative	  approach	  reflected	  in	  Article	  8	  BdPC	  (and	  Article	  5(a)	  CEDAW).	  	  In	   its	   conclusions	   in	   Advisory	   Opinion	   18/03,	   the	   IACrtHR	   summarises	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  167	  See	  also:	  Five	  Pensioners	  (para.	  164);	  The	  Last	  Temptation	  of	  Christ	  (para.	  87);	  Baena	  Ricardo	  et	  
al.	  (para.	  179);	  Durand	  and	  Ugarte	  (para.	  136).	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consensus	  reached	  in	  relation	  to	  States’	  erga	  omnes	  obligations,	  stating	  that	  a)	  States’	  general	  obligation	  to	  respect	  and	  ensure	  the	  enjoyment	  of	  fundamental	  rights	   on	   equal	   basis	   comprehends	   negative	   and	   positive	   duties,	   including	  
affirmative	  actions	   to	   reach	  substantive	  equality;	  b)	  non-­‐compliance	  with	   this	  general	  obligation	  gives	  rise	  to	  international	  responsibility;	  c)	  the	  fundamental	  principle	  of	  equality	  and	  non-­‐discrimination	  entered	  the	  domain	  of	   jus	  cogens	  and	   its	   peremptory	   nature	   entails	   obligations	   erga	   omnes	   of	   protection	   that	  bind	   all	   States	   and	   generate	   effects	   with	   regard	   to	   third	   parties,	   including	  individuals;	  and	  d)	  States	  may	  not	  subordinate	  or	  condition	  observance	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  equality	  before	  the	   law	  and	  non-­‐discrimination	  to	  achieving	  their	  public	  policy	  goals,	  whatever	  these	  may	  be.	  	  In	  the	  mentioned	  Concurring	  Opinion,	  Judge	  Cançado	  Trindade	  argues	  that	  this	  evolved	  understanding	  emanates	  from	  the	  opinio	  juris	  communis,	  and	  requires	  States	   to	   secure	   the	   prevalence	   of	   the	   fundamental	   principle	   of	   equality	   and	  non-­‐discrimination	   in	   relations	   between	   State	   and	   private	   individuals	   and	   in	  those	  between	  private	   individuals	   themselves	  (para.	  87).	  The	  positive	  duty	  to	  prevent	  is	  designed	  as	  an	  obligation	  of	  means,	  not	  of	  results,	  and	  encompasses	  all	   means	   of	   legal,	   political,	   administrative	   and	   cultural	   nature	   that	   promote	  human	   rights	   protection,	   ensure	   the	   punishment	   of	   those	   responsible	   and	  respect	   the	  obligation	   to	   indemnify	   the	  victims	  and	  guarantee	  non-­‐repetition.	  For	  what	  concerns	  VAW,	  Article	  7	  and	  8	  BdPC	  set	  the	  normative	  framework	  to	  determine	  States’	  obligations,	  overarching	  a	  comprehensive	  range	  of	  preventive	  duties:	   constitutional	   guarantees	   on	   the	   equality	   of	   women;	   the	   existence	   of	  national	   laws	  and	  administrative	  sanctions	   that	   issue	  adequate	  compensation	  to	  women	  victims	  of	   violence;	   policies	   or	  plans	   of	   action	   that	   concentrate	   on	  the	   question	   of	   violence	   against	   women;	   making	   the	   criminal	   justice	   system	  and	  police	  more	  aware	  of	  gender	   issues;	  access	   to	  and	  availability	  of	   support	  services;	   the	   promotion	   of	   awareness	   and	   a	   modification	   of	   discriminatory	  policies	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  education	  and	  the	  media,	  and	  the	  collection	  of	  data	  and	  publication	  of	  statistics	  on	  violence	  against	  women.168	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  168	  For	  what	  concerns	  prevention,	  detailed	  guidelines	  on	   the	  measures	   that	  States	  should	   take	   to	  fulfil	   their	   international	   obligations	  of	  due	  diligence	  have	  been	  defined	   in	   the	  Reports	  of	   the	  UN	  Special	  Rapporteurs	  on	  VAW.	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The	  conceptualisation	  of	  positive	  obligations	  erga	  omnes	  has	  been	  developed	  in	  IACrtHR’s	   case	   law	   on	   several	   matters.169	  In	   the	   Mapiripán	   Massacre	   case	  (2005),	   the	   IACrtHR	   further	   developed	   its	   interpretation	   of	   the	  Drittwirkung	  doctrine.	  In	  that	  occasion,	  Judge	  Cançado	  Trindade	  argued	  that	  a	  State’s	  failure	  to	  respect	  and	  ensure	  the	  enjoyment	  of	  the	  fundamental	  rights	  enshrined	  in	  the	  ACHR,	   omitting	   to	   comply	   with	   is	   erga	   omnes	   obligations	   to	   prevent	   and	  protect,	   constitutes	   a	   continued	   violation 170 	  of	   Article	   1.1.	   The	   on-­‐going	  character	  of	  this	  violation	  “can	  entail	  additional	  abridgments	  of	  the	  Convention,	  
added	   on	   to	   the	   original	   abridgments.	   Article	   1(1),	   thus,	   has	   a	   broad	   scope.	   It	  
refers	   to	   a	   permanent	   duty	   of	   the	   States,	   non-­‐fulfilment	   of	  which	   can	   generate	  
new	  victims,	  causing	  per	  se	  additional	  violations,	  without	  the	  need	  for	  them	  to	  be	  
related	  to	  the	  rights	  that	  were	  breached	  originally	  […]	  To	  deny	  the	  broad	  scope	  of	  
the	   duty	   of	   protection	   under	   Articles	   1(1)	   and	   2	   of	   the	   Convention	   –	   or	   to	  
minimize	  them	  by	  means	  of	  a	  dispersed	  and	  disintegrated	  interpretation	  of	  said	  
duties-­‐	  would	  amount	  to	  depriving	  the	  Convention	  of	  its	  effect	  utile.”	   (Mapiripán	  
Massacre,	  Judge	  Cançado	  Trindade,	  Concurring	  Opinion,	  par.	  3	  and	  5).171	  	  	  However,	  in	  Massacre	  of	  Pueblo	  Bello	  (2006)	  the	  Court	  clarified	  that	  a	  “the	  erga	  
omnes	  nature	  of	  a	  State	  party’s	  obligations	  to	  ensure	  the	  rights	  protected	  under	  
the	  American	  Convention	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  it	  bears	  limitless	  responsibility	  for	  
any	   act	   of	   private	   individuals.	  	   [Its	   responsibility]	   depends	   on	   whether	   it	   had	  
knowledge	   of	   a	   real	   and	   present	   danger	   to	   a	   particular	   individual	   or	   group	   of	  
individuals,	  and	  whether	  it	  had	  any	  reasonable	  chance	  of	  preventing	  or	  avoiding	  
that	  danger.	  […]	  The	  circumstances	  of	  each	  particular	  case	  have	  to	  be	  considered,	  
as	   do	   the	   measures	   taken	   so	   that	   those	   obligations	   to	   ensure	   are	   fulfilled”	  (Massacre	   of	   Pueblo	  Bello,	   para.	   123).	   To	   determine	   States’	   responsibility	   for	  acts	  committed	  by	  private	  individuals	  the	  IACrtHR	  referred	  to	  the	  Osman	  test,	  elaborated	  by	  the	  ECrtHR	  in	  Osman	  v.	  U.K.	  (1998),	  arguing:	  “Bearing	  in	  mind	  the	  
difficulties	   in	   policing	  modern	   societies,	   the	   unpredictability	   of	   human	   conduct	  
and	   the	   operational	   choices	   which	   must	   be	   made	   in	   terms	   of	   priorities	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  169	  Refer	  to	  the	  Concurring	  Opinion	  of	  Judge	  Cançado	  Trindade	  in	  Blake	  v.	  Guatemala	  (para.	  28)	  and	  
Las	  Palmeras.	  170	  In	  analogy	  with	  the	  continuous	  nature	  of	  the	  violations	  of	  the	  right	  to	  effective	  legal	  proceedings.	  	  171	  In	  his	  Dissenting	  Opinion	  to	  Caballero	  Delgado	  y	  Santana	  v.	  Colombia,	  Judge	  Cançado	  Trindade	  insisted	  on	  an	  hermeneutic	  of	  Article	  1.1	  and	  2	  ACHR,	  which	  maximizes	  protection	  of	  human	  rights	  under	  the	  Convention.	  The	  position	  was	  then	  endorsed	  by	  the	  IACrtHR	  in	  Suárez	  Rosero	  v.	  Ecuador	  and	   in	  subsequent	   judgements	  (e.g.	  Castillo	  Petruzzi	  et	  al.	  v.	  Peru;	  Baena	  Ricardo	  et	  al.	  v.	  Panama;	  
Hilaire,	  Constantine	  and	  Benjamin	  et	  al.	  v.	  Trinidad	  and	  Tobago,	  Five	  Pensioners	  v.	  Peru;	  Girls	  Yean	  
and	  Bosico	  v.	  the	  Dominican	  Republic).	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resources,	   the	   positive	   obligation	  must	   be	   interpreted	   in	   a	  way	  which	   does	   not	  
impose	  an	  impossible	  or	  disproportionate	  burden	  on	  the	  authorities.	  Accordingly,	  
not	   every	   claimed	   risk	   to	   life	   can	   entail	   for	   the	   authorities	   a	   Convention	  
requirement	   to	   take	   operational	   measures	   to	   prevent	   that	   risk	   from	  
materialising.	   For	  a	  positive	   obligation	   to	  arise,	   it	  must	   be	   established	   that	   the	  
authorities	   knew	  or	  ought	   to	  have	  known	  at	   the	   time	  of	   the	   existence	  of	   a	   real	  
and	  immediate	  risk	  to	  the	  life	  of	  an	  identified	  individual	  or	   individuals	   from	  the	  
criminal	   acts	   of	   a	   third	   party	   and	   that	   they	   failed	   to	   take	  measures	  within	   the	  
scope	   of	   their	   powers	   which,	   judged	   reasonably,	   might	   have	   been	   expected	   to	  
avoid	  that	  risk”	  (para.	  116).	  	  	  The	   interpretation	   adopted	   by	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions	   covers	   cases	   in	  which	  it	  can	  be	  proved	  that	  the	  State	  should	  have	  had	  knowledge	  of	  a	  situation	  of	  risk	  or	  threat	  or	  had	  the	  means	  to	  know,	  without	  necessarily	  requiring	  this	  knowledge	   to	   be	   effective.	   This	   is	   the	   approach	   adopted	   in	   Cotton	   Field	  (2009),172	  where	  the	  Mexico	  was	  found	  responsible	  for	  the	  killings	  (femicides)	  of	   three	  women,	  given	   the	  documented	  pattern	  of	  violence	  existing	   in	  Ciudad	  Juárez	   that	   the	   State	   should	   have	   addressed,	   and	   given	   the	   State’	   failure	   to	  protect	   the	   victims’	   right	   to	   life,	   omitting	   to	   investigate	   their	   disappearance,	  although	  it	  had	  been	  duly	  reported	  to	  the	  police.	  State’s	  responsibility	  emerges,	  on	   the	  one	  hand,	   from	   its	  omissions	   for	  what	  concerns	  adopting	  measures	   to	  counter	   the	  dramatic	   context	  of	  Ciudad	   Juárez,	   constituting	  a	   continuous	  and	  immediate	  risk	  for	  women	  and,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  from	  its	  lack	  of	  due	  diligence	  in	  guaranteeing	  effective	  investigations	  on	  the	  facts.	  	  The	   critical	   difficulty	   in	   cases	   of	   VAW,	   when	   they	   do	   not	   involve	   the	  infringement	   of	   women’s	   rights	   by	   public	   officials,	   is	   to	   evaluate	   States’	  inability	   or	   unwillingness	   to	   prevent	   the	   violation	   and	   ensure	   effective	  mechanisms	   of	   accountability	   (Pinheiro,	   2002).	   Given	   that	   States’	  responsibility	   essentially	   emerges	   from	  omissions,	   its	   evaluation	   becomes	   an	  extremely	   delicate	   issue	   in	   cases	   in	  which	   acts	   of	   VAW	  occur	   in	   a	   context	   in	  which	   the	   State	   has,	   indeed,	   enacted	   a	   number	   of	   measures	   to	   prevent	   and	  punish	  such	  acts.	  These	  cases	  require	  complex	  evaluations,	  assessing	  the	  type	  of	  measures	  adopted	  and	  their	  appropriateness,	  and	  their	  number	  is	  bound	  to	  increase	  given	  that,	  as	  we	  will	  see	  further	  on	  in	  this	  research,	  Latin	  American	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  172	  And	  in	  the	  currently	  pending	  Maria	  Isabel	  Véliz	  Franco	  et	  al	  v.	  Guatemala.	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countries	   have	   started	   to	   abide	   to	   their	   obligations	   under	   the	   BdPC.	  Commission’s	  application	  to	  the	  IACrtHR	  concerning	  Maria	  Isabel	  Véliz	  Franco	  
et	  al	  v.	  Guatemala,	  sharing	  several	   features	  with	  the	  Cotton	  Field	  case	  and	  still	  pending,	   provides	   an	   example	   of	   this	   type	   of	   reasoning.	   The	   Commission	  considered	  the	   implemented	  measures	  unsatisfactory,	  highlighting	  the	   lack	  of	  coordination	  and	  funding	  reported	  by	  several	  institutions	  working	  in	  the	  field	  of	   VAW173	  and	   its	   own	   Rapporteur	   on	   VAW.	   Additionally,	   the	   Commission	  emphasised	  that	  such	  measures	  had	  not	  been	  adopted	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  events	  of	  the	  case.	  In	  order	  to	  prove	  their	  abidance	  to	  Article	  7	  BdPC,	  hence,	  in	  order	  not	   to	   incur	   in	   Institutions’	   sanction,	   States	   must	   provide	   evidence	   of	   the	  measures	   taken	   to	   eliminate	   the	   discriminatory	   causes	   of	   VAW	   in	   general	  (Maria	  Da	  Penha,	  para.	  57)	  as	  well	  as	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  facts	  of	  the	  concrete	  case	  (Maria	  Da	  Penha,	  para.	  57-­‐58).	  
	  In	  order	   to	  develop	  such	  analyses,	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions	  need	  to	  gather	  an	  enormous	  amount	  of	  information	  to	  assess	  whether	  systematic	  patterns	  can	  be	  recognised	  in	  States’	  response	  to	  VAW,	  expressing	  a	  generalised	  tolerance	  of	  such	  acts	  in	  detriment	  of	  the	  victim	  as	  well	  as	  of	  others	  belonging	  to	  the	  same	  (subordinated)	  social	  group.	  This	  approach	  requires	  a	  re-­‐conceptualisation	  of	  remedies,	   since	   recommendations	   are	   not	   limited	   to	   occurred	   violations,	   but	  are	   expected	   to	   reverse	   systematic	   patterns	   or	   overcome	   institutional	  deficiencies,	   preventing	   reiteration 174 	  (Abramovich,	   2009).	   States’	   duties	  extend	  beyond	  a	  concrete	  case	  presented	  to	  Inter-­‐American	  Institutions,	  hence,	  Institutions’	   requirements	   include	   changes	   in	   public	   policies,	   legislation	   and	  judicial	  and	  administrative	  procedures	  (e.g.	  Cotton	  field).	  	  In	   this	   phase,	   and	   for	  what	   concerns	   BdPC	   effectiveness,	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  System	   moved	   beyond	   the	   compensation	   of	   victims,	   seeking	   to	   establish	  principles	   and	   standards	   influencing	   States’	   structural	   dynamics.	   This	  evolution	  is	  grounded	  on	  the	  regional	  system’s	  subsidiary	  function,	  relying	  on	  States’	   implementation	   to	   prevent	   violations.	   As	   Abramovich	   argues,	   in	   this	  phase	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions’	   recognise	   the	   limitations	   of	   international	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  173	  See,	  for	  instance,	  the	  2006	  Report	  of	  the	  High	  Commissioner	  for	  Human	  Rights	  on	  the	  situation	  of	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Guatemala	  (para.	  22)	  and	  Special	  Rapporteur	  Yakin	  Ertürk’s	  Addendum	  to	  the	  2005	  Report	  on	  the	  Mission	  to	  Guatemala.	  174	  On	   the	  competing	   interests	   to	  balance	  when	  reconceptualising	  remedies	   to	  address	  structural	  deficiencies	  see,	  inter	  alia,	  Sabel	  and	  Simon,	  2004;	  Gauri	  and	  Brinks,	  2008;	  Abramovich,	  2009.	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  175	  The	  monitoring	   of	   national	   implementation	  mechanisms	   is	   crucial	   and	   requires	   a	   structured	  coordination	  between	  supranational	   institutions	  and	  governmental	  agencies.	  On	  the	  subject	  refer	  to:	  Margarell	  and	  Filippini,	  2006;	  Gargarella,	  2008.	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Internalising	   the	   paradigm	   shift	   in	   national	  
legislations	  on	  VAW:	  the	  road	  to	  convergence	  	  
	  
Constitutional	   substance	   and	   dynamic	   nature	   of	   human	  
rights	  instruments	  	  International	   instruments	   and	   institutions,	   in	   general,	   “are	   subject	   to	  
fundamental	   limitations	   in	   the	   influence	   they	   can	  exert	  on	  developments	  at	   the	  
national	   level”	   (Rao,	   1995),	   constituting	   a	   significant	   challenge	   in	   the	   case	   of	  Women’s	  Conventions	  which,	  recognising	  the	  structural	  of	  gender	  inequalities,	  require	  systemic	  solutions	  to	  modify	  national	  societies.	  	  In	   the	   case	   of	   CEDAW,	   transformational	   provisions	   such	   as	   Article	   5(a),	  received	  the	  highest	  number	  of	  reservations	  (Merry,	  2003,	  2006),	  although	  the	  1979	   instrument	   only	   provided	   for	   a	   monitoring	   body	   to	   ensure	   States’	  implementation,	   i.e.	   CEDAW	   Committee.	   Arguably,	   this	   issue	   constituted	   the	  biggest	  obstacle	  to	  its	  effectiveness,	  representing	  States’	  limited	  political	  will	  to	  endorse	   the	   new	   paradigm	   on	   women’s	   rights	   addressing	   VAW	   as	   a	   human	  rights	   violation	   and	   a	   manifestation	   of	   unequal	   relations	   of	   power	   (Evatt,	  2002).	   The	   Option	   Protocol,	   which	   admits	   no	   reservations,	   was	   adopted	   in	  2000	   to	   address	   the	   problem	   of	   the	   limited	   impact	   of	   the	   convention	   on	  national	   systems	   (Evatt,	   2002;	  Merry,	   2003),	   allowing	   CEDAW	  Committee	   to	  receive	  and	  consider	  individual	  and	  group	  petitions.	  However,	  this	  mechanism	  is	   available	   only	   for	  petitioners	  within	   the	   jurisdiction	  of	   countries	   that	   have	  ratified	   both	   treaties,	   and	   reservations	   to	   CEDAW	   persist,	   constituting	   a	  significant	  limitation	  to	  Committee’s	  activities.	  	  As	  opposed	  to	  CEDAW,	  BdPC	  provisions	  did	  not	  receive	  any	  reservation	  from	  States	  Party.	  Additionally	  the	  BdPC	  establishes	  a	  strong	  protection	  mechanism	  providing	   the	   possibility	   to	   submit	   petitions	   to	   the	   Commission,	   initiating	   a	  procedure	   that	   may	   lead	   to	   a	   judgement	   delivered	   by	   the	   IACrtHR.	   This	  element	  of	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  systems	  established	  to	  ensure	  women’s	  rights	  at	  universal	  and	  regional	  level,	  inter	  alia,	  constitutes	  a	  significant	  factor	  influencing	  the	  different	  outcomes	  that	  the	  adoption	  of	  BdPC,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	   of	   CEDAW,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   had	   on	   States	   Party.	   As	   opposed	   to	   the	  
	   210 
limited	   impact	   of	   CEDAW,	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	   BdPC	   exercised	   a	   significant	  influence	  on	  national	  legislations	  in	  the	  Latin	  American	  region	  	  The	   Inter-­‐American	   System	   constitutes	   a	   multilevel	   system	   of	   human	   rights	  protection	   in	  which,	  States	  Party	  to	  the	  ACHR,	  commit	  to	  adapt	  their	  national	  legal	   orders	   to	   guarantee	   its	   effectiveness	   (Article	   2	   ACHR).	   Notably,	   the	  
margin	   of	   appreciation	   doctrine	   in	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   System	   is	   not	   as	  comprehensive	   as	   in	   the	   European	   System,	   which	   enjoys	   a	   higher	   cultural	  homogeneity,	   hence,	   in	   general,	   national	   solutions	   to	   common	   problems	   in	  Latin	   American	   countries	   tend	   to	   vary	   to	   a	   lesser	   degree	   compared	   to	   the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  Member	  States	  (Acosta-­‐Alvarado,	  Núñez-­‐Poblete,	  2012).	  	  	  On	   the	   basis	   of	   our	   comparative	   review	  of	   the	   relevant	   laws	   implemented	   in	  Latin	  American	  countries	  following	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  BdPC,	  we	  could	  identify	  two	  phases	  of	  national	  reception	  and	  adaptation	  to	  BdPC	  provisions.	  The	  first	  phase	   follows	   directly	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	   new	   instrument	   in	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  System,	  with	   a	   first	  generation	   of	   laws	   characterized	  by	   their	   focus	  on	  domestic	  violence.	   In	   the	  second	  phase,	  such	   laws	  were	  broadly	  reformed,	  integrated	   or	   complemented	   by	   additional	   legislations	   with	   a	   wider	   scope,	  presenting	   a	   holistic	   approach	   to	   women’s	   rights	   and	   constituting	   a	   second	  
generation	  of	   laws,	   explicitly	   recognising	   VAW	   as	   a	  manifestation	   of	   unequal	  relations	   of	   power	   and	   discrimination	   against	   women.	   As	   we	   will	   see,	   the	  beginning	   of	   this	   second	   phase	   chronologically	   coincides	   with	   the	   path-­‐breaking	   Castro-­‐Castro	   judgment	   of	   the	   IACrtHR	   and	   the	   second	   generation	  legislations	   largely	   reflect	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions’	   interpretation	  of	  BdPC	  provisions.	  	  There	   is	   an	   increasing	   consensus	   in	   legal	   literature	   in	   recognising	   a	  
constitutional	   substance	   (Cassese,	   2006;	   Tsagourias,	   2007)	   to	   international	  human	   rights	   instruments,	   reconceptualising	   the	   basic	   principles	   of	  constitutionalism	  (Pizzolo,	  2013)	  and	  emancipating	  them	  from	  the	  traditional	  understanding	   of	   the	   principle	   of	   national	   self-­‐determination.	  With	   the	   1948	  Universal	   Declaration	   of	   Human	   Rights	   (UDHR),	   the	   subject	   of	   fundamental	  rights	  shifted	  from	  citizens	  to	   individuals	  and	  their	  protection	  and	  promotion	  left	   the	   realm	   of	   proclamations,	   emerging	   as	   a	   positive	   obligation	   (Bobbio,	  1992).	  As	  seen	  previously	   in	   this	  research,	   the	  gradual	  reconceptualization	  of	  States’	   positive	   duties	   overcame	   the	   traditional	   public/private	   divide,	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recognised	   as	   one	   of	   the	  most	   influential	   factors	   for	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   the	  principles	   of	   (substantial)	   equality	   and	   non-­‐discrimination.	   Some	   scholars	  argue	   that	   in	   this	  process	  human	   rights	  became	   self-­‐evident	  (Mezzetti,	   2010),	  turning	   the	   international	  community	   into	  a	  community	  of	  people,	  as	  opposed	  to	   a	   community	   of	   States,	   in	   the	   framework	   of	   a	   constitutional	   theory	   of	  
international	   law	   (Kelsen,	   1966).	   In	   this	   view,	   like	   constitutional	   texts	   in	  national	   orders,	   human	   rights	   instruments	   define	   the	   competences	   and	  entitlements	  of	   the	  State,	   overarching	   their	  negative	  and	  positive	  obligations,	  and	  performing	  and	  actual	  foundational	  function	  (Borsari,	  2007).	  In	  this	  view,	  the	   UDHR,	   with	   the	   core	   international	   human	   rights	   instruments,	   came	   to	  constitute	  the	  constitutional	  block	  of	  international	  constitutional	  law.176	  	  
	  Overlapping	   national	   and	   international	   instruments	   extended	   human	   rights	  protection,	   while	   increasing	   the	   complexity	   of	   pluralist	   legal	   contexts.	   The	  interaction	  between	  orders	  is	  a	  structural	  feature	  of	  multilevel	  (Pernice,	  2002;	  Gambino	   2008),	   or	   polycentric	   (Morrone,	   2011),	   systems	   of	   protection	   of	  human	   rights,	   framed	   in	   the	   Universal	   System	   but	   regionally	   established.	  Regional	  human	   rights	   systems	  are	  based	  on	   the	   subsidiarity	  of	  national	   and	  supra-­‐national	   instruments	   and	   on	   complex,	   and	   often	   dynamic,	   hierarchical	  structures.	  	  	  Formally,	   depending	   on	   the	  mechanism	   adopted	   to	   incorporate	   conventional	  instruments	   in	  national	   legal	  systems,	   international	  norms	  acquire	  a	  different	  domestic	   status,	   namely:	   supra-­‐constitutional,	   constitutional,	   sub-­‐constitutional/supra-­‐legislative	   or	   legislative	   (De	  Vergottini,	   2010).	  However,	  the	  dynamicity	  of	  hierarchical	  structures	  due	  to	  the	  interaction	  between	  orders	  through	   national	   and	   supra-­‐national	   Courts,	   often	   overcomes	   strictly	   formal	  criteria,	   creating	   favourable	   conditions	   for	   the	   convergence	   of	   national	  disciplines.	  	  	  
Formal	  status	  of	  human	  rights	  instruments	  in	  Latin	  American	  
national	  constitutional	  structures	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  176	  For	   a	   punctual	   and	   commented	   collection	   of	   all	   international	   instruments	   integrating	   such	  
international	  constitutional	  block,	  refer	  to	  Mezzetti,	  2010	  (pp.	  40-­‐41).	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Article	   2	   ACHR	   binds	   States	   Party	   to	   adapt	   their	   national	   legal	   systems	   to	  guarantee	   effectiveness	   to	   conventional	   provisions,	   regardless	   of	   the	   formal	  domestic	   status	   of	   international	   human	   rights	   instruments.	   Nevertheless,	  formality	   still	   governs	   relations	   between	   national	   and	   international	   law,	  although	   increasingly	   counterbalanced	   by	   a	   tendency	   to	   refer	   to	   material	  criteria	  when	   it	   comes	   to	  determine	   the	  status	  of	  human	  rights	   law	  (Ruggeri,	  2008).	  	  	  In	   order	   to	   identify	   the	   factors	   that	   influence	  BdPC	  national	   implementation,	  determining	   the	   structural	   preconditions	   for	   its	   effectiveness,	   we	   present	   an	  overview	   of	   the	   status	   of	   international	   human	   rights	   instruments	   in	   Latin	  American	   countries	   constitutional	   systems.	   It	   is	   not	   within	   the	   scope	   of	   this	  research	  to	  engage	  in	  the	  unsettled	  debate	  on	  dualist	  and	  monist	  approaches	  to	  international	  law,	  originated	  in	  the	  theories	  of	  Kelsen	  and	  Triepel.	  Our	  limited	  scope	   in	   the	   following	  paragraphs	   is	   not	   to	   analyse	   the	   solutions	   adopted	  by	  ACHR	  States	  Party,	  rather	  to	  describe	  them,	  in	  order	  to	  identify	  the	  features	  of	  the	  multi-­‐level	  system	  of	  human	  rights	  protection	  in	  which	  the	  BdPC	  has	  been	  adopted	  and	  exercised	  its	  influence.	  	  Most	   Latin	   American	   constitutions	   are	   currently	   opened	   to	   international	  human	   rights	   law	   (De	   Vergottini,	   2010)	   presenting,	   in	   some	   cases,	   explicit	  provisions	   to	   guarantee	   the	   effect	   of	   IACrtHR’s	   jurisprudence	   (Pinto	   Bastos,	  2007).	   Through	   a	   comparative	   constitutional	   review,	  we	   found	   that	   different	  but	   functionally	   equivalent	   solutions 177 	  provided	   effective	   mechanisms	   of	  enforcement	  of	  international	  human	  rights	  law,	  particularly	  for	  what	  concerns	  Inter-­‐American	  instruments	  and	  case	  law.	  	  	  The	  majority	  of	  countries	  explicitly	  assign	  a	  constitutional	  (or,	  arguably,	  supra-­‐constitutional)	   status	   to	   human	   rights	   treaties.	   This	   is	   the	   case	   of:	   Argentina	  (Cost.	  1994,	  Art.	  31);	  Bolivia	  (Const.	  2009,	  Art.	  13-­‐14);	  Brazil	  (Const.	  1988,	  Art.	  4,	  78);	  Chile	  (Const.	  1980,	  through	  a	  broad	  interpretation	  of	  art.	  5);	  Colombia	  (Cost.	   1991,	   Art.	   93,	   and	   C-­‐400/98	   Constitutional	   Court	   ruling);	   Dominican	  Republic	  (Const.	  2010,	  Art.	  74);	  Ecuador	  (Const.	  2008,	  Arts.	  3,	  10-­‐11,	  424-­‐425);	  Guatemala	   (Const.	   1993,	   Art.	   46);	   Honduras	   (Const.	   1982,	   Art.	   16-­‐17);	  Nicaragua	   (Const.	   1987,	   Art.	   46);	   Panama	   (Const.	   1972,	   Art.	   129);	   Venezuela	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  177	  The	  European	  System	  presents	  a	  similar	  context;	  see	  Stone-­‐Sweet,	  Keller,	  2008.	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(Cost.	   1999,	   Art.	   23).	   The	   previous	   Mexican	   Constitution	   did	   not	   contain	   a	  specific	   provision	   establishing	   the	   status	   of	   human	   rights	   instruments.	  While	  the	   Supreme	   Court	   recognized	   their	   sub-­‐constitutional	   status	   in	   2007	   (Case	  120/2002),	   this	  position	  remained	  a	  “tesis	  aislada”	  (isolated	  thesis).	  Since	  the	  constitutional	  reform	  of	  2011,	  Article	  1	  establishes	  the	  highest	  rank	  for	  human	  rights	   instruments	   according	   to	   the	   principle	   of	   the	   maximum	   standard	   of	  
protection.	  	  In	  three	  countries	  the	  hierarchical	  position	  of	  human	  rights	  instruments	  is	  set	  below	  the	  constitution	  and	  above	  national	  legislation	  (supra-­‐legislative	  status):	  Costa	   Rica	   (Const.	   1949,	   Art.	   7);	   El	   Salvador	   (Const.	   1983,	   Art.	   144)	   and	  Paraguay	  (Const.	  1992,	  Arts.	  137,	  141).	  	  Others	  are	  less	  explicit,	  such	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Peru,	  with	  Article	  55	  of	  the	  1993	  Constitution	   defining	   human	   rights	   treaties	   as	   “part	  of	  national	   law”,	  without	  further	  specification,	  and	  Article	  56	  providing	  for	  a	  special	  procedure	  to	  ratify	  treaties	   on	   constitutional	   matter,	   thus	   suggesting	   a	   constitutional	   status	   of	  human	   rights	   law,	   and	   Uruguay,	   where	   the	   1997	   Constitution	   does	   not	  explicitly	   refer	   to	   the	   rank	   of	   international	   instruments,	   but	   their	   legislative	  status	  can	  be	  inferred	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  Article	  46,	  referring	  to	  national	  legislation	  and	   international	   conventions	   as	   instruments	   to	   fight	   social	   problems	   (the	  terminology	  used	  is	  “vicios	  sociales”).	  	  	  The	   IACrtHR	   endorses	   the	   supra-­‐constitutional/constitutional	   perspective,	  having	  repeatedly	  stated	  that	  the	  ACHR	  and	  “other	  treaties	  on	  human	  rights,	  are	  
inspired	   to	   shared	  superior	  values	   (…)	  define	  obligations	  of	  objective	  character,	  
and	   have	   a	   special	   nature	   compared	   to	   other	   treaties	   (…)”	   (Ivcher	   Bronstein	  
Case,	   1999,	  par.	  42).	  This	  perspective	  has	  been	  maintained	   since	  Court’s	   first	  rulings,	  such	  as	  Advisory	  Opinion	  2/1982,	  where	  it	  argued	  that	  “modern	  human	  
rights	   treaties	   in	   general,	   and	   the	   American	   Convention	   in	   particular,	   are	   not	  
multilateral	   treaties	   of	   the	   traditional	   type	   concluded	   to	   accomplish	   the	  
reciprocal	   exchange	   of	   rights	   for	   the	   mutual	   benefit	   of	   the	   contracting	   States.	  
Their	  object	  and	  purpose	  is	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  basic	  rights	  of	  individual	  human	  
beings	  irrespective	  of	  their	  nationality,	  both	  against	  the	  State	  of	  their	  nationality	  
and	  all	   other	   contracting	  States.	   In	   concluding	   these	  human	  rights	   treaties,	   the	  
States	  can	  be	  deemed	  to	  submit	  themselves	  to	  a	  legal	  order	  within	  which	  they,	  for	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the	  common	  good,	  assume	  various	  obligations,	  not	  in	  relation	  to	  other	  States,	  but	  
towards	  all	  individuals	  within	  their	  jurisdiction”	  (para.	  29).178	  	  Article	  2	  ACHR	  establishes:	  	  
Where	  the	  exercise	  of	  any	  of	  the	  rights	  or	  freedoms	  referred	  to	  in	  Article	  1	  is	  not	  
already	  ensured	  by	  legislative	  or	  other	  provisions,	  the	  States	  Parties	  undertake	  to	  
adopt,	  in	  accordance	  with	  their	  constitutional	  processes	  and	  the	  provisions	  of	  this	  
Convention,	  such	  legislative	  or	  other	  measures	  as	  may	  be	  necessary	  to	  give	  effect	  
to	  those	  rights	  or	  freedoms.	  	  The	   IACrtHR	   performs	   an	   actual	   control	   of	   conventionality179	  when	   called	   to	  judge	  on	  the	  compatibility	  of	  national	  legislation	  with	  respect	  to	  conventional	  provisions.	   At	   times,	   this	   function	   went	   as	   far	   as	   triggering	   a	   constitutional	  reform	  (The	  Last	  Temptation	  of	  Christ	  case).	  Formally,	  ACHR	  norms	  and	  Court’s	  jurisprudence	  do	  not	  have	  direct	  effect	   in	  domestic	   legal	  systems;180	  however,	  the	  praxis	  has	   increasingly	  been	  to	  guarantee	  to	  them	  ex	  tunc	  and	  erga	  omnes	  effects	  (De	  Vergottini,	  2010).	  	  	  Given	   the	   complementarity	   recognised	   to	   BdPC	   provisions,	   interpretive	   tools	  that	   integrate	   ACHR	   norms,	   the	   influence	   of	   Article	   2	   ACHR	   extends	   to	   this	  separate	   instrument,	   implying	  the	  commitment	  to	  adopt	   legislative	  (or	  other)	  measures	   to	   guarantee	   effectiveness	   to	   ACHR	   provisions	   read	   in	   conjunction	  with	  BdP	  norms.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  178	  In	  Austria	  v.	  Italy	   (1961),	   the	  European	  Commission	  on	  Human	  Rights	  (ECommHR)	  had	  stated	  that:	  “the	  purpose	  of	  the	  High	  Contracting	  Parties	  in	  concluding	  the	  Convention	  was	  not	  to	  concede	  to	  
each	  other	  reciprocal	  rights	  and	  obligations	  in	  pursuance	  of	  their	  individual	  national	  interests	  but	  to	  
realize	  the	  aims	  and	  ideals	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe...and	  to	  establish	  a	  common	  public	  order	  of	  the	  
free	   democracies	   of	   Europe	   with	   the	   object	   of	   safeguarding	   their	   common	   heritage	   of	   political	  
traditions,	   ideas,	   freedom	   and	   the	   rule	   of	   law.	   (…)	   [T]he	   obligations	   undertaken	   by	   the	   High	  
Contracting	   Parties	   in	   the	   European	   Convention	   are	   essentially	   of	   an	   objective	   character,	   being	  
designed	  rather	  to	  protect	  the	  fundamental	  rights	  of	  individual	  human	  beings	  from	  infringements	  by	  
any	   of	   the	   High	   Contracting	   Parties	   than	   to	   create	   subjective	   and	   reciprocal	   rights	   for	   the	   High	  
Contracting	  Parties	  themselves”	  (paras.	  138-­‐140).	  179	  For	   IACrtHR’s	   jurisprudence	   on	   the	   control	   of	   conventionality	   refer	   to:	  Myrna	  Mack	  Chang	  v.	  
Guatemala;	   Trabajadores	   Cesados	   del	   Congreso	   (Aguardo	   Alfaro	   et	   al.)	   v.	   Peru;	   Suarez	   Rosero	   v.	  
Ecuador;	  Castillo	  Petruzzi	  v.	  Peru.	  180	  Nevertheless,	  there	  are	  cases	  of	  constitutional	  provisions	  guaranteeing	  direct	  effect	  to	  IACrtHR’s	  jurisprudence,	  such	  as	  Article	  11.3	  of	  the	  Ecuadorian	  Constitution.	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Nevertheless,	  the	  BdPC	  contains	  its	  own	  specific	  provision	  referring	  to	  States’	  obligations	   for	   what	   concerns	   guaranteeing	   its	   effect	   utile,	   establishing	   at,	  Article	  7:	  	  
The	   States	   Parties	   condemn	   all	   forms	   of	   violence	   against	   women	   and	   agree	   to	  
pursue,	  by	  all	  appropriate	  means	  and	  without	  delay,	  policies	  to	  prevent,	  punish	  and	  
eradicate	  such	  violence	  and	  undertake	  to:	  a)	  refrain	   from	  engaging	   in	  any	  act	  or	  
practice	  of	   violence	  against	  women	  and	   to	  ensure	   that	   their	  authorities,	   officials,	  
personnel,	  agents,	  and	  institutions	  act	  in	  conformity	  with	  this	  obligation;	  b)	  apply	  
due	   diligence	   to	   prevent,	   investigate	   and	   impose	   penalties	   for	   violence	   against	  
women;	  c)	  include	  in	  their	  domestic	  legislation	  penal,	  civil,	  administrative	  and	  any	  
other	   type	   of	   provisions	   that	   may	   be	   needed	   to	   prevent,	   punish	   and	   eradicate	  
violence	  against	  women	  and	  to	  adopt	  appropriate	  administrative	  measures	  where	  
necessary;	  	   d)	   adopt	   legal	   measures	   to	   require	   the	   perpetrator	   to	   refrain	   from	  
harassing,	  intimidating	  or	  threatening	  the	  woman	  or	  using	  any	  method	  that	  harms	  
or	  endangers	  her	  life	  or	  integrity,	  or	  damages	  her	  property;	  	  e)	  take	  all	  appropriate	  
measures,	   including	   legislative	   measures,	   to	   amend	   or	   repeal	   existing	   laws	   and	  
regulations	  or	  to	  modify	  legal	  or	  customary	  practices	  which	  sustain	  the	  persistence	  
and	   tolerance	   of	   violence	   against	   women;	  	   f)	   establish	   fair	   and	   effective	   legal	  
procedures	  for	  women	  who	  have	  been	  subjected	  to	  violence	  which	  include,	  among	  
others,	   protective	   measures,	   a	   timely	   hearing	   and	   effective	   access	   to	   such	  
procedures;	  	   g)	   establish	   the	   necessary	   legal	   and	   administrative	   mechanisms	   to	  
ensure	   that	   women	   subjected	   to	   violence	   have	   effective	   access	   to	   restitution,	  
reparations	  or	  other	   just	  and	  effective	  remedies;	  and	  	  h)	  adopt	  such	   legislative	  or	  
other	  measures	  as	  may	  be	  necessary	  to	  give	  effect	  to	  this	  Convention.	  
	  Let	  us	   recall	   that	   several	  Latin	  American	  countries	   joined	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  System	   during	   their	   democratic	   transitions,	   seeking	   a	   supranational	  framework	   to	   support	   their	   institutional	   consolidation.	   During	   their	   long	  successful	   experience,	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions	   acquired	   significant	  legitimacy	   in	   the	   region,	   performing	   a	   crucial	   role	   in	   accompanying	   the	  reconstruction	   of	   democratic	   constitutional	   orders.	   The	   constitutional	   status	  guaranteed	   to	   international	   human	   rights	   law,	   with	   particular	   reference	   to	  Inter-­‐American	  instruments,	  and	  the	  auctoritas	  of	  Inter-­‐American	  Institutions,	  offer	  favourable	  preconditions	  to	  guarantee	  BdPC	  national	  implementation	  and	  regional	   convergence	   towards	   shared	   principles	   and	   standards	   on	   women’s	  rights	   protection.	   In	   order	   to	   understand	   the	   crucial	   influence	   that	   the	  multi-­‐
	   216 
level	  regional	  structure	  in	  which	  the	  BdPC	  was	  adopted	  had	  in	  promoting	  States’	  compliance,	  we	   shall	   now	   describe	   how	   Latin	   American	   countries	   perform	   for	  what	  concerns	  CEDAW	  as	  an	  international	  human	  rights	  instrument	  adopted	  at	  universal	  level.	  	  By	   1985	   most	   Latin	   American	   countries	   had	   ratified	   CEDAW,181	  the	   “late-­‐comers”	  were:	  Costa	  Rica	   (1986);	  Paraguay	   (1987);	  Chile	   (1989)	   and,	   finally,	  Bolivia	   (1990).	  Four	  Countries	   (Argentina,	  Brazil,	  El	  Salvador	  and	  Venezuela)	  apposed	  reservations	  on	  Article	  29.1,	  which	  grants	   the	   International	  Court	  of	  Justice	   the	   competence	   to	   arbitrate	   States	   Party’s	   disputes	   on	   the	  interpretation	   of	   CEDAW.	   Additionally,	   Mexico	   declared	   that	   its	   national	  legislation	   agreed	   in	   “all	   essentials”	   with	   CEDAW	   provisions,	   that	   “will	   be	  
applied	   in	  Mexico	   in	  accordance	  with	   the	  modalities	  and	  procedures	  prescribed	  
by	  Mexican	  legislation	  and	  that	  the	  granting	  of	  material	  benefits	  in	  pursuance	  of	  
the	   Convention	   will	   be	   as	   generous	   as	   the	   resources	   available	   to	   the	   Mexican	  
State	  permit.”	  This	  declaration	  manifests	   the	  will	   of	   the	  State	   to	  underline	   its	  national	   sovereignty,	   putting	   boundaries	   to	   CEDAW	   Committee’s	   free	  evaluation	   of	   the	   appropriateness	   of	   the	   Mexican	   legal	   system	   for	   what	  concerns	  its	  abidance	  to	  the	  convention.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Chile	  clarified	  that	  some	   of	   the	   provisions	   of	   the	   convention	  were	   not	   entirely	   compatible	   with	  Chilean	   legislation,	   and	   stressed	   that,	   for	   what	   concerned	   its	   civil	   code,	   a	  national	   commission	   had	   been	   established	   to	   evaluate	   proposals	   of	  amendment	   to	   those	   provisions	   found	   not	   fully	   consistent	   with	   CEDAW	  normative	   framework.	  Brazil	   is	   a	  noteworthy	   case,	   expressing	   its	   reservation	  on	  Article	  29.1,	  as	  well	  as	  on	  Articles	  15.4	  and	  16.1,	  establishing:182	  	  	  	  Article	  15.4	  
States	  Parties	  shall	  accord	  to	  men	  and	  women	  the	  same	  rights	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  
law	   relating	   to	   the	   movement	   of	   persons	   and	   the	   freedom	   to	   choose	   their	  
residence	  and	  domicile.	  	  Article	  16.1	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  181	  Chronologically:	   in	   1981,	   El	   Salvador,	   Ecuador,	  Nicaragua,	  Mexico,	   Panama,	  Uruguay;	   in	   1982	  Peru,	   Colombia,	   Dominican	   Republic,	   Guatemala,	   Peru;	   in	   1983	   Honduras,	   Venezuela;	   in	   1984	  Brazil;	  in	  1985	  Argentina.	  182	  Objected	  by	  Netherlands,	  Germany	  and	  Sweden.	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States	   Parties	   shall	   take	   all	   appropriate	   measures	   to	   eliminate	   discrimination	  
against	  women	   in	   all	  matters	   relating	   to	  marriage	   and	   family	   relations	   and	   in	  
particular	  shall	  ensure,	  on	  a	  basis	  of	  equality	  of	  men	  and	  women:	  (a)	  The	  same	  
right	   to	   enter	   into	   marriage;	   (c),	   The	   same	   rights	   and	   responsibilities	   during	  
marriage	  and	  at	  its	  dissolution;	  (g)	  he	  same	  personal	  rights	  as	  husband	  and	  wife,	  
including	  the	  right	  to	  choose	  a	  family	  name,	  a	  profession	  and	  an	  occupation;	  and	  
(h)	   The	   same	   rights	   for	   both	   spouses	   in	   respect	   of	   the	   ownership,	   acquisition,	  
management,	   administration,	   enjoyment	   and	   disposition	   of	   property,	   whether	  
free	  of	  charge	  or	  for	  a	  valuable	  consideration.	  
	  It	   shall	   be	   noticed	   that	   these	   reservations	   can	   be	   considered	   as	   against	   the	  
spirit	   of	   the	   convention	   itself,	   representing	   a	   strong	   limitation	   to	   the	  understanding	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  equality	  and	  non	  discrimination,	  particularly	  in	   relation	   to	   Article	   15.4,	   and	   a	   tendency	   to	   protect	   a	   particular	   concept	   of	  marriage	   determined	   by	   socio-­‐cultural	   patterns,	   thus	   influencing	   the	  interpretation	   of	   the	   scope	   of	   Article	   5(a)	   CEDAW.	   Interestingly,	   Brazil	  withdrew	   these	   substantial	   reservations	   in	  1994,	   the	   same	  year	   in	  which	   the	  Inter-­‐American	  System	  adopted	  the	  BdPC,	  which	  the	  State	  ratified	  in	  1995.	  	  For	  what	   concerns	   the	  Optional	   Protocol	   to	  CEDAW,	  by	  2002	  most	   countries	  had	  ratified	  this	  additional	  instrument.	  Argentina	  and	  Colombia	  joined	  in	  2007,	  with	  the	  latter	  opting	  out	  from	  Article	  8	  (Inquiry	  Procedure),	  allowing	  CEDAW	  Committee	  to	  initiate	  a	  confidential	  investigation	  by	  one	  of	  its	  members,	  when	  receiving	   reliable	   information	   of	   grave	   and	   systematic	   violations	   of	   the	  convention	  by	  a	  State	  Party,	  and	  Article	  9,	  establishing	  a	  follow-­‐up	  mechanism	  for	  the	  Inquiry	  Procedure.	  Colombia	  also	  declared	  its	  own	  interpretation	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  Article	  5	  of	  the	  Optional	  Protocol,	  as	  precluding	  "a	  determination	  on	  
admissibility	  or	  on	  the	  merits	  of	  the	  communication"	  (Article	  5.2),	  and	  requiring	  any	  measure	  involving	  the	  enjoyment	  of	  economic,	  social	  and	  cultural	  rights	  to	  be	   applied	   according	   to	   the	   progressive	   nature	   of	   these	   rights.	   Additionally,	  somehow	   redundantly,	   the	   State	   clarified	   that	   no	   provision	   of	   the	   Optional	  Protocol,	   or	   CEDAW	   Committee’s	   Recommendation,	   may	   be	   interpreted	   as	  requiring	  Colombia	  to	  decriminalize	  offences	  against	  life	  or	  personal	  integrity.	  Chile	   and	   El	   Salvador	   signed	   but	   did	   not	   ratify	   the	   Optional	   Protocol,	   whilst	  Honduras	  and	  Nicaragua	  have	  not	  signed	  it	  yet.	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On	   the	   basis	   of	   our	   comparative	   analysis	   of	   national	   legislations	   on	   VAW,	   we	  shall	  now	  evaluate	  the	  role	  that	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  System	  played	  in	  influencing	  BdPC	  implementation	  in	  the	  region.	  As	  we	  will	  see,	  although	  a	  direct	  causal	  link	  can	  be	  difficult	  to	  establish	  conclusively,	  for	  what	  concerns	  national	  responses	  to	  VAW,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  our	  findings	  we	  are	  able	  to	  provide	  significant	  evidence	  of	  a	  direct	  influence	  of	  the	  structural	  and	  institutional	  specificities	  of	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  System	  in	  promoting	  States’	  abidance	  to	  BdPC	  provisions.	  	  	  
Evolution	   of	   national	   legislations	   on	   VAW:	   the	   road	   to	  
convergence	  	  	  	  
The	  first	  generation	  of	  laws	  	  As	  seen	  in	  the	  Second	  Section	  of	  this	  research,	  our	  comparative	  chronological	  review	   led	   us	   to	   identify	   two	   generations	   of	   laws	   addressing	   the	   problem	   of	  VAW,	  with	  evident	  distinctive	  features	  for	  what	  concerns	  their	  respective	  focus	  and	  scope.	  	  	  The	  legislations	  belonging	  to	  the	  first	  generation	  have	  been	  enacted	  in	  the	  ’90,	  following	   directly	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	   BdPC	   in	   the	   region.	   This	   almost	  immediate	  effect	  is	  largely	  explained	  by	  the	  structural	  specificities	  of	  the	  Inter-­‐American	   multilevel	   system	   of	   human	   rights	   protection,	   which	   offers	   an	  extremely	  convenient	  framework	  to	  ensure	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  effectiveness	  to	  international	  instruments	  adopted	  by	  States	  Party.	  The	  laws	  enacted	  in	  the	  ’90	  are	  focused	  on	  domestic	  violence	  and	  maintain	  a	  restricted	  scope,	  establishing	  mainly	   reactive	   measures	   to	   address	   the	   problem	   of	   VAW,	   e.g.	   provisions	  directed	  to	  guarantee	  the	  punishment	  of	  the	  perpetrator	  and	  protect	  the	  victim	  once	  the	  violation	  has	  already	  occurred.	  However,	  the	  significant	  change	  in	  the	  understanding	  of	  women’s	   rights	   that	   these	   legislations	   represent	   should	  not	  be	  underestimated.	  	  	  Some	  contextual	  element	  will	  prove	  useful	  to	  understand	  its	  meaning.	  As	  seen	  in	   the	   First	   Section	   of	   this	   research,	   the	   drafting	   and	   adoption	   of	   the	   BdPC	  paralleled	  the	  international	  process	  through	  which	  international	  human	  rights	  law	   was	   coming	   to	   terms	   with	   the	   shortcomings	   of	   the	   early	   approach	   to	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equality	   and	   discrimination.	   The	   traditional	   public/private	   divide,	  characterizing	   the	   understanding	   international	   human	   rights	   law	   as	   a	  restricting	   States’	   intervention	   in	   private	  matters,	   with	   an	   emphasis	   of	   their	  negative	  obligations,	  had	  been	  challenged	  with	  particular	  strength	  by	  feminist	  legal	   scholars,	   pointing	   at	   its	   inherent	   shortcomings	   for	   what	   concerned	   the	  promotion	  and	  protection	  of	  women’s	  rights,	  mainly	  violated	  in	  ambits	  left	  out	  of	   the	   scope	   of	   international	   law.	   VAW	   and,	   particularly,	   domestic	   violence,	  occurring	   by	   definition	   in	   the	   intimate	   (private)	   sphere	   and	   perpetrated	   by	  private	   individuals,	   could	   not	   but	   be	   a	   primary	   concern	   of	   these	   criticisms,	  which	   emphasised	   the	   invisibility	   of	   the	   phenomenon	   and	   its	   intrinsically	  discriminatory	  nature,	  affecting	  disproportionately	  women.	  	  Although	   domestic	   violence	   had	   not	   been	   included	   in	   1979	   CEDAW,	   later	  evolutions	   at	   universal	   level	   raised	   international	   awareness	   on	   its	   critical	  features.	   Following	   a	   series	   of	   UN	   Resolutions,	   CEDAW	   Committee	   adopted	  General	  Recommendation	  12,	  requiring	  States	  to	  submit	  periodical	  reports	  on	  VAW,	  and	  the	  1990	  Resolution	  45/114	  of	  the	  UN	  General	  Assembly	  called	  for	  a	  public	  and	  criminal	  response	  to	  domestic	  violence.	  In	  1992,	  CEDAW	  Committee	  General	  Recommendation	  19	  shifted	  the	  traditional	  paradigm,	  defining	  VAW	  in	  the	   public	   and	   private	   sphere	   as	   a	   human	   rights	   violation	   affecting	  disproportionately	  women,	  manifesting	  discriminatory	  conductive	  contexts	   in	  which	  violence	  is	  directed	  against	  women	  because	  they	  are	  women.	  	  	  Through	   the	   analysis	   of	   domestic	   violence	   women	   were	   identified	   as	   a	  vulnerable	  group	  as	  not	   in	   terms	  of	  differences	  given	  by	   their	  sex,	  but	  on	   the	  basis	  of	  the	  structural	  difference	  in	  power	  relations	  between	  the	  two	  genders.	  As	  feminist	  scholars	  pointed	  out,	  domestic	  violence	  was	  one	  of	  those	  violations	  that	  men	  did	  not	  experience	  and	  could	  not	  be	  addressed	  with	  a	  “neutral”	  norm.	  Research	   provided	   evidence	   that	   domestic	   violence	   affected	   women	  disproportionately,	   while	   cases	   of	   women’s	   violence	   against	   men	   proved	   to	  have	  mainly	  reactive	  motivations,	  i.e.	  self-­‐defence	  (e.g.	  Bacon	  and	  Lansdowne,	  1982;	   Saunders,	   1986;	   O’Donovan,	   1991),	   as	   well	   as	   a	   completely	   different	  nature	   (Choudhry,	  Herring,	   2006),	   differing	   in	   frequency,	   intention,	   intensity,	  physical	   injury	   and	   emotional	   impact	   (Dobash,	   Dobash,	   2004).	   Such,	   mainly	  reactive,	  acts	  were	  rarely	  repeated	  and	  did	  not	  generally	  cause	  injury	  or	  fear	  in	  male	  victims	  (Fields,	  Kirchner,	  1978),	  since	  women	  did	  not	  use	  intimidating	  or	  coercive	   forms	   of	   controlling	   behaviour.	   VAW	   had	   more	   serious	   effects	   and	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varied	  in	  forms,	  ranging	  from	  physical	  to	  economical	  or	  psychological	  violence,	  originating	   in	  male	  dominant	   social	  position	   in	   relation	   to	  his	   female	  partner	  (Dobash,	  Dobash,	  2004).	  	  	  The	  paradigm	  shift	  required	  States	  to	  intervene	  on	  the	  discriminatory	  bases	  of	  VAW	  and	   the	  1994	  UNGA	  Declaration	  on	   the	  Elimination	  of	  Violence	  Against	  Women	  explicitly	   indicated	   the	  due	  diligence	  principle,	   reflected	   in	  Article	  7.b	  BdPC,	   adopted	   in	   the	   same	   year,	   as	   the	   standard	   to	   evaluate	   prevention	   and	  protection	  measures,	  addressing	  the	  problem	  both	  when	  perpetrated	  by	  public	  agents	  and	  private	  individuals	  (Articles	  1	  and	  3	  BdPC).	  	  	  Overall,	  national	  legal	  systems	  did	  not	  present	  any	  specific	  norm	  or	  measure	  to	  address	  the	  problem	  of	  domestic	  violence.	  As	  seen	  in	  the	  Second	  Section	  of	  this	  research,	   the	   first	   legal	   reforms	   were	   focused	   on	   introducing	   such	   acts	   as	   a	  punishable	   crime,	   reflecting	   the	   emerged	   international	   consensus	   and	  encouraging	  its	  reporting.	  Notably,	  filling	  a	  legislative	  gap	  was	  also	  a	  relatively	  easy	  choice	  to	  suggest	  national	  political	  will	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  commitments	  undertaken	  with	  the	  BdPC.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  new	  laws	  constituted	  a	  measure	  of	  significant	  symbolic	  meaning,	  through	  which	  States	  were	  willing	  to	  prove	  their	  will	   to	   comply	   with	   the	   BdPC	   and	   signal	   to	   their	   societies	   a	   change	   in	   the	  perception	  of	  a	  wide-­‐spread	  phenomenon.	  	  	  Violence	   per	   se	   was,	   obviously,	   already	   covered	   by	   criminal	   codes,	  nevertheless,	  through	  codifying	  domestic	  violence,	  new	  legislations	  challenged	  the	  pattern	  of	   tolerance	   that	  normalized	  VAW	  in	   the	  domestic	  sphere.	  Due	   to	  the	  features	  of	  a	  strictly	  criminal	  approach,	  although	  some	  of	  the	  laws	  contain	  an	   explicit	   reference	   to	   women	   or	   gender,	   the	   definition	   of	   the	   criminal	   act	  remained	   gender	   neutral,	   both	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   victim	   and	   the	   perpetrator.	  Nevertheless,	   the	   definition	   of	   violence	   was	   extended	   to	   include	   the	   specific	  forms	   of	   VAW	   identified	   in	   academic	   research	   and	   originating	   in	   women’s	  subjugation,	   such	   as	   psychological	   violence,	   introduced	   in	   all	   new	   laws,	   and	  patrimonial	   violence,	   mentioned	   in	   Costa	   Rica’s	   law.	   New	   precautionary	  measures	   represent	   a	   crucial	   element	   to	   evaluate	   the	   efforts	   on	   preventions.	  However,	  in	  this	  early	  phase,	  such	  measures	  fall	  short	  from	  a	  holistic	  approach	  directed	  to	  eradicate	  VAW,	  while	  they	  primarily	  constitute	  remedies	  once	  the	  violation	  has	  already	  occurred,	  or	  has	  been	  threatened,	  to	  protect	  victims	  and	  avoid	  reiteration.	  A	  few	  legislations	  directly	  referred	  to	  the	  BdPC,	  such	  as	  those	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of	   El	   Salvador,	   Guatemala,	   Honduras,	   Panama,	   Peru	   and	   Venezuela.	  Nevertheless,	   reviewing	   all	   relevant	   national	   legislation,	   we	   found	   that	   even	  those	   including	   provisions	   similar	   or	   reproducing	   Article	   9	   BdPC,183	  did	   not	  follow	   up	   in	   devising	   measures	   to:	   (…)	  Modify	   social	   and	   cultural	   patterns	   of	  
conduct	   of	   men	   and	   women,	   including	   the	   development	   of	   formal	   and	   informal	  
educational	   programs	   appropriate	   to	   every	   level	   of	   the	   educational	   process,	   to	  
counteract	  prejudices,	  customs	  and	  all	  other	  practices	  which	  are	  based	  on	  the	  idea	  
of	  the	  inferiority	  or	  superiority	  of	  either	  of	  the	  sexes	  or	  on	  the	  stereotyped	  roles	  for	  
men	  and	  women	  which	  legitimize	  or	  exacerbate	  violence	  against	  women.	  	  From	  a	  feminist	  perspective,	  the	  focus	  on	  domestic	  violence,	  leaving	  uncovered	  other	  forms	  of	  VAW,	  could	  lead	  to	  a	  conceptual	  error.	  Indeed,	  new	  legislations	  present	   a	   bias	   towards	   the	   preservation	   of	   the	   sphere	   in	   which	   VAW	   is	  perpetrated,	  protecting	   the	   family	  unit	  more	   than	   its	  members’	   rights	   “to	  live	  
free	   from	  violence	  and	  discrimination.”	  This	   approach	  might	   be	   interpreted	   as	  the	   reproduction	   of	   a	   culturally	   determined	   understanding,	   although	   a	  significant	   improvement	   in	   the	  process	  of	  adaptation	   to	   the	  new	  paradigm.	   It	  holds	  together	  the	  normative	  bases	  provided	  by	  Article	  17	  ACHR,	  recognising	  the	   family	  as	   the	   fundamental	   element	   of	   society,	   an	   Article	   2.a	   BdPC,	  which	  focuses	  on	  the	  problem	  of	  violence	  “that	  occurs	  in	  the	  family	  or	  domestic	  unit	  or	  
within	   any	   other	   interpersonal	   relationship,	   whether	   or	   not	   the	   perpetrator	  
shares	  or	  has	   shared	   the	   same	  residence	  with	   the	  woman	   (…),”184	  a	   framework	  reflected,	   for	   instance,	   in	   the	   constitutional	   texts	   of	   Brazil,	   Colombia,	   El	  Salvador	  and	  Guatemala.	  	  	  Abiding	   to	   the	   BdPC	   and	   General	   Recommendation	   19,	   several	   legislations	  adopted	   a	   broad	   definition	   of	   the	   family	   nucleus, 185	  sometimes	   including	  relatives	  and	  unrelated	  people	   living	   in	   the	   same	  household,	  besides	   spouses	  and	  partners,	  on	   the	  basis	  of	   the	  prevalent	   socio-­‐demographic	  characteristics	  of	   Latin	   American	   countries	   (Ariza,	   De	   Oliveira,	   2004).	   Such	   new	   laws	  broadened	  their	  scope	  encompassing	  the	  concrete	  complex	  structure	  of	  social	  relations	  between	  related	  people	  (Wainerman,	  2002),	  but	  also	  the	  relations	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  183	  	  Those	  of	  Bolivia,	  Costa	  Rica,	  Guatemala,	  Honduras,	  Mexico,	  Venezuela,	  Panama.	  184	  In	  Advisory	  Opinion	  17/02,	  on	  the	  juridical	  status	  and	  human	  rights	  of	  the	  child,	  the	  Court	  had	  already	  adopted	  a	  broad	  definition	  of	  the	  family	  unit.	  185	  For	  an	  extensive	  study	  on	  the	  history	  of	  the	  family	  refer	  to	  Burguiere	  et	  al.	  1998.	  For	  an	  analysis	  directed	   to	   determine	   a	   functional	   definition	   of	   the	   family	   see	   Badinter,	   1991.	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power	  arising	  between	  unrelated	  people	  sharing	  the	  same	  home.	  Nevertheless,	  their	  approach	  to	  VAW	  manifests	   the	  challenges	  to	  guarantee	  effectiveness	  to	  transformational	   provisions	   such	   as	   Article	   5(a)	   CEDAW	   and	   Article	   8	   BdPC.	  Whereas	  the	  public/private	  dilemma	  is	  successfully	  overcome,	  we	  did	  not	  find	  significant	   elements,	   besides	   occasional	   mentioning,	   suggesting	   the	  internalisation	  of	  the	  need	  to	  modify	  unequal	  social	  relations.	  	  	  States	   Party	   to	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   System	   had	   ratified	   CEDAW	   before	   the	  adoption	  of	  the	  BdPC,	  most	  of	  them	  as	  early	  as	  10	  years	  before.	  Therefore,	  the	  regional	  wave	  of	   legislations	  of	   the	   ‘90s	  should	  be	   interpreted	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  two	  concurring	  elements:	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  given	  the	  structural	  preconditions	  of	  the	  multilevel	  Inter-­‐American	  System	  of	  human	  rights	  protection,	  the	  timing	  of	  these	  legislations	  suggests	  a	  direct	  link	  with	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  BdPC,	  which	  “regionalised”	  the	  paradigm	  shift	   in	  the	  Universal	  System,	  facilitating	  national	  reception	   by	   integrating	   it	   in	   a	   familiar	   and	   more	   accessible	   system	   of	  protection	  with	  a	   favourable	   structure	   to	  promote	  convergence.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   the	   specific	   focus	   on	   domestic	   violence	   emerged	   from	   the	   joint	  contributions	   of	   BdPC	   provisions,	   CEDAW	   Committee’s	   General	  Recommendation	  19	  and	  the	  international	  context	  of	  raised	  awareness	  on	  the	  issue.	  The	   features	  of	   these	   legislations,	  and	   their	  shortcomings,	  highlight	   the	  complexity	  of	  fulfilling,	  and	  fully	  internalising,	  the	  paradigm	  shift	  endorsed	  by	  Women’s	  Conventions,	  tackling	  the	  discriminatory	  nature	  of	  VAW.	  	  Nevertheless,	   the	   first	   generation	   of	   laws	   represents	   States’	   significant	  adaptive	  effort,	  “to	  the	  extent	  of	  their	  possibilities,”	  to	  give	  the	  BdPC	  a	  meaning,	  although,	  to	  a	   large	  extent,	  still	  embedded	  in	  their	  socio-­‐cultural	  contexts	  at	  a	  given	   time.	   Social	   change	   is	   an	   incremental	   process,	   in	   which	   each	   step	   is	   a	  precondition	  for	  the	  next	  one,	  and	  as	  such	  needs	  to	  be	  evaluated.	  	  	  
The	  second	  generation	  of	  laws	  	  The	  second	  generation	  of	  national	  legislations	  on	  VAW,	  identified	  in	  the	  Second	  Section	   of	   this	   research,	   presents	   distinctive	   features.	   The	   beginning	   of	   this	  second	  regional	  wave	  coincides	  with	  the	  years	  of	  the	  Castro-­‐Castro	  case,	  when	  the	   IACrtHR	   established	   its	   contentious	   jurisdiction	   on	   the	   BdPC	   through	   a	  lengthy	  systematic	  and	  teleological	  interpretation.	  Since	  Castro-­‐Castro,	  not	  only	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the	  BdPC	  acquires	  official	   full	   justiciability	   in	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  System,	  but	  the	  Court	  also	  sends	  a	  message	  of	  significant	  symbolic	  meaning.	  It	  grounds	  its	  arguments	   on	   the	   “implicit	   complete	   procedure”	   established	   by	   Article	   12	  BdPC	   and,	   more	   importantly,	   on	   the	   jus	   cogens	   nature	   of	   the	   principles	   of	  equality	  and	  non-­‐discrimination	  which,	   through	  Article	  1.1	  ACHR,	   implies	   the	  complementarity	   of	   ACHR	   and	   BdPC,	   with	   the	   specific	   content	   of	   the	   latter	  integrating	  the	  general	  catalogue	  of	  rights	  and	  guarantees.	  	  	  As	  seen,	  if	  in	  the	  years	  following	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  BdPC,	  the	  formal	  structure	  of	   the	   multilevel	   Inter-­‐American	   System	   provided	   favourable	   conditions	   to	  trigger	   the	   first	  wave	  of	  national	   legislations	  adapting	  domestic	   legal	  systems	  to	   the	   new	   understanding	   of	   women’s	   rights,	   the	   second	   generation	   of	   laws	  reflects	   the	   crucial	   role	   of	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions	   in	   developing,	   through	  interpretation,	  the	  regional	  interpretation	  of	  the	  meaning	  and	  scope	  of	  the	  new	  instrument.	  The	  path-­‐breaking	  Castro-­‐Castro	  case	   follows	  a	  series	  of	  petitions	  invoking	   the	   BdPC	   that,	   although	   not	   submitted	   to	   the	   Court,	   had	   given	   the	  region	  occasions	  to	  experiment	  the	  new	  instrument	  on	  concrete	  cases.	  	  Let	   us	   recall	   that	   the	   primary	   objective	   of	   a	   regional	   system	   is	   to	   establish	   a	  body	  of	  principles	  and	  standards	  that	  national	  systems	  commit	  to	  guarantee	  to	  prevent	   human	   rights	   violations.	   Victims’	   compensation	   is,	   hence,	   not	   an	  objective	  per	  se,	  while	  the	  crucial	  function	  of	  regional	  Institutions	  is	  to	  develop	  and	   implement	   conventional	   norms,	   setting	   and	   actualising	   standards	   and	  principles	   through	   dynamic	   processes	   (Abramovich,	   2009).	   This	   objective	   is	  inherent	   in	   the	   subsidiary	   character	   of	   international	   protection	  mechanisms,	  which	   complement	   national	   systems’	   guarantees,	   intervening	   only	   once	  domestic	   remedies	   have	   been	   exhausted.	   This	   procedural	   rule	   gives	   States	  Party	   the	   opportunity	   to	   consider,	   solve	   and	   remedy	   violations	   before	   Inter-­‐American	  Institutions’	  intervention.	  	  	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions	   maintain	   a	   high	   degree	   of	  autonomy	  to	  attain	  higher	  levels	  of	  efficacy	  and	  compliance	  with	  conventional	  provisions.	   Some	   scholars	   underline	   that,	   while	   technical	   follow	   up	  mechanisms	   for	   Inter-­‐American	   rulings	   still	   present	   some	   deficiencies,	   the	  Inter-­‐American	   System’	   structure	   created	   the	   conditions	   for	   a,	   somehow,	  “spontaneous”	   generalised	   implementation	   of	   the	   set	   standards	   of	   protection	  (Abramovich,	  2009).	  Based	  on	  our	  comparative	  review	  of	  national	  legislations	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on	   VAW,	  we	   argue	   that	   the	   generalised	   adoption	   of	   standards	   elaborated	   by	  Inter-­‐American	  institutions	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  BdPC,	  harmonised	  with	  those	  at	  universal	   level,	   provides	   evidence	   of	   an	   attitude	   of	   national	   deference,	  facilitated	   by	   the	   favourable	   procedural	   conditions	   provided	   by	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   System,	   i.e.	   the	   mutual-­‐alimentation	   process	   previously	   analysed,	  and	  by	  the	  legitimacy	  that	  the	  IACommHR	  and	  the	  IACrtHR	  gained	  on	  the	  basis	  of	   their	   crucial	   role	   in	   supporting	   Latin	   American	   countries	   transitions	   to	  democracy.	  	  The	   second	   generation	   of	   laws	   manifests	   regional	   convergence	   towards	   the	  holistic	  understanding	  emerged	  in	  the	  universal	  framework	  and	  reflected	  and	  developed	   in	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   convention	   on	  women’s	   rights.	   Considering	  the	   regional	   tendency	   to	   guarantee	   ex	   tunc	  and	   erga	  omnes	  effects	   to	   Court’s	  rulings	   (De	   Vergottini,	   2010),	   the	   timing	   and	   features	   of	   the	   second	  wave	   of	  national	  legislations	  on	  VAW	  identifies	  a	  direct	  link	  with	  IACrtHR’s	  first	  rulings	  on	  the	  BdPC.	  	  Our	  case	  law	  review,	  since	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  BdPC,	  shows	  an	  evolution	  of	  the	  interpretation	   of	   the	   principles	   of	   equality	   and	   non-­‐discrimination.	   	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions	   overcome	   the	   traditional	   conceptualisation,	   which	  mainly	   required	   the	   elimination	   of	   arbitrary	   differences	   in	   the	   treatment	   of	  women	  and	  men,	  and	  endorse	  a	  substantial	  approach,	  which	  implies	  enacting	  measures	   to	   produce	  women’s	   equality	   and	   their	   enjoyment	   of	   fundamental	  rights	   on	   equal	   bases.	   Recognising	  women’s	   structural	   discrimination,	   in	   the	  framework	   of	   the	   BdPC	   and	   CEDAW,	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions’	   elaborated	  on	   the	   concept	   of	   States’	   positive	   obligations	   and	   due	   diligence,	   not	   only	   for	  what	   concerns	   providing	   measures	   to	   address	   the	   problem	   of	   VAW	   or	  guarantee	   effective	   legal	   remedies,	   but	   also	   requiring	   them	   to	   adopt	  appropriate	  measures	   to	   identify	   systemic	   patterns	   of	   discrimination	   against	  women	  and	  eradicate	  their	  causes.	  	  Following	  the	  interpretations	  provided	  since	  IACommHR’s	  Maria	  da	  Penha	  and	  IACrtHR’s	   Castro-­‐Castro,	   new	   legislations	   on	   VAW	   explicitly	   recognised	  discrimination	   against	   women	   as	   the	   structural	   cause	   of	   VAW,	   introducing	  inter-­‐disciplinary	   programmes	   and	   policies	   for	   prevention,	   reflecting	   the	  international	  emphasis	  on	  eradication.	  Some	  countries	   included	  references	   to	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Salvador,	   Guatemala,	   Mexico,	   Nicaragua	   and	   Venezuela),	   or	   articulated	   the	  understanding	  of	  shared	  responsibility,	  as	  the	  need	  for	  proactive	  participation	  and	   support	   of	   all	   societal	   sectors	   to	   design	   the	   policies	   to	   eradicate	   VAW	  (Colombia,	  Panama,	  Venezuela,	  Nicaragua	  and	  Bolivia).	  	  	  New	   legislations	   internalise	   the	   “double	   foundation”	   (García	   Ramírez,	  Concurring	   Opinion,	   Castro-­‐Castro	   case,	   2006)	   of	   human	   rights,	   generally	  abandoning	   gender-­‐neutrality	   when	   identifying	   women	   as	   the	   target	   of	  discriminatory	   violence.	   The	   right	   of	   women	   to	   a	   life	   free	   from	   violence	   is	  recognised	   in	   both	   the	   public	   and	   private	   sphere,	   overcoming	   the	   restrictive	  focus	   on	   domestic	   violence.186	  Three	   countries	   go	   as	   far	   as	   contemporarily	  including	   in	   their	  new	  constitutions	   specific	  provisions:	  Bolivia	   (2009)	   refers	  to	   the	  enjoyment	  of	   this	   right	  both	   in	   the	   family	  as	  in	  society,	  Ecuador	   (2008)	  refers	  to	  the	  public	  and	  private	  sphere	  and	  explicitly	  binds	  the	  State	  to	  adopt	  all	  necessary	   measures	   to	   prevent,	   eliminate	   and	   sanction	   VAW,	   the	   same	  commitment	  is	  expressed	  by	  Dominican	  Republic	  (2010),	  referring	  to	  any	  form	  of	  violence	  in	  the	  family	  or	  based	  on	  gender.	  	  	  
	  As	   seen,	   scholars,	   NGOs	   and	   activists	   had	   a	   significant	   influence	   in	   the	  development	   of	   Inter-­‐American	   analyses	   and	   conceptual	   elaborations	   of	  regional	  standards	  of	  protection	  and	  contributed	  enhancing	  their	  resonance	  at	  regional	  and	  national	  level.	  We	  defined	  it	  a	  process	  of	  mutual	  alimentation,	  in	  which	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions	   synthetize	   the	   outcome	   of	   a	   dialogue	  with	  different	   sources	   contributing	   elaborations,	   while	   occasionally	   strengthening	  the	   legitimacy	   of	   specific	   instances	   endorsing	   their	   perspectives	   in	   its	  discourse	   and	   transforming	   them	   in	   juridical	   categories.	   As	   Pinto	   Coelho	  argues,	   this	   process	   provided	   women	   and	   women’s	   rights	   movements	   and	  lawyers,	  with	  material	  to	  set	  international	  judicial	  precedents	  (Pinto	  Coelho	  et	  al.	   2008).	  Due	   to	   the	  high	  degree	  of	   regional	  homogeneity	   for	  what	   concerns	  several	   problems	   affecting	   Latin	   American	   societies,	   Inter-­‐American	  Institutions’	   rulings	   offered	   civil	   society’s	   organisations,	   national	   judges	   and	  legal	   practitioners,	   authoritative	   precedents	   to	   hold	   in	   front	   of	   national	  institutions,	   regardless	   of	   the	   State	   involved	   in	   the	   case,	   increasing	   the	  influence	   of	   Inter-­‐American	   jurisprudence	   region-­‐wide	   (Zuloaga,	   2008).	   We	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  186	  	  Exceptions	  are	  three	  countries	  that	  focus	  on	  a	  reform	  of	  their	  penal	  codes,	  without	  adopting	  a	  law	  of	  broader	  scope,	  namely:	  Chile,	  Peru	  and	  Costa	  Rica	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found	   critical	   evidence	   of	   this	   process	   in	   the	   broad	   reception	   in	   national	  legislations	  and	  penal	  codes	  of	   the	  concept	  of	   femicide,	   referring	  to	  killings	  of	  women	  because	  they	  are	  women.	  	  This	   element	   acquires	   a	   particular	   meaning	   when	   analysing	   the	   role	   of	   a	  regional	  Court	  in	  guaranteeing	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  an	  international	  instrument	  of	   peculiar	   features	   such	   as	   those	  presented	  by	   the	  BdPC,	  which	  needs	   to	   be	  translated	  into	  policies	  and	  legislations	  reflecting	  specific	  regional	  and	  national	  contexts.	  We	  analysed	   the	  process	  of	  mutual	   alimentation	   through	  which	   the	  IACrtHR	  came	   to	  use	   the	  concept	  of	   femicide	   in	  Cotton	  Field	  (2009);	   the	   term	  emerged	   as	   essentially	   anthropological,	   sociological	   and	   political,	   elaborated	  by	   feminist	   scholars	   to	   conceptualise	   the	   specific	   features	   of	   a	   widespread	  phenomenon	  in	  the	  region.	  The	  word	  gained	  momentum	  nationally,	  regionally	  and,	   eventually,	   internationally	   through	   the	   campaigning	   of	   transnational	  advocacy	   networks	   and	   institutions.	   However,	   it	   is	   when	   Intern-­‐American	  Institutions	   officially	   endorse	   the	   concept,	   with	   the	   Court’s	   final	   ruling	   in	  
Cotton	  field,	  that	  it	  turns	  into	  a	  juridical	  category.	  Notably,	  in	  deciding	  the	  case,	  the	   IACrtHR	  also	   largely	  drew	  on	  CEDAW	  Committee	   inquiry	   into	   the	  case	  of	  women’s	  disappearing	  and	  killings	  in	  Ciudad	  Juárez.	  Ten	  countries,	  thereafter,	  introduced	   the	   crime	   of	   femicide	   in	   their	   penal	   codes:	   Costa	  Rica	   (2007)	   and	  Guatemala	   (2008),	  when	   the	  Cotton	  field	  case	  was	   still	  pending	  and,	   after	   the	  ruling,	   Bolivia	   (2013),	   Chile	   (2010),	   El	   Salvador	   (2012),	   Nicaragua	   (2012),	  Honduras	  (2012),	  Mexico	  (2012),	  Panama	  (2011)	  and	  Peru	  	  (2011).	  	  Brazil	   represents	   an	   apparent	   exception,	   with	   its	   2006	   Law	   11340,	   focused	  only	   on	   domestic	   violence.	   However,	   the	   peculiar	   features	   of	   its	   experience	  make	  Brazil’s	  case	  a	  non-­‐exception	  in	  the	  recognised	  pattern	  of	  Inter-­‐American	  Institutions’	   influence	   on	   national	   legislations.	   Let	   us	   recall	   that	   Brazil	   had	  “skipped”	  the	  first	  generation	  phase	  by	  introducing	  the	  BdPC	  as	  a	  national	  law	  in	  1995,	  without	  counting	  on	  a	  legal	  framework	  to	  guarantee	  its	  effectiveness.	  The	   2006	   law,	   hence,	   fills	   a	   vacuum	   that	   other	   countries	   in	   the	   region	   had	  already	   recognised.	  However,	  what	  makes	  Brazil	   a	  non-­‐exception	   in	   terms	  of	  deference	   to	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions’	   interpretations,	   is	   that	   the	   law	  represents	   a	   follow-­‐up	   to	   IACommHR’s	  Maria	  da	  Penha	  v.	  Brazil	  Report,	   even	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  187	  In	   2005	   Brazil	   repelled	   inappropriate	   language	   from	   its	   penal	   code,	   such	   as	   the	   expression	  “decent	  woman”	  in	  norms	  referred	  to	  sexual	  violence.	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Conclusions	  
	  
Inter-­‐American	   Institutions’	   influence	  on	  the	   internalisation	  
of	  the	  BdPC	  paradigm	  shift	  on	  VAW	  in	  national	  legislations	  	  	  Although	   a	   direct	   causal	   link	   between	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   System	   and	  legislative	   or	   policy	   reforms	   at	   national	   level	   might	   be	   difficult	   to	   establish	  conclusively,	   for	   what	   concerns	   VAW,	   we	   argue	   that	   the	   generalised	  convergence	   towards	   the	   adoption	   of	   legislations	   substantially	   reflecting	  standards	  elaborated	  by	  Inter-­‐American	  Institutions	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  BdPC,	  as	  well	  as	  its	  timing,	  cannot	  be	  considered	  coincidental.	  	  From	  our	   comparative	   review	  of	  national	   legislations	  on	  VAW	  enacted	   in	   the	  region	  since	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  BdPC,	  we	  conclude	  that	  both	  the	  ratification	  of	  the	  instrument	  itself	  and	  the	  role	  on	  Inter-­‐American	  Institutions,	  clarifying	  the	  content	  of	  the	  new	  paradigm	  and	  the	  broader	  scope	  of	  the	  regional	  instrument,	  had	  a	  crucial	  influence	  in	  promoting	  national	  implementation.	  The	  evolution	  of	  national	  compliance,	   for	  what	  concerns	  adapting	  and	  reforming	  national	   legal	  orders,	   rests	  on	   the	  procedural	   and	   structural	  preconditions	  provided	  by	   the	  Inter-­‐American	   multilevel	   system	   of	   protection	   of	   human	   rights,	   further	  strengthened	  by	  the	  generalised	  consensus	  on	  VAW	  reached	  at	  universal	  level.	  The	  first	  generation	  of	  laws	  represents	  an	  immediate	  response	  of	  States	  willing	  to	   show	   their	   compliance	   to	   the	   BdPC,	   facilitated	   by	   the	   constitutional	  structures	   of	   Latin	   American	   countries,	   which	   generally	   guarantee	  constitutional	   status	   to	   international	   human	   rights	   law	   and,	   in	   particular,	   to	  Inter-­‐American	  instruments.	  However,	  the	  specific	  focus	  on	  domestic	  violence	  shared	   by	   all	   the	   laws	   of	   the	   ‘90s	   is	   largely	   explained	   by	   the	   raising	  international	   awareness	   on	   the	   specific	   issue,	   which	   gained	   momentum	   in	  1992,	  with	  CEDAW	  Committee’s	  adoption	  of	  General	  Recommendation	  19.	  The	  second	   generation	   of	   laws,	   with	   its	   timing	   and	   broader	   scope,	   provides	  evidence	   of	   the	   critical	   function	   of	   Institutions	   that	   had	   achieved	   a	   strong	  legitimacy	   in	   the	   region.	   Through	   these	   laws,	   States	   provided	   national	  solutions	  designed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  wider	  scope	  of	  the	  BdPC,	  as	  interpreted	  by	  the	  IACrtHR	  and	  the	  IACommHR.	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SECTION	   IV	   –	   Discussion	   of	  
results	   and	   overall	  
conclusions	  	  	  
Introduction	  
	  In	   the	   first	  part	  of	   this	  Section,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	   the	   findings	  of	  our	  analysis	  on	  the	   process	   of	   internalisation	   of	   the	   BdPC	   in	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   System,	   we	  identify	   the	   features	   of	   a	  method	   to	   respond	   to	   the	   challenges	   posed	   by	   the	  socio-­‐legal	   approach	   endorsed	   in	   Women’s	   Conventions.	   Drawing	   on	   our	  previous	  considerations,	  we	  shall	  also	  propose	  guidelines	  to	  address	  persisting	  shortcomings.	  In	  particular,	  we	  suggest	  a	  reform	  of	  the	  IACommHR’s	  role	  in	  the	  protection	  mechanism,	   overcoming	   its	   function	   as	   a	   filter	   of	   the	   cases	   to	   be	  referred	   to	   the	   IACrtHR	   and	   extending	   and	   better	   organizing	   its	  Rapporteurships.	  This	  role	  better	  suits	  a	  currently	  mature	  regional	  context	  and	  provides	   the	  means	   for	   responding	   to	   the	   increased	   need	   for	   contextual	   and	  thematic	   analyses,	   required	   to	   guarantee	   coherence	   in	   increasingly	   complex	  multi-­‐factorial	   analyses.	   In	   this	   perspective,	   we	   present	   and	   discuss	   an	  analytical	   method,	   able	   to	   consistently	   and	   conclusively	   hold	   together	   the	  challenges	   emerging	   from	   clashes	   of	   fundamental	   rights,	   arising	   from	  intersectionality	  and	  cultural	  diversity.	  To	  develop	  and	  justify	  our	  proposal	  we	  use	   the	   facts	   of	   a	   case	   decided	   by	   the	   IACommHR	   in	   2001,	  Ana,	  Beatriz,	   and	  
Celia	  González	  Pérez	   v	  Mexico,	  providing	   an	   explanatory	   example	   of	   how	   our	  proposal	  allows	  shaping	  acceptable	  coherent	  solutions.	  	  	  In	  the	  second	  part	  of	  this	  Section,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  high	  degree	  of	  similarity	  between	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   and	   European	   Systems,	   we	   follow	   up	   to	   our	  secondary	  objective,	  developing	  a	  brief	  a	  priori	  assessment	  of	  the	  perspectives	  of	   effectiveness	   of	   the	   Istanbul	   Convention,	   i.e.	   its	  plausibility.	  We	   describe	   a	  workable	   outline	   for	   our	   future	   research	   focus,	   in	  which	  we	  will	   evaluate	   to	  what	   extent	   the	   conclusions	   drawn	   from	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   experience	   are	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“exportable,”	  whether	  and	  how	  they	  can	  be	  adapted	  to	  a	  different	  context,	  and	  single	  out	  specific	  features	  of	  the	  European	  System	  that	  might	  provide	  further	  tools	  to	  enhance	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  new	  instrument,	  once	  it	  will	  come	  into	  force.	  Based	  on	  CoE	  analytical	  studies	  on	  Member	  States’	  national	   legislations	  on	   VAW,	   we	   provide	   evidence	   of	   the	   overall	   disappointing	   response	   of	   the	  European	   context	   compared	   to	   the	   Latin	   American	   region.	   We	   then	   briefly	  analyse	   how,	   in	   absence	   of	   a	   specific	   convention	   in	   the	   CoE,	   the	   ECrtHR	  addressed	   cases	   of	   domestic	   violence,	   highlighting	   the	   normative	   framework	  used	   for	   its	   interpretations.	   As	   we	   will	   see,	   the	   ECrtHR	   rarely	   mentions	  discrimination	   when	   analysing	   cases	   of	   domestic	   violence,	   while	   it	   usually	  refers	  to	  breaches	  to	  the	  Right	  to	  a	  Private	  Life	  (Article	  8	  ECHR),	  and	  persists	  in	  an	   extensive	   use	   of	   the	   margin	   of	   appreciation	   doctrine.	   Drawing	   some	  preliminary	   conclusions,	   we	   argue	   that	   both	   ECrtHR’s	   case	   law	   and	   CoE	  Member	   States’	   legislations	   on	   VAW	   appear	   to	   be	   at	   an	   early	   stage	   in	   the	  process	   of	   internalisation	   of	   the	   international	   paradigm	   shift	   on	   VAW,	   if	  compared	  to	  the	  analysed	  context	  of	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  System.	  	  	  We	  shall	  focus	  on	  one	  significant	  element	  of	  difference	  between	  the	  BdPC	  and	  the	   Istanbul	   Convention,	   i.e.	   the	   enforcement	   mechanism	   established.	   While	  the	   IACrtHR	   holds	   contentious	   jurisdiction	   on	   the	   BdPC,	   the	   Istanbul	  Convention	  never	  mentions	  the	  ECrtHR,	  neither	  explicitly	  nor	  implicitly.	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  findings	  of	  our	  research,	  and	  recalling	  the	  debate	  in	  feminist	  legal	  literature,	   we	   argue	   that	   this	   choice	   might	   imply	   a	   limited	   prospective	  influence	   of	   the	   instrument	   in	   the	   region,	   resulting	   in	   a	   missed	   opportunity	  with	  a	  negative	  impact	  on	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  instrument	  itself.	  Given	  the	  high	  degree	   of	   comparability	   between	   the	   two	   systems,	   and	   in	   the	   light	   of	   our	  considerations	   with	   respect	   to	   ECrtHR	   case	   law	   and	   overall	   unsatisfactory	  development	  of	  national	  legislations	  on	  VAW,	  we	  shall	  develop	  our	  arguments	  on	   the	   need	   to	   reconsider	   ECrtHR’s	   role	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   Istanbul	  Convention	   and	   suggest	   concrete	   solutions	   to	   guarantee	   the	   feasibility	   of	  granting	  contentious	  jurisdiction	  to	  the	  ECrtHR.	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Identifying	   a	   method	   to	   internalise	   the	   paradigm	  
shift	   on	   VAW	   in	   a	   regional	   multi-­‐level	   system	   of	  
human	  rights	  protection	  	  The	  normative	   framework	  provided	  by	   the	  Vienna	  Convention	  on	   the	  Law	  of	  the	  Treaties	  (VCLT)	  cannot	  ensure,	  per	  se,	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  an	  international	  instrument	  in	  States	  Party,	  while	  its	  likelihood	  is	  enhanced	  establishing	  strong	  enforcement	  mechanisms.	  	  As	   seen,	   the	   literature	   largely	   agrees	   in	   pointing	   at	   1979	   CEDAW	   weak	  enforcement	   mechanism	   (Charlesworth	   et	   al.,	   2001;	   Keck,	   Sikkink,	   1998;	  Merry,	  2003),	   and	  at	   the	  high	  number	  of	   substantial	   reservations	   (Johnstone,	  2006;	  Chinkin,	  1995),	  as	   the	  main	  reasons	  that	  relegated	   it	   to	  a	  “second-­‐class	  instrument”	   (Meron,	   1990).	   After	   a	   ten	   years	   long	   debate,	   in	   2000	   the	  Universal	   System	   addressed	   the	   problem	   with	   an	   additional	   treaty,	   the	  Optional	  Protocol,	  with	  its	  own	  iter	  of	  ratification.	  	  	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	  BdPC	  was	   adopted	   in	   1994,	   and	   by	   1996	  most	   Inter-­‐American	  States	  Party	  had	  ratified	  the	  new	  instrument	  with	  no	  reservations.188	  The	   events	   in	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   System	   took	   place	   at	   the	   same	   time	   as	   the	  United	   Nations,	   including	   Latin	   American	   countries,	   were	   addressing	   the	  CEDAW	   poor	   implementation.	   Let	   us	   underline,	   as	   mentioned	   in	   the	   First	  Section	  of	  this	  research,	  that	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Institute	  of	  Human	  Rights	  was	  amongst	  the	  most	  active	  promoters	  of	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  petition	  procedure	  to	  strengthen	  the	  protection	  mechanism	  provided	  by	  CEDAW.	  	  As	  seen,	  while	  Article	  11	  BdPC	  grants	  the	  IACrtHR	  the	  competence	  to	  elaborate	  Advisory	   Opinions	   on	   the	   convention	   if	   requested	   by	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  Commission	  of	  Women,	  Article	  12	  established	  a	  petition	  mechanism	  similar	  to	  that	   provided	   by	   the	   ACHR,	   but	   explicitly	   mentioned	   only	   the	   IACommHR,	  creating	   a	   troublesome	   ambiguity.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   in	   the	   travaux	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  188	  Bahamas	   is	   not	   a	   member	   to	   the	   ACHR	   and,	   when	   ratifying	   the	   BdPC	   in	   1995	   submitted	   a	  declaration:	   “Article	   7(g)	   of	   the	   Convention	   imports	   no	   obligation	   upon	   the	   Government	   of	   the	  
Commonwealth	   of	   The	   Bahamas	   to	   provide	   any	   form	   of	   compensation	   from	   public	   funds	   to	   any	  
woman	  who	  has	   been	   subjected	   to	   violence	   in	   circumstances	   in	  which	   liability	  would	   not	   normally	  
have	  been	  incurred	  under	  existing	  Bahamian	  law.”	  As	  mentioned,	  currently	  only	  Canada	  and	  United	  States,	  amongst	  all	  OAS	  member	  States,	  have	  not	  ratified	  the	  BdPC	  (nor	  the	  ACHR).	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préparatoires	   of	   the	   BdPC	   we	   could	   not	   find	   any	   evidence	   allowing	   us	   to	  establish	  beyond	  doubts	  if	   the	  intent	  of	  the	  drafters	  was	  that	  of	  excluding	  the	  possibility	   of	   granting	   the	   IACrtHR	   contentious	   jurisdiction,	   nor	   we	   can	  evaluate	   whether	   a	   more	   explicit	   provision	   would	   have	   discouraged	   States’	  ratification.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  given	  the	  contemporary	  international	  debate	  on	  the	   need	   for	   an	   enforcement	   mechanism	   to	   CEDAW	   and	   the	   praxis	   of	   Inter-­‐American	  Institutions’	  with	  treaties	  other	  than	  the	  ACHR,	  we	  can	  conclude	  that,	  at	  least	  for	  what	  concerns	  its	  possibility	  to	  use	  the	  BdPC	  as	  an	  interpretive	  tool	  for	   ACHR	   provisions,	   the	   competence	   of	   the	   Court	   was,	   indeed,	  uncontroversial.	  	  However,	   although	   the	   IACommHR	   admitted	   its	   first	   petition	   invoking,	   inter	  
alia,	   BdPC	   provisions	   in	   1998	   (Maria	   Da	   Penha),	   a	   similar	   occasion	   was	  presented	  to	  the	  Court	  only	  in	  2004,	  with	  the	  path-­‐breaking	  Castro-­‐Castro	  case.	  Our	   analysis	   of	   the	   features	   of	   the	   process	   suggests	   that	   the	   ambiguity	   of	  Article	   12	   BdPC	   influenced	   this	   delay,	   creating	   the	   conditions	   for	   the	  Commission’s	  excessive	  “filtering”	  of	  petitions	  invoking	  the	  BdPC,	  which,	  at	  an	  early	   stage,	   ended	   their	   iter	  with	  Commission’s	  decisions.	   It	   should	  be	  noted,	  additionally,	   that	   most	   relevant	   cases	   ended	   in	   friendly	   settlements,	   a	  possibility	  that	  prevents	  the	  referral	  to	  the	  Court	  (Article	  48.1.f	  and	  49	  ACHR).	  	  The	   IACrtHR	   clarified	   its	   competence	   in	   the	  Castro-­‐Castro	  case.	   Although	   the	  IACommHR	  had	  excluded	  BdPC	  provisions,	  invoked	  by	  the	  petitioners,	  from	  its	  application	   to	   the	   Court,	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	   facts	   presented	   by	   victims’	  representatives	  gave	   the	  Court	   the	  occasion	   to	  unravel	   the	  ambiguity	  created	  by	  Article	  12	  BdPC.	  The	  Court	  developed	  a	  lengthy	  teleological	  and	  systematic	  interpretation,	  further	  extended	  in	  the	  Concurring	  Opinions	  of	  Judges	  Cançado	  Trindade	   and	   García	   Ramírez.	   The	   arguments	   rested	   on	   two	   grounds:	   a)	   the	  principle	  of	  effectiveness,	  since	  no	  BdPC	  provision	  explicitly	  excluded	  IACrtHR’	  competence,	   whereas	   both	   Article	   51	   ACHR	   and	   Commission’s	   Rules	   of	  Procedure	   implied	   the	  possibility	   of	   the	  Court	   to	   receive	   a	   case	   submitted	   to	  the	  Commission	   and	  b)	   the	   jus	  cogens	   nature	   of	   the	  principle	   of	   equality	   and	  non-­‐discrimination	   and	   the	   pro	   personae	   principle,	   which	   implied	   a	  compulsory	   joint	   reading	   of	   the	   BdPC	   and	   the	   ACHR,	   given	   that	   specific	  provisions	   clarifying	   the	   duties	   of	   States’	   for	   what	   concerns	   women’s	   rights	  complement	   the	   general	   catalogue	   provided	   by	   the	   ACHR.	  However,	   as	   seen,	  the	   IACrtHR	   had	   to	   further	   justify	   its	   decision	   in	   the	   later	   Cotton	   field	   case,	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confronting	   Mexico’s	   preliminary	   objections,	   where	   the	   State	   pointed	   at	   the	  alleged	   arbitrariness	   of	   its	   conclusion	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   rule	   of	   express	  
jurisdiction	   established	   by	   Article	   62	   ACHR	   and	   the	   normative	   framework	  provided	  by	  the	  VCLT.	  Although	  the	  contentious	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  Court	  on	  the	  BdPC	  is	  now	  consolidated,	  we	  found	  that	  the	  ambiguity	  of	  Article	  12	  probably	  influenced	   the	   delay	   in	   referring	   petitions	   invoking	   the	   BdPC	   to	   the	   IACrtHR	  and	  forced	  the	  Court	  to	  construct	   its	   interpretation	  of	  a	  procedural	  provision.	  This	  problem	  carried	  the	  risk	  to	  affect	  not	  only	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  its	  conclusions	  for	   what	   concerns	   the	   BdPC,	   but	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   the	   Court	   itself,	   since	   the	  expansion	   of	   its	   public	   function	   might	   have	   been	   perceived	   as	   arbitrary,	  providing	  arguments	  to	  those	  pointing	  at	  its	  excessive	  judicial	  activism.	  	  Through	  our	  analysis	  of	   Inter-­‐American	  case	   law	  and	  national	   legislations	  on	  VAW,	   we	   argued	   that	   BdPC	   full	   justiciability,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   provided	   a	  strong	   protection	   mechanism	   to	   guarantee	   reparation	   and	   non	   repetition	   of	  occurred	  violations,	  leveraging	  on	  the	  certainty	  of	  sanctions	  as	  a	  deterrent	  and,	  on	   the	   other	   hand,	   carried	   a	   high	   symbolic	   meaning,	   sending	   a	   message	   to	  States	  Party	  and	  reinforcing	  BdPC	  legally	  binding	  nature,	  encouraging	  domestic	  implementation.	  	  As	   argued,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   a	   convention	   presenting	   transformative	   provisions,	  this	  choice	  acquires	  a	  particular	  meaning.	  The	  role	  of	  norms,	  whether	  national	  or	   international,	   in	   triggering	   social	   change	   has	   been	   questioned	   on	   several	  grounds.	   In	  Merry’s	  words:	  “we	  are	  left	  to	  struggle	  about	  how	  to	  set	  an	  agenda	  
about	   justice	   in	   the	   l990s	   post-­‐Foucauldian,	   post-­‐Marxian	   world	   of	   discursive	  
power	  and	  decentred	  subjectivities	  in	  which	  no	  group	  is	  authorized	  to	  construct	  
for	   others	   a	   vision	   of	   a	   socially	   just	   world”	   (Merry,	   1995,	   p.	   13).	   However,	  feminist	   legal	   scholarship	   currently	   agrees	   in	   considering	   them	   as	   valuable	  complementary	  instruments	  for	  social	  transformation	  and	  cultural	  redefinition	  (Fellmeth,	  2000;	  Rhode,	  1990;	  Villmoare,	  1985;	  Merry,	  1995,	  2006).	  	  	  BdPC	   justiciability	   enhanced	   the	   integration	  of	   a	   gender	  perspective	   in	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions’	   analyses.	   Recognising	   the	   male-­‐bias	   of	   both	  international	   law	   and	   International	   Institutions	   (Charlesworth	   et	   al.	   1991;	  Koskemmeini,	   1995;	   MacKinnon,	   1987,	   1989;	   Smart,	   1989;	   Coomaraswamy,	  1997;	   Zuloaga,	   2008),	   implied	   the	   need	   for	   specific	   instruments	   to	   elaborate	  the	   content	   of	   general	   human	   rights	   norms,	   clarifying	   their	   meaning	   with	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respect	   to	  women.	   In	   this	  sense,	  as	  argued,	   the	  BdPC	  provided	   the	  normative	  framework	   to	   “catch-­‐up”	  on	   the	  evolved	   international	   consensus	  on	  women’s	  rights	  (Fellmeth,	  2000).	  	  	  The	   adoption	   of	   Women	   Conventions	   exercises	   on	   International	   bodies,	   as	  social	   Institutions,	   the	   same	   transformative	   influence	   that	   its	   national	  implementation	   is	   expected	   to	   exercise	   on	   States.	   Our	   findings	   allowed	  us	   to	  conclude	   that	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	   BdPC	   triggered	   a	   process	   in	   which	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions	   gradually	   internalised	   the	   new	  understanding	   on	  VAW	  and	  learnt	  to	  use	  the	  convention	  as	  an	  additional	  instrument	  of	  analysis.	  	  	  As	   opposed	   to	   CEDAW	   Committee,	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions	   pre-­‐exist	   the	  BdPC	   and	   there	   is	   no	   reason	   to	   expect	   that	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	  BdPC,	  per	  se,	  could	   directly	   imply	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions’	   ability	   to	   recognise	   the	  gendered	  nature	  of	  violations.	  Indeed,	  as	  noticed	  in	  our	  analysis,	  it	  took	  several	  years	   and	   the	   crucial	   effort	   of	   civil	   society	   organisations	   with	   specific	  experience,	  for	  the	  Commission	  to	  move	  beyond	  stressing	  the	  link	  between	  the	  sex	   of	   the	   victims	   and	   the	   form	   in	   which	   violations	   occurred	   and	   effectively	  consider	   discrimination	   as	   the	   cause	   of	   VAW.	   Notably,	   even	   in	   the	   path-­‐breaking	   Maria	   da	   Penha,	   the	   first	   case	   in	   which	   the	   shifted	   paradigm	  materializes	   its	   impact	   on	   VAW	   perpetrated	   by	   private	   individuals,	   the	  Commission	  only	  considers	  discrimination	  as	  the	  cause	  of	   the	  violation	  of	   the	  victim’s	  right	  to	  effective	  legal	  proceedings,	  preventing	  redress	  and	  generating	  a	  conductive	  context	  for	  domestic	  violence.	  Although	  this	  choice	  is	  technically	  justified	   considering	   that,	   at	   the	   time	   of	   the	   facts,	   Brazil	   had	   not	   ratified	   the	  BdPC,	  allowing	   to	  establish	   its	   international	   responsibility	  on	   the	  basis	  of	   the	  continuous	  nature	  of	  the	  violation	  of	  the	  right	  to	  effective	  judicial	  proceedings,	  arguably	   this	   limitation	   should	   have	   not,	   per	   se,	   prevented	   the	   Commission	  from	   identifying	   the	   discriminatory	   nature	   of	   VAW,	   as	   coherently	   done	   in	  successive	   cases.	   We	   recognised	   a	   similar	   gradual	   process	   in	   the	   Court’s	  neglect	  of	  the	  double	  transgression	  interpretation	  presented	  by	  the	  petitioners	  in	  the	  Castro-­‐Castro	  case,	  and	  the	  later	  increased	  sensitivity	  to	  gender-­‐specific	  analyses	  recognised,	  for	  instance,	  in	  the	  endorsement	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  femicide	  in	   Cotton	   field.	   In	   this	   crucial	   case,	   not	   only	   the	   Court	   focuses	   on	   the	  discriminatory	  nature	  of	   the	  generalised	   impunity	  of	   the	  killings	  of	  women	  in	  Mexico,	   but	   also	   the	   discriminatory	   nature	   of	   the	   violations	   themselves,	  regardless	  of	  the	  perpetrator	  being	  a	  public	  agent	  or	  a	  private	  individual.	  	  
	   235 
	  We	  argue	  that,	  although	  the	  non-­‐specific	  nature	  of	  Inter-­‐American	  Institutions	  required	  a	   few	  years	   for	   the	  understanding	  provided	  by	   the	  BdPC	   to	  be	   fully	  internalised	   in	   their	   decisions,	   the	   choice	   of	   using	   already	   established	  Institutions	  to	  enforce	   its	  provisions	  carried	  a	  high	  value	  added,	  compared	  to	  that	   provided	   by	   the	   apparently	   more	   suitable	   instruments	   constituted	   by	   a	  body	  with	  specific	  expertise	  and	  mandate,	  such	  as	  CEDAW	  Committee.	  Relying	  on	   legitimate	   Institutions	  with	   consolidated	  experience	  and	  a	  broad	  mandate	  minimize	  the	  risk	  of	  marginalization	  of	  women’s	  rights	  and	  better	  responds	  to	  the	  critique	  to	  objectivity	  and	  neutrality	  of	  human	  rights	  law	  raised	  by	  feminist	  legal	   scholarship.	   Both	   the	   IACommHR	   and	   the	   IACrtHR	   guarantee	   the	  effectiveness	   of	   several	   specific	   instruments	   and	   the	   ACHR,	   increasing	   the	  likelihood	   of	   a	   crossed	   use	   of	   conventional	   provisions,	   and	   providing	   the	  opportunity	  to	  consider	  BdPC	  norms	  when	  the	  features	  of	  the	  facts	  so	  require,	  even	  if	  not	  invoked	  by	  the	  petitioners,	  as	  it	  already	  happens	  in	  the	  case	  of	  other	  Inter-­‐American	  Instruments.189	  Moreover,	   the	  understanding	  of	   the	  BdPC	  as	  a	  complementary	  interpretive	  tool	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  pro	  personae	  principle	  and	  the	  double	   foundation	  of	  human	  rights,	  and	  the	  praxis	  of	   interpreting	  general	  and	   specific	   norms	   in	   conjunction,	   identified	   in	   our	   case	   law	   analysis,	  overcomes	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  gender-­‐bias	  of	  general	  norms,	  allowing	  dynamic	  interpretations	  to	  “catch-­‐up”	  with	  evolving	  understandings.	  	  	  The	   gradual	   internalisation	   of	   the	   new	   paradigm	   parallels	   the	   international	  elaborations	   on	   the	   concept	   due	   diligence	   and	   its	   implications	   for	   what	  concerns	  States’	  positive	  obligations	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  VAW.	  Inter-­‐American	  Institutions	  start	   recognising	   States’	   responsibility	   for	   omissions	   in	   providing	   effective	  remedies	   (Raquel	   de	   Mejia;	   Dianna	   Ortiz;	   Ana,	   Beatriz,	   and	   Celia	   González	  
Pérez),	   then	   begin	   analysing	   such	   omissions	   as	   originating	   in	   discrimination	  against	   women	   (Maria	   da	   Penha;	   MZ	   v.	   Bolivia)	   and,	   eventually,	   come	   to	  determine	   the	   structural	   discriminatory	   nature	   of	   States’	   omissions	   in	  protecting	   and	   ensuring	   women’s	   rights	   against	   violations	   perpetrated	   by	  private	  (or	  unknown)	  individuals,	  in	  contexts	  of	  foreseeable	  risk	  (Cotton	  field),	  	  recognising	   the	  crucial	   role	  of	  appropriate	  measures	   to	  guarantee	  prevention	  and	   non-­‐repetition	   of	   acts	   of	   VAW	   and	   eradicate	   artificially	   construed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  189	  See,	  for	  instance,	  the	  Commission’s	  decision	  to	  include	  a	  consideration	  of	  the	  facts	  under	  Article	  8	   of	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   Convention	   to	   Prevent	   and	   Punish	   Torture	   in	   Ana,	   Beatriz,	   and	   Celia	  
González	  Pérez	  v	  Mexico	  (2001).	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inequities,	   beyond	   the	   concrete	   case	   (e.g.	  Las	  Dos	  Erres	  Massacre,	  Concurring	  Opinion	  of	  ad	  hoc	  Judge	  Cadena	  Rámila).	  In	  the	  currently	  pending	  Véliz	  Franco	  
et	  al.	  v.	  Guatemala,	  which	  shares	  several	  similarities	  with	  the	  Cotton	  field	  case,	  although	   the	   State	   declared	   to	   have	   adopted	   several	   measures	   to	   eradicate	  VAW,	   the	   Commission	   referred	   the	   case	   to	   the	   Court	   not	   only	   because	   such	  measures	   are	   successive	   to	   the	   facts	   of	   the	   case,	   but	   also	   considering	   them	  unsatisfactory	   given	   the	   lack	   of	   coordination	   and	   funding.	   Through	   this	  process,	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions	   came	   to	   extend	   their	   recommendations	  including	   measures	   directed	   to	   trigger	   structural	   changes	   in	   States’	   Party	  societies,	   assessing	   systematic	   socio-­‐cultural	   patterns	   in	   detriment	   of	   the	  victim	   as	   well	   as	   of	   other	   individuals	   belonging	   to	   the	   same	   (subordinated)	  social	  group.	  	  	  As	  seen	  in	  the	  Third	  Section	  of	  this	  research,	  the	  incremental	  internalisation	  of	  the	   new	   understanding	   on	   VAW	   took	   place	   through	   a	   process	   of	   mutual	  alimentation	  between	  Inter-­‐American	  Institutions	  and	  a	  multi-­‐level	  coalition	  of	  civil	   society	   actors,	   which	   contributed	   to	   provide	   the	   expertise	   on	   gendered	  violations	   that	   such	   Institutions	  did	  not	  have.	  The	  conditions	   for	   this	  process	  were	   allowed	   by	   the	   consolidated	   praxis,	   currently	   formalized	   in	   the	  Institutions’	  Rules	  of	  Procedure,	   of	   admitting	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	   sources	  when	  gathering	   information	   on	   the	   cases	   under	   consideration.	   As	   noticed,	   in	   fact,	  crucial	   contributions	   were	   provided	   in	   Amici	   Curiae	   briefs	   and	   experts’	  statements.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  as	  argued,	  the	  increased	  production	  of	  thematic	  and	   country	   Reports	   elaborated	   by	   the	   Commission,	  with	   a	   specific	   focus	   on	  VAW	   and	   reflecting	   the	   contributions	   of	   national	   and	   international	   actors,	  contributes	  to	  construct	  Inter-­‐American	  Institutions	  “self-­‐sufficiency”	  for	  what	  concerns	  counting	  on	  the	  contextual	  information	  necessary	  for	  developing	  the	  type	  of	  analysis	  required	  by	  the	  BdPC.	  The	  extensive	  documentation	  available	  provides	   the	   basis	   for	   the	   re-­‐conceptualisation	   of	   remedies	   in	   cases	   that	  require	   the	   eradication	   of	   systematic	   patterns,	   overcoming	   structural	  deficiencies,	  allowing	  to	  shape	  standards	  and	  principles	  that	  extend	  beyond	  the	  concrete	   cases	   (Abramovich,	   2009).	   In	   this	   perspective,	   the	   gender-­‐sensitive	  interpretation	   of	   ADHR	   general	   provisions	   developed	   by	   the	   Commission	   in	  
Jessica	  Lenahan	  (Gonzales)	  et	  al.	  v.	  United	  States	  (2011),	  constitutes	  evidence	  of	  the	   successful	   influence	   the	   learning	   process	   triggered	   by	   the	   adoption	   of	   a	  specific	  instrument	  to	  protect	  women’s	  rights	  in	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  System.	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Therefore,	   in	  our	  view,	   the	   criticisms	   raised	  by	   feminist	   legal	   scholars	  on	   the	  appropriateness	  of	  a	  specific	   instrument	  to	  ensure	  women’s	  rights,	  which	  has	  long	  affected	  CEDAW	   legitimacy	   (Charlesworth	  et	   al.	   1991;	   Johnstone,	  2006),	  do	  not	  apply	  to	  the	  case	  of	  a	  regional	  instrument	  enforced	  by	  Institutions	  with	  a	   broad	  mandate,	   such	   as	   the	   BdPC	   in	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   System,	   provided	  that	  such	  choice	  might	  imply,	  as	  it	  did,	  a	  period	  of	  institutional	  adaptation.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	   our	   findings	  do	  not	   allow	  us	   to	   conclusively	   exclude	   that	   the	  extreme	   under	   representation	   of	   women	   in	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions	  contributed	   to	   the	   relatively	   slow	   path	   of	   BdPC	   internalisation,	   as	   argued	   by	  Zuloaga	   (Zuloaga,	   2008).	   However,	   in	   the	   files	   of	   the	   cases	   decided	   when	   a	  woman	  integrated	  the	  composition	  of	  either	  the	  Commission	  or	  the	  Court,	  we	  did	   not	   find	   evidence	   of	   a	   particular	   contribution	   on	   her	   behalf.	   On	   the	  contrary,	  crucial	  elaborations	  frequently	  came	  from	  men	  Judges,	  such	  as	  García	  Ramírez	   and	  Cançado	  Trindade	   (Concurring	  Opinions,	  Castro-­‐Castro	  case),	  or	  
ad	  hoc	  Judge	  Cadena	  Rámila	  (Concurring	  Opinion,	  Las	  Dos	  Erres	  Massacre).	  The	  first	  two	  Judges	  served	  several	  years	  as	  Presidents	  of	  the	  Court,	  which	  arguably	  provides	   grounds	   to	   consider	   them	   “la	   crème”	   of	   a	   bench	   already	   selected	  
“among	   jurists	   of	   the	  highest	  moral	   authority	  and	  of	   recognised	   competence	   in	  
the	   field	  of	  human	  rights”	   (Article	   52	  ACHR).	   Cançado	  Trindade,	   in	   particular,	  often	  provided	  evolutionary	  perspectives	  on	  crucial	  cases	  concerning	  equality	  and	  non-­‐discrimination,	   through	  his	  habit	   to	  attach	  separate	  opinions	   to	   final	  judgements,	   and	   his	   doctrinal	   production	   often	   influenced	   Inter-­‐American	  interpretive	   choices	   and	   the	   regional	   debate	   on	   institutional	   and	   procedural	  reforms.	   Let	   us	   recall	   that,	   for	   instance,	   in	   Castro-­‐Castro	   on	   the	   basis	   of	  Commission’s	  limited	  use	  of	  the	  BdPC,	  Cançado	  Trindade	  came	  to	  question	  the	  need	  for	  a	  “filtering”	  Institution	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  reached	  maturity	  of	  petitioners	  in	  appropriately	  presenting	  their	  cases.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Judge	  Cadena	  Rámila	  had	   been	   appointed	  ad	  hoc	   Judge	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   his	   Guatemalan	   nationality	  and	  of	  his	  long	  experience	  in	  armed	  conflicts,	  post-­‐conflict	  issues,	  violence	  and	  social	  conflicts,	  which	  provided	  him	  with	  a	  specific	  sensitivity	  and	  expertise	  on	  the	  facts	  of	  Las	  Dos	  Erres	  Massacre	  v.	  Guatemala.	  	  
	  The	   previous	   considerations	   bring	   us	   to	   a	   conclusion:	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	  notwithstanding	   the	   consensus	   on	   the	   need	   to	   guarantee	   women’s	  participation	   to	   public	   life	   on	   equal	   bases,	   the	   appointment	   of	   women	   in	  international	  bodies	  does	  not,	  per	  se,	  necessarily	  ensure	  Institutions’	  increased	  gender	   sensitivity;	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   fact	   that	   important	   contributions	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were	   provided	   by	   men	   Judges,	   does	   not	   exclude	   that	   the	   gender-­‐bias	   of	  Institutions’	  membership	  could,	  in	  general,	  slow	  down	  the	  process	  of	  adoption	  of	   a	   gender-­‐perspective,	   since	   the	   Judges	   previously	   mentioned	   presented	  peculiar	   characteristics.	   Indeed,	   this	   fact	   might	   suggest	   that	   experience	   and	  subjective	   characteristics	   have	   a	   stronger	   influence	   than	   sex	   in	   enabling	  complex	   analyses	   encompassing	   specific	   sensitivities.	  Nevertheless,	  we	   argue	  that,	   whether	   in	   the	   long	   run	   expertise	   makes	   the	   difference,	   we	   share	   the	  conclusion	   that,	   at	   early	   stages,	   balanced	   sex-­‐representation	   constitutes	   a	  favourable	  condition	   for	   the	  adoption	  of	  a	  gender	  perspective,	  given	   that	   it	   is	  hardly	   controversial	   that	   appropriate,	   professional	   or	   personal,	   experience	   is	  more	   likely	   to	   be	   found	   in	   women	   Judges	   than	   in	   men	   Judges.	   In	   our	   view,	  although	   we	   cannot	   conclude	   that	   women	   underrepresentation	   slowed	   the	  process	   of	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions’	   internalisation	   of	   the	   BdPC	   approach,	  this	  possibility	  should	  have	  been	  ruled	  out	  beyond	  doubts,	  with	  a	  greater	  effort	  in	   guaranteeing	   their	   gender	   balance,	   as	   a	   crucial	   condition	   to	   enhance	   the	  plausibility	  of	  the	  paradigm	  shift	  on	  women’s	  rights,	  signalled	  by	  feminist	  legal	  scholars.	  	  Inter-­‐American	   Institutions’	   consolidated	   open	   attitude	   towards	   other	  international	   sources	   is	   another	   crucial	   element	   in	   their	   development	   of	  doctrinal	  elaborations	  on	  gender-­‐based	  violence.	  Our	  case	  law	  analysis	  signals	  an	   extensive	   use	   of	   references	   to	   elaborations	   produced	   in	   the	   Universal	  System	  and	   to	  ECrtHR’s	   jurisprudence	  on	  domestic	  violence.	   In	   the	  early	  case	  
Raquel	  Martín	  de	  Mejía	  v.	  Peru	  (1996),	  with	  the	  BdPC	  just	  entered	  into	  force,	  no	  previous	   experience	   with	   the	   instrument,	   nor	   being	   able	   to	   count	   on	   other	  international	  bodies’	  case	  law	  on	  a	  similar	  convention	  (CEDAW	  Optional	  Protocol	  was	  adopted	  several	  years	  later),	  the	  Commission	  largely	  draws	  on	  international	  humanitarian	   law	  on	   sexual	   abuses	   in	   cases	   of	   armed	   conflict.	   In	  particular,	   in	  recognising	   rape	   as	   a	   form	   of	   torture,	   the	   Commission	   referred	   to	   the	   Geneva	  Conventions	   and	   the	   Statute	   of	   the	   International	   Criminal	   Tribunal	   for	   the	  former	  Yugoslavia	  (ICTY).	  Additionally,	   the	   facts	  are	  considered	  under	  Article	  11	  ACHR	  (Right	  to	  a	  Private	  Life),	  adopting	  ECrtHR’s	  extended	  interpretation	  of	  Article	  8	  ECHR	  in	  X	  and	  Y	  vs.	  The	  Netherlands	  (1980).	  In	  Ana,	  Beatriz,	  and	  Celia	  
González	  Pérez	  v.	  Mexico	  (2001)	  the	  Commission	  mentions	  ICTY’s	  Prosecutor	  v.	  
Anto	  Furudzija	  (1998)	  and	  to	  ECrtHR’s	  Aydin	  v.	  Turkey	  (1997).	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  the	   1998	   Statement	   of	   Radhika	   Coomarasway,	   as	   UN	   Special	   Rapporteur	   on	  VAW,	  the	  Commission	  elaborates	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  re-­‐victimization	  of	  sexually	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abused	  women	  and	  the	  principles	  of	  effective	  investigation	  and	  documentation	  of	   torture	   and	   other	   cruel,	   inhuman	   or	   degrading	   treatments.	   References	   to	  ECrtHR’s	   extended	   interpretation	   of	   the	   Right	   to	   a	   Private	   Life	   can	   be	   also	  found	   in	  Fernández-­‐Ortega	  et	  al.	  v.	  Mexico	  and	  Rosendo-­‐Cantú	  et	  al.	   v.	  Mexico,	  where	  the	  IACrtHR	  mentions	  several	   judgements	  of	   its	  European	  homologous	  and,	  in	  particular	  for	  what	  concerns	  VAW,	  M.C.	  v.	  Bulgaria	  (2003).	  	  In	  Maria	  da	  Penha,	  where	  the	  Commission	  applies	  the	  BdPC	  for	  the	  first	   time,	  external	   references	   are	   used	   to	   corroborate	   its	   arguments	   on	   the	   continuous	  nature	  of	  the	  violation	  of	  the	  right	  to	  effective	  judicial	  proceedings,	  mentioning	  the	  consensus	  in	  ECrtHR’s	  case	  law	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  First	  Optional	  Protocol	  of	  the	  UN	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Civil	  and	  Political	  Rights,	  and	  using	  ECrtHR’s	  guidelines	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  time	  period	  within	  which	  proceedings	  take	  place	   is	   reasonable,	   depending	   on	   the	   complexity	   of	   the	   case,	   the	   procedural	  activity	  of	  the	  interested	  party	  and	  the	  conduct	  of	  the	  judicial	  authorities.	  	  External	  references	  are	  also	  extensively	  used	  in	  the	  pioneering	  Advisory	  Opinion	  18/O3.	  Although	  this	  decision	  does	  not	  address	  gender-­‐related	  issues,	  concerning	  the	   jus	   cogens	   nature	   of	   the	   principle	   of	   equality	   and	   non-­‐discrimination	   its	  conclusions	   have	   a	   crucial	   role	   in	   the	   evolution	   of	   Inter-­‐American	   case	   law	   on	  VAW,	  developing	  the	  concept	  of	  States’	  positive	  obligations	  erga	  omnes.	  To	  argue	  States’	   positive	   obligations	   as	   encompassing	   the	   relations	   between	   the	   State	  and	  the	   individuals	  subject	  to	   its	   jurisdiction	  as	  well	  as	  the	  relations	  between	  individuals,	   the	   Court	   cites:	   the	   Drittwirkung	   doctrine,	   elaborated	   by	   the	  German	  Federal	  Constitutional	  Court	  in	  the	  1958	  Lüth	  case;	  General	  Comments	  18	  and	  20	  of	  the	  UN	  High	  Commissioner	  on	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Article	  7	  of	  the	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Civil	  and	  Political	  Rights.	  	  	  Interpreting	  Article	  5	  ACHR	  (Right	  to	  Humane	  Treatment)	  in	  Castro-­‐Castro,	  the	  IACrtHR	  refers	  to	  both	  BdPC	  and	  CEDAW	  as	  part	  of	  the	  corpus	  juris	  on	  women’s	  rights.	   In	   Pueblo	   Bello	   Massacre,	   determining	   State’s	   responsibility	   for	   acts	  committed	   by	   private	   individuals,	   the	   IACrtHR	   referred	   to	   the	   Osman	   test,	  elaborated	  by	   the	  ECrtHR	   in	  Osman	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  further	  extending	   it	   to	  include	   responsibilities	   for	   omitted	   interventions	   in	   situation	   of	   foreseeable	  risk	  of	  which	  the	  State	  ought	  to	  have	  knowledge.	  In	  Maria	  Isabel	  Véliz	  Franco	  et	  
al	  v.	  Guatemala,	  concerning	   femicides,	   the	  Commission	  refers	   to	   the	  definition	  of	   impunity	  elaborated	  by	  CEDAW	  Committee,	  while	   the	  special	   connotations	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of	  due	  diligence	   in	   cases	  of	  VAW	  are	  argued	  citing	  Resolution	  2003/45	  of	  UN	  High	  Commissioner	  on	  Human	  Rights	  and	  ECrtHR’s	  Opuz	  v.	  Turkey	  (2009).	  
	  It	   is	  worth	   noting	   that	   Inter-­‐American	   case	   law	   on	   VAW	   runs	   parallel	   to	   the	  advancements	   in	   the	   Universal	   System	   and	   ECrtHR’s	   case	   law.	   In	   this	   sense,	  Inter-­‐American	   Institutions’	   understanding	  develops	  with	   the	   crucial	   support	  of	  other	  authoritative	  international	  sources,	  strengthening	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  its	  evolutionary	   interpretations,	   when	   it	   was	   not	   yet	   possible	   to	   refer	   to	  consolidated	  experiences.	  As	  we	  will	  see	  in	  the	  second	  part	  of	  this	  last	  Section,	  on	   this	   subject	   we	   can	   identify	   a	   close	   bi-­‐directional	   interaction,	   with	   the	  ECrtHR	   increasingly	   referring	   to	   the	   BdPC	   and	   Inter-­‐American	   jurisprudence	  on	  VAW.	  Let	  us	  recall	  that	  the	  Istanbul	  Convention	  has	  been	  adopted	  in	  2011,	  it	  has	  not	  entered	  into	  force	  yet,	  and	  the	  ECrtHR	  has	  not	  been	  grated	  competence	  on	  the	  instrument.	  	  	  The	   Inter-­‐American	   experience	  with	   the	   BdPC	   provides	   evidence	   of	   the	   first	  dimension	   of	   that	   bi-­‐focused	   perspective	   of	   regional	   institutions	   signalled	   by	  Garlicki,	   through	   which	   regional	   institutions	   harmonise	   their	   case	   law	   with	  concepts	   and	   solutions	   elaborated	   at	   universal	   level	   (Garlicki,	   2012)	   and,	  we	  add,	  by	  comparable	  regional	  systems.	  	  	  For	  what	   concerns	   the	   accessibility	   of	   the	  protection	  mechanism	  established,	  we	  shall	   recall	   the	   framework	   in	  which	  BdPC	   justiciability	  develops.	  By	  2002	  most	   Inter-­‐American	   countries	   had	   ratified	   CEDAW	   Optional	   Protocol.	  However,	  none	  of	  the	  11	  cases	  on	  VAW	  decided	  to	  date	  by	  CEDAW	  Committee	  concerns	   a	   Latin	   American	   country,190	  and	   only	   two	   decisions	   involve	   States	  not	   Party	   to	   the	   European	   System	   (Philippines	   and	   Canada).	   This	   pattern	   is	  explainable	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   higher	   familiarity	   of	   Latin	   American	   societies	  with	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  System	  and	  its	  long-­‐proven	  effectiveness	  in	  providing	  remedies	  and	  compensation	  for	  victims	  (Abregú,	  Espinoza,	  2006),	  which	  make	  the	  regional	  mechanism	  of	  protection	  more	  accessible	  and	  generally	  preferable	  to	  seek	  protection	  from	  human	  rights	  abuses.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  the	  entry	  into	  force	  of	  the	  Optional	  Protocol,	  the	  IACommHR	  had	  already	  received	  several	  petitions	  invoking	   the	   BdPC,	   including	   the	   crucial	  Maria	   da	   Penha	   case	   (2001),	   which	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  190	  With	   the	   exception	   of	   CEDAW	   Committee’s	   2005	   Inquiry	   on	   the	   femicides	   in	   Ciudad	   Juárez,	  which	  was	  used	  as	  an	  additional	  source	  of	  reference	  by	  the	  IACrtHR	  when	  evaluating	  the	  facts	  in	  
Cotton	  field.	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had	   gained	   great	   resonance	   in	   the	   region.	   Moreover,	   the	   timing	   of	   the	   first	  petitions	   admitted	   by	   CEDAW	   Committee	   coincides	   with	   the	   submission	   of	  
Castro-­‐Castro	  to	  the	  IACrtHR.	  	  	  As	   previously	   argued,	   these	   elements	   largely	   overshadowed	   the	   new	  protection	  mechanism	  offered	   by	   CEDAW	  Optional	   Protocol.	   Familiarity	  with	  the	   human	   rights	   discourse	   and	  with	   supranational	  mechanism	  of	   protection	  largely	   explains	   the	   high	   number	   of	   CoE	   States	   involved	   in	   CEDAW	  Committee’s	  case	  law,	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  generalised	  early	  underutilization	  of	  the	  new	  procedure	  in	  societies	  within	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  countries	  not-­‐belonging	  to	  regional	   systems.	   Indeed,	   until	   2011,	   the	   CoE	   had	   not	   adopted	   a	   specific	  instrument	  on	  women’s	  rights	  and	  individual	  petitions	  concerning	  VAW	  almost	  evenly	   distributed	   between	   the	   ECrtHR	   and	   CEDAW	   Committee.	   Similarly,	  familiarity	   with	   the	   specific	   mechanisms	   provided	   in	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  System,	   counting	   with	   the	   BdPC	   since	   1994,	   explains	   the	   relative	   lack	   of	  interest	   of	   Latin	   American	   petitioners	   in	   the	   mechanism	   provided	   by	   the	  Optional	   Protocol,	   considering	   that	   the	   two	   mechanisms	   are	   mutually	  exclusive.	   Additionally,	   Inter-­‐American	   System’s	  multilevel	   structure	   and	   the	  familiarity	   of	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions	   with	   national	   contexts,	   are	   more	  suitable	   to	   promote	   the	   structural	   reforms	   required	   by	   the	   current	  understanding	  on	  women’s	  rights	  and	  VAW.	  	  The	   same	   elements	   that	   make	   the	   enforcement	   mechanism	   in	   the	   BdPC	  preferable	  than	  that	  established	  by	  the	  Optional	  Protocol	  for	  what	  concerns	  the	  protection	   f	   victims,	   affect	   the	   different	   perspectives	   on	   the	   national	   impact	  that	   the	   respective	   Institutions’	   case	   law	   can	   have,	   beyond	   the	   facts	   of	   the	  concrete	  cases	  and	  besides	  the	  States	  directly	  involved	  in	  the	  decisions.	  Indeed,	  the	   influence	   of	   Inter-­‐American	   jurisprudence	   rests	   on	   the	   legitimacy	   built	  during	  years	  of	  successful	  experience	  in	  the	  region,	  on	  the	  multilevel	  structure	  of	   a	   system	   in	  which	   regional	   instruments	   are	   generally	   given	   constitutional	  status	   in	   domestic	   systems	   and	   on	   the	   familiarity	   developed	   by,	   on	   the	   one	  hand,	  Latin	  American	  societies	  with	  the	  regional	  protection	  mechanism	  and,	  on	  the	   other	   hand,	   by	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions	   themselves	   with	   national	  contexts.	   We	   do	   not	   argue	   that	   these	   features	   are	   completely	   absent	   in	   the	  Universal	   System,	   which	   counts	   on	   its	   own	   legitimacy	   and	   on	   human	   rights	  instruments	  of	  inherent	  constitutional	  substance	  (Cassese,	  2006).	  Nevertheless,	  the	   fact	   that	   their	   impact	  and	   legally	  binding	  nature	  are	  weaker	  compared	   to	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regional	   experiences	   is	   hardly	   controversial.	   Consequently,	  while	   the	  parallel	  development	  of	  principles	  and	  standards	   in	  CEDAW	  Committee’s	   case	   law	  on	  VAW	  constitutes	   a	   relevant	   contextual	   element,	   corroborating	   the	   arguments	  and	   increasing	   the	   strength	   of	   IACrtHR’s	   jurisprudence	   on	   the	   BdPC,	   its	  potential	  to	  exercise	  a	  direct	  effect	  on	  Latin	  American	  countries	  is	  significantly	  lower	  than	  that	  of	  Inter-­‐American	  Institutions.	  	  	  Besides	  our	  previous	  considerations,	  we	  shall	  underline	  that	  the	  relatively	  high	  degree	   of	   cultural	   homogeneity	   in	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   System	   provides	   a	  valuable	   precondition	   for	   a	   wide	   reception	   of	   standards	   and	   principles	  elaborated	  in	  Inter-­‐American	  case	  law,	  beyond	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  cases	  and	  of	  the	  States	   concretely	   involved,	   facilitating	   regional	   convergence.	   Indeed,	   the	  likelihood	  of	  “spontaneous”	  adaptations	  is	  higher	  when	  national	  contexts	  share	  similar	   features,	   in	   particular	   when	   recommendations	   concern	   structural	  changes	   and	   systematic	   patterns	   elaborated	   through	   contextual	   analyses.	   In	  other	  words,	   for	   instance,	  Guatemala	  would	  find	  easier	  and	  more	  appropriate	  to	  adopt	  an	  approach	  suggested	  in	  a	  case	  involving	  Argentina,	  rather	  than,	   let	  us	   say,	   Philippines	   or	  Austria.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   considering	   that	   the	   limited	  influence	  of	  the	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  doctrine	  in	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  System,	  if	   compared	   to	   the	  European	  System,	   the	   IACrtHR	  maintains	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  control	  on	  States’	  discretionality,	  restricting	  their	  room	  for	  manoeuvre.	  	  	  These	  considerations	  bring	  us	  to	  the	  second	  dimension	  of	  regional	  systems’	  bi-­‐focused	  perspective	  (Garlicki,	  2012),	  i.e.	  their	  influence	  in	  the	  harmonisation	  of	  national	   solutions.	   Controlled	   “spontaneous”	   solutions	   are	   endogenously	  harmonised	   in	   domestic	   legal	   structures	   and	   better	   identify	   contextual	  specificities	   than	   enforced	   adaptations,	   while,	   at	   the	   same	   time	   avoid	   sharp	  divergence	   from	   Inter-­‐American	   standards	   and	   principles.	   This	   is	   a	   direct	  implication	  of	  the	  subsidiary	  nature	  of	  supranational	  systems	  of	  human	  rights	  protection.	  	  From	  our	   comparative	   review	  of	  national	   legislations	  on	  VAW	  enacted	   in	   the	  region	   since	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	   BdPC,	   we	   can	   conclude	   that	   both	   the	  ratification	  of	  the	  instrument	  itself,	  and	  the	  interpretive	  role	  of	  Inter-­‐American	  Institutions,	   which	   often	   clarified	   the	   meaning	   and	   content	   of	   the	   regional	  instrument,	   had	   a	   crucial	   influence	   in	   promoting	   national	   adaptation	   to	   the	  new	   international	   understanding	   on	   VAW.	   The	   evolution	   of	   national	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compliance	   for	   what	   concerns	   adapting	   and	   reforming	   national	   legal	   orders	  rests	   on	   the	   structural	   preconditions	   provided	   by	   the	   regional	   multilevel	  system	   of	   protection,	   where	   the	   BdPC	  was	   adopted	   reflecting	   the	   consensus	  reached	  in	  the	  Universal	  System.	  	  	  Formality	  determines	  the	  hierarchical	  position	  of	  international	  instruments	  in	  national	   legal	   orders,	   affecting	   the	   degree	   of	   influence	   that	   international	   law	  and	   jurisprudence	   exercise	   at	   domestic	   level,	   although,	   when	   it	   comes	   to	  human	  rights,	  formality	  is	  increasingly	  overshadowed	  by	  the	  subject	  matter	  of	  such	   instruments.	   Overall,	   most	   Latin	   American	   constitutions	   are	   currently	  open	   to	   international	   human	   rights	   law	   (De	   Vergottini,	   2010),	   in	   some	   cases	  also	   providing	   explicit	   provisions	   to	   guarantee	   direct	   effect	   to	   IACrtHR’s	  jurisprudence	  (Pinto	  Bastos,	  2007).	  Indeed,	  through	  a	  comparative	  review,	  we	  found	   that	   different	   but	   functionally	   equivalent	   solutions	   provide	   effective	  mechanisms	  of	  enforcement	  of	   international	  human	  rights	   law	  and	   IACrtHR’s	  jurisprudence	  in	  Latin	  American	  countries.	  The	  IACrtHR,	  since	  its	  early	  rulings,	  endorsed	   the	   supra-­‐constitutional/constitutional	   status	   of	   human	   rights	   law	  (e.g.	  Advisory	  Opinion	  2/82;	  Ivcher	  Bronstein	  Case,	  1999,	  par.	  42).	  Additionally,	  the	  Court	  performs	  an	  actual	  control	  of	  conventionality	  when	  called	  to	  judge	  on	  the	   compatibility	   of	   national	   legislation	   with	   respect	   to	   conventional	  provisions	  and,	   although	   its	   rulings	   require	   specific	   acts	   to	  be	   applied	  by	   the	  State	  found	  responsible	  of	  violating	  the	  Convention,	  the	  praxis	  has	  increasingly	  been	  to	  guarantee	  to	  them	  ex	  tunc	  and	  erga	  omnes	  effects	  (De	  Vergottini,	  2010).	  	  	  Besides	   BdPC	   own	   high	   hierarchical	   status	   in	   Latin	   American	   domestic	  systems,	   given	   the	   generalised	   open	   attitude	   towards	   human	   rights	   law,	   the	  strength	   of	   such	   instrument	   is	   further	   reinforced	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   its	  complementarity	   with	   the	   ACHR.	   In	   this	   sense,	   Article	   2	   ACHR	   implicitly	  requires	  the	  adoption	  of	  legislative	  (or	  other)	  measures	  necessary	  to	  give	  effect	  to	  rights	  enshrined	  by	  the	  ACHR	  read	  in	  conjunction	  with	  BdPC	  provisions.	  	  	  CEDAW	  ratification	  process	   in	  Latin	  American	  countries	  pre-­‐dates	   that	  of	   the	  BdPC.	   By	   1990	   all	   States	   Party	   to	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   System	   had	   ratified	  CEDAW.	   As	   seen,	   four	   apposed	   reservations	   to	   Article	   29.1,	   granting	   the	  International	   Court	   of	   Justice	   (ICJ)	  with	   the	   competence	   on	   arbitration	   upon	  dispute	   between	   States	   concerning	   the	   interpretation	   of	   CEDAW.	  Mexico	   and	  Brazil	   presented	   further	   declarations	   or	   reservations,	   which	   affect	   more	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substantially	   the	   content	   of	   the	   instrument.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   Inter-­‐American	  States	  Party	  ratified	  the	  BdPC	  (almost)	  immediately	  and	  without	  reservations.	  While	   this	   difference	   can	   be	   partially	   explained	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   growing	  international	  and	  regional	  awareness	  on	  women’s	  rights,	  and	  BdPC	  ratification	  was	   probably	   facilitated	   by	   the	   precedent	   constituted	   by	   CEDAW,	  we	   cannot	  overlook	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  higher	   familiarity	  of	  Latin	  American	  countries	  with	  the	   Inter-­‐American	   System	   played	   a	   role	   in	   the	   rapidity	   and	   absence	   of	  reservations	  in	  the	  ratification	  process	  of	  the	  BdPC.	  	  	  Let	   us	   recall	   that	   the	   content	   of	   the	   two	   instruments	   is	   not	   identical.	   As	  mentioned	  in	  the	  First	  section	  of	  this	  research,	  while	  the	  BdPC	  explicitly	  refers	  to	  VAW,	  CEDAW	  Committee	  had	   to	   elaborate	   an	   additional	  Recommendation	  on	  the	  issue	  in	  1992.	  More	  importantly,	  the	  protection	  mechanism	  established	  by	   Article	   12	   BdPC	   is	   stronger	   than	   the	   monitoring	   function	   assigned	   to	  CEDAW	   Committee	   until	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	   Optional	   Protocol	   in	   2000.	  Moreover,	   although	   the	   substance	   of	   the	   two	   Women’s	   Conventions	   is	   the	  same,	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   BdPC	   is	   an	   Inter-­‐American	   instrument	   reinforces	   its	  status	   in	   national	   constitutional	   structures,	   through	   the	   direct	   link	   with	   the	  ACHR.	  	  	  	  The	   differences	   in	   BdPC	   and	   CEDAW	  enforcement	  mechanisms,	   an	   increased	  international	   awareness	  on	  VAW,	   emerged	  at	   universal	   level	   and	   reflected	   in	  the	  BdPC,	   and	   the	   specific	   features	   of	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   System	   in	   terms	   of	  structure,	  procedures	  and	  context	  of	  action,	  contributed	  to	  the	  different	  impact	  that	  the	  two	  conventions	  had	  on	  national	  implementation.	  Our	  findings	  provide	  significant	  evidence	  of	  the	  success	  of	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  System	  in	  promoting	  regional	  convergence	  in	  national	  legislations	  on	  VAW.	  Although	  a	  direct	  causal	  link	  might	  be	  difficult	   to	  establish	  conclusively,	  we	  argue	  that	   the	  generalised	  adoption	  of	  national	  legislations	  on	  VAW,	  substantially	  reflecting	  the	  standards	  elaborated	  by	  Inter-­‐American	  Institutions	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  BdPC,	  as	  well	  as	  its	  timing,	  cannot	  be	  considered	  coincidental.	  	  The	   first	   generation	   of	   laws	   on	   VAW	   represents	   an	   immediate	   response	   of	  States	   willing	   to	   show	   their	   compliance	   to	   the	   BdPC.	   This	   timely	   effect	   is	   a	  consequence	  of	  the	  mentioned	  structural	  preconditions	  provided	  by	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  multilevel	  system	  of	  human	  rights	  protection,	  extremely	   favourable	  bases	   to	   guarantee	   national	   implementation	   of	   regional	   instruments.	   At	   the	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same	  time,	  their	  specific	  focus	  on	  domestic	  violence	  is	  largely	  explained	  by	  the	  raising	   international	   awareness	   on	   that	   specific	   issue,	   which	   gained	  momentum	  in	  1992,	  with	  CEDAW	  Committee’s	  General	  Recommendation	  19.	  	  The	   second	   generation	   of	   laws,	   with	   its	   timing	   and	   broader	   scope,	   provides	  evidence	  of	  the	  critical	   function	  of	  Institutions	  with	  a	  strong	  legitimacy	  in	  the	  region.	   Following	   several	   Commission’s	   decisions	   on	   petitions	   invoking	   the	  BdPC,	   constituting	   first	   examples	   of	   concrete	   evaluations	   of	   States’	  responsibilities	   for	   what	   concerns	   VAW	   (in	   particular,	  Maria	   da	   Penha),	   the	  second	  generation	  of	  laws	  coincides	  with	  the	  years	  of	  the	  Castro-­‐Castro	  case,	  As	  thoroughly	  analysed	   in	   the	  Third	  Section	  of	   this	   research,	  with	  Castro-­‐Castro,	  not	   only	   the	   BdPC	   officially	   acquires	   full	   justiciability	   in	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  System,	  but	  the	  IACrtHR	  also	  sends	  a	  message	  of	  significant	  symbolic	  meaning,	  grounding	   its	   arguments	   on	   the	   jus	   cogens	   nature	   of	   the	   principles	   of	  substantial	   equality	   and	   non-­‐discrimination.	   Through	   Article	   1.1	   ACHR,	   such	  principles	   imply	   the	   complementarity	   of	   the	   ACHR	   and	   the	   BdPC,	   with	   the	  specific	   content	   of	   the	   latter	   integrating	   the	   catalogue	   of	   general	   rights	   and	  guarantees.	   Since	   this	   path-­‐breaking	   case,	   besides	   the	   deterrence	   effect	   of	   a	  stronger	   enforcement	   mechanism,	   through	   its	   interpretive	   function	   the	  IACrtHR	   provided	   a	   crucial	   contribute	   to	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   the	   rights	  enshrined	   in	   the	  BdPC.	   The	   timing	   and	   generalised	   convergence	   towards	   the	  adoption	  of	  new	   legislations,	  which	  reflect	   the	  standards	  elaborated	  by	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions	   through	   the	   previously	   analysed	   incremental	   process,	  cannot	   be	   considered	   coincidental.	   Through	   these	   laws,	   States	   provided	  national	  solutions	  shaped	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  BdPC	  wider	  scope,	  as	  interpreted	  by	  both	  the	  IACrtHR	  and	  the	  IACommHR.	  	  	  Our	   previous	   conclusions	   on	   the	   features	   of	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions’	  process	   of	   internalisation	   of	   BdPC	   paradigm	   shift,	   signal	   some	   important	  elements	   that	   influenced	   the	   impact	   of	   Inter-­‐American	   case	   law	   on	   States’	  legislations.	   As	   mentioned,	   given	   the	   suitable	   preconditions	   provided	   by	   the	  rules	  of	  procedure	  of	  Inter-­‐American	  Institutions,	  a	  multi-­‐level	  coalition	  of	  civil	  society	   actors	   and	   scholars	   contributed	   to	   facilitate	   the	   adoption	   of	   a	   gender	  perspective	   that	   such	   institutions	   had	   not	   yet	   introduced	   in	   their	   analyses,	  directly	  influencing	  the	  process	  of	  internalisation	  of	  the	  new	  paradigm	  on	  VAW	  and	   even	   providing	   the	   IACrtHR	   with	   the	   occasion	   to	   clarify	   its	   contentious	  jurisdiction	  on	  the	  BdPC	  and	  overcome	  an	  impasse.	  In	  the	  previous	  Section	  we	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referred	  to	  this	  interaction	  as	  a	  process	  of	  mutual	  alimentation.	  Indeed,	  on	  the	  one	   hand,	   external	   contributions	   facilitated	   the	   gradual	   adaptation	   of	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions’	   interpretive	   tools	   and	   the	   increasing	   production	   of	  Country	  and	  Thematic	  Reports	  providing	  contextual	  information	  for	  structural	  analyses,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   Institutions’	   endorsement	   of	   conceptual	  elaborations	   suggested	   by	   scholars	   and	   petitioners	   (e.g.	   the	   concept	   of	  
femicide),	   introducing	   them	   in	   the	   legal	   discourse	   on	   human	   rights,	   provided	  civil	   society	   actors	   and	   public	   officials	   with	   authoritative	   judicial	   precedents	  with	   significant	   public	   legitimacy,	   which	   could	   be	   held	   before	   national	  institutions	   to	   trigger	   legal	   reforms	   and	   the	   adoption	   of	   appropriate	   public	  policies,	   increasing	   the	   influence	  of	   Inter-­‐American	   case	   law	  at	   national	   level	  and	  beyond	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  concrete	  case.	  	  Overall,	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   System	   provided	   a	   favourable	   context	   and	  structure	  for	  the	  internalisation	  of	  the	  BdPC	  paradigm	  shift.	  For	  what	  concerns	  the	  jurisprudence	  on	  VAW,	  we	  found	  evidence	  of	  civil	  society	  organisations	  and	  scholars’	   critical	   role	   in	   compensating	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions’	   lack	   of	  previous	   experience	   with	   gendered	   analyses,	   enabling	   a	   “learning	   process”	  leading	   to	   the	   integration	   of	   a	   gender	   perspective	   in	   Inter-­‐American	  evaluations	  of	  concrete	  cases.	  Let	  us	  consider	  the	  criticisms	  raised	  by	  feminist	  legal	   scholars	   on	   the	   inherent	   gender-­‐blindness	   of,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	  international	   human	   rights	   law,	   due	   to	   the	   male-­‐bias	   of	   “neutral”	   general	  norms	   and,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   of	   international	   institutions,	   given	   women	  underrepresentation.	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  our	  findings	  we	  can	  argue	  that,	  both	  the	  availability	   of	   a	   specific	   instrument	   complementing	   ACHR	   norms	   and	   the	  permeability	   of	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions	   to	   external	   sources	   and	  frameworks	   of	   analysis,	   represented	   crucial	   conditions	   compensating	   such	  shortcomings,	   providing	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   System	   with	   the	   normative	  framework	  and	  the	  necessary	  expertise	  to	  appropriately	  address	  gender-­‐based	  violations.	   To	   a	   certain	   extent,	   these	   conditions	   allowed	   to	   overcome	   the	  potential	   negative	   effect	   of	   the	   persistent	   male-­‐bias	   in	   Inter-­‐American	  Institutions’	   memberships,	   which	   might	   have	   had,	   however,	   a	   partial	  responsibility	  in	  slowing	  down	  the	  process	  of	  internalisation	  of	  BdPC	  paradigm	  shift.	  	  However,	   based	   on	   the	   reviewed	   tools	   of	   analysis	   provided	   by	   the	   feminist	  literature,	   our	   findings	   signal	   that	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions’	   analyses	   of	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VAW	   still	   largely	   fail	   to	   appropriately	   respond	   to	   the	   complexities	   emerging	  from	  intersectionality	  and	  cultural	  diversity	  in	  concrete	  cases.	  Nevertheless,	  as	  we	   will	   argue,	   a	   strategic	   use	   of	   the	   recognised	   favourable	   features	   of	   the	  regional	   system’s	   structure	   and	   procedures	   will	   prove	   a	   valuable	   tool	   to	  develop	  a	  method	  able	  to	  overcome	  this	  problem.	  	  As	   it	  was	  the	  case	  when	  gender	  had	  yet	   to	  be	   included	  as	  a	  relevant	   factor	   in	  evaluating	   specific	   cases,	   we	   consider	   the	   found	   limited	   sensitivity	   to	  intersectional	   factors	   due	   to,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	   obvious	   increased	  complexity	  of	  multiplying	  the	  factors	  at	  stake	  in	  an	  analysis,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	   inherent	   unlikeliness	   (current	   and	   future)	   to	   be	   able	   to	   count	   on	  Institutions	  with	  an	  adequate	   level	  of	  sensitivity	  and	  appropriate	  expertise	  to	  grasp	  interconnections	  in	  any	  given	  context	  at	  any	  given	  time.	  Intersectionality	  and	  cultural	  diversity	  require	  multi-­‐factorial	  cultural-­‐sensitive	  analysis	  able	  to	  address,	   at	   the	   same	   level	   of	   elaboration,	   issues	   belonging	   to	   completely	  different	   fields,	   and	   harmonise	   solutions	   with	   the	   normative	   framework	  provided	  by	  the	  multiple	  human	  rights	   instrument,	  often	  specific,	  provided	  in	  the	  regional	  and	  universal	  context.	  Notably,	  on	  some	  issues	  (e.g.	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  systemic	  patters	  of	  women	  discrimination),	  cultural	  diversity	  can	  give	  rise	  to	   clashes	   of	   fundamental	   rights	   for	   which	   appropriate	   (or	   acceptable)	  solutions	  still	  need	  elaboration.	  	  As	   argued,	   if	   we	   consider	   “gender”	   as	   a	   uniform	   category,	   balanced	  representation	   in	   international	   institutions’	   memberships	   is,	   generally,	   more	  likely	  to	  shorten	  their	  process	  of	  internalisation	  of	  a	  gender	  perspective.	  Such	  a	  facilitating	   condition	   is	   hardly	   a	   viable	   option	   to	   promote	   intersectional	  perspectives	   and	   accurate	   representation	   of	   cultural	   diversity,	   since	   it	  would	  imply	  being	  able	  to	  design	  institutions’	  compositions	  representing	  all	  possible	  subjective	   identities	   of	   both	  men	   and	  women.	  When	   it	   comes	   to	   analyse	   the	  causes	   of	   discrimination,	   intersectionality	   and	   cultural	   diversity	   are	   complex	  problems,	   which	   depend	   on	   subjective	   and	   context-­‐related	   factors	   that	  preclude	  standardisation.	  In	  this	  perspective,	  we	  argue	  that	  virtuous	  processes	  and	  solutions	  need	  to	  be	  facilitated	  focusing	  on	  the	  procedural	  level.	  	  	  In	   our	   analysis	   of	   VAW	   case	   law,	   we	   found	   that	   the	   need	   to	   develop	  intersectional	   analyses	   was	   largely	   overshadowed	   by	   Inter-­‐American	  Institutions’	   need	   to	   construct	   appropriate	   tools	   to	   develop	   a	   gender-­‐
	   248 
perspective.	   This	   focus	   presents	   conceptual	   limitations	   that	   should	   not	   be	  underestimated,	   both	   for	   what	   concerns	   the	   emphasis	   on	   the	   uniformity	   of	  gender	   as	   a	   category	   and	   for	   its	   limited	   usefulness	   when	   considering	   issues	  emerging	   from	   cultural	   diversity.	   Given	   the	   transformative	   approach	   of	   the	  BdPC,	   specifically	   at	   Article	   8,	   and	   its	   endorsement	   of	   an	   intersectional	  perspective	   at	   Article	   9,	   these	   issues	   should	   not	   be	   overlooked.	  Notwithstanding	   its	   limitations,	   we	   argue	   that	   the	   recently	   experienced	  process	  can	  be	  considered,	  somehow,	  propaedeutic.	  	  As	   argued,	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions	   developed	   significant	   familiarity	   with	  national	   contexts	   and	   local	   specificities.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   Inter-­‐American	  Institutions	  provide	  appropriate	  institutional	  and	  procedural	  preconditions	  to	  encourage	   a	   dialogue	   with	   several	   societal	   actors,	   which	   “inform”	   the	   cases,	  contributing	  to	  the	  development	  of	  specific	  and	  context-­‐related	  analyses.	  As	  we	  saw	   in	   the	   case	   of	   VAW,	   this	   is	   a	   successful	   praxis	   in	   the	   system,	   already	  experienced	  on	  several	  other	  specific	   issues.	  Counting	  on	  the	  contributions	  of	  civil	   society	  movements	  with	   specific	   expertise,	   anthropologists,	   sociologists,	  NGOs	  and	  international	  organisations,	  Inter-­‐American	  Institutions	  were	  able	  to	  develop	   evolutionary	   conceptual	   constructions,	   as	   happened	   in	   the	   case	   of	  collective	   property	   rights	   for	   what	   concerns	   indigenous	   communities.	   We	  argue	   that,	   besides	   the	   obvious	   need	   of	   a	   dialogue	  with	   the	   stakeholders,	   an	  increased	   focus	   in	   coordinating	   different	   expertise	   in	   a	   dynamic	   multi-­‐level	  coalition,	   will	   facilitate	   Institutions’	   internalisation	   process	   of	   these	   further	  challenges,	   providing	   them	   with	   the	   necessary	   information	   and	   specific	  experience	  to	  consistently	  evaluate	  concrete	  cases	  in	  which	  several	  subjective	  and	  contextual	  factors	  concur	  to	  determine	  the	  facts.	  	  The	   crucial	   element	   to	   guide	   coordination	   is	   the	   conceptual	   tool	  provided	  by	  the	   dominance	   approach,	   endorsed	   in	   both	   BdPC	   and	   CEDAW	   with	   the	  recognition	   of	   unequal	   relations	   of	   power	   as	   structural	   discrimination.	   The	  origins	   of	   this	   approach,	   and	   its	   reception	   in	   the	   Women’s	   Conventions,	  promoted	   its	   use	   to	   ground	   the	   new	   understanding	   on	   sex	   discrimination.	  Nevertheless,	   limiting	   its	   scope	   to	   the	   analysis	   of	   discrimination	   only	   n	   the	  basis	  of	  gender	  is	  bound	  to	  prove	  insufficient	  to	  consistently	  address	  complex	  concrete	  social	  contexts,	  in	  which	  multiple	  factors	  concur	  to	  determine	  unequal	  power	  relations.	  A	  coherent	  contextualised	  analysis	  should	  be	  able	  to	  consider,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  how	  (and	  if)	  gender	  and	  other	  societal	  structures	  contribute	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to	  place	  in	  a	  subjugated	  position	  a	  particular	  woman	  in	  a	  concrete	  context	  and,	  on	   the	   other	   hand,	   how	   women’s	   social	   position	   is	   structured	   in	   different	  cultural-­‐context.	  	  	  We	   shall	   now	   briefly	   explain	   the	   features	   that	   an	   analysis	   of	   VAW	   should	  present	   in	  order	  to	  appropriately	   internalise	  the	   intersectionality	  of	  causes	  of	  discrimination	   and	   unequal	   relations	   of	   power,	   through	   an	   extended	  understanding	   of	   the	   dominance	   approach.	   Incidentally,	   we	   note	   that	   the	  extension	   of	   this	   approach	   to	   encompass	   all	   vulnerable	   groups	  would	   prove	  crucial	   to	   guarantee	   appropriate	   evaluations	   of	   all	   forms	   of	   discrimination,	  regardless	   of	   the	   gender	   of	   the	   victim.	   Notably,	   Judge	   Cançado	   Trindade	  supported	   this	   approach,	   stating	   that	   “It	   is	   perfectly	   possible,	   besides	   being	  
desirable,	   to	   turn	   the	   attentions	   to	   all	   the	   areas	   of	   discriminatory	   human	  
behaviour,	   including	   those	   which	   have	   so	   far	   been	   ignored	   or	   neglected	   at	  
international	  level	  (e.g.,	  inter	  alia,	  social	  status,	  income,	  medical	  state,	  age,	  sexual	  
orientation,	  among	  others)	  […]”	  (Advisory	  Opinion	  18/03,	  Concurring	  Opinion,	  Cançado	  Trindade,	  para.	  62-­‐63).”	  However,	  given	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  research,	  we	  will	  restrict	  our	  considerations	  on	  intersectionality	  to	  cases	  of	  VAW,	   in	  which	  the	   sex	   of	   the	   victim	   constitutes	   one,	   arguably	   the	   primary,	   cause	   of	  discrimination.	  	  Extending	   the	   dominance	   approach,	   the	   social	   position	   of	   the	   victim	   with	  respect	   to	   that	   of	   the	   perpetrator	   needs	   to	   be	   analysed	   considering	   the	  intersection	   of	   multiple	   factors	   such	   as	   gender,	   race,	   religion	   and	   economic	  status.	   The	   identification	   of	   all	   intersections	   in	   the	   causes	   of	   discriminatory	  violence	   is	   crucial	   to	   address	   institutional	   deficiencies	   that	   affected	   the	  concrete	   case,	   as	   well	   as	   systemic	   failures	   and	   social	   and	   cultural	   patterns	  creating	  a	  conductive	  context,	  i.e.	  the	  context	  in	  which	  the	  subjective	  identity	  of	  the	   victim	   (“intersectionally”	   understood)	   placed	   her	   in	   a	   position	   of	  subjugation,	   in	   order	   to	   provide	   redress	   and	   reparation	   as	   well	   as	   adequate	  guarantees	  of	  non-­‐repetition.	  An	  analysis	  able	  to	  hold	  together	  multiple	  factors	  needs	  to	  count	  on	  the	  availability	  of	  extensive	  contextual	  information,	  provided	  through	   the	   continuous	   (non-­‐contingent)	   reporting	   activity	   of	   an	   Institution	  able	  to	  coordinate	  relevant	  external	  sources	  of	  information	  as	  well	  as	  identify	  diverse	   specific	   expertise	   that	   might	   be	   needed	   to	   evaluate	   a	   concrete	   case.	  Such	   open	   attitude	   when	   investigating	   the	   facts,	   overcomes	   the	   practical	  problem	  of	  counting	  on	  a	  judicial,	  or	  monitoring,	  body	  expected	  to	  present	  an	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extremely	   varied	   range	   of	   expertise	   and	   sensitivities,	   enabling	   pre-­‐existing	  institutions	   to	   rapidly	   internalise	  new	  available	  human	   rights	   instruments	   or	  evolving	   shared	   understandings.	   As	   argued,	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   System	  presents	  the	  preconditions	  to	  make	  plausible	  such	  an	  ambitious	  objective.	  For	  what	   concern	   the	   BdPC,	   we	   found	   that	   the	   interpretive	   function	   of	   Inter-­‐American	  Institutions	  was	  crucial	  to	  guarantee	  its	  effect	  utile,	  since	  the	  multiple	  causes	  and	  consequences	  of	  discrimination	  are	  unsuitable	   to	  be	   standardised	  and	   encompassed	   by	   a	   written	   convention.	   Additionally,	   the	   mentioned	   bi-­‐focused	   perspective	   of	   the	   IACrtHR	   implies	   that,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   regional	  standards	  and	  principles	  are	  harmonised	  with	  the	  universal	  framework	  and,	  on	  the	   other	   hand,	   counting	   on	   the	  multi-­‐level	   structure	   of	   the	   regional	   system,	  they	   exercise	   a	   strong	   influence	   on	   domestic	   systems	   facilitating	   regional	  convergence	  on	  shared	  solutions.	  	  	  But	  what	   happens	   if	   this	   analysis	   uncovers	   other	   patterns	   of	   discrimination,	  unrelated	  to	  the	  social	  position	  of	  the	  victim	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  perpetrator?	  This	  is	  a	  complex	  issue	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  systematically	  addressed.	  	  	  When	   considering	   the	   facts	   of	   a	   case	   of	   gender-­‐based	   violence,	   the	   analysis	  focuses	   on	  how	   the	   victim’s	   subjective	   identity,	   created	  by	   an	   intersection	   of	  factors,	   places	   her	   in	   a	   position	   of	   subjugation	   in	   relation	   to	   the	  perpetrator.	  The	   discriminatory	   causes	   of	   violence	   are,	   hence,	   analysed	  with	   respect	   to	   a	  given	   socio-­‐cultural	   context,	   unequally	   structured,	   that	   both	   perpetrator	   and	  victim	   “inhabit,”	   a	   shared	   context.	   However,	   people	   may	   contemporarily	  “inhabit”	  other	  social	  contexts,	  with	  their	  own	  specific	  structures	  and	  features.	  There	  might	   be	   cases	  where	   investigations	   on	   a	   concrete	   case	   uncover	   other	  forms	   of	   discrimination	   that	   the	   victim	   experiences,	   which	   emerge	   from	   a	  social	  context	  she	  inhabits	  not	  shared	  with	  the	  perpetrator,	  that	  do	  not	  hold	  a	  causal	   relation	  with	   the	   abuse	   suffered	   (although,	   as	  we	  will	   see,	   they	  might	  emerge	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   the	   abuse).	   Now,	   considering	   the	   normative	  framework	   of	   the	   BdPC,	   in	   particular	   Article	   8	   BdPC,	   and	   the	   shared	  international	  consensus	  on	  women’s	  rights,	  States’	  positive	  obligations	  require	  addressing	   sociocultural	   patterns	   and	   practices	   causing	   women’s	  discrimination.	   In	   this	   perspective,	   evaluating	   cases	   of	   VAW,	   Inter-­‐American	  Institutions	  increasingly	  include	  in	  their	  decisions	  a	  broad	  variety	  of	  measures	  to	   be	   adopted	   to	   eradicate	   conductive	   contexts	   for	   VAW	   as	   well	   as	   more	  general	  measures	   considered	   appropriate	   to	   eradicate	   discrimination	   against	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women,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	   the	   jus	  cogens	  nature	  of	   the	  principles	  of	  equality	  and	  non-­‐discrimination.	   VAW	   is	   a	   human	   rights	   violation	   because	   it	   manifests	  generalised	   patterns	   of	   discrimination,	   otherwise	   it	   would	   be	   “just	   a	   crime,”	  undifferentiated	   from	   acts	   of	   violence	   directed	   to	   men.	   Consequently,	   and	  redundantly,	   existing	   discriminatory	   patterns	   must	   be	   eradicated	   even	  imagining	  a	  society	  in	  which	  VAW	  does	  not	  occur	  as	  a	  manifestation	  of	  unequal	  social	   relations.	   On	   this	   basis	   rests	   the	   broad	   mandate	   of	   Inter-­‐American	  Institutions,	   which	   extend	   the	   scope	   of	   their	   recommendations	   beyond	   the	  facts	  of	  the	  concrete	  case.	  	  From	   the	   findings	   of	   our	   research	   on	   VAW	   case	   law,	   we	   argue	   that	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions	   proved	   to	   unsatisfactorily	   consider	   the	   implications	   of	  their	   broad	   mandate	   when	   it	   happened	   to	   (apparently)	   clash	   with	   other	  fundamental	   rights,	   related	   to	   the	   principles	   of	   equality	   and	   non-­‐discrimination,	  giving	  rise	  to	  “fundamental	  clashes.”	  	  In	   order	   to	   clarify	   this	   complex	   issue	  we	   shall	   refer	   to	   the	  Ana,	   Beatriz,	   and	  
Celia	  González	  Pérez	  v.	  Mexico	  case,	  ended	  with	  a	  Report	  of	   the	   IACommHR	  in	  2001.	   While	   successive	   IACrtHR’s	   case	   law	   on	   similar	   facts	   shows	   some	  improvement	  both	  in	  the	  ability	  to	  consider	  intersectional	  factors,	  we	  found	  no	  contemporary	   improvement	   for	   what	   concerns	   appropriately	   addressing	   the	  challenges	   posed	   by	   cultural	   diversity.	   On	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   facts	   of	   the	  mentioned	   case	   we	   can	   provide	   an	   explanatory	   example	   to	   clarify	   the	  implications	  of	  our	  considerations.	  	  We	   shall	   not	   address	   all	   the	   features	  of	   the	   case,	  which	  has	  been	   extensively	  described	   in	   the	   Second	   Section	   of	   this	   research	   and	   analysed	   in	   the	   Third	  Section.	  Let	  us	  recall	  that	  the	  case	  concerned	  sexual	  abuses	  against	  indigenous	  women,	  allegedly	  participating	  to	  a	  dissident	  group,	  by	  members	  of	  the	  armed	  forces.	   As	   previously	   argued,	   we	   found	   no	   evidence	   of	   particular	   gender	  sensitivity,	   the	   indigenous	   origins	   of	   the	   victims	   are	   explicitly	   singled	   out	   as	  aggravating	  State’s	  responsibility.	  This	  particular	  gravity	  is	  established	  on	  two	  grounds:	   a)	   because	   the	   abuses	   “led	  [the	   victims]	   to	   flee	  their	  community	   in	  a	  
situation	   of	   fear,	   shame,	   and	   humiliation,”	   (para.	   52)	   given	   the	   ostracism	  experienced	  in	  their	  communities	  of	  origin	  because	  the	  abuses	  suffered	  and	  b)	  given	   State’s	   obligation	   to	   respect	   indigenous	   cultures.	   The	   Commission	   finds	  that	   the	   ostracism	   suffered	   aggravates	   the	   consequences	   of	   the	   violations,	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nevertheless,	  it	  fails	  to	  recognise	  that	  the	  rejection	  of	  the	  victims	  constitutes	  a	  
second	   violence	   they	   suffer,	   perpetrated	  by	   their	   communities	   of	   origin.	   This	  second	   violence	   is	   a	   consequence	   of	   the	   sexual	   abuses,	   but	   holds	   its	  autonomous	  nature.	  	  	  During	   the	  proceedings,	   the	   testimonies	  provided	  uncovered	   this	   consequent	  suffering	   experienced	   by	   the	   victims,	   unrelated	   to	   the	   social	   position	   of	   the	  indigenous	  women	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  perpetrators	  of	  their	  sexual	  abuses.	  The	  Commission	   considers	   State’s	   responsibility	   particularly	   grave	   given	   its	  obligation	  to	  respect	  indigenous	  cultures.	  In	  this	  argumentation	  lays	  the	  crucial	  conceptual	  error,	  which	  implicitly	  legitimates	  the	  discriminatory	  nature	  of	  the	  
ostracism	  suffered.	   The	   final	   decision	   establishes	   an	   ambiguous	   link	   between	  the	  aggravating	  circumstance	  and	  the	  right	  to	  cultural	  diversity.	  In	  our	  view,	  on	  the	   basis	   of	   such	   right,	   State’s	   positive	   obligations	   imply	   eradicating	  discriminatory	   social	   structures	   which	   place	   indigenous	   individuals	   and	  communities	   in	  a	  position	  of	  subjugation	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  non-­‐indigenous	   individuals,	  whereas	  by	  no	  means	   imply	   that	  a	  discriminatory	  pattern	  emerging	   from	  the	  social	   structure	   of	   a	   given	   indigenous	   community	   might	   be	   reductively,	   and	  incoherently,	  identified	  as	  aggravating	  State’s	  responsibility	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  obligation	  to	  respect	  indigenous	  communities,	  while	  it	  undoubtedly	  aggravated	  victims’	  suffering.	  	  This	  case	  constitutes	  an	  example	  of	  contradiction	   that	  signals	  a	   “fundamental	  clash,”	  emerging	  from	  within	  the	  conceptualisation	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  equality	  and	   non-­‐discrimination.	   During	   the	   proceedings,	   the	   testimonies	   uncovered	  another	   pattern	   of	   subjugation.	   In	   this	   perspective,	   the	   practice	   ostracising	  sexually	  abused	  women	  constitutes	  a	  second	  discriminatory	  violence	  suffered	  as	   a	   consequence	   of	   the	   abuses,	  which	  manifests	   unequal	   relations	   of	   power	  between	   the	   sexes	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   indigenous	   communities	   concerned.	  This	  specific	  social	  context,	  which	  the	  perpetrators	  of	  the	  sexual	  abuses	  do	  not	  share,	  does	  not,	  per	  se,	  contribute	  to	  the	  causes	  of	  the	  first	  violation.	  	  Let	  us	  try	  and	  go	  beyond	  the	  critique:	  what	  should	  have	  done	  the	  Commission?	  	  In	  the	  concrete	  case,	  considering	  the	  early	  stage	  in	  the	  internalisation	  of	  BdPC	  understanding,	  we	  reckon	  that	  avoiding	  ambiguity	   in	  the	  final	  decision	  would	  have	  been	  already	  a	  partially	  satisfactory	  solution.	  However,	  we	  shall	  use	   the	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case	   to	   develop	   our	   argumentations	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   tools	   and	   experience	  
currently	   available	   to	   appropriately	   encompass	   the	   implications	   of	   the	  paradigm	  shift	  on	  women’s	  rights,	  considering	  its	  transformative	  scope.	  	  Considering	  the	  analysed	  evolutionary	  interpretations	  of	  the	  content	  of	  States’	  positive	  obligations	  and	  due	  diligence	   in	   relation	   to	   the	  principles	  of	  equality	  and	  non	  discrimination,	  and	  having	  found	  evidence	  of	  the	  generalised	  tendency	  of	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions	   to	   include	   in	   their	   recommendations	   a	   wide	  range	  of	  measures	  addressing	  systemic	  patterns	  of	  discrimination	  beyond	  the	  limits	   of	   the	   facts	   of	   a	   case,	   we	   could	   argue	   that	   measures	   directed	   to	   the	  eradication	  of	   the	  practice	   of	   ostracism	  of	   sexually	   abused	  women	   should	  be	  included	   amongst	   the	   requirements.	   Such	   delicate	   issue	   could	   be	   coherently	  addressed	  provided	  that,	  through	  the	  processes	  described	  in	  the	  Third	  Section	  of	   this	   research,	   the	   Commission	   gathered	   a	   sufficient	   amount	   of	   contextual	  information	   to	   be	   able	   to	   appropriately	   address	   a	   culturally	   specific	   context,	  bearing	  in	  mind	  the	  concurrent	  need	  to	  avoid	  legal	  ethnocentrism.	  	  However,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  determine	  the	  range	  of	  the	  measures	  that	  might	  be	  included	  in	  the	  final	  recommendation,	  several	  issues	  emerge.	  In	  the	  first	  place,	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  inclusion	  of	  measures	  to	  modify	  culture-­‐specific	  patterns	  of	   discrimination,	   unrelated	   to	   the	   causes	   of	   the	   sexual	   abuses,	   cannot	   be	  argued	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   their	   contribution	   to	   the	   generalised	   context	   of	  discrimination	   that	   caused	   the	   reported	   violations.	   As	   mentioned,	   ostracism	  emerges	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   the	   violations	   suffered,	   and	   its	   discriminatory	  causes	  are	  unrelated	  to	  those	  causing	  sexual	  violations.	  The	  perpetrators	  of	  the	  sexual	  abuses	  do	  not	  “inhabit”	   the	  social	  context	   in	  which	  ostracism	  emerges,	  and	   are	   not	   influenced	   by	   the	   social	   structures	   that	   determine	   relations	   of	  power	  between	  individuals	  within	  the	  indigenous	  community.	  In	  our	  view,	  this	  consideration	   explains	   the	   tendency,	   found	   in	   successive	   IACrtHR’s	  jurisprudence,	  to	  avoid	  getting	  involved	  with	  this	  second	  dimension	  in	  similar	  cases.	  Indeed,	  in	  rulings	  such	  as	  Fernández-­‐Ortega	  et	  al.	  v.	  Mexico	  and	  Rosendo-­‐
Cantú	   et	   al.	   v.	   Mexico	   (2010),	   the	   Court	   analyses	   the	   facts	   integrating	   an	  intersectional	   perspective,	   correctly	   considering	   the	   victims’	   indigenous	  identity	   as	   contributing	   to	   determine	   their	   subjugated	   position	   in	   the	   social	  structure	   which	   caused	   their	   sexual	   abuses.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   it	   does	   not	  mention	  elements	  signalling	  victims’	  social	  position	  in	  their	  communities,	  since	  they	  do	  not	  emerge	  during	  the	  proceedings.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  in	  Ana,	  Beatriz,	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and	   Celia	   González	   Pérez	   v	   Mexico,	   testimonies	   uncovered	   an	   additional	   and	  autonomous	   discriminatory	   pattern	   that	   gave	   rise	   to	   an	   additional	   problem	  requiring	   a	   consistent	   solution.	  While	   in	   the	  mentioned	   successive	   cases	   the	  Court	   could	   avoid	   incurring	   in	   conceptual	   inconsistencies,	  we	   argue	   that	   this	  was	   possible	   due	   to	   contingent	   circumstances	   that	   allowed	   overlooking	   the	  issue,	   while	   the	   problem	   remains	   unsolved	   would	   such	   additional	   elements	  emerge	  in	  other	  cases.	  	  	  From	  a	  cultural	  relativist	  standpoint,	  characterising	  post-­‐modernist	  and	  post-­‐colonial	  scholars	  (e.g.,	  Nicholson,	  1990;	  Ashe,	  1988),	  one	  might	  argue	  that	  the	  Commission	  could	  not	   consider	   the	  State	  as	  holding	  positive	  obligations	  with	  respect	   to	   changing	   socio-­‐cultural	   patterns	   of	   indigenous	   communities,	   given	  their	   concurrent	   right	   to	   cultural	   diversity	   and	   self-­‐determination.	  Moreover,	  the	   legitimacy	   of	   State	   intervention	   might	   be	   criticised	   as	   based	   on	  ethnocentrism,	   incapable	   to	   account	   for	   diversity	   (Villamoare,	   1991;	   Morse,	  Sayeh,	   1995;	   Chow,	   1991).	   However,	   such	   arguments	   carry	   an	   inherent	  essentialism,	   depicting	   specific	   cultures	   as	   protected	   by	   a	   special	   deference,	  regardless	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   this	   might	   imply	   the	   preservation	   of	   structures	  infringing	   human	   rights	   (Nussbaum,	   1999).	   These	   claims	   clash	   with	   the	  paradigm	  endorsed	  by	  Women’s	  Conventions,	  which	  assumes	  that	  (all)	  socio-­‐cultural	  patterns	  are	  capable,	  and	  required,	  to	  adapt	  to	  changing	  circumstances	  and	   understandings	   (Mayer,	   1996)	   and	   implies	   that,	   when	   it	   comes	   to	  guarantee	   equality	   and	   non-­‐discrimination,	   interventions	   to	   facilitate	   social	  transformation	  are	  legitimate.	  	  In	   the	   normative	   framework	   provided	   by	   the	   BdPC,	   hence,	   the	   obligation	   to	  change	   an	   uncovered	   discriminatory	   practice	   cannot	   be	   questioned.	  Nevertheless,	   the	   problem	   arises	  when	   it	   comes	   to	   determine	  who	   holds	   the	  positive	  obligation	  to	   intervene.	  This	  are,	   indeed,	   the	  only	   terms	   in	  which	  the	  
impasse	  can	  be	  coherently	  overcome,	  finding	  solutions	  consistent	  with	  both	  the	  understanding	  of	  women’s	  rights	  and	  the	  right	  to	  cultural	  diversity.	  	  Let	  us	  continue	  in	  our	  example.	  We	  argued	  that	  the	  Commission	  could	  not	  have	  included	   in	   its	   decision	  measures	   to	   address	   the	   practice	   of	   ostracism,	  given	  that	   such	  recommendations	  cannot	  be	  consistently	  grounded	  on	   the	   (broadly	  defined)	   responsibility	   of	   the	   State	   for	   what	   concerns	   eradicating	   the	  discriminatory	   patterns	   that	   caused	   the	   sexual	   abuses	   reported.	   At	   the	   same	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time,	  discrimination	   is	   illegitimate	  per	  se,	  and	  VAW	  constitutes	  a	  human	  right	  violation	   because	   it	   manifests	   structural	   inequality.	   In	   this	   perspective,	  ostracism	   of	   sexually	   abused	   women	   constitutes,	   itself,	   a	   manifestation	   of	  unequal	   social	   relations	   being,	   indeed,	   another	   form	   of	   VAW.	   	   A	   second	  petition,	  invoking	  protection	  from	  the	  suffered	  ostracism	  would	  overcome	  the	  technical	   problem	   of	   the	   Commission’s	   switch	   of	   focus.	   Nevertheless	   this	  possibility	   can	  hardly	  be	  considered	  a	   solution,	  on	  several	  grounds.	  The	   first,	  obvious,	   technical	   problem	   is	   that	   the	   admissibility	   of	   this	   second	   petition	  would	   also	   be	   conditioned	   to	   the	   exhaustion	   of	   domestic	   remedies.	  Consequently,	   we	   still	   confront	   the	   problem	   of	   determining	   who	   holds	   the	  positive	  obligation	  to	  intervene,	  providing	  the	  first	  instance	  to	  seek	  protection	  and	  redress.	  	  	  If	   State’s	   judicial	   system	   were	   the	   domain	   in	   which	   remedies	   should	   be	  exhausted,	  this	  would	  imply	  that	  the	  State	  should	  intervene	  to	  provide	  redress	  and	   reparations	   for	   victims	   of	   ostracism.	   Provided	   that	   a	   national	   court	  admitted	   the	   case,	   we	   can	   assume	   that	   the	   petition	   would	   not	   reach	   the	  Commission.	   Indeed,	   we	   shall	   exclude	   that,	   in	   a	   State	   like	   Mexico	   in	   our	  example,	   the	   judicial	   system	   would	   (and	   could)	   adopt	   a	   cultural	   relativist	  standpoint	  allowing	  the	  practice,	  whereas	  a	  national	  court	  would	  plausibly	  rule	  in	   favour	   of	   the	   victim	   of	   such	   practice.	   However,	   this	   possibility	   does	   not	  conclusively	   solve	   the	   question	   since,	   for	   instance,	   a	   problem	   emerges	   in	  identifying	   the	   perpetrator	   responsible	   for	   the	   violation,	   given	   the	   collective	  nature	   of	   the	   practice	   of	   ostracism.	   Assuming	   that	   we	   can	   single	   out	   the	  perpetrator,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	   the	   individuation	  of	   the	   individual,	  or	  community	  institution,	  that	  took	  the	  decision	  to	  ostracise	  the	  victim	  of	  a	  sexual	  abuse,	  the	  collective	  nature	  of	  the	  practice	  requires	  addressing	  the	  socio-­‐cultural	  patterns	  that	   contribute	   to	   its	   reproduction.	   The	   issue	   would,	   hence,	   come	   down	   to	  define	   a	   method	   through	   which	   the	   State	   should	   promote	   a	   process	   of	  endogenous	   change	   in	   an	   indigenous	   community,	   avoiding	   breaches	   to	   the	  right	  of	  cultural	  diversity	  and	  self-­‐determination.	  The	  problem	  is	  complex,	  but	  not	  unsolvable	  consistently.	  Such	  terms	  would	  imply	  participatory	  processes	  in	  which	  State’s	  Institutions	  and	  representatives	  of	  the	  communities	  would	  have	  to	  collaborate	  to	  a	  common	  objective.	  We	  found	  mentions	  to	  similar	  processes	  in	   Inter-­‐American	   jurisprudence;	   for	   instance,	   IACrtHR’s	   recommendations	   in	  
Fernández-­‐Ortega	   et	   al.	   and	   Rosendo-­‐Cantú	   require	   the	   State	   to	   undertake	  programmes	   for	   reinserting	   victims	   of	   sexual	   abuses	   in	   their	   communities	   of	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origin.	  	  	  What	   happens	   in	   the	   case	   of	   those	   States	   recognising	   indigenous	  jurisdiction191?	  	  Considering	   that	   ostracism	   is	   a	   legitimate	   practice	   in	   the	   community,	   it	   is	  plausible	   to	   assume	   that	   indigenous	   jurisdictions	   would	   not	   consider	   it	   a	  violation	   of	   the	   victim’s	   rights.	   In	   such	   cases,	   we	   would	   have	   to	   determine	  whether	   the	   implicit	   unavailability	   of	   effective	   remedies	   in	   the	   community	  would	  allow	  the	  Commission	  to	  admit	  a	  specific	  petition,	  or	  if	  the	  impossibility	  to	  obtain	  redress	  and	  reparation	  implies	  that	  the	  victim	  might	  refer	  the	  case	  to	  the	   national	   judicial	   system,	   in	  which	   case,	   the	   process	   previously	   described	  would	   apply.	   Countries	   that	   recognise	   indigenous	   jurisdiction	   have	   recently	  addressed	   this	   technical	   issue,	   through	   attempts	   of	   coordinating	   legal	  pluralism.192	  These	  experiences	  allow	  drawing	  on	  existing	  knowledge	  to	  define	  a	  consistent	  procedure.	  However,	  this	  is	  an	  issue	  that	  extends	  its	  implications	  beyond	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  focus	  of	  our	  analysis,	  therefore,	  we	  shall	  address	  it	  in	  future	  developments	  of	  our	  research.	  	  	  Let	   us	   underline,	   that	   all	   previous	   considerations	   imply	   that	   discriminatory	  socio-­‐cultural	   practices	  within	   indigenous	   communities	   should	   be	   eradicated,	  consistently	  with	  an	  interpretation	  of	  the	  right	  to	  cultural	  diversity	  harmonised	  to	   BdPC	   normative	   framework,	   while	   the	   State	   holds	   the	   duty	   to	   create	   the	  conditions	  for	  such	  an	  endogenous	  transformation	  to	  occur.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  State	   ends	   up	   performing	   the	   same	   role	   as	   that	   of	   regional	   human	   rights	  institutions	   in	   relation	   to	   States’	   positive	   obligations	   and	   due	   diligence,	   i.e.	  functioning	   as	   an	   external	   engine	   to	   promote	   social	   change	  while	   allowing	   a	  certain	   degree	   of	   discretionality	   for	   what	   concerns	   shaping	   the	   measures	  trough	  which	  the	  final	  scope	  should	  be	  accomplished.	  Like	  the	  IACrtHR,	  hence,	  State’s	   judicial	   institutions	   should	   adopt	   a	   bi-­‐focused	   perspective,	   able	   to	  harmonise,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  their	  decisions	  with	  the	  supra-­‐nationally	  defined	  principles	  and	  standards	  and,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  harmonise	  locally	  constructed	  solutions	   with	   those	   adopted	   at	   national	   level.	   The	   supreme	   judges	   of	   this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  191 	  Recently,	   Bolivia,	   Colombia,	   Ecuador,	   Mexico,	   Nicaragua,	   Paraguay	   and	   Peru	   modified	   or	  adopted	  new	  constitutions,	  which	  recognise	  the	  multicultural	  nature	  of	  their	  societies.	  	  192 	  For	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	   processes	   through	   which	   Latin	   American	   countries	   recognising	  indigenous	   jurisdiction	   are	   adapting	   their	   domestic	   systems	   to	   internal	   legal	   pluralism,	   refer	   to:	  Lee	  Van	  Cott,	  2000,	  Inksater,	  2010.	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multi-­‐layered	  process	  would,	  ultimately,	  be	  Inter-­‐American	  Institutions.	  	  If	   these	   considerations	   allow	   the	   development	   of	   satisfactory	   processes	  minimizing	   the	   risk	  of	   fundamental	   clashes,	  we	   cannot	  overlook	   the	   fact	   that	  their	  plausibility	  rests	  on	  a	  controversial	  assumption,	  i.e.	  that	  besides	  suffering	  because	   of	   the	   ostracism,	   victims	   would	   also	   perceive	   such	   practice	   as	  illegitimate.	   Recalling	   what	   argued	   by	   Crenshaw	   in	   relation	   to	   black	   women	  (Crenshaw,	   1988),	   about	   the	   inherent	   unsuitability	   of	   an	   approach	   to	   their	  rights	  that	  would	  have	  put	  them	  in	  contraposition	  to	  the	  men	  of	  their	  racially	  defined	   community,	   we	   argue	   that	   expecting	   indigenous	   women	   to	   seek	  protection	   against	   indigenous	   men,	   sharing	   with	   them	   an	   identity	   primarily	  defined	  by	  their	  ethic	  origin,	   is	  not	  a	  viable	  option.	  More	   likely,	   in	   the	  case	  of	  ostracism,	   they	  would	   consider	   the	   sexual	   abuse	   suffered	  more	   odious	   given	  that	   it	  exposes	   them	  to	   that	  practice.	   It	   should	  be	  noticed	   that	   this	   is,	   indeed,	  exactly	   the	   “aggravating”	   perception	   adopted	   by	   the	   Commission	   in	   Ana,	  
Beatriz,	  and	  Celia	  González	  Pérez	  v	  Mexico,	  which	  we	  considered	  unsatisfactory	  given	  that	  it	  implies	  the	  legitimation	  of	  a	  discriminatory	  practice,	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  jus	  cogens	  nature	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  equality	  and	  non-­‐discrimination.	  	  This	  problem	  brings	  us	  back	  to	  the	  initial	  issue	  of	  the	  fundamental	  clash.	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  conceptual	  tools	  elaborated	  in	  feminist	  scholarship,	  analysed	  in	  the	  First	   Section	   of	   this	   research,	   we	   shall	   now	   define	   the	   terms	   in	   which	   the	  mentioned	  clash	  should	  be	  addressed	  through	  an	  approach	  that	  holds	  together	  the	  issues	  emerging	  from	  both	  intersectionality	  and	  cultural	  diversity,	  in	  their	  respective	  dimensions,	  analysed	  in	  the	  framework	  of	  the	  dominance	  approach,	  constructing	  a	  plausible	  viable	  method	  to	  address	  difficult	  cases.	  	  	  Let	  us	  recall	  the	  issues	  at	  stake:	  	   a) Consistently	   with	   the	   BdPC	   normative	   framework,	   the	   analysis	  requires	   a	   balancing	  process,	   able	   to	   accommodate	   cultural	   diversity	  without	   rejecting	   the	   universality	   of	   a	   set	   of	   minimum	   standards,	  derived	   from	   the	   jus	   cogens	   principles	   of	   equality	   and	   non-­‐discrimination.	  	  	  b) At	   the	   same	   time,	   such	   an	   analysis	   should	   avoid	   adopting	   a	   single-­‐factor	   focus,	   encompassing	   all	   subjective	   dimensions	   concurring	   to	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determine	  an	   individual’s	  position	   in	  the	  structure	  of	  social	  relations,	  and	   considering	   possible	   contemporary	   “inhabitation”	   of	   culturally	  diverse	  contexts.	  	  Let	   us	   consider	   the	   features	   of	   an	   analysis	   coherent	   with	   the	   requirements	  clarified	  at	  point	  (a).	  	  	  Assuming	  the	  autonomy	  of	  individuals	  pursuing	  self-­‐realization,	  understood	  as	  freedom	  of	  choice	  and	  action	  (Garlicki,	  2012),	  poses	  serious	  limitations	  to	  the	  transformative	   power	   of	   the	   BdPC	   approach.	   Feminist	   scholars	   stress	   the	  influence	   of	   contextual	   constraints	   on	   agency	   (Chinkin,	   Charlesworth,	   2000),	  ruling	  out	   self-­‐determination	  of	  women,	   and	   individuals	   in	   general,	   placed	   in	  subjugated	   positions	   in	   unequally	   structured	   societies.	   Social	   and	   cultural	  transformation	   is,	   therefore,	   an	   instrument	   to	   achieve	   women	   substantial	  equality.	   Consequently,	   differences	   in	   culture-­‐specific	   traditions	   or	   practices	  within	  a	  State’s	  society	  cannot	  be	  invoked	  to	  justify	  breaches	  of	  the	  principles	  and	  standards	  of	  women’s	  rights	  protection	  (Binion,	  1995),	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  States	   are	   not	   allowed	   to	   invoke	   national	   socio-­‐cultural	   patterns	   to	   avoid	  international	   responsibility.	   Indeed,	  Merry	  stresses	   that,	   in	  Western	  societies,	  battered	  women	  did	  not	  perceive	  this	  violence	  as	  illegitimate	  until	  enabled	  by	  a	  framework	   that	   provided	   the	   instruments	   to	   challenge	   the	   normalization	   of	  discrimination	   (Merry,	   2003).	   Interventions	   on	   the	   contextual	   constraints	   to	  agency	  are,	  hence,	  legitimated	  by	  the	  jus	  cogens	  nature	  of	  the	  objective.	  In	  this	  perspective,	   all	   cultures	   are	   considered	   capable	   of	   dynamic	   adaptations,	  without	  changes	   implying	  inherent	  clashes	  with	  the	  right	  to	  cultural	  diversity	  (neither	  at	  State	  or	  community	   level),	   since	  socio-­‐cultural	   transformation	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  happen	  through	  endogenous	  processes	  promoted	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  framework	  provided	  by	  the	  BdPC.	  	  	  In	   order	   to	   coherently	   respond	   to	   the	   requirements	   clarified	   at	   point	   (b)	  we	  can	  draw	  on	  the	  conceptual	   tools	  elaborated	  by	   feminist	  scholars	   focusing	  on	  intersectionality,	  presented	  in	  the	  First	  Section	  of	  this	  research	  and	  previously	  recalled.	  	  The	  concept	  emerged	  from	  the	  Black	  Women	  movement,	  which	  pointed	  at	  the	  shortcomings	   of	   a	   feminist	   theory	   developed	   creating	   a	   consciousness	   of	  (white)	   women	   in	   opposition	   to	   (white)	   male	   (Crenshaw,	   1988;	   Thornhill,	  
	   259 
1985).	   In	   their	   view,	   such	   gender-­‐based	   alliance	   overlooked	   other	   social	  structures,	  which	  constituted	  black	  women’s	  identities,	  such	  as	  race.	  Crenshaw	  argued	  that,	  for	  black	  women	  part	  a	  community	  defined	  by	  race,	  a	  challenge	  of	  patriarchal	   structures	   created	   in	   opposition	   to	   black	   man	   and	   through	   an	  alliance	  with	  white	   (privileged)	  women	  was	  not	   a	  viable	   solution	   (Crenshaw,	  1988).	  	  These	   claims	   are	   of	   crucial	   significance	   for	  what	   concerns	   our	   example	  with	  
Ana,	  Beatriz,	  and	  Celia	  González	  Pérez	  v	  Mexico.	  They	  uncover	  the	  criticalities	  in	  determining	   on	   which	   basis	   to	   construct	   instruments	   that	   would	   make	  unconstrained	   individual	   agency	   plausible,	   eventually	   triggering	   endogenous	  processes	   of	   change.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   instruments	   to	   enable	   indigenous	  women’s	  perception	  of	  the	  illegitimacy	  of	  ostracising	  sexually	  abused	  women,	  should	   not	   be	   constructed	   on	   the	   assumption	   that	   the	   path	   to	   enable	   this	  perception	  passes	  through	  a	  direct	  challenge	  to	  indigenous	  women	  subjugation	  in	   their	   communities	   of	   origins,	   created	   in	   alliance	   with	   non-­‐indigenous	  women	  and	  in	  opposition	  to	  indigenous	  man.	  	  These	   considerations	   might	   be	   criticized	   for	   assuming,	   eventually,	   a	  convergence	   towards	   “reasonable	   understandings”	   (Gunning,	   1992).	   We	  cannot	   completely	   discard	   this	   challenge,	   however,	   we	   argue	   that	   its	   weight	  should	  not	  be	  overestimated.	  Through	  our	  research,	  we	  could	  single-­‐out	  those	  features	   of	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   System	   that,	   if	   further	   developed	   and	  structured,	  provide	  the	  tools	  to	  construct	  a	  method	  capable	  of	  balancing	  both	  the	  need	  to	  provide	  the	  instruments	  of	  protection	  against	  perceived	  violations,	  and	  that	  of	  promoting	  socio-­‐cultural	  change	  through	  endogenous	  processes.	  	  	  Concluding	  the	  analysis	  of	  our	  example,	  we	  go	  back	  to	  our	  initial	  question:	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  currently	  available	  tools	  of	  analysis,	  what	  should	  have	  done	  the	  Commission	   in	   Ana,	   Beatriz,	   and	   Celia	   González	   Pérez	   v.	   Mexico?	   And,	  consequently,	   what	   should	   a	   competent	   supranational	   institution	   do	   to	  coherently	  address	  fundamental	  clashes	  when,	  in	  developing	  an	  intersectional	  analysis	   sensitive	   to	   cultural	   diversity,	   additional	   violations	   emerge	   from	   the	  investigation?	  	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  our	  previous	  considerations,	  we	  shall	  conclude	  that,	  technically,	  evaluating	   the	   abuses	   reported	   such	   an	   institution	   could	   not	   include	   in	   its	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suggestions	   measures	   to	   eradicate	   discriminatory	   practices	   belonging	   to	   a	  context	  unrelated	  to	  that	  in	  which	  the	  first	  gender-­‐based	  violation	  occurred,	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  States’	  positive	  obligations	  to	  eradicate	  socio-­‐cultural	  patterns	  that	   caused	   it.	   	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	  we	   argued	   that	   supposing	   to	   address	   the	  problem	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   a	   separate	   complaint	   invoking	   protection	   from	   the	  
second	  gender-­‐based	  violation,	  whether	  in	  front	  of	  community	  bodies,	  national	  courts	   or	   submitting	   a	   specific	   petition	   to	   the	   Commission,	   might	   not	   be	   a	  viable	  option,	  given	  possible	  constraints	  on	  victims’	  agency	  or	  the	  difficulties	  in	  overcoming	   obstacles	   posed	   by	   other	   dimensions	   of	   their	   identities,	   such	   as	  ethnicity.	   In	   our	   explanatory	   case,	   we	   argued	   that	   depending	   on	   the	  subjectivity	   of	   the	   victim,	   if	   her	   ethnic	   origins	   constitute	   the	   primary	  determinant	  of	  her	  identity,	  this	  might	  decrease	  the	  likelihood	  of	  challenging	  a	  culture-­‐specific	  social	  structure	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  her	  gender	  and	  against	  the	  men	  of	  her	  community.	  This	  possibility	  creates	  the	  conditions	  for	  the	  preservation	  of	  the	  status	  quo,	   in	  a	  context	  in	  which,	  in	  absence	  of	  a	  complaint,	  nobody	  can	  be	  held	  responsible	  for	  the	  discrimination	  suffered.	  We	  confront	  a	  parallelism	  with	   the	   challenges	   posed	   by	   domestic	   violence:	   in	   our	   explanatory	   case,	  ostracism	  as	  a	  discriminatory	  violation	  is	  invisible	  and	  naturalized,	  in	  the	  same	  way	   as	   it	   happened	   with	   domestic	   violence	   when	   the	   phenomenon	   was	   not	  perceived	   as	   a	   crime,	   therefore	   not	   reported	   and	  preserved	  by	   the	   refrain	   of	  the	   State	   from	   intervening	   in	   a	   sphere	   protected	   by	   the	   right	   to	   cultural	  diversity,	  as	  it	  was	  the	  case	  when	  the	  right	  to	  privacy	  prevented	  intervention	  in	  cases	   of	   violations	   perpetrated	   within	   the	   family,	   were	   the	   autonomy	   of	   the	  individual	  had	   to	  be	  entitled	   to	   the	  highest	  deference.	  As	  discussed	  at	   length,	  the	  discriminatory	  nature	  of	  VAW	  justified	   the	  rejection	  of	   the	  public/private	  divide,	  and	  led	  to	  accept	  that	  individuals’	  autonomy	  in	  the	  private	  sphere	  could	  be	   limited	  on	  the	  basis	  of	   jus	  cogens	  principles.	  Through	  the	  process	  analysed	  at	  length	  in	  this	  research,	  the	  paradigm	  shift	  on	  women’s	  rights	  gave	  battered	  women	   the	   instruments	   to	   perceive	   such	   violence	   as	   undeserved.	   Refraining	  from	   addressing	   gender-­‐based	   discriminations	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   an	   absolute	  interpretation	   of	   the	   right	   to	   cultural	   diversity	   generates	   exactly	   the	   same	  consequences,	   resulting	   in	   the	   invisibility,	   impunity,	   tolerance	   and	  naturalization	   that	   we	   recognised,	  mutatis	  mutandis,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   domestic	  violence.	  	  In	  our	  problem-­‐solving	  approach,	  the	  impossibility	  to	  single	  out	  a	  responsible	  institution	  generates	  an	  unacceptable	  impasse,	  against	  the	  scope	  and	  the	  spirit	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of	   the	   BdPC,	   which	   reproduces	   and	   legitimates	   unequal	   power	   relations	  granting	   deference	   to	   culture-­‐specific	   discriminatory	   practices.	   To	   finally	  answer	  our	   initial	  question,	   in	  Ana,	  Beatriz,	  and	  Celia	  González	  Pérez	  v	  Mexico,	  given	  the	  jus	  cogens	  nature	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  equality	  and	  non-­‐discrimination	  and	   principle	   of	   effectiveness,	   the	   Commission’s	   refrain	   from	   addressing	  ostracism	  as	  a	  second	  gender-­‐based	  violation	   cannot	  be	   justified,	   regardless	  of	  the	   potential	   obstacles	   signalled.	   A	   viable	   coherent	   solution	   is	   to	   tackle	   the	  issue	   gathering	   additional	   context	   specific	   information,	   through	   the	   mutual	  alimentation	  process	  thoroughly	  described,	  and	  resorting	  to	  possibly	  available	  external	  frameworks	  of	  analysis	  and	  sources	  of	  interpretation.	  Inter-­‐American	  Institutions	   have	   past	   experiences	   of	   a	   similar	   method,	   not	   only	   for	   what	  concerns	   the	   construction	  of	   a	   gender	  perspective,	   but	   also	   in	   relation	   to	   the	  construction	   of	   analytical	   tools	   to	   address	   cultural	   specificities	   of	   indigenous	  communities,	   referring	   to	   the	   normative	   framework	   provided	   by	   the	   1989	  International	   Labour	   Organisation	   (ILO)	   Convention	   169	   on	   Indigenous	   and	  Tribal	   People	   (Oliva-­‐Martínez,	   2012).	   In	   a	   similar	   way,	   Inter-­‐American	  Institutions	   could	   have	   appropriately	   addressed	   ostracism	   as	   a	   separate	  problem	   and	   account	   for	   cultural	   diversity	   producing	   a	   balanced	   solution,193	  such	  as	  that	  found	  to	  limit	  individual	  autonomy	  in	  the	  private	  sphere.	  	  	  Provided	  that	  such	  an	  additional	  analysis	  gave	  grounds	  to	  recognise	  ostracism	  as	  a	   form	  of	  violence	  manifesting	  a	  pattern	  of	  discrimination	  against	  women,	  hence,	   illegitimate,	   the	  Commission	  could	   include	   in	   its	  recommendations	   the	  duty	  of	  the	  State	  to	  adopt	  participatory	  policies	  to	  promote	  endogenous	  change	  in	   indigenous	   communities.	  The	  mentioned	   recommendations	  of	   the	   IACrtHR	  in	   Fernández-­‐Ortega	   et	   al.	   and	   Rosendo-­‐Cantú	   show	   a	   tendency	   to	   take	   this	  path,	   although	   the	   suggested	  measures	   primarily	   focus	   on	   the	   reinsertion	   of	  abused	  women	  in	  their	  communities.	  	  	  We	  argue	  that	  Inter-­‐American	  Institutions	  can	  ground	  this	  apparent	  extension	  of	  their	  mandate	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  State’s	  obligation	  to	  harmonise	  the	  diversity	  of	  
socio-­‐cultural	   practices,	   pursuing	   equality	   and	   non-­‐discrimination	   between	  men	  and	  women	  in	  a	  context	  of	  cultural	  (and,	   in	  some	  cases,	   legal)	  pluralism.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  193 	  Notably,	   these	   balancing	   efforts	   led	   to	   interesting	   attempts	   to	   harmonically	   adapt	   deeply	  controversial	   practices,	   such	   as	   Female	   Genital	   Mutilation	   (FGM),	   to	   turn	   them	   into	   safe	   and	  hygienic	  symbolic	  female	  circumcision	  or	  rituals.	  On	  this	  complex	  and	  crucial	  issue	  see,	   inter	  alia,	  Lane	  and	  Rubinstein,	  1996.	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Such	   measures	   could	   be	   shaped	   drawing	   on	   existent	   available	   national	  experiences	   in	   countries	   that	   recognise	   indigenous	   jurisdiction	   and	   have	  already	   experienced	   “fundamental	   clashes.”194	  In	   this	   way,	   we	   are	   able	   to	  identify	  a	  responsible	  institution,	  the	  State,	  with	  a	  limited	  mandate	  to	  intervene	  as	   a	   facilitator,	   while	   the	   indigenous	   community	   maintains	   the	   agency	   on	  dynamic	  adaptation,	  accommodating	  it	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  its	  cultural	  specificities,	  harmonised	  with	   the	   international	   normative	   framework,	   being	   entitled	   to	   a	  certain	   degree	   of	   discretionality	   (or,	   if	   preferred,	  margin	   of	   appreciation195).	  Such	   an	   approach	   minimises	   the	   likelihood	   of	   ethnocentric	   solutions	   and	  avoids	  the	  limitations	  that	  impede	  cultural	  change,	  or	  assume	  it	  as	  immutable,	  while	   supranational	   institutions	   maintain	   a	   certain	   degree	   of	   control	   on	   the	  local	  processes.	  	  	  
Final	  remarks	  and	  reform	  proposal	  	  On	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   conceptual	   tools	   provided	   by	   feminist	   scholarship	   we	  described	  the	  structural,	  institutional	  and	  procedural	  preconditions	  needed	  to	  facilitate	  the	  consistent	  internalisation	  of	  an	  instrument	  such	  as	  the	  BdPC	  in	  a	  regional	  system	  of	  human	  rights	  protection.	  Analysing	  Inter-­‐American	  case	  law	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  194	  For	   invaluable	   informative	  material	  on	  national	  experiences,	   refer	   to	   the	   jurisprudence	  of	   the	  Colombian	   Constitutional	   Court	   on	   the	   limits	   to	   indigenous	   jurisdiction	   posed	   by	   the	   need	   for	  harmonisation	  with	  human	  rights	  law,	  with	  particular	  reference	  to	  decisions	  T-­‐496/96;	  T-­‐349/96	  and	   T-­‐523/97.	   For	   an	   overview	   of	   the	   Colombian	   constitutional	   jurisprudence	   on	   the	   issue	   see	  Solano-­‐González,	  2004.	  For	  perspectives	  on	  practical	  implications	  of	  the	  recognition	  of	  indigenous	  jurisdiction	   in	   Colombia	   see,	   inter	   alia,	   Blanco-­‐Blanco,	   2006;	   Holguín-­‐Tafur,	   2012,	   Sampedro-­‐Arrubla,	   1993.	   For	   a	   general	   overview	   of	   the	   questions	   emerging	   from	   legal	   pluralism	   and	  indigenous	  jurisdiction	  see:	  Oliva-­‐Martínez,	  2012;	  Odello,	  2012;	  Carbonell,	  2003,	  Kuppe,	  1994.	  195 	  Garlicki	   summarizes	   the	   factors	   that	   contribute	   determining	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   margin	   of	  appreciation:	   a)	   the	   nature	   –	   subject	   matter	   –	   of	   the	   right	   in	   question;	   b)	   the	   nature	   of	   State’s	  duties,	   in	   particular	   their	   positive	   or	   negative	   aspect;	   c)	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   aim	   pursued	   by	   the	  contested	   State	   action;	   in	   particular	   the	   link	   of	   the	   aim	   with	   one	   of	   the	   “legitimate	   aims”	  enumerated	  in	  different	  articles	  of	  the	  convention;	  d)	  surrounding	  circumstances	  (the	  doctrine	  of	  the	  margin	  of	   appreciation	  had	  been,	   at	   first,	   used	   in	   the	   context	   of	   emergency	   situations	  of	   the	  fight	   against	   terrorism,	   hence,	   not	   to	   protect	   cultural	   diversity);	   e)	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   common	  ground	  between	   the	   laws	   of	   the	  member	   states	   (legislative	   consensus	   or	   common	   trend);	   f)	   the	  existence	   of	   a	   common	   cultural	   context	   (i.e.	   of	   particular	   traditional	   combination	   of	   moral,	  religious,	   ideological,	   political	   and	   constitutional	   values	   and	   attitudes)	   in	  which	  particular	   rights	  operate	   within	   the	   society	   (Garlicki,	   2012).	   Notably,	   the	   factors	   summarized	   at	   point	   e)	   and	   f)	  emerge	   as	   particularly	   problematic,	   given	   the	   transformative	   approach	   reflected	   in	   Women’s	  Conventions.	  On	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  see,	  amongst	  the	  many:	  Ovey,	  White,	  2002;	  De	  la	  Rasilla-­‐Del	  Moral,	  2006.	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on	   VAW,	   we	   evaluated	   through	   which	   processes	   the	   new	   understanding	   on	  women’s	   rights	   influences	   Institutions’	   analyses	   and	   singled	   out	   their	   crucial	  elements,	   highlighting	   strengths,	   shortcomings	   and	   obstacles.	   We	   then	  proceeded	  to	  a	  comparative	  analysis	  of	  the	  evolution	  of	  national	  legislations	  on	  VAW	   in	   the	   region,	   to	  evaluate	   the	   impact	  of	  BdPC	  adoption	  and	   Institution’s	  interpretation	   on	   regional	   convergence	   towards	   a	   holistic	   approach	   to	   the	  eradication	   of	   VAW.	   On	   the	   basis	   of	   our	   findings	  we	   drew	   some	   preliminary	  conclusions	   on	   the	   valuable	   opportunity	   that	   some	   of	   the	   identified	   features	  provide	  for	  further	  improvements	  in	  Institutions’	  tools	  of	  analysis,	  to	  construct	  standards	   and	   principles	   to	   reach	   the	   ambitious	   scope	   set	   by	   the	   BdPC	   and	  enhancing	   domestic	   implementation.	   We	   argued	   that	   IACrtHR’s	   contentious	  jurisdiction	  on	  the	  BdPC	  gave	  a	  significant	  impulse	  to	  the	  development	  of	  such	  processes,	  and	   that	   its	   interpretive	   function	  played	  a	  crucial	   role	   in	  clarifying	  the	   implications	   of	   the	   new	   paradigm,	   providing	   valuable	   guidelines	   and	  authoritative	  precedents.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  we	  identified	  the	  Commission	  as	  the	  crucial	  engine	  for	  extending	  and	  coordinating	  the	  availability	  of	  contextual	  information	   and	   specific	   expertise,	   necessary	   to	   appropriately	   address	  concrete	  cases	   in	  a	  way	  that	   is	  consistent	  with	  the	  paradigm	  endorsed	  by	  the	  BdPC.	  	  	  	  On	   the	   basis	   of	   our	   preliminary	   conclusions	   we	   suggested	   how	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  System	  could	  construct	  a	  method	  to	  better	  respond	  to	  the	  increasing	  complexities	  emerging	  from	  fundamental	  clashes,	  and	  provided	  an	  explanatory	  case	  to	  describe	  its	  features	  and	  implications.	  	  Given	   the	   inherent	   incompleteness	   of	   the	   BdPC,	   and	   the	   other	   Women’s	  Conventions,	   Institutions	   with	   competence	   to	   interpret	   such	   instruments	  appear	   as	   crucial	   actors	   in	   the	   internalisation	   at	   all	   levels	   of	   their	   paradigm	  shift	   and	   implications,	   fundamental	   engines	   of	   the	   vertical	   and	   horizontal	  interactions	   on	   which	   conventional	   effectiveness	   rely.	   The	   structural,	  institutional	  and	  procedural	  preconditions	  of	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  System	  create	  the	   context	   for	   a	   process	   of	   inclusive	   regional	   dialogue,	   open	   to	   external	  sources	   and	   harmonised	   with	   the	   universal	   framework,	   which	   creates	  favourable	   conditions	   for	   plausibility	   for	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   women’s	   rights,	  understood	   through	   a	   complex	   socio-­‐legal.	   In	   this	   sense,	   Inter-­‐American	  Institutions	   are	   enabled,	   on	   the	  one	  hand,	   to	   “translate”	   and	   introduce	   in	   the	  regional	   human	   rights	   discourse	   principles	   and	   standards	   emerging	   from	   an	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evolving	   international	   consensus,	   exercising	   a	   crucial	   influence	   for	   their	  reception	   at	   national	   level	   while,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   they	   are	   enabled	   to	  produce	   pioneering	   solutions	   to	   unaddressed	   critical	   issues	   raising	   from	  complex	  fundamental	  clashes.	  	  In	   conclusion,	   we	   claim	   that	   our	   method	   allows	   us	   to	   elaborate	   on	   Judge	  Cançado	  Trindade’s	  critique	  of	  the	  Commission’s	  filtering	  function,	  which	  rests	  on	   the	   recognition	   of	   an	   increased	   maturity	   of	   petitioners	   in	   the	   region,	  currently	   able	   to	   appropriately	   present	   their	   claims	   without	   the	   need	   to	   be	  represented	  by	  an	  intermediate	  institution.	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  our	  findings,	  while	  we	   share	   Cançado	   Trindade’s	   opinion,	   we	   also	   believe	   that	   there	   are	   strong	  grounds	  to	  argue	  that,	  given	  the	  multiple	  functions	  of	  the	  Commissions	  and	  its	  crucial	  political	   role	   in	   the	  Organization	  of	  American	  States,	   this	  body	  should	  not	  be	  excluded	  from	  the	  protection	  mechanism.	  Nevertheless,	  we	  suggest	  that	  the	  Commission’s	  Rules	  of	  Procedure	  should	  be	  reformed	  in	  two	  directions:196	  	  a) Removing	   its	   filtering	   function,	   allowing	   all	   petitions	   that	   cannot	   be	  rejected	  as	  manifestly	   inadmissible	  to	  reach	  the	  Court,	  without	  the	  possibility	  to	   remove	   from	   the	   application	   to	   the	   Court	   provisions	   invoked	   by	   the	  petitioners.	  However,	  the	  Commission	  should	  be	  allowed	  to	  include	  additional	  provisions	   under	   which	   the	   Court	   should	   evaluate	   the	   facts.	   This	   change	  “capitalises”	   increased	   petitioners’	   maturity,	   removing	   the	   possibility	   of	   the	  Commission’s	   potential	   “slowing-­‐down	   effect”	   on	  processes	   of	   internalisation	  and	  adaptation	  to	  dynamically	  changing	  understandings,	  as	  it	  was	  possibly	  the	  case,	   besides	   the	   analysed	   technical	   obstacle	   of	   Article	   12	   BdPC,	   in	   the	   long	  delay	  before	   the	   IACrtHR	  could	  rule	  on	  a	  VAW	  case	  on	   the	  basis	  of	   the	  BdPC.	  The	  Commission	  would,	  hence,	  maintain	  a	  limited	  filtering	  function,	  discarding	  
manifestly	   inadmissible	   petitions,	   to	   decrease	   the	   possibility	   of	   clog	   up	   in	   the	  Court	  as	  cases	  multiply.	  	  b) Strengthening	   and	   extending	   Commission’s	   Rapporteurships,	   which	  should	   become	   its	   main	   activity.	   Considering	   the	   increased	   complexity	   of	  analyses,	   Rapporteurships	   need	   to	   be	   organized	   in	   order	   to	   allow	   better	  coordination	   of	   information	   gathering	   and	   on-­‐site	   investigations,	   extending	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  196	  The	   IACommHR	  would	  maintain	   its	   current	   function	   in	   cases	   involving	   a	   State	   that	   does	   not	  recognise	  the	  competence	  of	  the	  Court.	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their	   articulations	   and	   structuring	   continuous	   interactions	   with	   civil	   society	  actors,	  experts,	  scholars,	  NGOs,	  governmental	  bodies,	  international	  institutions	  and	  advocacy	  networks.	  The	  crucial	  role	  of	  the	  Commission	  would	  be	  providing	  the	   Court	   with	   extensive	   documentation	   on	   concrete	   cases,	   as	   well	   as	  additional	   information	   necessary	   to	   consider	   their	   systemic	   and	   structural	  dimensions.	   Commission’s	   applications	   to	   the	   Court	   would,	   thus,	   turn	   into	  valuable	   informed	   opinions	   attached	   to	   the	   petitions	   received	   by	   the	   Court,	  signalling	   the	   criticalities	   of	   a	   case	   and	   possibly	   identifying	   the	   specific	  expertise	  required.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  Commission	  would	  serve	  as	  a	  facilitator	  for	  increasingly	  complex	  multidimensional	  systemic	  analyses.	  	  The	  proposed	  reform	  consistently	  holds	  together,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  current	  viability	  of	  a	  (preferable)	  direct	  recourse	  to	  the	  Court	  and,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  contemporary	  necessity	  of	  appropriately	  informed	  cases,	  while	  accounting	  for	   Court’s	   fallibility,	   i.e.	   the	   inherent	   unlikelihood	   of	   its	   “self-­‐sufficiency”	   in	  counting	  with	  the	  appropriate	  specific	  expertise	  and	  experience	  to	  address	  all	  relevant	   dimensions	   in	   any	   given	   case.	   In	   this	   perspective,	   a	   shared-­‐function	  between	   the	   IACommHR	   and	   Inter-­‐American	   Commission	   of	   Women	  (IACommW),	   in	   the	   in	   the	   first	   phase	   of	   the	   admissibility	   control	   and	   in	  coordinating	  activities	  to	  gather	  specific	  information,	  would	  prove	  particularly	  suitable	   to	   improve	   appropriate	   handling	   of	   gendered	   cases,	   considering	   the	  specific	  composition	  and	  expertise197	  of	  the	  IACommW.	  	  	  
Further	  developments	  of	  this	  research	  	  
	  
Conditions	  for	  plausibility	  of	  the	  Istanbul	  Convention	  	  In	   the	   following	   paragraphs	   we	   present	   our	   future	   research	   directions.	  Following	  up	  to	  the	  motivations	  presented	  in	  the	  General	  Introduction,	  we	  use	  this	  opportunity	  to	  show	  how	  our	  findings	  can	  contribute	  to	  the	  current	  debate	  on	   the	   Istanbul	   Convention	   in	   the	   European	   System,	   providing	   valuable	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  197	  Incidentally,	  we	  note	   that,	   had	   the	  BdPC	  provided	   for	   a	  more	   active	   role	   of	   the	   IACommW	   in	  processing	  of	  individual	  petitions,	  the	  learning	  process	  identified	  in	  our	  research	  could	  have	  been	  shortened.	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informative	   material	   of	   an	   analogous	   instrument	   with	   twenty	   years	   of	  experience	  in	  a	  comparable	  regional	  system.	  	  	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  our	  findings,	  we	  shall	  develop	  a	  brief	  a	  priori	  assessment	  of	  the	  perspectives	   of	   the	   Istanbul	   Convention,	   not	   yet	   come	   into	   force,	   in	   order	   to	  present	   a	  workable	  outline	   for	   further	   research,	   in	  which	  we	  will	   thoroughly	  evaluate	   to	   what	   extent	   the	   conclusions	   drawn	   from	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  experience	   are	   “exportable,”	   whether	   and	   how	   they	   can	   be	   adapted	   to	   a	  different	   context,	   and	   single	   out	   favourable	   structural,	   institutional	   and	  procedural	   preconditions	   available	   in	   the	   European	   System,	   which	   might	  enhance	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  Istanbul	  Convention.	  	  	  We	   believe	   that	   the	   evolution	   of	   the	   BdPC	   in	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   System	  provides	  a	  crucial	  informative	  experience	  for	  the	  development	  of	  the	  European	  response	   to	   VAW.	   ECrtHR	   case	   law	   currently	   provides	   an	   enormous	   corpus	  
juris	  that	  proves	  sufficient	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  norm	  of	  reference	  to	  solve	  the	  majority	  of	   problems	   involving	   human	   rights.	   Indeed,	   the	   longer	   experience	   of	   the	  ECrtHR	  often	  provided	  the	   IACrtHR	  with	  crucial	  authoritative	  solutions	  when	  confronting	   similar	   issues.	   However,	   this	   should	   not	   lead	   to	   believe	   that	   the	  European	  System	  is	  capable,	  by	   itself,	  of	  always	   finding	  appropriate	  solutions	  to	   new	   emerging	   questions	   (Garlicki,	   2012).	   Even	   if	   it	   were,	   it	   would	   prove	  time	   consuming	   to	  work	  out	   each	   solution	   from	   scratch,	  without	   drawing	  on	  consolidated	  experiences	  of	   systems	  with	   comparable	   long	   successful	   history	  and	  auctoritas.198	  However,	   some	  of	   the	  choices	  made	   in	  drafting	   the	   Istanbul	  Convention,	   particularly	   for	   what	   concerns	   the	   enforcement	   mechanisms	  established,	   appear	   to	   have	   overlooked	   the	   lessons	   learnt	   from	   previously	  enacted	  Women’s	  Conventions.	  	  Three	  decades	  after	  CEDAW,	  and	  nearly	   two	  decades	  after	   the	  BdPC,	   in	  2011	  the	   Council	   of	   Europe	   adopted	   the	   Istanbul	   Convention,	   currently	   open	   for	  ratifications.	  As	  thoroughly	  analysed	  in	  the	  First	  Section	  of	  this	  research,	  while	  substantially	   reflecting	   both	   CEDAW	   and	   BdPC	   content,	   the	   more	   recent	  Istanbul	  Convention	  actualised	  the	  understanding	  of	  women’s	  rights	  and	  VAW,	  internalising	   doctrinal	   evolutions	   and	   currently	   consolidated	   approaches.	   Of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  198	  On	  the	  continuous	  nature	  of	  the	  violation	  of	  the	  right	  to	  effective	  legal	  proceedings,	  the	  ECrtHR	  referred	   to	   the	  doctrinal	   elaborations	  of	   IACrtHR’s	   jurisprudence	  on	   the	  desaparecidos	   (Massolo,	  2012).	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the	  47	  countries	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe,	  29199	  have	  signed	  it	  and,	  to	  date,	  only	  5	  ratified	  this	  instrument:	  Albania,	  Montenegro,	  Portugal,	  Turkey	  and	  Italy.	  All	  29	   States	   signatories	   are	   contemporarily	   CEDAW	   members	   and	   all	   but	   2	  countries,	  Malta	  and	  Monaco,	  have	  additionally	  ratified	  the	  Optional	  Protocol.	  The	   Istanbul	   Convention	   is	   also	   open	   for	   signature	   and	   ratification	   from	   five	  countries	   non-­‐members	   of	   the	   Council	   of	   Europe	   (Canada,	   Holy	   See,	   Japan,	  Mexico,	   United	   States)	   and	   the	   European	   Union.	   To	   date,	   none	   of	   these	   has	  either	   signed	   or	   ratified	   the	   convention,	   which	   will	   enter	   into	   force	   once	  reached	  10	  ratifications,	  including	  8	  CoE	  Member	  States.	  	  In	  order	  to	  present	  a	  workable	  outline	  for	  further	  research,	  we	  shall	  adopt	  the	  same	  approach	  used	   analysing	   the	   internalisation	  process	  of	   the	  BdPC	   in	   the	  Inter-­‐American	   System,	   and	   present	   some	   preliminary	   considerations	   on	   the	  perspectives	  of	  the	  Istanbul	  Convention	  in	  the	  European	  System.	  	  On	   the	   basis	   of	   CoE	   studies	   and	   reports	   on	   the	   implementation	   of	  Recommendation	  2002/5	  on	  VAW,	  we	  can	  argue	   that,	   in	  CoE	  Member	  States,	  most	  specific	  laws	  tend	  to	  restrict	  their	  scope	  to	  criminal	  responses	  to	  VAW	  in	  cases	  of	  harm	  to	  a	  family	  member	  or	  intimate	  partner	  (Hagemann-­‐White,	  Bohn,	  2007;	   Hagemann-­‐White,	   2008,	   2009,	   2010).	   These	   legislations	   extend	   their	  coverage	  to	  abuses	  on	  children	  or	  elderly,	  violence	  between	  siblings	  and	  other	  relations	  of	  this	  sort.	  Provisions	  on	  domestic	  violence	  are	  highly	  diverse,	  with	  several	   laws	   focusing	   on	   forced	   marriages	   and	   Female	   Genital	   Mutilations	  (FGM),	   in	   countries	   were	   such	   practices	   are	   “exogenous,”	   i.e.	   encountered	  within	   migrant	   communities,	   more	   then	   on	   forms	   of	   violence	   originating	   in	  their	  own	  socio-­‐cultural	  contexts.	  Consequently,	  the	  recognition	  of	  the	  need	  to	  eradicate	   the	   discriminatory	   causes	   conducting	   to	   domestic	   violence	   is	   still	  partial	   and	   ambiguous,	   with	   a	   wide	   spread	   persisting	   perception	   of	   the	  phenomenon	  as	  exogenous	  (Hagemann-­‐White,	  2010).	  	  	  Indeed,	  although	  Recommendation	  2002/5	  lays	  down	  clear	  guiding	  principles,	  it	  is	  rather	  vague	  about	  the	  appropriate	  measures	  to	  fulfil	  them.	  Only	  Spain	  and	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  Albania,	  Andorra,	  Austria,	  Belgium,	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina,	  Croatia,	  Finland,	  France,	  Germany,	  Greece,	   Iceland,	   Italy,	   Luxembourg,	   Malta,	   Monaco,	   Montenegro,	   Netherlands,	   Norway,	   Poland,	  Portugal,	  Serbia,	  Slovakia,	  Slovenia,	  Spain,	  Sweden,	  Macedonia,	  Turkey,	  Ukraine,	  United	  Kingdom.	  The	   constantly	   updated	   interactive	   map	   is	   available	   on	   the	   CoE	   website	   at:	  http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/convention-­‐violence/source/flash/map/map_en.htm.	  	  
	   268 
Sweden	  have	  introduced	  gender-­‐based	  definitions	  of	  violence	  in	  their	  criminal	  codes,	   addressing	   a	   range	   of	   forms	   of	   VAW	   broader	   than	   those	   perpetrated	  within	  partnerships	  or	  family	  relations.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  CoE	  Campaign	  to	   Combat	   VAW	   and	   domestic	   violence	   had	   a	   sustained	   impact	   on	   the	  availability	   of	   information	   about	   women’s	   right	   to	   a	   life	   free	   from	   violence	  (Hagemann-­‐White,	   2010),	   which	   countries	   disseminated	   through	   various	  initiatives,	   including	   school	   programmes	   and	   media	   coverage.	   However,	   the	  CoE	  Reports	   signal	   that	   the	   efforts	   in	   awareness-­‐raising	   campaigns	  were	   not	  matched	   with	   an	   increased	   attention	   to	   legislative	   reforms,	   enhanced	   police	  investigations	  and	  prosecutions	  of	  those	  responsible	  of	  acts	  of	  VAW.	  Overall,	  no	  significant	   legislative	   change	   occurred	   after	   the	   mentioned	   first	   wave	   of	  domestic	  adaptation.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  CoE	  “seems	  to	  have	  reached	  a	  plateau	  of	  
legislative	  approaches	  for	  the	  time	  being,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  very	  few	  cases	  
of	  violence	  against	  women	  are	  actually	  being	  prosecuted,	  measured	  against	   the	  
prevalence	  data.	  (…)	  Limits	  to	  consensus	  have	  also	  become	  visible.	  Especially	  in	  a	  
period	  of	  financial	  crisis,	  with	  severe	  impact	  on	  many	  member	  states,	  expansion	  
of	  services	  has	  not	  been	  pursued,	  and	  the	  human	  rights	  obligation	  to	  ensure	  that	  
every	  women	  threatened	  by	  discriminatory	  violence	  be	  effectively	  protected	  has	  
not	   been	   fulfilled”	   (Hagemann-­‐White,	   2010,	   p.	   30).	   The	   2010	   CoE	   analytical	  study,	   while	   emphasising	   the	   crucial	   need	   for	   a	   European	   Women’s	  Convention,	   endorsing	  new	   international	   standards	   of	  protection	   against	   and	  prevention	   of	   VAW,	   concludes:	   “It	   will	   remain	   to	   be	   seen	   to	   what	   extent	   this	  
future	  convention	  will	  enhance	  the	  realization	  of	  women’s	  right	  to	  a	  life	  free	  from	  
violence”	  (Hagemann-­‐White,	  2010,	  p.	  31)	  
	  Given	   the	   unavailability	   of	   a	   specific	   convention	   amongst	   the	   instruments	   of	  the	  European	  System	  of	  Human	  Rights,	  individual	  petitions	  coming	  from	  within	  CoE	   Member	   States	   and	   concerning	   VAW	   are	   currently	   almost	   evenly	  distributed	  between	   the	  ECrtHR	  and	  CEDAW	  Committee.	  All	  but	   two	  cases	  of	  VAW	  decided	  by	  CEDAW	  Committee	  under	   the	  Optional	  Protocol	   involve	  CoE	  Member	   States. 200 	  As	   argued	   previously	   in	   this	   Section,	   in	   a	   context	   of	  generalised	  early	  underutilization	  of	   the	  new	  protection	  mechanism	  provided	  by	  CEDAW	  Optional	  Protocol,	   the	   significantly	  higher	   tendency	  of	   petitioners	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  200	  Ms.	   A.T.	   v.	   Hungary	   (2005);	  Ms.	   A.S.	   v.	   Hungary	   (2006);	   Goekce	   v.	   Austria	   (2007);	   Yildirim	   v.	  
Austria	  (2007);	  Ms.	  N.	  S.	  F.	  v.	  U.K.	  (2007);	  Vertido	  v.	  Philippines	  (2010);	  Ms.	  V.K.	  v.	  Bulgaria	  (2011);	  
Abramova	   v.	  Belarus	   (2011);	   S.	   V.	   P.	   v.	  Bulgaria	   (2012);	   Jallow	  v.	  Bulgaria	   (2012);	  Kell	   v.	   Canada	  (2012).	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from	   within	   CoE	   Member	   States	   to	   seek	   protection	   resorting	   to	   CEDAW	  Committee,	   is	   due	   to	   their	   relatively	   higher	   familiarity	   with	   supranational	  mechanisms	   of	   protection	   and,	   in	   general,	   with	   the	   human	   rights	   discourse,	  given	  their	  participation	  to	  a	  regional	  system	  of	  human	  rights	  protection.	  	  	  For	  the	  scope	  of	  these	  final	  considerations,	  from	  the	  enormous	  amount	  of	  cases	  arguably	  concerning	  gendered	  violations	  decided	  by	   the	  ECrtHR	  primarily	  on	  the	   basis	   of	   the	   ECHR,	  we	   selected	   only	   those	   concerning	   domestic	   violence,	  more	  suitable	  to	  provide	  a	  general	  overview	  of	  the	  degree	  of	  internalization	  of	  the	  new	  international	  understanding	  on	  VAW.	  	  We	   shall	   now	   briefly	   describe	   how,	   in	   absence	   of	   a	   specific	   convention,	   the	  ECrtHR	  addressed	  cases	  of	  domestic	  violence.	  Although	  the	  phenomenon	  might	  be	   analysed	   under	   Article	   3	   ECHR	   (Prohibition	   of	   torture	   and	   inhuman	   or	  degrading	   treatments),	   the	   ECrtHR	   preferred	   to	   address	   it	   focusing	   on	   the	  sphere	  in	  which	  it	  occurs.	  Extending	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  content	  of	  Article	  8	   (Right	   to	   respect	   for	   private	   and	   family	   life), 201 	  the	   Court	   generally	  recognised	  breaches	   in	   cases	  of	   bodily	   injuries	   or	   threats	   (e.g.	   in	  Bevacqua	  v.	  
Bulgaria202,	   A.	   v.	   Croatia203,	   Hadjuova	   v.	   Slovakia,204	  Kalucza	   v.	   Hungary205).	  	  Notably,	  however,	  referring	  to	  Article	  8	  the	  Court	  overlooks	  the	  discriminatory	  causes	  of	  domestic	  violence,	  disregarding	   the	  nature	  of	   this	  violation	  and	   the	  origins	  of	  the	  structural	  deficiencies	  of	  the	  national	  judicial	  system.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  201	  The	   relevant	   principles	   at	   the	   bases	   of	   ECrtHR’s	   assessments	   under	   Article	   8	   are	   recalled	   in	  
Hajduová	  v.	  Slovakia	  (2010).	  202	  In	  Bevacqua	  v.	  Bulgaria	   (2008):	   “there	  were	  at	   least	  four	  separate	  incidents	  of	  violence	  towards	  
the	   applicant	   by	   her	   husband,	   in	   the	   course	   of	   custody	   and	   divorce	   proceedings.	   The	   authorities’	  
failure	   to	   impose	   sanctions	   or	   otherwise	   ensure	   that	   the	   applicant’s	   estranged	   husband	   refrained	  
from	  unlawful	  acts	  was	  critical,	  as	  it	  amounted	  to	  a	  refusal	  to	  provide	  the	  applicant	  and	  her	  son	  the	  
immediate	  assistance	  they	  required”	  (para.	  83).	  203	  A	  v.	  Croatia	  (2010)	  concerned	  frequent	  episodes	  of	  violence,	  over	  three	  years.	  The	  perpetrator	  had	  been	  diagnosed	  with	  mental	  health	  disorders.	  The	  Court	   found	   that	   the	  Croatian	  authorities	  had	   failed	   to	   implement	   measures,	   which	   had	   been	   considered	   adequate	   and	   necessary	   by	   the	  Croatian	  courts,	  in	  order	  to	  address	  the	  violence	  directed	  against	  the	  applicant.	  	  204	  In	   Hajduová	   v.	   Slovakia	   (2010)	   the	   applicant	   was	   attacked	   and	   threatened	   by	   her	   former	  husband	  A.	  During	   the	  criminal	  proceedings,	  A.	  was	  diagnosed	  with	  serious	  personality	  disorder	  and	   in-­‐patient	  psychiatric	   treatment	  was	  ordered.	  The	  Court	   found	   that	   the	  domestic	  authorities	  had	   failed	   to	   ensure	   that	   A.	   was	   duly	   detained	   for	   psychiatric	   treatment,	   which	   enabled	   him	   to	  continue	  to	  threaten	  the	  applicant	  and	  her	  lawyer.	  205	  In	  Kalucza	  v.	  Hungary	  (2012)	  the	  Court	  recognised,	  inter	  alia,	  a	  failure	  by	  the	  domestic	  courts	  to	  promptly	  decide	  on	  the	  applicant’s	  request	   for	  a	  restraining	  order	  on	  her	  common	  law	  husband,	  which	  was	  ultimately	  refused.	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Some	  of	  the	  cases	  present	  broader	  argumentations,	  including	  the	  consideration	  of	  Article	  2	  (Right	  to	  life)	  and	  13	  (Right	  to	  effective	  remedies),	  e.g.	  Kontrova	  v.	  
Slovakia,206or	   Article	   3,	   e.g.	  E.S.	   and	  Others	   v.	   Slovakia.	   Such	   differences	  were	  relevant	  mainly	  for	  what	  concerned	  determining	  the	  amount	  of	  compensations.	  	  
Opuz	  vs.	  Turkey207	  presents	  a	  more	  articulated	  reasoning,	  that	  better	  responds	  to	   the	   specific	   requirements	   of	   the	   current	   understanding	   of	   the	   right	   of	  women	  to	  a	  life	  free	  from	  violence.	  Notably,	  besides	  considering	  the	  facts	  under	  Articles	   2	   and	   3,	   respectively	   in	   reference	   to	   the	   killing	   of	   the	   applicant’s	  mother	   and	   to	   the	   battering	   of	   the	   applicant	   herself,	   in	   this	   case	   the	   Court	  recognised	   a	   violation	   of	   Article	   14	   (Prohibition	   of	   discrimination),	   in	  conjunction	  with	  both	  Article	  2	  and	  3,	  recognizing	  the	  discriminatory	  origins	  of	  the	   failure	   of	   the	   national	   judicial	   system	   to	   protect	   the	   victims	   from	  reiteration	  and	  punish	  the	  perpetrator.	  Significantly,	  the	  ECrtHR	  clarified	  that,	  in	   order	   to	   imply	   a	   breach	   on	   Article	   14,	   omissions	   in	   guaranteeing	   equal	  protection	  do	  not	  need	  to	  be	  intentional	  (Opuz	  v.	  Turkey,	  para.	  191).	  	  While	  for	  several	   years	   this	   remained	   the	   only	   example	   of	   a	   reference	   to	   the	  discriminatory	   causes	   of	   domestic	   violence,	   the	   Court	   adopted	   again	   this	  approach	  this	  year,	  in	  Eremia	  et	  al.	  v.	  Republic	  of	  Moldava.	  Notwithstanding	  the	  efforts	  of	  the	  State,	  during	  the	  proceedings,	  to	  argue	  its	  reasonable	  handling	  of	  the	   case,	   the	   Court’s	   evaluation	   of	   authorities’	   responses	   to	   the	   victims’	  complaints	   led	   resulted	   in	   the	   recognition	   of	   a	   violation	   of	   Article	   14,	  identifying	   a	   pattern	   of	   tolerance	   of	   domestic	   violence	   and	   a	   discriminatory	  attitude	   towards	   the	   applicant	   as	   a	   woman	   (para.	   89).	   We	   shall	   notice,	  incidentally,	   that	   the	   reference	   to	   Article	   14	   appears	   in	   two	   cases	   involving	  States	  that	  are	  not	  contemporarily	  members	  of	  the	  EU.	  	  Although,	   as	   seen,	   the	   ECHR	   contains	   provisions	   suitable	   for	   grounding	   and	  developing	   interpretations	   on	   the	   nature	   of	   domestic	   violence,	   their	   overall	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  206	  In	  Kontrová	  v.	  Slovakia	  (2007),	  the	  applicant’s	  husband	  had	  shot	  himself	  and	  their	  two	  children	  dead,	  after	  reiterated	  violence	  on	  her	  and	  their	  children.	  The	  Court	  observed	  that	  the	  police	  had	  an	  array	  of	  specific	  statutory	  and	  administrative	  obligations	  but	  they	  had	  failed	  to	  ensure	  that	  these	  obligations	  were	  complied	  with.	  207	  In	   Opuz	   v.	   Turkey	   (2009),	   there	   was	   a	   series	   of	   serious	   assaults	   and	   threats	   directed	   to	   the	  applicant	  and	  her	  mother,	  from	  the	  applicant’s	  husband,	  which	  resulted	  in	  the	  mother’s	  killing.	  He	  was	  sentenced	  a	  low	  punishment	  and	  released	  pending	  an	  appeal.	  The	  Court	  recognised,	  inter	  alia,	  violations	   of	   Articles	   2	   and	   3	   ECHR,	   considering	   that	   Turkey’s	   criminal	   law	   system	   does	   not	  provide	  a	  deterrent	  capable	  of	  preventing	  these	  acts,	  and	  that	  domestic	  authorities’	  response	  was	  manifestly	  inadequate.	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underutilization	   signals	   that	   the	   unavailability	   of	   a	   specific	   convention	  might	  be	  delaying	  the	  European	  System’s	  full	  internalisation	  of	  the	  paradigm	  shift	  in	  the	   understanding	   of	   VAW.	   In	   absence	   of	   a	   regional	   specific	   convention,	   we	  found	  evidence	  of	   frequent	  references	   to	  external	  normative	   frameworks	  and	  precedents,	   when	   the	   specificities	   of	   the	   cases	   of	   domestic	   violence	   so	  required.	   In	   this	   way,	   the	   Court	   has	   often	   been	   able	   to	   ground	   evolutionary	  interpretations,	   using	   internationally	   established	   standards	   to	   justify	   new	  approaches208	  that	  might	  not	  have	  been	  accepted	  otherwise	  by	  States’	  Party.	  	  Evidence	  of	  the	  tendency	  of	  the	  Court	  to	  use	  available	  specific	  instruments	  can	  be	   found,	   for	   instance,	   in	   its	   references	   to	   those	   adopted	   in	   the	   Universal	  System.	   In	  Bevaqua	  v.	  Bulgaria,	  referring	   to	  due	  diligence,	   the	  Court	  mentions	  Article	   4(c)	   of	   the	   1993	   UNGA	   Declaration	   on	   the	   Elimination	   of	   Violence	  against	   Women	   (1993)	   and,	   in	   Opuz	   v.	   Turkey,	   generalised	   discriminatory	  judicial	   passivity,	   disproportionately	   affecting	   women,	   was	   identified	   on	   the	  basis	   of	   the	   Report	   prepared	   by	   CEDAW	   Committee.	   Citing	   CEDAW	  Committee’s	  decisions	  in	  Fatma	  Yıldırım	  v.	  Austria	  and	  A.T.	  v.	  Hungary,	  in	  Opuz	  the	   Court	   underlines	   that,	   in	   cases	   of	   domestic	   violence,	   perpetrators’	   rights	  cannot	   supersede	   victims’	   human	   rights	   to	   life	   and	   to	   physical	   and	   mental	  integrity.	  Judge	  Albuquerque’s	  Concurring	  Opinion	  to	  Valiuliene	  v.	  Lithuania	  is	  particularly	  noteworthy	  for	  his	  extensive	  reference	  to	  all	  available	  sources	  and	  instruments	   on	   VAW,	   as	   well	   as	   to	   both	   Inter-­‐American	   and	   CEDAW	  Committee’s	   specific	   case	   law,	   when	   reviewing	   the	   evolution	   of	   ECrtHR’s	  approach	   to	   domestic	   violence,	   and	   for	   his	   elaboration	   of	   an	   articulated	  interpretation	  of	  the	  facts	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  new	  international	  understanding	  on	  VAW.	  
	  	  The	   ECrtHR	   presents	   an	   open	   attitude	   towards	   the	   explicit	   consideration	   of	  IACrtHR	   case	   law	   on	   the	   BdPC.	   In	   Bevaqua	   v.	   Bulgaria,	   the	   ECrtHR	   recalls	  IACrtHR’s	   doctrinal	   elaborations	   on	   due	   diligence	   referring	   to	   Velasquez	  
Rodriguez	  v.	  Honduras	   and,	  with	   particular	   reference	   to	   the	   interpretation	   of	  due	  diligence	  in	  cases	  of	  VAW,	  to	  IACommHR’s	  decision	  in	  Maria	  da	  Penha	  Maia	  
Fernandes	   v.	   Brazil.	   In	   Opuz	   v.	   Turkey,	   the	   Strasburg	   Court	   quotes	   an	   entire	  paragraph	  of	  Maria	  da	  Penha,	  which	  provides	  a	  thorough	  analysis	  of	  impunity.	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  See,	  for	  instance,	  ECrtHR’s	  Baytan	  and	  Cudak	  cases.	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Somehow	  prematurely,	   since	   only	   half	   of	   the	   ten	   ratifications	   needed	   for	   the	  Istanbul	   Convention	   to	   enter	   into	   force	   have	   been	   deposited,	   recently	   the	  ECrtHR	   began	   to	   mention	   the	   new	   instrument	   when	   addressing	   facts	   of	  domestic	  violence.	  It	  was	  the	  case	  of	  Valiuliene	  v.	  Lithuania	  and	  M.T	  and	  S.T.	  v.	  
Slovakia,	   although	   the	   latter	  was	   then	  declared	  manifestly	   inadmissible.	   	  This	  tendency	   strengthens	   the	   arguments	   for	   the	   need	   of	   a	   specific	   convention	  complementing	  the	  ECHR,	  and	  highlights	  the	  criticalities	  of	  the	  decision	  not	  to	  grant	  the	  ECrtHR	  contentious	  jurisdiction	  on	  the	  instrument.	  	  The	  general	   tendency	   to	  date	  has	  been	   that	  of	   referring	   to	  Article	  8	   (Right	   to	  respect	  for	  private	  and	  family	  life),	  evaluating	  States’	  due	  diligence	  in	  fulfilling	  their	   positive	   obligations	   to	   prevent,	   investigate,	   punish	   and	   provide	  reparations	   for	   acts	   domestic	   violence	   perpetrated	   by	   private	   individuals.	  However,	   besides	   identifying	   State’s	   omissions,	   when	   determining	   the	  compensation	   granted	   to	   the	   applicant,	   the	   Court	   does	   not	   usually	   include	  specific	  requirements	  to	  guarantee	  non-­‐repetition,	  nor	  it	  suggests	  appropriate	  measures	  to	  adopt	  to	  address	  systemic	  deficiencies.	  Indeed,	  the	  reviewed	  cases	  signal	  ECrtHR’s	  deference	   to	  States’	  margin	  of	   appreciation	  when	   it	   comes	   to	  define	  recommendations	  to	  eradicate	  discriminatory	  patterns.	  	  In	   Hajduová	   v.	   Slovakia	   the	   Court	   stresses	   that	   its	   task	   is	   not	   to	   replace	  competent	  domestic	  authorities	  in	  determining	  the	  most	  appropriate	  methods	  for	  protecting	  individuals	  from	  attacks	  on	  their	  personal	  integrity,	  but	  rather	  to	  review	   their	  decisions	  under	   the	  ECHR,	  allowing	  a	  margin	  of	   appreciation.	   In	  
Bevaqua	   v.	   Bulgaria	   the	   Court	   reiterates	   the	   same	   position	   clarifying	   that,	  within	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  ECHR,	  the	  choice	  of	  the	  means	  to	  comply	  with	  Article	  8	  ECHR	   falls	  within	   domestic	   authorities’	  margin	   of	   appreciation.	   	   In	   the	  more	  recent	  Valiuliene	  v.	  Lithuania,	  although	  recalling	  the	  margin	  allowed,	  the	  Court	  includes	   a	   stronger	   requirement	   for	   what	   concerns	   establishing	   effective	  criminal	  law	  provisions	  to	  abide	  to	  Article	  3	  ECHR	  (Prohibition	  of	  torture	  and	  other	   inhumane	  or	  degrading	   treatment),	  while	  we	   found	  a	   similar	   increased	  precision	  in	  M.C.	  v.	  Bulgaria,	  with	  respect	  to	  Article	  8	  ECHR.	  	  	  If	   we	   consider	   the	   decisions	   adopted	   in	   cases	   of	   domestic	   violence	   where	  discriminatory	   patterns	   have	   indeed	   been	   recognised,	   i.e.	   Valiuliene	   v.	  
Lithuania,	   Opuz	   v.	   Turkey	  and	   Eremia	   et	   al.	   v.	   Republic	   of	  Moldava,	  we	   notice	  that	   such	   recognition	   affected	   primarily	   the	   decisions	   on	   victims’	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compensation.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  discriminatory	  patterns	  against	  specific	  groups	  have	   been	   more	   comprehensively	   addressed	   in	   previous	   cases	   that	   do	   not	  concern	  VAW,	  where	  the	  Court	  suggested	  specific	  measures	  to	  address	  States’	  omissions	  or	  reform	  non-­‐neutral,	  or	  apparently	  neutral,	  legislations	  (e.g.	  Hugh	  
Jordan	  v.	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  Hoogendijk	  v.	  the	  Netherlands,	  Oršuš	  and	  Others	  v.	  
Croatia).	  	  In	   conclusion,	   if	   compared	   to	   our	   findings	   for	   what	   concerns	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   States,	   currently	   both	   ECrtHR’s	   case	   law	   and	   CoE	   Member	   States	  legislations	  on	  VAW,	  with	  particular	  reference	  to	  domestic	  violence,	  appear	  to	  be	   still	   at	   an	   early	   stage	   in	   the	   process	   of	   internalisation	   of	   the	   new	  international	  understanding	  endorsed	  in	  Women’s	  Conventions.	  While,	  on	  the	  one	   hand,	   this	   constitutes	   a	   further	   evidence	   of	   CEDAW	   limited	   impact	   on	  national	   legislations,	   these	   considerations	   acquire	   a	   particular	   meaning	   in	  relation	  to	  the	  expectations	  on	  the	  recent	  adoption	  of	  the	  Istanbul	  Convention,	  once	  (and	  if)	  it	  will	  enter	  into	  force.	  	  	  
Necessity	  and	  feasibility	  of	  granting	  contentious	  jurisdiction	  
to	  the	  ECrtHR	  	  As	   mentioned,	   the	   objective	   of	   these	   final	   considerations	   is	   to	   present	   a	  workable	  outline	  for	  future	  developments	  of	  our	  research	  and	  to	  make	  a	  case	  for	   the	   crucial	   relevance	   of	   systematically	   analyse	   comparable	   previous	  experiences	   to	   draw	   useful	   lessons	   for	   decisions,	   actions	   and	   processes	  concerning	  the	  adoption	  and	  implementation	  of	  the	  Istanbul	  Convention	  in	  the	  European	  System.	  	  We	   refer	   to	   the	   First	   Section	   of	   this	   research	   for	   the	   arguments	   in	   favour	   of	  enhancing	   the	   effectiveness	   of	  women’s	   rights	   through	   regional	   conventions,	  where	  possible,	   rather	   than	   relying	   on	   a	   less	   accessible	   universal	   convention	  adopted	   in	   a	   system	   that	   does	   not	   present	   a	   comparably	   suitable	   structure.	  Further	  developments	  of	  this	  research	  will	  identify	  and	  analyse	  the	  differences	  between	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  and	  European	  Systems	  to	  assess	  whether	  and	  how	  they	   influence	   the	   perspectives	   of	   the	   respective	   Women’s	   Conventions.	   A	  particular	  attention	  will	  be	  focused	  on	  the	  higher	  diversity	  of	  national	  solutions	  for	   what	   concerns	   ECHR	   hierarchical	   status	   in	   national	   constitutional	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structures	   (see	   Stone	   Sweet,	   Keller,	   2008);	   the	   significantly	   lower	   degree	   of	  cultural	   homogeneity	   within	   the	   47	   CoE	   Member	   States	   and,	   in	   particular,	  amongst	   the	   29	   signatories	   of	   the	   Istanbul	   Convention	   signatories;	   the	  influence	  of	  the	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  doctrine	  in	  ECrtHR’s	  jurisprudence	  and	  the	   issue	   of	   gender	   representation	   in	   CoE	   Institutions’	   memberships.	   In	   the	  following	  paragraphs	  we	  follow	  up	  to	  our	  final	  objective	  and	  develop	  a	  brief	  a	  
priori	  assessment	   of	   the	   perspectives	   of	   the	   Istanbul	   Convention,	   in	   order	   to	  show	  how	  our	  findings	  for	  what	  concerns	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  experience	  with	  the	   BdPC	   can	   be	   used	   to	   provide	   valuable	   comparable	   information	   to	  contribute	  providing	  favourable	  conditions	  for	  plausibility	   for	  women’s	  rights	  in	  the	  European	  System.	  	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  analytical	  studies	  elaborated	  within	  the	  CoE,	  we	  argued	  that	  ECrtHR’s	  case	  law	  and	  national	  legislations	  on	  VAW	  are	  still	  at	  an	  early	  stage,	  if	  compared	   to	   the	   current	   Inter-­‐American	   context,	   notwithstanding	   some	  improvements	   in	   European	   jurisprudence	   and	   despite	   CoE	   countries’	  ratification	   of	   both	   CEDAW	   and	   the	   Optional	   Protocol.209	  In	   the	   following	  paragraphs,	  we	  will	  focus	  on	  one	  significant	  element	  of	  difference	  between	  the	  BdPC	   and	   the	   Istanbul	   Convention	   that,	   in	   our	   view,	  might	   imply	   the	   latter’s	  limited	  prospective	  influence	  in	  the	  region,	  i.e.	  its	  lack	  of	  a	  strong	  enforcement	  mechanism	  and,	  in	  particular,	  the	  missed	  opportunity	  to	  grant	  competence	  on	  the	  new	  instrument	  to	  the	  ECrtHR.	  	  We	   argued	   that	   Inter-­‐American	   Institutions,	   particularly	   since	   the	   Court	  clarified	   BdPC	   full	   justiciability,	   performed	   a	   crucial	   role	   to	   guarantee	   its	  effectiveness	   and	   national	   implementation,	   applying	   of	   its	   provisions	   in	  concrete	   cases	  and	  shaping	   regional	   standards	  and	  principles	   interpreting	   its	  content.	  Given	  the	  high	  degree	  of	  comparability	  between	  the	  two	  systems,	  and	  in	   the	   light	  of	   our	  previous	   considerations	  with	   respect	   to	  ECrtHR’s	   case	   law	  and	  CoE	  national	   legislations	  on	  VAW,	  we	   shall	   argue	   the	  need	   to	   reconsider	  ECrtHR’s	  role	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  Istanbul	  Convention.	  	  Similarly	   to	   the	   ACHR,	   the	   BdPC	   allows	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   Commission	   of	  Women	   and	   States	   Party	   to	   request	   IACrtHR’s	   Advisory	   Opinions	   on	   its	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  209Only	  two	  countries	  did	  not	  sign	  the	  Istanbul	  Convention:	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia.	  Monaco	  signed,	  but	  did	  not	  ratify	  the	  instrument.	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interpretation	  (Article	  11).	  This	  crucial	  instrument	  for	  dialogue	  does	  not	  exist	  in	  the	   Istanbul	   Convention,	  whereas	   the	   ECHR	   allows	   it	   in	   very	   restrictive	   terms	  (Article	   47).210	  The	   Istanbul	   Convention	   establishes	   an	   independent	   group	   of	  experts	   (GREVIO)	   for	   monitoring	   national	   implementation,	   adopting	   reports,	  conclusions	   and	   general	   recommendations	   concerning	   the	  measures	   to	   enact	  in	   abidance	   to	   the	   Convention.	   However	   it	   does	   not,	   implicitly	   or	   explicitly,	  refer	  to	  any	  role	  of	  the	  ECrtHR.	  	  	  Furthermore,	  Article	  74	  provides	  an	  alternative	  procedure	  for	  the	  settlement	  of	  disputes:	  	  
	  
The	   Parties	   to	   any	   dispute,	   which	   may	   arise	   concerning	   the	   application	   or	  
interpretation	  of	  the	  provisions	  of	  this	  Convention,	  shall	  first	  seek	  to	  resolve	  it	  by	  
means	   of	   negotiation,	   conciliation,	   arbitration	   or	   by	   any	   other	   methods	   of	  
peaceful	   settlement	   accepted	   by	   mutual	   agreement	   between	   them.	   The	  
Committee	   of	   Ministers	   of	   the	   Council	   of	   Europe	   may	   establish	   procedures	   of	  
settlement	  to	  be	  available	  for	  use	  by	  the	  Parties	  in	  dispute	  if	  they	  should	  so	  agree.	  
	  Considering	   the	   long	   delay	   and	   the	   significant	   actualisation	   effort	   that	   its	  content	   reflects,	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	   Istanbul	   Convention	   carries	   a	   high	  symbolic	   meaning.	   However,	   notwithstanding	   the	   detailed	   organisation	   of	  GREVIO’s	   functions,	  we	   argue	   that	   excluding	   the	   ECrtHR	   from	   the	   protection	  mechanism	  carries	  the	  risk	  of	  creating	  a	  new	  instrument	  with	  similar	  features	  to	  those	  that	  caused	  the	  limited	  impact	  of	  1979	  CEDAW.	  As	  previously	  argued,	  it	  took	  ten	  years	  to	  tackle	  the	  problem	  allowing	  CEDAW	  Committee	  to	  receive	  and	   consider	   petitions,	   and	   the	   2000	   Optional	   Protocol	   had	   to	   undergo	   a	  separate	   additional	   ratification	   process.	   Similarly,	   the	   lack	   of	   an	   explicit	  reference	  to	  the	  IACrtHR	  in	  the	  BdPC,	  although	  possibly	  unintended,	  arguably	  delayed	   its	   internalisation	   in	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   System	   and	   had	   to	   be	  overcome,	   somehow	   controversially,	   through	   a	   lengthy	   systematic	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  210	  Article	  47:	  1.	  The	  Court	  may,	  at	  the	  request	  of	  the	  Committee	  of	  Ministers,	  give	  advisory	  opinions	  
on	  legal	  questions	  concerning	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Convention	  and	  the	  Protocols	  thereto.	  2.	  Such	  
opinions	  shall	  not	  deal	  with	  any	  question	  relating	  to	   the	  content	  or	  scope	  of	   the	  rights	  or	   freedoms	  
defined	  in	  Section	  I	  of	  the	  Convention	  and	  the	  Protocols	  thereto,	  or	  with	  any	  other	  question	  which	  the	  
Court	  or	  the	  Committee	  of	  Ministers	  might	  have	  to	  consider	  in	  consequence	  of	  any	  such	  proceedings	  as	  
could	  be	  instituted	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  Convention.	  3.	  Decisions	  of	  the	  Committee	  of	  Ministers	  to	  
request	  an	  advisory	  opinion	  of	  the	  Court	  shall	  require	  a	  majority	  vote	  of	  the	  representatives	  entitled	  
to	  sit	  on	  the	  committee.	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teleological	   interpretation	   of	   a	   procedural	   provision	   (Article	   12	   BdPC),	  resulting	   in	   BdPC	   full	   justiciability	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   IACrtHR’s	   implicit	  competence.	  	  Considering	   the	   slow	   pace	   of	   Istanbul	   Convention’s	   ratification	   process,	  manifesting	   a	   generalised	   lack	   of	   political	   will	   possibly	   worsened	   by	   the	  European	   financial	   crisis,	   we	   can	   assume	   that	   ECrtHR’s	   exclusion	   from	   the	  protection	   mechanism	   intended,	   inter	   alia,	   to	   encourage	   ratifications.	  Nevertheless,	  this	  issue	  will	  require	  a	  thorough	  analysis	  in	  our	  future	  research,	  where	  we	  will	   review	   the	   travaux	  préparatoires	   for	   the	   new	  CoE	   instrument.	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  our	  findings	  on	  the	  critical	  role	  of	  the	  IACrtHR’s	  in	  guaranteeing	  BdPC	   effectiveness,	   we	   argue	   that	   the	   weak	   mechanism	   established	   by	   the	  Istanbul	   Convention	   hinder	   its	   potential.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   paradoxically,	   it	  appears	   to	   have	   failed	   in	   overcoming	   States’	   reluctance.	   This	   objective	  might	  have	   been	   more	   appropriately	   pursued	   allowing	   an	   opting-­‐out	   clause	   on	  ECrtHR’	  contentious	  jurisdiction,	  by	  which	  States	  unwilling	  to	  be	  subject	  to	  the	  Court	   for	  what	   concerns	   Istanbul	   Convention’s	   requirements	   could	   explicitly	  consent	  to	  the	  more	  limited	  monitoring	  mechanism	  led	  by	  GREVIO.	  	  We	  make	  a	  point	  on	  the	  controversial	   legitimacy	  of	   the	  weak	  choice	  made	  by	  the	   CoE,	   on	   the	   bases	   of	   the	   lessens	   learnt	   from	   the	   history	   of	   the	   older	  Women’s	   Conventions	   and	   recalling	   the	   concerns	   raised	   by	   feminist	   scholars	  with	   respect	   to	   the	   marginalising	   impact	   on	   women’s	   rights,	   which	   are	  prevented	  from	  officially	  integrating	  and	  complementing	  ECHR	  provisions	  and	  ensured	  by	  a	  judicial	  body	  with	  a	  broad	  mandate	  and	  a	  long	  successful	  history	  in	  the	  region.	  	  However,	   given	   the	   slow	  pace	   of	   the	   ratification	  process,	  we	  believe	   that	   the	  CoE	  is	  allowed	  some	  room	  of	  manoeuvre	  to	  reconsider	  the	  missed	  opportunity	  and	  modify	  its	  approach	  before	  it	  is	  too	  late.	  In	  this	  perspective,	  we	  shall	  now	  briefly	  present	  our	  proposal	  with	  respect	   to	  possible	  changes	  to	  be	  discussed	  in	  order	   to	  guarantee	  more	   favourable	   conditions	   for	   the	  effectiveness	  of	   the	  new	  CoE	   instrument.	   Incidentally,	  we	  underline	   that	   there	   are	  no	   grounds	   to	  assume	   that	   our	   proposal	   would	   necessarily	   imply	   a	   success	   rate	   in	   the	  ratification	  process	  lower	  than	  the	  current,	  disappointing,	  one.	  	  On	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   findings	   of	   our	   research	   on	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   System,	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which	   specific	   tools	   would	   the	   European	   System	   provide	   to	   the	   ECrtHR	   for	  appropriately	  addressing	  cases	  of	  VAW	  under	  the	  Istanbul	  Convention?	  	  Let	   us	   consider	   the	   implications	   of	   the	   jus	   cogens	   nature	   of	   the	   principles	   of	  equality	   and	   non-­‐discrimination,	  with	   the	   consequent	   complementary	   nature	  of	   Istanbul	   Convention	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   ECHR,	   and	   ECrtHR’s	   tendency	   to	  refer	   to	   available	   international	   specific	   instruments,	   including	   premature	  references	   to	   the	   Istanbul	   Convention,	   and	   relevant	   Inter-­‐American	   case	   law.	  We	   argue	   that,	   even	   if	   excluded	   from	   the	   protection	  mechanism,	   the	   ECrtHR	  counts	  on	  strong	  grounds	  to	  use	  conventional	  provisions	  as	  additional	  tools	  for	  interpreting	   the	   ECHR,	   if	   the	   gendered	   nature	   of	   the	   violations	   so	   required.	  Nevertheless,	   this	   option	   is	   left	   to	   the	   discretionality	   of	   the	   Court,	   since	   the	  Istanbul	  Convention	  does	  not	  belong	  to	  the	  instruments	  under	  its	  jurisdiction,	  and	  might	  encounter	  States’	  objections,	  as	  it	  was	  the	  case	  in	  the	  early	  phases	  of	  BdPC	  application	  by	  the	  IACrtHR.	  	  Naturally,	  the	  possibility	  to	  use	  specific	  provisions	  as	  interpretive	  tools	  would	  not	   imply	   an	   expansion	   of	   ECrtHR’s	   public	   function	   resulting	   in	   Istanbul	  Convention’s	  full	  justiciability,	  since	  the	  European	  instrument	  does	  not	  offer	  an	  occasion	   similar	   to	   that	   provided	  by	  Article	   12	  BdPC,	   thoroughly	   analysed	   in	  the	   Third	   Section	   of	   this	   research.	   Additionally,	   the	   limited	   use	   allowed	  restricts	   the	   influence	   that	   the	   convention	   can	   exercise	   when	   it	   comes	   to	  include	   specific	   measures	   in	   the	   recommendations	   to	   the	   State	   considered	  appropriate	  to	  modify	  structural	  deficiencies	  or	  discriminatory	  patterns,	  even	  more	   so	   if	   we	   consider	   that	   Court’s	   intervention	   is	   already	   limited	   by	   its	  deference	   to	   the	   national	   margin	   of	   appreciation.	   This	   is	   a	   relevant	  consequence,	  if	  we	  recall	  the	  crucial	  implications	  of	  an	  extended	  interpretation	  of	  States’	  positive	  obligation	  based	  on	  the	  new	  paradigm	  adopted	  in	  Women’s	  Conventions,	  analysed	  in	  the	  First	  Section	  of	  this	  research.	  	  	  After	   these	   substantial	   considerations,	   in	   the	   following	   paragraphs	   we	   shall	  adopt	   a	   problem-­‐solving	   approach	   to	   present	   our	   proposal,	   arguing	   the	  
feasibility,	   besides	   the	   necessity,	   of	   granting	   full	   justiciability	   to	   the	   Istanbul	  Convention.	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A	  concrete	  proposal	  	  The	   first	   problem	   to	   consider	   is	   that,	   precisely	   given	   the	   early	   stage	   of	  adaptation	   of	   national	   legislations	   to	   the	   new	  understanding	   on	  VAW	   in	   CoE	  Member	   States	   and	   amongst	   perspective	   Istanbul	   Convention	   Parties,	  attributing	   contentious	   jurisdiction	   to	   the	   ECrtHR	  might	   overload	   an	   already	  clogged-­‐up	   system.	   This	   is	   a	   critical	   issue,	   which	   possibly	   contributes	   to	  reasons	  that	  led	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  GREVIO	  and	  the	  exclusion	  of	  the	  Court	  from	   the	   protection	  mechanism.	   However,	   we	   argue	   that	   the	   likelihood	   of	   a	  negative	  impact	  of	  this	  choice	  with	  respect	  to	  national	  implementation	  as	  well	  
as	   its	   unacceptable	   consequences	   of	   implicit	  marginalization	  women’s	   rights,	  reduce	   the	   justifiability	   of	   such	   argument.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   problem	  cannot	   be	   overlooked,	   as	   it	   carries	   the	   risk	   of	   neutralizing	   Court’s	   effective	  intervention,	   both	   in	   cases	   of	   VAW	   and	   with	   respect	   to	   its	   whole	   activity.	  Therefore,	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   finding	   of	   our	   research,	   we	   shall	   suggest	   a	  solution	   that	  might	   hold	   together	   the	   need	   to	   avoid	   Court’s	   overload	   and	   to	  guarantee	  effectiveness	  to	  the	  Istanbul	  Convention.	  	  	  As	   it	   was	   the	   case	   prior	   to	   the	   1998	   reform	   of	   the	   European	   System,	   which	  abolished	  the	  European	  Commission	  of	  Human	  Rights	  (ECommHR),	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  protection	  mechanism	  presents	  an	  intermediate	  stage	  before	  a	  case	  can	  be	  presented	  to	  the	  Court.	  We	  argued	  that	  IACommHR’s	  filtering	  function	  had	  the	  negative	  effect	  of	  delaying	  the	  Court’s	  first	  ruling	  on	  the	  BdPC.	  Besides	  the	  technical	  problem	  of	  Article	  12	  ambiguous	  wording,	  we	  found	  that	  part	  of	  the	  reason	  of	  this	  early	  neglect	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  early	  lack	  of	  a	  gender	  perspective	   in	   an	   institution	   with	   general	   competences	   and	   no	   previous	  specific	  experience.	  For	  these	  reasons,	  given	  the	  current	  maturity	  of	  petitioners	  in	   presenting	   their	   cases,	   building	   on	   Judge	   Cançado	   Trindade’s	   opinion	   we	  suggested	   a	   reform	   of	   the	   IACommHR,	   limiting	   its	   filtering	   function	   and	  reinforcing	   its	  Rapporteurships,	   as	   strategic	  engines	   for	   the	  coordination	  and	  organisation	   of	   necessary	   informative	   material	   and	   specific	   expertise	   to	  facilitate	  IACrtHR	  activities.	  	  	  On	  this	  basis,	   in	  absence	  of	  the	  ECommHR,	  we	  suggest	  that	  such	  intermediate	  function	   might	   be	   performed	   by	   GREVIO.	   This	   possibility	   presents	   several	  positive	   features:	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   it	   attributes	   to	   a	   body	   with	   specific	  expertise	   and	   experience	   the	   first	   stages	   of	   the	   proceedings	   of	   gendered	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violations,	   overcoming	   the	   problem	   encountered	   with	   respect	   to	   the	  IACommHR;	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   it	   provides	   the	   ECrtHR,	   a	   body	  with	   a	   broad	  mandate,	  with	   extensive	   information	   and	   valuable	   analytical	   contributions	   to	  appropriately	  address	  such	  cases.	  In	  this	  way,	  GREVIO	  would	  be	  able	  to	  reject	  ill-­‐founded	  cases	  before	  they	  reach	  the	  Court,	  while	  facilitating	  its	  work	  once	  a	  case	  is	  submitted	  to	  its	  consideration.	  	  	  We	   argue	   that	   the	   Pilot-­‐judgment	   Procedure211,	   developed	   since	   2004	   and	  codified	   in	   2011	   in	   Rule	   61	   of	   the	   Rules	   of	   the	   Court,	   is	   a	   suitable	   tool	   to	  guarantee	   the	   feasibility	  of	   Istanbul	   Convention’s	   full	   justiciability.	   If	   dealing	  with	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  repetitive	  cases	  caused	  by	  an	  identifiable	  systemic	  dysfunction,	  this	  procedure	  allows	  the	  Court	  to	  select	  only	  one	  or	  a	  few	  of	  them	  for	   priority	   treatment,	   seeking	   to	   achieve	   a	   solution	   that	   extends	  beyond	   the	  facts	   of	   the	   concrete	   case	   and	   provides	   a	   guidelines	   to	   States	   for	   solving	  structural	   problems.	   The	   Court	   might	   also	   adjourn	   related	   cases	   on	   the	  condition	   that	   the	   State	   concerned	   fulfils	   the	   requirements	   of	   the	   Pilot-­‐judgement,	  under	  the	  control	  of	  the	  Committee	  of	  Ministries.	  	  This	  procedure	  appears	  to	  provide	  a	  particularly	  suitable	  tool	  to	  guarantee	  the	  
feasibility	  of	  Istanbul	  Convention’s	  full	  justiciability	  and,	  hence,	  the	  plausibility	  of	  the	  rights	  enshrined.	  Building	  on	  our	  previous	  considerations	  about	  turning	  GREVIO	   into	   an	   intermediate	   facilitator,	   and	   given	   CoE	  Member	   States’	   (and	  Istanbul	   Convention	   Signatories’)	   disappointing	   legislations	   on	   VAW,	   we	  suggest	  that	  GREVIO	  could	  also	  perform	  a	  crucial	  function	  organising	  the	  Pilot-­‐judgement	  Procedure	  in	  cases	  of	  VAW.	  As	  a	  body	  with	  specific	  expertise,	  with	  the	  possibility	   to	  gather	  relevant	  contextual	   information	   for	  admissible	  cases,	  compared	   to	   the	   ECrtHR,	   GREVIO	   is	   better	   endowed	   to	   identify	   systemic	  problems	   in	   repetitive	   cases,	   whether	   they	   be	   procedural	   or	   emerging	   from	  socio-­‐cultural	  patterns.	  Therefore,	  we	  suggest	  that	  GREVIO	  should	  be	  given	  the	  competence	  to	  select	  the	  Pilot	  case	  to	  be	  submitted	  to	  the	  Court	  and,	  would	  the	  ECrtHR	   adjourn	   related	   cases	   of	   VAW,	   replace	   the	  Committee	   of	  Ministers	   in	  monitoring	  States’	  compliance	  with	  the	  judgment.	  	  Coming	   to	   the	   issue	   of	  Advisory	  Opinions,	  we	   recall	   that	   the	  ECHR	  allows	   this	  possibility	   on	   very	   restrictive	   terms	   (Article	   47).	   Following	   the	   2012	  Brighton	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  For	  an	  extensive	  and	  exhaustive	  analysis	  of	  the	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  Procedure,	  see	  Haider,	  2013.	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Declaration,	  the	  Committee	  of	  Ministries	  drafted	  Protocol	  No.	  16,	  currently	  open	  for	  signatures,	  extending	  ECrtHR’s	  advisory	  competence	  to	  on	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  ECHR.	  This	  Protocol	  is	  the	  result	  of	  a	  lengthy	  process,	  due	  to	  the	  diversity	  of	  views	  on	  the	   issue.	  Moreover,	   the	  prospective	  EU	  accession	  to	   the	  European	  System	  is	   triggering	  an	   internal	  reorganization	  that	  will	  need	  to	  coordinate	  the	  competences	  of	  supranational	  regional	  Courts	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  national	  legal	  systems.	  In	  this	  framework,	  strengthening	  ECrtHR	  advisory	  competences	  would	  constitute	  a	  significant	  instrument	  for	  dialogue	  with	  national	  and	  EU	  institutions,	  preventing	  competence	   overlapping	   and	  minimising	   the	   risk	   of	   contrasting	   priorities.	   For	  what	   concerns	   an	   instrument	   with	   broad	   structural	   implications	   such	   as	   the	  Istanbul	  Convention,	  extending	  ECrtHR	  advisory	  competence	  would	  constitute	  a	  significant	  tool	  for	  dialogue.	  	  	  Nevertheless,	  considering	  the	  difficulties	  encountered	  in	  reaching	  an	  agreement	  on	  ECrtHR	  extended	  advisory	  competence	  on	  the	  ECHR,	  we	  believe	  that	  a	  viable	  alternative	  for	  the	  Istanbul	  Convention	  would	  be	  granting	  advisory	  competence	  to	  GREVIO,	  which,	  in	  the	  framework	  of	  our	  previous	  proposal,	  as	  an	  intermediate	  body	  of	  experts	  represents	  a	  valuable	   tool	   for	  clarifying	   the	   implications	  of	   the	  paradigm	   shift	   on	   women’s	   rights.	   We	   suggest	   reconsidering	   the	   procedure	  established	  at	  Article	  74	  Istanbul	  Convention,	  which	  currently	  requires	  States	  to	  settle	   disputes	   on	   the	   application	   of	   the	   convention	   by	   means	   of	   negotiation,	  arbitration	   or	   other	   mutually	   agreed	   methods,	   leaving	   to	   the	   Committee	   of	  Ministers	  the	  competence	  to	  establish	  specific	  procedures	  of	  dispute	  settlement	  that	  States	  Party	  may	  use.	  In	  our	  proposal,	  such	  function	  would	  be	  performed	  by	  GREVIO,	   integrating	   the	   report-­‐based	   monitoring	   procedure	   on	   States’	  compliance	   currently	   established	   at	   Chapter	   IX	   of	   the	   convention	   (Monitoring	  Mechanism).	   Such	   integration	   would	   prove	   a	   powerful	   tool	   to	   guarantee	  effectiveness	   to	   the	   Istanbul	   Convention,	   uncovering	   potential	   challenges	   and	  possibly	   contributing	   to	   decrease	   the	   number	   of	   prospective	   applications	  invoking	   the	   convention,	   would	   the	   Court	   be	   also	   granted	   contentious	  jurisdiction.	  	  In	  the	  previous	  paragraphs	  we	  outlined	  how	  the	  findings	  of	  our	  research	  on	  the	  Inter-­‐American	   experience	   with	   the	   BdPC	   provide	   valuable	   comparable	  informative	  material	  to	  design	  better	  conditions	  for	  plausibility	  for	  the	  Istanbul	  Convention	   in	   the	   European	   System.	   After	   a	   brief	   evaluation	   of	   the	   ECrtHR	  performance	   in	   handling	   cases	   of	   domestic	   violence,	   without	   counting	   on	   a	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specific	   regional	   instrument,	   and	   an	   overview	   of	   the	   trends	   in	   CoE	   Member	  States’	  national	  legislations	  on	  VAW,	  we	  used	  the	  information	  drawn	  from	  our	  research	   to	   argue	   the	   need	   to	   reconsider	   ECrtHR’s	   role,	   and	   made	   some	  proposals	   with	   respect	   to	   potentially	   appropriate	   reforms,	   considering	   they	  actual	  feasibility	  in	  the	  current	  European	  System’s	  context.	  	  While	   what	   we	   presented	   constitutes	   a	   brief	   a	   priori	   assessment,	   our	  prospective	   research	   objective	   is	   to	   thoroughly	   assess	   the	   feasibility	   of	   our	  proposal	  to	  grant	  the	  ECrtHR	  with	  the	  contentious	  jurisdiction	  on	  the	  Istanbul	  Convention,	   focusing	  on	  the	  specific	   features	  possibly	  representing	   influential	  differences	   (e.g.	   higher	   diversity	   in	   the	   formal	   hierarchical	   status	   of	   human	  rights	   instruments	   in	   CoE	   Member	   States’	   constitutional	   structures,	   lower	  cultural	  homogeneity,	  relations	  with	  EU	  Institutions	  and	  EU	  Treaties,	  influence	  of	   the	   margin	   of	   appreciation	   doctrine,	   …).	   Our	   goal	   will	   be	   to	   evaluate	   the	  degree	  of	  	  “exportability”	  of	  the	  findings	  of	  our	  research	  on	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  experience	   with	   the	   BdPC,	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	   reproducing	   known	   errors	   and	  contribute	   designing	   the	   best	   conditions	   for	   plausibility	   for	   the	   Istanbul	  Convention	  in	  the	  European	  System.	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  8589	  Penalizing	  Violence	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  (2007)	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  24	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  the	  Family	  (1997)	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  Law	  Prohibiting	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  Against	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  (1995)	  Law	  105	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  of	  Sex	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  Salvador:	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  902	  Against	  Intra-­‐family	  Violence	  (1996)	  	  Decree	  520	  Special	  Law	  for	  a	  Life	  Free	  from	  Violence	  for	  Women	  (2012)	  	  
Guatemala:	  	  Decree	  Law	  97	  to	  Prevent,	  Punish	  and	  Eradicate	  Intra-­‐family	  Violence	  (1996)	  Decree	   Law	   7	   On	   the	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   and	   Integral	   Promotion	   of	   the	  Woman	   (1999)	  Decree	  57	  Introducing	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  as	  a	  Criminal	  Offence.	  (2002)	  Decree	  22	  Law	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  and	  other	  Forms	  of	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  Against	  Women	  (2008)	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  Decree	  Law	  132	  Prevention,	  Punishment	   and	  Eradication	  of	  Violence	  Against	  Women	  (1997)	  	  
Mexico:	  	  Law	  on	  Prevention	  of	  Family	  Violence	  and	  Related	  Assistance	  (1996)	  Reforms	  of	  the	  Civil	  and	  Penal	  codes	  with	  Respect	  to	  Intra-­‐family	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  and	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  in	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  (1996)	  Law	   779	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   Women	   and	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   the	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  (2012)	  	  
Panama:	  	  Law	  No.	  27	  Typifying	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  of	  Violence	  in	  the	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  and	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  Abuse	  (1995)	  Law	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  38	  On	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  the	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  and	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  Domestic	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  (2002)	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